



TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

MILITARY REVIEW

**Security and Defence Review
Training and Doctrine Command**

Second Edition, December 2011

Tirana, December 2011

Board of Military Review Publication

Approved by the Order of the Minister of Defense No. 1538, dated 18/08/2010

Board Chair

B.G. Prof. Asc. Dr. Agim Lala

Members

Col. Thimi Hudhra

Col. Perikli Koliçi

M.G. (R) Prof. Dr. Ruzhdi Gjatoja

M.G. (R) Prof. Dr. Kostaq Karoli

Editor in chief

Pano Hallko

Editor

Silvana Markgjonaj

English Translation

Etleva Babameto

Piro Tanku

Renalda Manushi

Operator

Lindita Kuçana

Art design

Teuta Mullisi

Copyright © 2011 All rights reserved. The Center for Defence Analyses (CDA) of the Albanian Training and Doctrine Command.

The views and opinions expressed in this Military Review are of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policies or positions of the Ministry of Defence, General Staff and Training and Doctrine Command.

The authors of Military Review articles will not be subject to punishment for free expression of individual views and positions even if they are not in line with the official positions of the defence institution.

The authors are also responsible for any slander actions, distortions of facts, offense and plagiarism aspects to the creativity and thoughts of other authors.

This edition of Military Review is found on the website <http://www.tradoc.mil.al/> In case you can not get the information you need on the Internet, please apply for a copy at the electronic address: e-mail: revistaushtarake@aaf.mil.al or qam@aaf.mil.al

Training and Doctrine Command

Center for Defence Analyses

Research Publications Branch

Printed: December 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION ONE: “SMART DEFENCE”

Albania-A contributing country to the Euroatlantic security _____	7
(Address of the Minister of Defence of Albania, Mr. Arben Imami, in the 57 th session of the General Assembly of the Association of the North Atlantic Treaty)	
 “Smart Defence”	
<i>A Smart Approach for the Balkan Region</i> _____	10
Dr. Leonard Demi, Chairman of Parliamentary Security and Defence Commission Col. ® Thimi Hudhra Chief of Centre for Defence Analyses, TRADOC	
 “Smart Defence”	
<i>A concept on research and development in AAF</i> _____	17
Colonel Perikli Koliçi Defence Academy “Spiro Moisiu”, Commander	
 “Smart Defence”	
<i>A-5 Initiative after Lisbon Summit</i> _____	23
Colonel Jeronim Bazo, J5 Director, AAF General Staff	
 “Smart Defence”	
<i>NATO New Military Structure and Implications for Albania</i> _____	27
Colonel Piro Ahmetaj, National Military Representative of RA in SHAPE	
 <i>Management of State, Peace and Security</i> _____	36
Prof. Donald Abenheim, Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California	

SECTION TWO: STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW

Scenarios and Operational Concepts _____ 44

LtC Editson Zarka,
Senior Officer Course, Student
Academy of Defence “Spiro Moisiu” Tirana

SECTION THREE: PROFESSIONAL FORCE AND ITS CHALLENGES

The Military Profession and Professionalism _____ 52

Colonel Idai Qorraj,
Commander of the Training Center, Bunavi

Socialization, Learning and Adjustment _____ 60

Dr. Gaqo Tanku,
Lecturer at “Aleksandër Moisiu” University, Durrës

SECTION FOUR: SECURITY ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

Security within the Framework of International Relations _____ 69

Col. ® Zeno Jahaj,
Specialist, Strategic Policy and Plan Directorate, MoD

The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo _____ 75

Prof. Dr. Bejtush Gashi,
Deputy Minister of Kosovo Security Forces
MA. Sc. Sali Rexhepi

For a Reactivation of Domestic Air Transport in Albania _____ 87

Dilaver Goxhaj,
Air Traffic Lecturer, Troop School, TRADOC

Balanced Force and today Challenges _____ 95

LtC. Afërdita Blaka,
Expert of the Centre for Defence Analyses, TRADOC

SECTION FIVE: HISTORY STUDIES

Albania - From Yalta to Warsaw Treaty _____ 104

Colonel Ahmet Leka,

Chief of Doctrine and Manual Centre, TRADOC

SECTION SIX: NEW RESEARCH TALENTS

<i>Security Schools and their development</i> _____	112
MSc. Albert Hitoaliaj, Doctorate Degree Program on Security, Academy of Defence “Spiro Moisiu”	

SECTION SEVEN: CONTEMPORARY RESEARCHERS ON SECURITY

<i>Nationalism and Dual Citizenship</i> _____	120
George Friedman, Executive Director of STRATFOR, US	

<i>Past and Future Motives for War</i> _____	124
Prof. Richard Ned Lebow, Political Scientist, US	

Short Guidance for ‘Military Review’ Research Papers _____	129
---	-----

SECTION I

“SMART DEFENSE”

Smart defense is not simply a term to attract the attention of the relevant stakeholders and factors or of the selected readers of our Review. Now and in the future, it is a prerequisite for several reasons, among others certainly the financial austerity which has affected the entire Eurozone and beyond.

Several authors have expressed their opinion related to: smart defence and a regional approach, smart defence and research, smart defence and implication of new NATO structure, smart defence and A5 Charter. This section introduces also the opinions of Professor Donald Abenheim related to the management of state, peace and security.

The authors of the articles in this edition have initiated such debate as an issue already posed to the research community of defence and security. They encourage an open discussion in terms of the potential key areas for a “smart defence” at national, multinational and regional level.

How to develop more capacities with less resources? How to further identify the priorities of priorities? How to be specialized in *niche* type small capabilities that may be affordable? How to promote multinational approaches and how to develop regional capacities to face regional threats? Last but not least, how to “share and pull” at regional level most of the capabilities of our small countries?

These are some of the questions answered in this edition, but to be exhausted in the following edition on a step by step basis.

Albania – A contributing country to the Euroatlantic security

(Address of the Minister of Defence of Albania, Mr. Arben Imami, in the 57th session of the General Assembly of the Association of the North Atlantic Treaty)

Dear participants,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you very much for inviting me today to address the General Assembly of Atlantic Treaty Association here in Tirana. Something more than two decades ago I would have not imagined to hold a speech as the Minister of Defence of Albania in a meeting like this. By that time, Albania was one of the most isolated countries in the world, disoriented and uncertain about its future as a result of paranoid domination of decadent communist regime.

So, today I am proud to be here and hold this speech in the capacity of Minister of Defence of my country, which is a member of the most powerful and successful political and military alliance in the world. During the last two decades, Albania has scored tremendous progress in the consolidation of democracy, increase of the living standard of its people, protection and guarantee of freedom and human rights.

This progress did not come in one day; it came as a result of our constant efforts, our unshaken aspirations, and our great sacrifices to be part of the western family, part of which, we naturally belong.

Today, Albania is not only a proud member of the alliance; it is also a contributing country in the interest of the regional and international security.

Albania is an active contributor to the Global War on Terror. It was one of the first countries participating in the Iraqi Freedom operation, when it initially sent 70 troops in April 2003 in Iraq. Latter we substantially increased our deployment to 240 troops and kept this number of troops until the final withdrawal of contributing countries from Iraq.

Currently my country is contributing in Afghanistan in military and civilian operations with a considerable number of military forces, which have not only a supporting or secondary role, but also a real combat mission.

In this context, two companies are deployed to RC West, under the Italian Command. Their current strength is 222 military personnel. Also, one platoon (22 military personnel) is deployed in Regional Command under the Turkish command authority. Two military

personnel are deployed in ISAF HQ, Kabul. Six other military personnel are deployed in NATO Training Mission, Kabul and Herat. Four military personnel are deployed to 4 CSTC A (Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan) in support of the Enduring Freedom operation, under the U.S. Command.

Since July of the last year, a company of Special Forces of AAF is in combat operation under the command of US forces. This is the first combat mission of AAF in support of allied operations. The third contingent “Eagle” deployed in Kandahar today is composed of 44 officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and professional soldiers of the AAF Special Battalion.

Albania is giving also a special contribution to military operations in Afghanistan in the framework of regional military police cooperation in Kabul. This military police training mission led by Croatia is an example of cooperation of the countries of the Western Balkans.

Further, our military trainers are engaged in the OMLT mission which is focused on advising Afghan security forces in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics, and infantry tactics. Actually, under OMLT mentorship of various allied countries, the Afghan National Army capabilities are steadily increasing.

The Taliban clans exploit for their survival the narcotics traffic, of which huge benefits derives that serve later for the purchase of weapons with which they fight our ground forces. In this framework, it is demanding to all of us to increase the cooperation and coordination of our capabilities on the ground. On the other side, considering the fact that allied forces will not stay for an unlimited time in Afghanistan, we have to adapt a mid-term approach in accordance with to the real situation there.

NATO has planned to transfer the responsibilities to Afghan institutions by the end of 2014. With a sustained political, development and humanitarian effort from the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan and respecting Afghanistan sovereignty and leadership, the Government of Afghanistan, NATO and its partners of ISAF are implementing a process of transition, due to the fact that the level of violence in Afghanistan is currently at the lowest levels since 2007.

To accomplish this aim, firstly we have to reduce the capabilities of the insurgents, support the development of capacities of the Afghan National Security Forces, and create a politically stable and economically viable Afghanistan. Therefore, we have to stay committed to our comprehensive approach, security and development together. During the process of transition, we are supposed to manage not only the military withdrawal, but to support the political reconciliation of the country, economic development, and support the institutions of Afghanistan to reduce corruption and provide social justice. To do this, it is the real challenge.

We are aware of the difficulties of the process of transition. A number of challenges stay in front of us, such as logistic ones, security of transition and force protection, reconstruction of the country in a time of great financial constrains, etc. It is this situation that requires the engagement of various international agencies and organizations in assisting Afghan authorities, institutions and society to become a more democratic and open society, able to address the critical social problems of the country.

This requires the constructive engagement of the regional countries. Some countries of the region try to use Afghanistan as a proxy for their vague interests, despite the fact that a secure and democratic Afghanistan is in their best interest.

Closing my remarks, I would like to say that only by well-coordinated efforts allied countries will reach tangible results, doing Afghanistan a stable and reliable partner in the region.

As Minister of Defence, I can say that the Government of Albania has the will and will stay in Afganistan until the allied mission is completed. The Government of Albania, despite financial constraints, remains committed to the global operations against terror and to contribution to the international peace and security.

Thank you very much

“Smart Defense”

A Smart Approach for the Balkan Region

Dr. Leonard Demi,
Chairman of Parliamentary Security and Defence Commission

Col ® Thimi Hudhra,
Chief of the Center for Defense Analyses, TRADOC.

“Do you want to spend the rest of your life selling sugared water or do you want a chance to change the world?”¹

Abstract. *This smart maxim of the late Steve Jobs is very meaningful with concerns of changes and transformation in an organization, especially international ones. This is a universal axiom; it is valid for all areas of reforms and transformation of the society. It is also relevant to security and defence.*

This is the first article on smart defence in Albania, but not the last. The authors of this article initiate this open debate as ‘food for thoughts’ for the research community of defence and security. They promote open discussions on what could be ‘smart defense’ areas at national, multinational and regional level.

The authors try to give answers to several questions: how to develop more capabilities with less resources? How to further prioritize the priorities? How to specialize in niche capabilities we can afford? How to promote multinational approaches and develop regional capabilities to face regional threats, and how to share and pool many of capabilities at regional level?

One thing is sure: the idea of going smart in this time of austerity is in the agenda of all defence organizations of all allied countries, and nobody can avoid that easily. The authors do not pretend to say everything about smart defence; they expect this is only the beginning of a ‘for and against’ positioning of independent experts and other civil and military researchers.

‘Smart defence’ was the central topic of the Conference of the Adriatic Charter of the Parliaments of A5 countries, held in Tirana in 24-25 October 2011.

¹ Steve Jobs’ famous question to John Sculley, former Apple CEO

Introduction

The origin of the ‘*smart defense*’ concept is linked with the preparation of the NATO New Strategic Concept of Lisbon, November 2010. Definitely, Secretary Rasmussen advised by the ‘Wise Men Group’ led by Madelain Albright, supported the idea for a substantial change in the Alliance business. He further elaborated his vision in his speech at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, in 30 September 2011.

He said, and I quote: *“I know that in an age of austerity, we cannot spend more. But neither should we spend less. So the answer is to spend better. And to get better value for money. To help nations to preserve capabilities and to deliver new ones. This means we must prioritize, we must specialize, and we must seek multinational solutions. Taken together, this is what I call Smart Defense.”*

For information, ‘Smart Defense’ is one of 4 key topics of the agenda of the next NATO summit of May 2012, in Chicago, US. Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) is tasked to provide ways and approaches for a smart defence in this summit. *Prioritize, specialize, and provide multinational solutions on collective defense, are the three key points for discussions prior to, during and after the Chicago Summit.*

There are different perceptions about smart defence. Some are very ambitious, some others are skeptical. Some say it might be important for NATO as a whole, some say it is relevant only to big NATO countries, and some say it might be effective for all allied countries, either they are big or small. The authors of this article are aligned with the third group.

This article is particularly focused on how to apply a smart defence in the Balkan region, and especially within the community of A5 Adriatic Charter countries. The Balkans is a region of small countries with a total of about 550,000 km² and a population of over 50 million people.

In our opinion, ‘smart defence’ may have a specific approach for our region. We initiated with the Vilnius group after the Washington summit, later we continued with the A3 Initiative with the US in May 2003 with 3 countries (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia). From October 2008 we are 5, together with Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Later we will expect to be more. In this new regional framework, we should not act in isolation; we should be smart to build our multinational and regional approaches in the interest of our peoples.

Years ago, we have the experience of Baltic countries, which based on their good will, developed good practical aspects of a regional smart defence approach. Based on this experience and others, we are in the right time to identify specific options for our countries, bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally, as a whole. In this evolutionary effort, we have to overcome some historic barriers linked with the traditional development of security services and the armed forces, and adopt new approaches based on the messages of NATO Strategic Concept of Lisbon Summit.

Now and ahead, all our regional countries have and will have pressure to national budgets, where pressures to defense budget can not be excluded. There is an urgent need for new

solutions. How to develop more capabilities with less financial resources? This is the smart question that requires smart answers.

Smart Defence – A National and Regional Approach

In order to be more practical, below, we have explored through a *‘food for thought’* approach some of the priority areas we can use in connection with the application of a *‘smart defense’* approach in Albania and the Balkan region/ A5 community.

In our opinion, we should further extend the *‘smart defense’* to a broader *‘smart security’* agenda in national and regional level. We believe Security and Defense are interrelated topics which cannot be separated. This approach will better promote the armed forces as one of the instruments of national security, and as a service to the taxpayers as well. Let us further explore some key issues.

First, we need a ‘smart defense’ at national level. When building national capabilities, we should avoid parallel capabilities in the armed forces, police, information services, border control units, customs services, etc. We cannot develop a bit of everything and everywhere. We need to prioritize, and now under the *‘smart defense’*, we need to further prioritize the priorities. There are still duplications of national capabilities of the security institutions covering tasks in land, air and maritime areas. Small countries of the region cannot afford maintaining or building national capabilities with the same mission in different national security institutions. There are many areas we can use dual use technology, such as civil and military. The case of Pashaliman facility to build civil and military ships can be one of the areas. Other areas are those related to Maritime and Airspace Management systems, communication equipment, maintenance and logistic facilities, training and education institutions, integrated procurement, and many other areas to be further explored.

In order to promote the right capabilities for security and defense as a NATO country, Albania is currently conducting a Strategic Security and Defense Review (SSDR). We are working also to develop a new Security and Military Strategy, which will also consider elements of the *‘smart security and defense’* concept.

Second, ‘smart defense’ is about development of most critical capabilities through elimination of surpluses, obsolete capabilities, or units of low frequency use. The concept of usability is a primary test for future forces. Again, we cannot afford to develop and maintain military units which belong to the past and do not resist to the existing or expected security situations. SSDR is the right tool to identify the surpluses and the shortages of a smart defence.

As Secretary Rasmussen rightly argues “Our guiding principle should be to cut fat, and build up muscle. Rather than spending on fixed infrastructure and soldiers, who are essentially stuck in their barracks, we should re-direct our investments towards more flexible, mobile and modern armed forces – armed forces that we can actually use, against the challenges we actually face”².

Third, we need the development of a ‘smart defense’ concept at regional level. We together should build a new mentality for a better cooperation in the area of joint and

² Secretary Rasmussen, Munich Security Conference, February 2011

common capabilities needed to face common threats and risks to the region. In the emerging security situation, no country in the region can develop all required capabilities to deal with the full spectrum of threats we are facing today and tomorrow. Where necessary, ‘regionalization’ of some defense capabilities, based on NATO standards, is a smarter choice to be considered by all our countries. “*The best security is shared security*”, sais Secretary Rasmussen³.

Fourth, we need a ‘*smart defense*’ for the development of collective defense capabilities of NDPP (NATO Defence Planning Process). This ‘*smart defense*’ has to do with the implementation of the Force Goals or Partnership Goals’ package of our countries. Force Goals/Partnership Goals are a very important area for cooperation. NATO is in the transition phase of the New Defense Planning Process and we should take advantage of this period to develop the capabilities we need for Article 5 or Non-Article 5 contribution. To build more and spend less, we can develop a regional framework for the development of specific Force Goals/ Partnership Goals. As ACT Commander, General Abrial said “I do believe that by working together we can achieve surprising results. We all know the old maxim that necessity is the mother of invention. I also subscribe to the belief that financial adversity can also be the mother of invention or of new ways to achieve the most from what we have available.”⁴

For a successful implementation of a smart defence, the Alliance will strive to act as the “honest broker and ... facilitator”, enabling nations to work better, more effectively and efficiently together”⁵. And, as a centerpiece of NATO’s smart defence initiative, ACT is leading a task force across NATO aimed at identifying new opportunities for multinational collaborations. The group has presented its final report and identified over 150 ideas and among them, a dozen projects are already off the ground, especially in maintenance, logistics and training and education fields.

Development of the concept of a “*Single Set of Forces*” for NATO Force Structure, EU Battle groups (especially the Balkan Battlegroup), and UN Pool of Forces is a rational way of ‘*smart defense*’ for all our regional countries. We cannot afford the development of specific forces/capabilities for each of international organizations. Furthermore, all forces assigned for international operations should be available any time to support national operations as well. This is recommended by Secretary Rasmussen, saying that “In many cases, NATO and the EU share the same requirements for military capabilities. So let us identify priority areas and agree that, wherever possible, any capability work in one organization shall be open to all members of the other too, making mutual cooperation the norm rather than the exception.”⁶

Fifth, we need a ‘*smart defense*’ with regard to joint participation in NATO/EU/UN or Coalition led missions. Joint participation in NATO led operations, based on the experience of A3 countries medical team and the current POMLT case in ISAF. Going together in operations is much better and cheaper than going alone. This is an area of great interest for all of our regional countries.

³ Secretary Rasmussen, speech at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, 30 September 2011

⁴ General Stephane Abrial, ACT Commander Speech at Defence Ministerial meeting, October 5-6 in Brussels.

⁵ ACT Industry Newsletter, August 2011, Issue 4

Sixth, we need a ‘smart defense’ with special focus on the development of specialized niche capabilities. All our countries have traditional units and specialties, for which NATO is in real need. What NATO and EU need from our countries today are not mechanized or motorized battalions, but both organizations are in need for EOD, C-IED, MP, OMLT, POMLT, CIMIC, PRT teams, and other small specialized capabilities, which can be better provided by smaller nations.

Seventh, we need a ‘smarter defense’ with regard to Civil Emergencies. Civil Emergency should be the primary area for cooperation and development of joint capabilities. Albania had a flood crisis situation last December and most regional countries helped our country. We are committed to do the same, and we should continue this approach of helping each other in these cases.

Eighth, we need a ‘Smart Defense’ through applying a ‘sharing and pooling’ approach at bilateral, multinational and regional level, where possible. Sharing and pooling could be a better way to develop capabilities which overcome the possibilities of our individual nations, such as a Regional Airspace Management System, a Regional Air Policing System. Also, our countries are not able to develop Strategic Airlift, Intelligence capabilities, or other highly expensive capabilities, but we can work on alternative approaches based on national, regional, or collective level.

Ninth, we need a ‘Smart Defense’ in support of the Education and Training, Infrastructure and Maintenance. This is a large area of research on how to effectively use our precious available resources at local or regional level. Pooling and sharing some of the national training and education institutions, where necessary, is a very efficient tool to get closer our armed forces, and save considerable spending. The efforts made so far in this area are to be appreciated, but a new promotion of a regional cooperation framework on training and education capabilities under the ‘smart defense’ concept is a project to be supported by all countries. Among others, Albania has made available a Senior Regional Course on Security and Defense, and it has been successful so far.

Pooling and sharing can be further extended when building and using the capabilities of existing and future Regional Centers of Excellence, or Facilities for Training and Exercises of regional countries. We are working to finalize the project of Biza Training Center, a project to be provided for use to all regional countries and beyond. We appreciate the capabilities provided by all other regional countries in this direction. This is a very important area to be further explored by the experts of our countries.

Using infrastructure, maintenance and logistics capabilities of countries at regional level, or at multinational level is an area of smart cooperation to be further explored. For example, for a small region such as the Balkans, instead of having separate capabilities in all regional countries, we can use at a regional level destruction sites of excess ammunitions, or repair and maintenance factories, ship-building and shipyard facilities, and many other services. Communication is another area of interest to promote interoperability of our forces. Of course, they need legal appropriate arrangements.

⁶ “Security policy in an era of budgetary constraint”, 21 Jun. 2010, Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the conference of the Security and Defence Agenda in Brussels

Tenth, but not the least, 'Smart Defense' is not completed without the Research and Development element. We cannot find smart solutions without research and development in our defense institutions. Smart solutions require smart peoples and smart defense institutions based on knowledge and innovation practices. Albanian MoD is using all intellectual potentials of the Defence Academy and the Center for Defence Analyses to bring about 'smart defense' solutions regarding issues in national and international security agenda. In our opinion, Research and Development in the security and defence area should become a new item in the agenda of cooperation among our regional countries.

Some Conclusions

We identified only ten ideas on how to start with a smart defence approach in our region. Of course, there may be tens of others to be explored. Beyond the identification, they should be discussed in round tables based on a top-down or bottom-up approach, depending on the situation. The way ahead is open for debates and discussions for the good of our countries. We should be open-minded to promote them.

Small countries, like our regional countries, cannot develop all required capabilities on their own. Being flexible and pragmatic, away from being conformist and traditional, are two key elements of a smart defense. A new vision should be developed, a new mentality should be articulated, a new area of cooperation should be opened. Capabilities, we cannot afford at national level, could be developed together. A good example to be followed is the successful approach of the Baltic countries.

Smart defence may require short, mid and long term solutions. It has to do with use of existing capabilities and building new ones. With concern of using existing capabilities, smart defence has to do only with their identification and use with common consensus. While, in connection with building new capabilities, first comes common vision and good will, second comes short, mid and long term planning, and third comes implementation.

Application of 'smart defense' concept requires first of all a strong political will at national and regional level. It will require new legal arrangements from all regional countries, either members or aspiring NATO and EU membership. The new changes should be reflected in the National Security and Military Strategies of our countries. Security and defense of each of our countries is not any longer a question of the countries in isolation. We have common challenges, regional and transnational risks and threats which have to be managed by use of regional approaches, capabilities and solutions.

The ideas of this article are of the authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of the institutions they belong to. Opinions for and against the ideas of this article are welcomed.

Bibliography:

- NATO Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of States and Government of the Alliance, Lisbon Summit 2010
- Anders Fogh Rasmussen, speech at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, 30 September 2011

- General Stephane Abrial, Speech at **Defence Ministerial** meeting, October 5-6 in Brussels.
- Foreign Affairs, “*The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times, NATO After Libya*”, July/August 2011 edition, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, **www.ForeignAffairs.com**
- “*The New Strategic Concept – Three different perspectives*”, NATO Defence College ‘Vox Collegii’ Magazine, January 2011.
- “*Security policy in an era of budgetary constraint*”, 21 Jun. 2010. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen speech at the conference of the Security and Defense Agenda in Brussels

“Smart Defence”

A Concept on Research and Development in AAF

Colonel Perikli Koliçi,
Defence Academy “Spiro Moisiu”, Commander

Abstract. *Research and Development (R&D) is a term on the daily agenda for the Alliance and for each ally country. This process is inspired by the idea of the secretary general of the Alliance Rasmussen on “smart defence”. The new Strategic concept of Lisbon promotes the values of research in the security and defence sector.*

This article presents a general idea on the development of an organized system of research and development in the defence institution. It is a fact that the research we make in the AAF today has not served enough to the fundamental issues of the defence reform. A considerable part of the research in the AAF has reflected few applied values, in order to anticipate with advanced military studies all key decisions of high civilian and military authorities.

To improve this situation, as a new ally member with a new professional force, together with the development of other new management systems, this article provides an insight on the establishment of a research and development system in AAF.

Introduction

T*he main goal of the research-development is the advancement of knowledge and its implementation for the creation of better quality products, processes and new improved services fulfilling the increasing demands of the consumers..¹*

Today it is evident that the security of global environment is becoming more and more unpredictable. “*Many of the yesterday’s capabilities are being less usable today, and many of the capabilities we have today may be less usable for tomorrow*”². In this dynamic conditions of the security environment, the research on the strategic, operational and tactic level is of special importance. NATO experience shows that research activity (Research and Development – R&D) is more and more ranking among the priorities.

¹ Webster’s Dictionary, www.http.definitions/R&D

² Paul Davis, Capability based Planning, Study for RAND Cooperation, 2007, page 12

NATO countries have established specialized institutions in the research area with the right capabilities and relevant sources.

Our country, Albania, having little authentic research experience in support of the development of defence reforms in the last 20 years, in most cases, had delegated the AAF reform know-how to the foreign advisors, companies or expert groups of allied or partner nations. So far, this has been an acceptable policy, but now it requires the articulation of an alternative option in compliance with the new reality.

Now, we are in a more advanced situation. We should leave behind the phase of close advisory mentorship and enter the phase of full partnership. Albania is a NATO country moving forward to EU membership. This new phase, seeks for more efficient efforts and higher responsibility. It is the right time for us to shape our own positions and attitudes, becoming an active part of the process that we are involved in, and we also should become a moderated factor in building security the decision-making consensus of international organizations.

An overview of the research of the AAF

Currently in the Albanian Armed Forces there are several research institutions. Some of them such as the Defence Academy is functional based on the Law for Higher Education. Some others are supported by special decisions of the Council of Ministers, whereas some others conduct research in the tactical and operational level.

In my opinion, not every institution or any person is able to conduct research. The research work is characteristic of the institutions and developed countries which have advanced intellectual experience. Also, research is an attribute of institutions recognized by Higher Education Law and the engagement of the Defence Academy in the higher postgraduate studies cycle. The Master and Doctorate study programs underway are achievements that should be further explored in order to establish an organized research system in AAF. I believe we are in the right time to establish this research system, which will serve as “eye and ear” of decision-making authorities of the security and defence.

Research Priorities in AAF

Research should look at least 5 years ahead the rest of AAF. It should provide recommendations and solutions for the key issues in the defence agenda. Research should drive the AAF strategic planning.

It is obvious that before establishing a research system (R&D), we should articulate a clear view and understanding of why is the research needed in the AAF and what should be its priorities?

The midterm period ahead will be a period of reforms and transformations for the national institutions of security and defence, in order “*to develop more capabilities with fewer resources*”³. “In terms of budget constraints, we will need to find solutions and less costly alternatives. I think that one of the main sources of finding more effective alternatives and less costly actions, should be based on developing options of a “Smart Defence”. I also believe that research should look for recommendations and solutions for a period of time

³ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, speech at the European Policy Center, May 2011

at least 5 years ahead the rest of AAF. Research should drive the AAF strategic planning.

The Defence Academy in cooperation with the Center for Defence Analysis has defined 10 key areas of research in AAF for the next 5 years. They include, among other issues, fundamental issues regarding the National Security and Defence Strategy; the level of ambition and the challenges of NATO and the EU integration; the future security environment; issues of bilateral, regional and international relations; the reform and transformation issues in AAF in the longer term; the development and consolidation of Professional Force 2010; current and future of training, exercises and operations of the Armed Forces units; the development of Force Goal Package - 2008 (FG -2008), the development of tactics, technology and military technology, as well legal developments, psychological, social and pedagogical of professional AAF, etc⁴.

Research&Development planning in the AAF

Research and development, more than any other area, requires a careful planning. Inaccurate planning can lead to deviation of resources in the wrong directions and unpredictable losses. Research should focus on the main current and midterm priorities. On the other hand, it is almost impossible that research and development could respond to all research needs that Armed Forces might have.

Why do I recommend a careful planning for research and development in AAF? There have been many cases in the 20-year defence reform period when the major decision-making events are made without being well-studied and subject to research. In several cases during this period, considerable funds are invested in facilities, infrastructure and equipment that have not resisted in time. As a result, the expenses have not actually gone to the right direction.

In order to avoid such mistakes, very positive and promising steps are being made during the recent years. For the first time in 20 years, the Armed Forces have developed their annual and mid-term research plans.⁵ These plans are initiated by the Minister of Defence Directive 2010, and culminated with the support of research and development plan, as a separate category in the defence budget, which is still in the institutionalization process.

Supporting research and development

Despite the progress so far, one of the points to be considered ahead is the financial support for research activities. A new mindset for a better financial support for research and development projects in the AAF is the “Achilles heel” for a functional research system. It is encouraging the fact that the predisposition of the senior civil-military authorities at MoD is positive and gives a quality boost to this process.

Based on the experience of Allied military, Research & Development is planned separately in the defence budget. The current trend in these countries is to allocate from 1% to 6% of the defence budget for research-development. It is good that we follow the same trend, but always based upon the priorities of research, available research capacities,

⁴ Research Policy in AAF, working document, pg 4.

⁵ Research and Development Plan in AAF, 2008, 2009, and 2010, approved upon the Order of Minister of Defense.

and proportionate to other priority expenses. In the future, an acceptable option of funds allocated for research and development may be based on a gradual increase from year to year, to reach up to 1 to 1.5% of the defence budget in 2020, in accordance with the needs for Research & Development, priority research issues, available resources to R&D, and research capacities, etc.

The main question with this concept will be focused on how prepared we are to properly and effectively absorb this considerable fund in the coming years? This is a challenge, of course, but not impossible to be faced. The best solution is to approve within 2012 a Directive for Research and Development, to set up the respective infrastructure (ad-hoc boards), to develop and approve the respective R&D plan for 2012, to allocate the relevant budget for its implementation, and to assign the institutions responsible for research projects.

The Armed Forces have a sufficient structure for a quality research work. We have a Training and Doctrine Command with several subordinate institutions of education, training, and scientific research. With all this potential, TRADOC must become the place where the research should be concentrated. The Defence Academy should be the main institution for research projects now and in the future, given that today's trends has linked the research work with higher education institutions.

Products of AAF Research and Development

Scientific work has no real value if the final products of research and development do not bring forth development or a new quality of issues raised for solution. The primary goal in setting up the research and development system in AAF is to set quality standards for research products and institutionalization of a research discipline, in order to prevent subjectivity and pseudo-research and development.

Research projects will be conducted by the research community within and outside of AAF. They will be applied and conducted by the best applicants, based upon their quality, research background, and research guarantee filter, with clearly-defined research criteria. The application for research projects will be open for individuals and expert groups.

It is very important that the Annual Plan and Mid-term Research Work Plan serve as a main source to formulate research and scientific projects for the candidates of Professional Master Studies, Scientific Master and Doctorate, in their respective Defence Academy study programs.

Likewise, the research products should use various methods such as: formal and informal interviews, direct observation, monitoring, surveys, displays, direct participation in activities subject to study work, group or panel discussions under "brainstorming", statistical methods, written document analyses, workshops, seminars, conferences, symposiums, reviews, concept paper analysis, etc.

In the research and development system we should give primary importance to identification of a qualified research community in AAF, as well as promotion of young military and civilian research talents. The development of this elite community of research work should aim to include talented people, committed and passionate about research work.

A key issue in research work is also quality control, thus how useful it is to current developments and AAF reform-making perspective. To aim for the highest quality possible, AAF research products will be evaluated and checked based on modern parameters accepted by research institutions of advanced NATO countries.

There is no real research when there is no quality progress on the research issues – this will be a fundamental precondition of AAF research and development.

Each product of AAF Research Project Plan should be assessed not just about the amount of information it brings, but about application values, analyses and synthesis, as well as creative values, qualities to make recommendations and be action-oriented, provide concrete solutions to decision-making authorities, based on sound arguments and reliable statistics.

In this context, the evaluation of research and quality control will be performed on the basis of the “*improved Bloom system*”⁶ with 6 assessment levels, which has in the center independent research and study work based on analytical treatment, rational reflection, logical reasoning, critical and creative thinking. This system is compatible with both the national Higher Education Law, as well as the requirements of the Bologna process and that of the Consortium of Defence Academies.

This methodological system of quality control of the research will bring not only the avoidance of mediocrity, but also the research discipline of the authors and academic staff, as well as the quality control bodies for application of the same philosophy of the research and evaluation only on the basis of its real performance.

Of particular importance is the selection of research personnel in the AAF. Research institutions, such as the Academy of Defence or the Center for Defence Analysis, should be completed with *scientific, technical and administrative personnel*. Scientific and technical personnel should be selected among active / reserve military or civilian personnel, with a special background in the field of security and defence, with experience, talent and achievements in the research field of the mission, with quality of group work, operational experience and language skills according to STANAG 6001⁷. In my opinion, more experienced and knowledgeable reserve personnel should be engaged in research, especially those with international background and expertise.

Scientific personnel must necessarily hold scientific degrees. I think that the appointments of scientific and technical personnel should be performed after evaluation in the research department / center based on open applications. All personnel can apply for a research post which meets the specific criteria of the job description.

The Role of Research Cooperation

The research work in the AAF seeks cooperation and exchanges of knowledge with civilian and military academic elites within and outside the Armed Forces, sharing experiences and lessons learned, and collaboration with research institutions of NATO/EU (such as ACT), and with individual partner and allied countries also. For this purpose, I think we should aim to raise the level of cooperation:

⁶ Bloom system on Taxonomy of Learning and Research, Barton edition, page 34-67

⁷ English Proficiency Levels, STANAG 6001, 2006

- a. Among research institutions within the AAF;
- b. Among AAF research institutions and other national research institutions/ universities;
- c. Among AAF institutions and international research institutions, especially those of NATO / EU, allied and partner countries.

Conclusion

Development and consolidation of a research and development system will require several years, but it is necessary and worthwhile in the interest of the AAF transformation process in the coming years. The author of this article believes that with the status of membership in the Alliance, Albania and AAF are in the right time to make this step ahead.

Bibliography:

1. Law on Higher Education in the RA, 2010
2. Guidelines of RA Minister Education, March 2011
3. Minister of Defence Directive, 2010, 2011
4. National Security Strategy of RA, 2004
5. The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010
6. NATO Directive for Research Development
7. ACT Experimentation Campaign, 2010
8. Benjamin Bloom, Taxonomy of Learning and Research

“Smart Defence”

A-5 Initiative after Lisbon Summit

Colonel Jeronim Bazo,
J5 Director, AAF General Staff

Abstract. *This article focuses on the effects of the Strategic Concept of the Alliance in Lisbon, in November 2010. What is the Alliance doing to implement its decisions? It raises several questions of the smart defence especially in our Balkan region. It gives related answers on how we can produce more capabilities with few resources available.*

Now, the question of smart defence is at the agenda of many small and mid size countries of the Alliance. It is a question to be further elaborated in Chicago next year in 2012. The author gives some thoughts on the way ahead for Albania and other regional countries of A5 Charter.

Introduction

Together with the introduction of a new Strategic Concept influenced by the new geo-politics situation in the world, NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010, established the basis and enhanced aspirations of partner nations to become full members of world’s most powerful military Alliance. This summit, through the new Strategic Concept, re-confirmed NATO’s “Open Door” policy, encouraging aspiring nations to continue their reforms and strengthening their democracies with the ultimate goal of taking and fulfilling responsibilities of membership obligations and contributing to a common security and stability. This policy, not only found the support from member and partner nations, but also presented the upcoming challenge for non-NATO members of Adriatic A-5 countries.

The Essence of Smart Defence

In the framework of NATO’s new Strategic Concept and fiscal constraints that many Alliance member states are facing, NATO’s Secretary General, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, during Munich Conference in February this year, presented a new approach

called “Smart Defence”¹. NATO’s Secretary General expressed his concerns in regards to drastic defence budget cuts of European countries as result of financial challenges, from which results that post Cold War although the combined GDP grew by 55%, defence expenditures in Europe decreased by 20% and also from the threat of a Europe ‘divided, weaker and increasingly adrift from the United States’.

In Europe, this picture is much different from Asia, where defence expenditures are increasing recently, or even in US. Although defence is and must remain the prerogative of sovereign nations, a Trans-Atlantic alliance, requires an equitable sharing of the burden in order to be efficient. Bearing in mind that the security challenges Europe is facing now, are conflicts in its neighbourhood, such as conflict in Libya; terrorism from away failed states; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or cyber warfare, investing in national security or reliance on soft power won’t be enough. The newly presented approach, “Smart Defence” is *“providing greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility”*², so in other words *“ spending less, but in a better and smarter way”*. *This approach will be achieved through pooling and sharing of common capabilities, right prioritization and better coordination of efforts from member countries. This is what Mr. Rasmussen states in his speech at Munich Conference earlier this year: “”Pooling and sharing are vital if we want to develop our military know-how and capabilities and NATO is best placed to identify and connect nations that have similar needs but not enough money to build a capability on their own”*³.

A5 Countries and Smart Defence

As part of a common vision for a whole and free Europe and also new approach “Smart Defence”, partner countries of Adriatic Charter have their common goal for a full integration in political, economical, security and defence European and Trans-Atlantic institutions. Partnership Charter “Adriatic 5” has continuously proved to be a model of fruitful regional cooperation that serves the accomplishment of Euro-Atlantic aspiration of West Balkan countries. This “Charter” came as result of cooperation between West Balkan countries (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) as part Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program and Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) after the NATO’s Prague Summit in 2002.

In the spirit of cooperation framework, these nations decided to follow the same successful path Baltic countries, called “Vilnius group”. So, in 02 May 2003, Foreign Affairs Ministries of these countries, together with US, signed in Tirana “The Adriatic Charter”, receiving a considerable support from other NATO members, for promoting this new form of cooperation between countries. This Charter, as a diplomatic project has two main objectives – continuity of NATO Open Doors Policy and ensuring cooperation

¹ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Munich Security Conference speech, February 2011, page 3

² Idem, page 5

³ Munich Security Conference, speech by NATO Secretary General A.F. Rasmussen

and mutual support of candidate countries. This project did not put any sanctions or special obligations for all three countries, but only general conditions, valid for all NATO member countries. Assessing the success achieved through this cooperation, Montenegro and Bosnia & Herzegovina officially joined this initiative in an OSCE Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting, in Helsinki, Finland, in 04 December 2008. Former NATO Secretary General, Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during his farewell meetings (May 2009) said: *“In a broader view, the origin of NATO’s transformation after the Cold War, lies right here, in South East Europe”*⁴.

Cooperation in the framework of “Adriatic Charter” has been very fruitful in a variety of fields. This cooperation is finalised with successful projects, from which we can mention the contribution of A5 countries in support of ISAF NATO mission in Afghanistan, views exchange on Membership Action Plan (MAP) or also for joint training and exercises between Armed Forces of these countries. This cooperation is result of expertise exchanges, joint activities and trainings demonstrating the modern and interoperable capabilities that member countries are developing, but also as result of undertaking national reforms to achieve required Euro-Atlantic standards and support for neighbour countries in the region. This role, in enhancing the regional cooperation and speeding up the defence and security reforms, made it possible a successful effort of achieving NATO membership in 2009, of Albania and Croatia.

Cooperation between member countries of this initiative is achieved through Annual Cooperation Programs in defence fields, which have included in details all the activities with common interests. These programs include: annual Defence Ministers meeting, CHOD meetings, activities in framework of MAP, PfP, information exchange, contribution in SEEBRIG, logistics workshop, developing relationships for twinning and familiarization of NATO declared units, units evaluation during joint exercises, training or education. Annual Cooperation Programs have grown year by year, increasing the level of cooperation in preparation of joint medical team or joint training. The most meaningful project is the support with a joint medical team to NATO ISAF Mission in Afghanistan, while as other activities we can mention; joint exercises “Adriatic Phiblex”, “Eagle Sar” or “Adriatic Eagle”; establishment of Regional Training and Public Relations Centre in Macedonia; or guest speakers exchange and participants in High Course on Defence and Security Issues in Tirana. Albania has supported the projects initiated by Croatia, for support with training and instructors of Afghan Military Police School, support with artillery instructors for Afghan National Army (ANA) and also support to Afghan Police with Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (POMLT).

The Way Ahead

Albanian Defence Minister, Mr Arben Imami, in his speech at the last A-5 Defence Ministers Meeting, emphasized the importance of successfully achieving the objectives

⁴ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Sec Gen farewell meeting, NATO HQ, May 2009.

and reforms, but also relying on the new approach “Smart Defence”, new ways and means have to be followed to fulfil these objectives and best suit to the current circumstances. Our region’s countries have to think for common initiatives related to joint programs and modernization procurements which may result in developing common or joint capabilities that would help us save money and achieve the core goals. For this purpose, he suggested the establishment of joint groups of experts which based on a concrete agenda and in close cooperation with Allied Transformation Command (ACT), will further elaborate the potentials for such new concept of cooperation.

Even the joint statement of this Ministerial, expressed the welcome and support of A-5 countries to the NATO Open Doors Policy, new Strategic Concept, NATO ISAF Mission in Afghanistan, and in the same time expression of their readiness to cooperate in long term plans for equipments and maintenance systems. In this way was finalized the joint regional engagement for a new approach for projects with common interests with the purpose of a better exploitation of NATO’s new approach “Smart Defence”. Joint development and use of capabilities will affect decreasing the cost of the projects, increasing interoperability and burden sharing, this in the cases where countries have limited resources, financial or personnel ones. The primary focus of Albanian Armed Forces while selecting projects they want, with the purpose of enhancing the cooperation includes the field of multinational and force trainings and operations and maintenance.

Evaluating if this initiative has achieved its goals, we can say, yes, absolutely. In political or military plane, it has ensured the continuity of NATO Open Doors Policy, through the successful membership of Albania and Croatia in Alliance and also it has significantly increased the regional cooperation bringing up a better climate for improving relationships between South East Europe countries, security situation in region, but also the consolidation of democratic processes in these countries.

This “A5 Charter”, also has awakened the interest of its members to develop a strategic partnership with US, focused on military and security issues. Maintaining the national sovereignty and establishing a positive security environment for development of reforms, it is the main affect of these countries’ efforts in the road towards NATO. Let’s hope that the NATO’s Chicago Summit will reconfirm the A-5 Initiative, inviting new members to join “our club” and also remaining faithful to the visionary concept of Mr. Scheffer (Jaap de Hoop).

Bibliography:

1. Adriatic –US, A5 Charter 2003, Original document
2. NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon November 2010
3. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Sec Gen farewell meeting, NATO HQ, May 2009.
4. Membership Action Plan document, April 1999, Washington D.C.
5. Study for NATO Enlargement, 1995

“Smart Defence”

NATO New Military Structure and Implications for Albania

Colonel Piro Ahmetaj,
National Military Representative of RA in SHAPE

Abstract. *“Thinking is the hardest work, which is probably the reason why so few people engage in it.” This wise quote by Henry Ford attributes a lot great deal of values to the research work in the present conditions of the global financial crisis. The prevailing challenge for now and the future, is the following: how to develop more capacities with less resources. This, of course, shall be subject to accurate evaluations on how to develop new approaches, beyond the traditional ones.*

No doubt, the “smart defence” concept has a universal meaning in content, methodology and time. In this context, it is valid beyond the defence area. In order to do that, it is sufficient to replace the word “defence” with economy, science, education, army, including here even the individual human aspect, too, and so forth, as far as the context of society is to be concerned.

In the security area, “smart defence” – besides of the fact of being a concept, is therefore a tool and methodology to unify the efforts and increase the efficiency of the society to confront the challenges of time. By means of this article, the author tries to give a more applicative dimension to this concept – giving arguments concerning the functional connections through “smart defence” and more specifically NATO transformation. The author tries to think beyond this - the process of Alliance transformation after the Cold War has hereto inspired the security strategists to “discover” and promote concepts after concepts, including here even the “smart defence”.

The article conducts a thorough analysis of the quantitative and qualitative changes and transformations of NATO and its processes in these last two decades. One of the messages transmitted by the article is that restructuring is not only inflicted by the change of the security environment, technology advancement, progress in the lifestyle standards, economic crisis, but it is also to be highlighted that the reforms and transformation shall always be a “vital necessity” to remain alive at the labour market. So, the reforms and transformation will never stop. Generally speaking, “the successful history of the Alliance transformation is the message of the security structures transformation of each allied country”¹.

¹ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Speech at the Security Policy Center, Brussels, 11 May 2011, page 7;

The History of the Alliance and NATO's Military Structure

After the decision of the Lisbon Summit (November, 2010), NATO has therefore started an expanded reform. Part of this reform comprises even the Military Structure of the Alliance. Under the framework of these structural changes, I believe it is to give the reader a short overview about:

- (a) The history of the development of the Alliance;
- (b) The actual condition and perspective of Peacetime Establishment (PE²);
- (c) The potential implications for the contribution of our country in this structure.

a. An Overview of the Alliance History. The first official activity for a collective defence in the Western Europe was the endorsement of Dunkirk Treaty by France and Great Britain in 1947. This Treaty was further enlarged by the approval of Brussels Treaty on March 17th 1948 when Belgium, Great Britain, France, Netherlands and Luxemburg succeeded to achieve an agreement for assistance and cooperation in the defence area by means of establishing a mutual system for their defence.

Observing the growing danger from the communist East, Canada suggested a mutual defence system including the entire zone of North Atlantic, without excluding the Brussels Treaty, but by enlarging the defence and security space. This idea was supported by Denmark, Island, Norway, Portugal and USA, which together with the member countries of the Brussels Treaty signed the Washington Treaty, on April 4th, 1949. This date marks the historic day of NATO foundation³.

Further on, the Alliance has welcomed a series of enlargement rounds such as: Greece and Turkey (1952), The Federal Republic of Germany (1955), Spain (1982), Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004 – this is thereby the largest expansion after the 1990s), Albania and Croatia (2009).

Because of not being able to finally come to a solution relating the Macedonia name dispute (between Greece and Macedonia) the later remains the sole country which did not become a NATO member from the three last MAP countries⁴ (consequently Macedonia still remains a “MAP country”). *Summarizing we can state that starting with 16 countries, nowadays NATO finds itself expanded with 28 member countries, without mentioning here 19 other partner countries (PfP countries), 7 other countries pertaining to the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), 6 countries to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and 4 additional Contact Countries, – an organization which nowadays reaches a membership of 5 times higher (62 countries) when compared to its foundation time (12 countries).*

Meanwhile, it is thereby known that NATO elaborates special cooperation programs with Russia and Ukraine, respectively the NATO-Russia Council and the Cooperation Committee with Ukraine.

² PE – Peace Establishment – Structure of NATO's Command and Force in peacetime (author's note).

³ NATO Treaty Document, April 1949, Washington D.C.

⁴ MAP – Membership Action Plan, Main Document of Washington Summit, April 23-25, 1999.

b. The Alliance Military Structure (NCS). Initial NATO HQ was established in London, UK, immediately after its foundation. On September 1949, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided on the creation of the Defence Committee, which further on established the Military Committee, the later as an advisory body to NAC on military issues. On December 18th 1950, NAC did therefore approve the creation of a new Integrated Force for the Defence in Europe. This date marks the creation of the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). The expansion of NATO's headquarters structures did therefore generate the necessity for more room. So, on April 1952, NATO's headquarters was transferred in Paris. After the year 1966, when France withdrew from NATO military structure (for considerate reasons), there was to be performed another move – this time NATO HQ was located in Brussels, while SHAPE in Mons.

The Military Structure of the Alliance has therefore undergone several changes, particularly after the Cold War. Up to the 1990s the Alliance had some 40 main Peace Establishment facilities; in the period 1990-2000 it had approximately 20 facilities, from 2004 there was a decrease to 13 facilities, and expectations are that in the future this structure is going to incur a further decrease with only 7 main PE facilities. I think it is necessary to know that, before the 1990s, NATO did not have any troops/units engaged in operations (this was in accordance with the concept of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty). While today, NATO is engaged in 6 operations with a total number of 152.000 troops, conducting operations beyond the Article 5 of the Treaty.

Summarizing, we can mention that the NATO's performance and credibility in the “*market of global security*”, is related to: (1) its continuous transformation and (2) its “usability”⁵ – i.e. from a military structure for a “bad day”, with no contributions to security before the 1990s, into an organization which gives a daily contribution to the world peace and security (its operations are being conducted in three continents of the globe).


The current and future Alliance Military Structure

a. NATO's current Military Structure. As cited above NATO is comprised of 13 main/high-level headquarters and a considerable number of centres and agencies in support of Peacetime Establishments (PE) and other operations as conducted by the Alliance. The total NATO staff outnumbers **13.000 persons**. The greater part of NATO's headquarters and commands and of its Military Structure are being financed by the Alliance Common Fund (excluding the nominated staff by the member countries in the peacetime headquarters and commands and their associated costs – such costs are covered by the respective member countries). Meanwhile, some of the structures do therefore function on the base of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) signed by the member countries in these entities (each country does necessarily need to have a representative in these respective structures).

The following scheme Nr. 1 shows the current NATO Military Structure:⁶

⁵ Usability – Alliance Concept based on the frequency of use of Forces, AJP-1 (D)

⁶ An open letter to the of the Staff Chief of SHAPE/ACO, “ACO Reform Program – Newsletter” date September 01st 2011.




Today, Albanian contribution with personnel in the current NATO Military Structure is as follows: IMS, - 0; SHAPE/ACO and its subordinate structures 24 persons (out of which 8 in SHAPE, 5 in JFC Napoli, 2 in JFB Brunssum, 2 in JHQ Lisbon, 2 in CC Mar Napoli, 1 in CC Heidelberg, 1 in CC Izmir, 1 in CC Madrid, 1 in CAOC Larisa, 1 in CAOC P. Renatico); ACT and the dependent structures, - 4 persons (2 in Norfolk, 1 in ACT SE, Mons, 1 in JFTC, Poloni). The total personnel is 28 persons. (page 30)

b. The future NATO Military Structure. While the review of the current NATO structure initiated in 2006, and it was therefore implemented in August 2010, the later which initiated on November 2010 and approved on June 2011, and shall be entered into force within 2012, thus, in short deadlines. Consequently, the intensity of work and activities is at its highest and the difficulties under the framework of the international structures review of these levels and sizes are clearly understood. Moreover, we need a better coordination of the activities amongst the structures of MD/GS and the ones engaged in the NATO PE representation in order to perform a qualified representation to the new structure. These shall be in harmony to the conferences for the personnel of NCS, which shall be more in number and expanded in certain phases (in accordance to the plan of new structure development and its practical implementation). There must hereto have a representation from the structures of MD/GS which do therefore cover these issues.

On the termination of this reform the number of main staffs and commands shall be reduced from 13 to 7 main HQ; the number of agencies decreases from 12 to 3 and the number of staff from 13.000 reduces to approximately 8.800 persons. The new staffs shall be deployed and consequently its nominated personnel (including Albanian staffs) shall be required to easily deploy in operations during duty time. This, of course, requires additional measures and budget support, because of the costs increase. Taking into consideration the difficulties of the process of restructuring these multinational structures, the final goal is that this structures are to be completely operational (FOC) by June 2013.

From the military viewpoint, I recommend some key highlights of characteristics of the new structure:

- **The first characteristic of the future NATO structure** - the subordinate peacetime staffs and components (Naples, Brunssum, Izmir, etc) shall be deployable, and consequently the nominated personnel (including Albanian personnel) shall be deployed as the case may be in operations, under the framework of structures during crises time (CE) during the time they are fulfilling the duty in a certain peacetime structure (PE). As such, we should enforce additional measures for budget support and delegation of authority.
- **The second characteristic of the future NATO structure** - the new structure “has no place for manoeuvre” from the viewpoint of personnel completion. The message and ambition of NATO and SHAPE high military authorities for the new structure is to be completed with 100% of TOE personnel unlike the historically NCS has been completed up to the bulk of 80%.
- **The third characteristic of the future NATO structure**, - in financial terms, the duties and engagements for all the countries will not decrease, - on the contrary,



they shall increase. This becomes even clearer if we take under consideration that some of the services (such as the support with Communication and Information Systems - CIS) which up to now were and are provided by the Common Fund of the Alliance, by the implementation of the new structure they shall be covered by each country on its own. On the other hand, the geostrategic environment, which is becoming more and more unpredictable by conflicts extenuating all around the globe and where NATO has therefore been called for intervention, independent of the role it was created and does thereby exist as an Alliance for, it shall require the creation of capacities extraordinarily. The later shall have extra costs. The latest recent example for this is the NATO operation in Libya, where the engagement in operation came after only 10 days.

The draft of the future structure (approved in the meeting of the Defence Ministers in June 2011⁷), with the recommended contributions of our country for each staff/command, is given in the scheme no. 2, page 32:

Below there is a recommendation for Albanian representation in the new NATO Command structure: IMS, - 1; SHAPE/ACO and the dependent structures, -22 persons (8 in SHAPE, 5 in JFC Naples, 4 in JFC Brunssum, respectively 1 in the Land Force, Naval Force and Air Forces Commands, 2 in CAOC); ACT, - 5 persons (2 in Norfolk, 1 in JALLC, 1 in the Training Center - JFTC, 1 in the Simulation Centre - JWC). A total of 28 personnel.

Potential implications for the contribution of our country

In order to give this article a more applicative approach, for the current and future situation of NATO Military Structure, and the effects of these changes to the AAF, I recommend the following evaluations:

- a. Stating that the reform is only at its first steps, it is thus difficult to define the effects that its implementation shall have in all the countries of the Alliance, consequently even for our country. Only in June 2012 there shall be allocated the exact numbers that each country shall contribute with personnel.
- b. As far as the personnel contribution from the small countries (including even our country) is concerned, we do evaluate that there will be no radical changes. In accordance to the balance system (GDP, amount of AAF and of the defence budget and even the contributions for missions abroad) being utilized as for the posts allocation in the new NATO military structure for all member countries, I do believe that the number of 28 persons that our country actually contributes in this structure, shall remain the same, or there shall be only some minor changes. I do therefore clarify that this number does not include the contributions for the structures which are active based on the signed agreements between the member countries in these type of structures (being nominated Framework Structures (IFC, NSHQ), or the NATO Force Structure (NFS, NRDC, NDC).

These contributions do not therefore calculate the posts that our country aims to fulfil in the Military Committee (MC) or in the International Military Staff (IMS) in NATO HQ, because since NATO is a political-military body, the structures of MC and IMS are not

¹ Idem

being considered as part of NATO military integrated structure. Consequently, when we do speak about NCS, we shall therefore take under consideration only the structure of Strategic Commands (SHAPE/ACO and ACT), the ones of Operational level (JFC Naples and Brunssum) and Tactical (Land, Navy and Air Commands) and even the agencies supporting them.

c) Starting from the high representation level, the quotas for the posts of general (flag-post) shall be discussed and defined in the Military Committee in NATO HQ, Brussels. Being therefore based in a grounded military analysis, it shall be of great interest for our country to have a representation of this level in one of the Joint Force Commands (JFC) because they deal directly with the operations. While as for the other part (the ranks up to the level of colonel), the entire one-year process of negotiations and planning shall be therefore developed in SHAPE.

Some military recommendations

Based on the above described analysis, I do therefore recommend that in the near future we take under close consideration the following:

a) *The preservation of the actual representation level* of our country in the new structure. Besides the preservation of this level, there shall be reassessed a re-distribution of posts aiming at our presence in each and every staff, or main command, in accordance to scheme no. 2. Meanwhile that our country has therefore gained the necessary experience and has quite significantly increased the contributions in NATO's operations, we do evaluate that the future presence in every staff or command will help in learning the best experience from all of the countries where these staffs/commands are deployed, and even in all the fields and services that they do cover (land, naval, air forces, transformation area, training centres, drilling skills, etc).

b) *Selection in advance of personnel resources* (ranks, services – LF, NF, AF, experts and qualified personnel) which shall be negotiated in the process. This has to do with the offering of well-prepared and completely trained (human) resources to fill in these type of vacancies since the discussion process and “competition” for occupation of prestigious posts.

c) It is therefore necessary to consider the message of the Alliance and to plan in advance the vacancy occupation 100% which shall be allocated to our country, within the year 2013.

In the context of this article, these are the opinions of the author and they represent an academic approach and they do not necessarily represent the positions of the institutions they belong to and they shall not be attributed to the later. I really welcome any for and against opinions with reference to this article.

Bibliography:

1. NATO's Strategic Concept, approved by the countries and governments' principals of the Alliance, Lisbon Summit 2010.
2. The Common Declaration of the Defence Ministers, June 2010.
3. An open letter of the Headquarters Chief of SHAPE/ACO, “ACO Reform Programme – Newsletter”, date September 01st, 2011. (we do therefore clarify that the tables/schemes no.

1 and 2 are taken by this open document). Navigate to: <http://www.aco.nato.int/> ; http://twitter.com/SHAPE_ACO_PAO

4. Foreign Affairs, “*The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times, NATO After Libya*”, Edition July/ August 2011, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, www.ForeignAffairs.com.
5. “*The New Strategic Concept – Three different perspectives*”, NATO College in Rome, Newspaper ‘Vox Collegii’, January 2011.
6. “*Security policy in an era of budgetary constraint*”, June 21st, 2010. The Speech of General Secretary of NATO Mr. Anders Fough Rasmussen, in the conference of Security and defence in Brussels.

Management of State, Peace and Security

Prof. Asc. Donald Abenheim
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California

Abstract. *Donald Abenheim is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He joined the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) faculty in 1985. He was academic associate (i.e., director of graduate studies) for strategic studies in the Department of National Security Affairs from 2000 until 2004, where he was responsible for the oversight of some eighty graduate students from the United States and thirty from allied and partner nations.*

*The author of the monograph *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the German Armed Forces* (Princeton, 1988), his recent publications have appeared in the *Oxford Companion to Military History* (2000) (NATO and German military history) as well as in *Orbis* 46, no.1 (winter 2002) and the *Hoover Institution Digest* (winter/spring 2003) on the evolution of NATO policy and strategy from a historical perspective.*

*He lectures widely in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland and has been interviewed by such international media as *Newsweek*, the *International Herald Tribune*, *Die Zeit*, and the *Los Angeles Times* on questions of contemporary policy and strategy. Abenheim is a member of the Clausewitz Society, the professional association of officers of the German general staff. His present research concerns wars of ideology, paramilitary organizations, and genocide in the twentieth century.*

Before the completion of his doctoral studies, he was a civilian staff member of U.S. Army, Europe, as a liaison to the Bundeswehr in alliance burden sharing; an archivist at the Hoover Institution focusing on Germany in the twentieth century; and a museum curator at the Presidio of San Francisco on the U.S. Army with a focus on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Donald Abenheim received a Ph.D. degree in European history from Stanford University in 1985.

Statecraft of Peace and Security

I express my gratitude for the chance to speak to you today about questions of security and statecraft in the present and future with some thoughts about the past. Please recall that my opinions represent neither the position of the US government, nor the

US Defense Department, but only those of a private citizen and academic who has an abiding concern and affection for our collective values and our community of fate.

The goal the statecraft and policy of past two decades among the Euro-Atlantic nations and their international organizations, to say nothing of the desire among the peoples of this region, has been to bring security, peace and prosperity to the nations of Southeastern Europe in the wake of the warfare of the 1990s. Central to this undertaking have been the benefits of both the trans-Atlantic alliance and the construction of a United Europe anchored in the order of nation-states created at great cost from 1949 until 2006. My purpose here, however, goes well beyond the ordinary strategic communication praise of the security and collective defense benefits of the trans-Atlantic alliance. You have already heard such talks, and anyway, the topic is better depicted on the NATO website and its social media. Instead, I wish to reflect on the unsettled character of security, peace and prosperity and the growing threats to this fragile new order that are an ever more powerful feature of a crisis-laden present.

The necessary policy of including Southeastern Europe into the zone of democracy, prosperity and security, as say, between Liege and Aachen (that is, the old of the European common market), has lurched into a crisis of state, economy, and society, wrought of the weakening of the western democracies in the mayhem of the world financial crisis. This process of disintegration is further exacerbated by the failures of memory and the fatigue of the public mind in what seems to be a chain of crises without end. This process obscures what are central insights for the formulation of policy in the peace of Europe: that to slacken and falter in the preservation of values in security and prosperity will not only mean poverty, but chaos and war. That a return to the mentality and deeds of the era from the 1880s until 1939 in some new 21st century guise camouflaged in social media and the politics of disorder will have similar or worse results. I do not need to school you in this fact, granted what you have endured in the last twenty years, and which Europe and North America as a whole have learned at huge cost in the last century and more. Yet many who rule today on very shaky thrones and those who blog before they think seem all too willing to forget these insights with a carelessness that is shocking.

Terrible simplifiers and friend/foe

In the late 19th century, the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt wrote of the dangers of his epoch of mass politics amid the European era of nationalism and the industrial revolution. Chief among the perils of mass politics that Burckhardt described were its terrible simplifiers, that is those dubious figures in public life in Paris, Berlin and Vienna who poisoned political debate in the generation before 28 June 1914 and whose violence of thought and word, in part, made possible an era of the world wars. The principal weapon of the terrible simplifier, integral nationalism, has been the use of an image of the enemy (Feindbild) and the role of enemies within the state and society, as the essence of politics. The German jurist and political theorist, Carl Schmitt, reminds us that such a mechanism is central to politics or at least it was in the turmoil of much of the 20th century that we all hoped had ended in 1989-1991.

To be sure, the policies of Europe and the West in the last six decades or so have aimed at ameliorating the most pernicious effects of the terrible simplifiers-mitigating the zero-

sum competition among European states and the mass-political proclivity toward tribalism, in Hannah Arendt's sense of the term and for a while, at least, putting the lie to Schmitt's dialectic of friend or foe. But the conditions in which Carl Schmitt flourished (1920s-1940s) with such an idea, that is, the state of emergency and democracy in peril, are returning with frightening speed. And this image of the enemy more or less on model of such men as the founders in the 1880s and 1890s of the French xenophobe Action Française, or German radical nationalist *Alledeutscher Verband*, or the Austrian ethnic German, anti Slav Christian Socialists is once more becoming the currency of politics and society, to say nothing of the international economy in the Euro-Atlantic area. This process has unfolded in the last decade amid political and economic integration of a broad sort in the Euro-Atlantic realm, at the same time that religion and political violence became a dominant feature once more of the international system in the wake of 11 September 2001. No sooner has the scourge of integral-that is, the blood-and-soil variety of- nationalist war on the European continent been (mostly) contained after the suffering of the 1990s, the same tensions now emerge in the specter of racist nationalist violence in places of heretofore noteworthy for prosperity and stability.

This fact is made worse by the reappearance of class conflict of the 19th and 20th stripe. In this sense, the money crisis portends more than trouble for a common currency in use in Paris and Bratislava. The habits of thought and expressions of exclusion that the economic depression has engendered undermine much of the social, political, economic, and even cultural order which, for example, today threaten to undo the progress of the nations of the Adriatic and southeastern Europe in their consistent efforts to enter Euro-Atlantic political, security and defense institutions and acquire their rightful place once more in the democratic camp.

Europe in between and walls of gold and silver: source of disintegration

The march of disintegration, that is, the centrifugal forces at work today contain three interconnected centers of gravity or sources of dissolution that demand our response in policy and statecraft. This process of breakup via exclusion is bringing about a new division of Europe into its prosperous and its debt-laden realms-the sharpening of a conflict between the haves and the have-nots. The latter play the role of scapegoats or victims of the neo-liberal epoch of the era 1980-2008 which is coming plainly to an end.

The first of these sources of disintegration and decomposition concerns the bedrock of security of the Atlantic alliance and the shared fate between Europe and North America. The second source of disintegration is the fatigue among the "core Europeans" as concerns the merits of an enlarged, integrated Europe, and the tendency either to erect a new wall of prosperity to isolate the formerly secure peoples of southern Europe through a neo-liberal dogma that is, in turn, enflaming an ever more virulent populism that departs starkly from the political culture of the post-1945 era. The third source of disintegration is the revival of extreme right-wing politics with resort to violence, a phenomenon that more or less vanished in the maelstrom of the second World War and its aftermath. Let me explore each of the three in turn.

Burden-sharing abroad and tub-thumping at home

Democracy and prosperity require security, which the North Atlantic Alliance has provided at first with nuclear deterrence and more recently with the limited use of

military force for limited strategic ends, but with actual fighting and post-conflict security building, in southern Europe, South West Asia and, most recently, in North Africa. However, the combat of the last decade and a half nearby and now in Afghanistan and Libya, for instance, has exacerbated greatly the classical problem that concerns all forms of pluralistic politics, that is the price tag of policy and the political perception of the sharing of this price, i. e. burden-sharing or also burden-shifting. As graduates from Monterey know this phenomenon represents an important feature of how NATO works and works very well; but also now, in view of the EU rescue mechanism for southern European debt, of how the EU works as well in dimension of shared wealth and obligation.

The burden-sharing fight that has been especially vicious among the western European and US sides since 11 September 2001 and has done, I think, great damage by an overemphasis on its negative aspects. Let me be clear: What I will now describe to you represents not my personal and professional view, but the majority posture of those around me and who outnumber me many times over. Here the issue of who shoulders the burden of war and peace is seen by many in a narrow-minded, bookkeeping table, that once more ignores the contributions made by many allies of a qualitative sort, and that sees security, defense, and military affairs as a numerical exercise, as if war and alliance were a mathematical and business undertaking.

This toxic burden-sharing sight from that began in its present form in the 1990s here in south eastern Europe, leaped into a hateful phase prior the Iraqi campaign of 2003 and more recently has spread to the Afghan and Libyan campaigns. This process has especially had a poisonous effect on domestic politics in my country. Not for the first time in my experience, do war weariness and anxiety over the ill effects of financial crisis seize on the defense commitment to Europe. The advent of neo-isolationist political forces, who are at odds with the US alliances and their crucial role within the international system, represents a force of disintegration. A great debate about the costs and burdens of a US defense commitment to the security of Europe has already manifested itself in the electoral season. Opponents of defense spending in US domestic politics always deplore NATO as a cold war relic and a waste of money in their general attempt to accentuate social programs over security, defense and military requirements. How the “lessons learned” from the Libyan campaign will operate in this connection lies beyond my knowledge, though to my mind the Libyan operation shows the enduring strategic importance of NATO to peace and security. However, many, many young US officers as well as editorial writers and bloggers believe quite the opposite, insisting that NATO is *kaputt*. Thus, the core security and defense alliance that has brought peace and security throughout my lifetime at modest cost and great benefit is damaged by its burden-sharing mechanism gone berserk. The use of this broken tool of burden shifting as a weapon by rabble rousers in domestic politics portends, as one senior US official suggested, a “dismal future” for NATO, which one presumes will end up on some Dunkirk-like beach in the years to come.

Thrift, xenophobia, and statecraft: fatigue with greater Europe and the north-versus south syndrome

More alarming than the exhaustion in the North Atlantic capitals with the burdens of collective defense in the 21st century looms the danger to international politics from

money gone mad and middle-class values shoved into radicalism. In particular, I mean the agonies of the neo-liberal governance and management that stumbles in circles today under the banner of globalization ripped to shreds by the bank collapses of 2008. The loss of direction of this managerial elite and the riposte of enraged and duped stock holders and account book owners comprise the second force of disintegration in the international system.

Prosperity linked with democracy has been the basis of security since the economic recovery of western Europe in the late 1940s and 1950s. This prosperity formed the magnet of the western camp and had lately spread to the regions deprived of such prosperity even before the cold war. The political and social peace that this prosperity nourished has been nowhere more visible than in so called Rhenish social market economy; that is, the economic miracle in west Germany, the low countries and France that once again formed the core of a common, integrated and united Europe based on a renunciation of revanche and class war.

But such facts play little role in the lives of citizens today, in the second or third generation from these now remote times, whose position in a formerly comfortable middle class has lurched into uncertainty and whose paid vacations along the Adriatic are now at risk. Such nostalgia for the 1950s is no where to be found among young people unable to attain such prosperity at all because of what they perceive to be an invasion from open borders of "...cheap, foreign labor from alien lands" marshaled by heartless managerial elites blinded by power point slides atop their business towers to the harm they wreak on tens of millions.

Enlargement fatigue made virulent by the financial crisis of 2008 portrays the European Union as a distant tyrant when seen from Vienna or Bratislava, along with globalized banks and corporations that answer to no state in the conventional sense and whose profit accrues to the so-called 1 percent plutocratic class. Meanwhile, with the scenes of civil unrest and strikes in southern European capitals over the debt crisis, the owner of the Mediterranean restaurant becomes a kind of other, somewhat and somehow disenfranchised and burdened with a collective guilt of lacking thrift and middle class virtues, although in this person's case, their energy and prudence are beyond reproach. He or she lurches in the collective subconscious a little further towards the city gate or the debtor's prison. The former generosity and deeds of inclusion that once operated under the motto of prosperity for all has decayed into a mean-spirited, penny pinching mentality, in which the friend/foe mechanism of politics can operate more loudly and with less regard for the damage it will surely cause in the future.

Populism, the right wing, political violence

The third and most troubling source of disintegration and destruction is the reappearance of the integral nationalist right wing violence as a feature of European politics. Such politically driven, racist violence has long been a feature of life in my country, to be sure, but it surely was a more or less scarce thing in past decades in Europe. Most important, the Norwegian Breivik, having read Georges Sorel and Gustav Le Bon, among his bibliography of extremism, laid his bombs and moved down innocent children in a way that was entirely familiar to the epoch from the 1880s until 1945.

Populism can easily degenerate into xenophobia, made worse by prolonged warfare as well as the failure of elites to respond to the hopes and fears of the electorate. Most troubling has been the use of religion as a political weapon in a promiscuous way by our opponents, but also by figures in my country, as well. The infection of religious fundamentalist of whatever kind (I mean Christian Jews as well as Muslims) into the life of the state and the international system wreaks havoc on human rights, tolerance and peace, as such, is a phenomenon that few experts predicted a generation ago.

I believe, however, that Breivik was as much attempting to murder the established political order in western Europe as he was slaughtering Norwegian citizens “with an immigrant background” and brown eyes and dark skin. In this aspect, I also believe that others in their small, but growing number elsewhere in western Europe and central Europe who nurture similar ambitions, and that, after ten years of war in Iraq and especially Afghanistan, as well as an economic crisis weakening the west, they sense their moment is arriving. Perhaps they, themselves, do not keep their fingers on the trigger or accumulate the raw materials bombs, but they encourage and tolerate others, less civil, clad in black jump boots and with skin heads and tattooed “88” mottos, who can be mobilized in a crisis to upend the political and civil order of constitutional human rights.

This fact represents perhaps the least tangible of the three forces of disintegration I have described, but surely the most dangerous and troubling. Political violence on a small scale in the late 19th century portended an era of total war. Our job is to ensure that this pattern does not repeat itself in the present century.

Conclusion

This admonition, overdrawn as it might be, arises from a reflection about the European past informed, in turn, by an active professional involvement in NATO for more than thirty years. My warning also manifests a heartfelt and deep affinity for the people of central, eastern, and southern Europe who have been my students for twenty years (and are my own family for fourteen years), and whose desire for security and prosperity was cheated and betrayed in 19th and especially in the 20th centuries by epochal forces that may reassert themselves now.

Those who see the post-1945, and even post-1989 order as now being somehow worn out, exhausted, and ready for the upload of some new application as one puts in their smart phone, even when such is untested, should consider the real forces that brought about the era of the world wars and punished this part with particular evil and brutality. The three forces of disintegration that are undoing the order of values of democracy, prosperity, and security in this part of Europe are accelerating. This acceleration is propelled by the blindness of materialism, its pettiness and shrunken spirit; by an amnesia about the European past; and by an appalling ignorance that these questions of balance sheets and management wizardry, in fact, are not business school case studies, but affairs of statecraft, and thus, of war and peace.

You and I are enjoined to redouble our efforts to show that a broken Atlantic link as in 1920s and 1939s, will again result in a broken international system, as the justification for the sharing of the defense burden. We must find a more politically sound and sane answer to the spectacle of money gone wild rather than the witless penny pinching of

the year 1930. We must revive the best of Rhenish social market economy somehow so that its blessings will spread more widely, and prevent the marginalization of those nations in southern Europe that were the scene of such suffering in the 19th and 20th centuries. Most important, we must extinguish through the due process of law and power of the democratic state those radical right wing extremists, who would resort to violence once more and open Pandora's Box.

SECTION II

STRATEGIC DEFENSE REVIEW (SDR)

Through a personal analysis, the authors of this Section give their reflections and attempts to answer the following questions:

Which are the capabilities required for the Armed Forces to better accomplish their constitutional mission? Which organizational structures are the most suitable for achieving this objective? Should we review once again the appropriate structures, and how often?!

All of us may naturally have these questions, especially if we consider the constant changes that have occurred during the last two decades, associated with a number of challenges.

Other articles are welcomed for the next edition, to be written by professional experts who will know how to answer, in the Albanian context, these questions and many other ones, with reference to the Strategic Defense Review.

Scenarios and Operational Concepts

LtC Editson Zarka,
Senior Officer Course, Student
Academy of Defence “Spiro Moisiu” Tiranë

Abstract. *The Strategic Defence Review (SDR), which is underway in close cooperation with US Department of Defence, entered a new phase – the phase of development of scenarios and operational concepts. Both aspects are closely connected to each other. The later shall result in the highlight of the required capabilities for the successful accomplishment of the mission of the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF).*

This process is very important due to the fact that for the first time it is being conducted in close cooperation with several other institutions of the country. The institutions involved are linked with national security and defence. This article gives a general overview of the role of the Armed Forces in the XXIst century, development of scenarios and operational concepts with a sole purpose: the harmonization of all efforts for the identification of necessary operational capabilities for the coming decade.

Introduction

Planning and development of strategic scenarios and operational concepts takes in consideration the challenges and threats of the new concept of security, technological advancement, war fighting methods, as well as the lessons learned up to date by the Armed Forces in combat and non-combat operations, etc. The accurate and professional analysis of these elements is conducted to generate the most acceptable options for the development of future capabilities of the Armed Forces.

The basic questions to this end are the following: Which are the capabilities needed by the Armed Forces in order to better accomplish its constitutional missions? Which is the most suitable organization structure for the achievement of this goal? Should we review the structures and how often? What types of forces and capacities should we develop? Which operations should AAF units participate in? How should we accomplish our national and international obligations simultaneously? All the above questions flow quite naturally, and more particularly if we take under consideration the frequent reviews and changes made during the last two decades, which nonetheless have been associated with a lot of controversial issues.

Strategic Defence Reviews conducted so far have aimed at the development of the appropriate forces for the defence of our country. These organization structures, beside the positive achievements are being also associated with side effects which have required other minor reviews. I do therefore believe that use of a better balance between the goals to be achieved and the resources available, together with a better employment of the military expertise will mitigate these effects and help achieve the required goals.

The spectrum of the AAF missions has been considerably increased. This spectrum initiates with their utilization in peacetime and terminates with the participation in war fighting operations. There is a growing need for capabilities overlapping between the domestic requirements for participation in civil and humanitarian emergencies on one hand, and the contribution to international missions of organizations such as: UN, NATO, OSCE, or regional initiatives such as SEDM/SEEBRIG, A-3/5, etc. The concept of “*single set of forces*” is adopted by European NATO countries. This concept is perhaps the best option even for the smaller members such as our country. In addition, finding other alternative ways for the best use of our national restricted resources, and the cooperation with other countries driven by the slogan of “*smart defence*”, is a best approach to be followed for a successful midterm reform.

For many years, a modernization process of our Armed Forces has taken place. It has consisted in investments in communication systems, individual soldier weapons and equipment, maritime surveillance system, production of Navy Coastguard vessels, purchase of helicopters, purchase of special equipment for the elimination of excess munitions, and so forth. Thus, this is not the end of the modernization process; it is only the beginning. The hardest thing is investing for the future. This does therefore require an accurate analysis of the tendencies of missions of the Armed Forces, taking into close consideration the best analysis of the future security environment.

Spectrum of missions and role of the Armed Forces in the XXIst Century

In the above context, I believe that the identification of the missions and roles of the Armed Forces is not a complete duty. This becomes more evident if we bring to our attention the shocking events at the beginning of this century such as the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, terrorist bomb attacks in Spain in 2004, in London in 2005 and lately in Sweden in 2011. All these did therefore mark the beginning of a new era – the universal transformation pattern of the military organization structures in order to be in harmony with the new security environment.

Transformation: this is recently the word which is “*mentioned*” more frequently in all NATO countries. The asymmetric warfare has placed under question the heavy weaponry and stockpiles of the most powerful countries of the world, together with heavy mechanized units inherited by the Cold War. Their place has constantly been changed by smaller, light, deployable, sustainable, better trained and well-equipped structures. There is a growing need for these types of forces in the recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are conducting well-known operations such as “*small-unit operations*”.

What is the spectrum of missions that the Armed Forces will conduct now and in the future? In accordance to some analysts, these forces will perform four main roles, such

as: 1-Country's territorial defence; 2-Participation in missions abroad; 3-Contribution to the internal security; and 4-Contribution to the civilian contingency missions in the country. Shortly, these roles are respectively analyzed as stated below:

- *Defence of the country's territorial integrity.* Despite the changes of the security environment, the main role of the armed forces still remains the defence from external risks and threat. The defence of a country may be conducted either based on one's own capabilities and forces, or as part of specific military alliances. In Albanian case, as a new NATO member country, we need now to establish a closer and detailed cooperation and planning with the respective Operational Command of NATO. We need also to complete with the right personnel our Peace Establishment slots in NATO command structure.
- *Participation in the missions abroad.* The new missions and operations during the last decades, especially in the Balkans, Middle East, Africa or elsewhere, have therefore made it possible for the development of military capacities in order for the later to be much more suitable for the accomplishment of these missions. NATO is submitted to a transformation process in order to face these new challenges. It is thereby changing its command and force structure and even its functional systems including here the logistic support to better confront the new challenges of asymmetric operations.
- *The contribution for the internal security.* The role of the Armed Forces in the internal security is a new challenge compared with their traditional role of the defence of the country. As a general rule, the problems of internal security are normally managed by other specialized agencies, such as police, anti-crime or anti-drug bodies, etc. The engagement of the Armed Forces is regulated by law and it is thereby performed mainly after the requests of other security agencies, normally in an assisting role, such as protection of ports, airports, patrol duties, action against illegal trafficking, and so forth.
- *Contribution to the civilian contingency missions in the country.* The Armed Forces may play this role in two main directions: *firstly*, they may act as a symbolic representative of national values and sovereignty; *secondly*, they may therefore utilize the human power as for the support of infrastructure and civil projects or during natural force major such as: floods, heavy snow and rain crisis, wild fires, earthquakes, land-slides, etc.

What are expected to be the main operations of the Armed Forces in the XXIst century? One response to this question comes by Dr. John L. Clark¹, who divides the operations or missions performed by the Armed Forces of countries into six categories, such as:

- Intervention/Offensive Combat Operations
- International Stability and Support Operations
- Civil Support Operations
- National Defence Operations
- International Humanitarian Assistance Support

¹ Clark, John L. "What Roles and Missions for Europe's Military and Security Force in the 21st Century", page 5.

- Unilateral Military Operations

What about Albanian Armed Forces: in which operations shall they be engaged in? Which of them have the first priority and which is of second priority? In order to come closer to the real specific responses, there is the need to observe their operational scenarios, taking always into close consideration our real specifications and conditions.

Strategic Scenarios and Operational Concepts

Scenario planning is a method of strategic planning, which is utilized by some organizations to compile flexible long-term plans. There are two ways to the planning process: top-down planning and planning based on resources. The first case is a tendency “*from strategy to tasks*” - a process which is driven by the requirements of legal and sub-legal acts, by indications and issued directives by the high state bodies. The hierarchy of top-down scenario development continues in accordance to the following procedure: national scenarios, operational scenarios, mission statements, and capability planning. Then, this tendency descends at the lowest planning levels². In the second case, the entire force development process does not surmount beyond the resources available to defence, which, in our country conditions, do not exceed 2% of GDP.

Under the framework of Strategic Defence Review, which is underway in Albania, the highlight of scenarios come as a result of the close analysis of some of the most important strategic factors such as: the membership of our country in NATO, the progress of regional integration, and the lessons learned by the participation of our Armed Forces in national and international missions. As a consequence, thirteen strategic representative scenarios are developed, four of which are a direct responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, while the rest remains mainly the liability of the Ministry of Interior. These thirteen scenarios have derived from a total of thirty three scenarios covering the whole spectrum of challenges, threats and risks. All these scenarios will drive the activity of the main authorities in the area of national security and defence.

For the development of the strategic scenarios it is to be taken into full consideration the culmination point of the situation, in order to allocate the maximum number of the required capabilities. The lowest military unit for the scenario development is usually the battalion level, or the equivalent units of Navy and Air Force (vessel, helicopter, etc). Then, we can pass to the higher military structures such as the regiment, brigade, etc. The package of the initial force of options for each action of the potential adversaries may therefore be compiled and designated by using the military judgment and even a series of rules, or otherwise by means of modelling.³

The Operations Concept describes the way of which the commanders predict and design the main operation and the combat development.⁴ The Concept is based on the course of action selected by the commander for the execution of the entire mission. It responds to questions such as: “*What*”, “*Where*” “*How*” and “*Why*”. By doing this our forces and units confront the adversary. These questions shall be responded in details, involving in

² NATO Handbook on Long-Term Defense Planning, April 2003.

³ NATO Handbook on Long-Term Defense Planning, 2003, page 10.

⁴ FM 100-5 “Operations”, page 66.

so doing each and every element and assessing the contribution of all the participant actors in this process.

The operational planning takes under close consideration all the scenario data and analyzes with great accuracy all its component factors. There shall be a clear highlight of the end states, goals and missions of the adversaries, taking seriously into consideration the doctrines and lessons learned so far, as well as the time they were used before. The operational planning is to be conducted in accordance with the specifics of the mission. The shortages described at the operational planning are utilized by the defence planners as a basis to allocate the goals of the future force.

Identification of required operational capabilities and structures

A careful analysis shows that the defence resources must not be invested in heavy forces as inherited from the past. The later are much more expensive than the light forces, thus, more difficult to maintain, train and resist over time. Heavy forces have a more limited utilization, especially for our country's geographic conditions, where $\frac{3}{4}$ of the country is a mountainous terrain. Instead, light forces are more appropriate to the Albanian reality. The strategic mobility of heavy forces is difficult and the requirements for logistic support are greater. On the contrary, the active land light forces and the forces of special operations do therefore have a wider use spectrum. Moreover and most importantly, these forces require only minor changes and investments.

Taking under consideration the classification of NATO's "*Pyramid of Forces*"⁵, and the actual conditions of our Armed Forces, I do therefore judge that our capabilities shall be developed in accordance with the following categories:

1. *Special Operations Forces*. These kinds of forces have demonstrated high values in the development of several operations and missions, notably during the last decade. They may be utilized in rapid attacks against terrorist areas, bringing into attention the special operation against Bin Laden in Pakistan this year, and other engagement in particular missions concerning hostage rescue, destruction of obstacles and even surveillance and monitoring in enemy rears.

There is an extraordinary progress of our Special Forces these last years. They have therefore been trained together with most selected units of some Western countries, they are equipped and going through a modernization program with the best weapons of the time. Because of their character this type of forces are actively participating in the combat operations, in a very difficult location in the south of Afghanistan, ISAF. In this context, there will be several questions on how are these forces going to be employed in the future, which shall be their right size in general, and which is the best size for operations in the country, which shall be the frequency of their usability, etc. In addition to the Special Forces with a land background, what can be considered for their extension to the Navy or Air Force? This means that we have to take into consideration the coastguard mission or special situation missions in airports, and so forth.

⁵ "*Transforming NATO – NDU Anthology*", Center for Technology and National Security, page 4.

2. *Rapid Reaction Forces.* These forces have been mainly developed by NATO as general forces, selected and configured for combat striking operations with high technology. They can be activated very rapidly and employed in self-supporting missions or as components of other forces.

As far as our country is concerned, it is interesting to notice the declaration in NATO of a Military Police platoon, which is in its first “*embryonic*” steps of such a process, for the NATO Response Force. We should further keep thinking on the way these RRF forces can be developed, and how could they to be employed in order to justify their maintenance, expenditures and required training.

3. *High Readiness Forces.* These forces are mainly employed for key collective defence operations of NATO’s or as a response to a crisis. Based on NATO’s concept, part of these forces is planned to reinforce the Rapid Reaction Forces.

In the case of our country, this category may include Land Forces (ex-Rapid Reaction Brigade), which through a cautious modernization may be successfully employed in and out of the country. This shall be made through a careful judgment and sound decision-taking and by comparing all the alternatives in the development of the future force structure.

4. *Stabilization and Reconstruction Forces.* This is a relatively new category of capability, which has therefore been observed and developed with considerate interest, notably after the participation in Iraq and Afghanistan operations. The US, Canada and European armies have already performed stabilization and reconstruction roles, adapting the existing roles and missions in response to new challenges and requests. This is difficult for the combat forces which are trained about other missions other than the ones this category requires. For this purpose, NATO has therefore encouraged the development of suitable capacities which may be performed by the Armed Forces, as well as by other state and private institutions of the country. In my opinion, our Armed Forces have much more opportunities to increase specialized capacities for the stabilization-reconstruction operations. This may be notably comprised by the following units: civil engineering, military police, medical teams, CIMIC teams, and so forth.

5. *Capacities for Participation in the Security Sector Reform.* This is not new to the Armed Forces. Activities of this kind generally start in peacetime, notably the collaboration between NATO countries with the partner countries. The main domains of this activity are the following: training events, regional seminars, joint consultations, exchange of special teams, assistance in building defence capabilities, etc.

The role of Albania, which has gained a great 15 years long experience, as a partner and aspirant country, may give a great contribution even in this particular field. I believe that our Armed Forces may offer training expertise, as it is actually happening with the OMLT in Afghanistan, in close cooperation with New Jersey National Guard. Other interesting areas may include the development of various courses in the partner countries, development of military diplomacy, expertise presentation in peculiar fields such as defence planning, elimination of excess ammunitions, English language, mountainous training, etc.

Conclusions/ Recommendations

The Process of Strategic Defence Review does not happen every year. It is more like an opportunity for reflection for all strategic command and control authorities of the Armed Forces. This process does thereby create opportunities such as: participation in debates, consultations and suggestions for the establishment of a professional and quality force able to accomplish the constitutional missions, with the right balance of requirements with the resources available.

Development of strategic scenarios and operational concepts are two of the most important phases of strategic planning. This process has to conclude about the adequate structures and capabilities of the Armed Forces. How can this be achieved? It can be achieved by the involvement of our best experts, best directors, by utilizing our national professional expertise and other countries experience? How to build the best smaller allied force under the financial austerity and the smart defence approach?

We have already entered the NATO collective security and defence agenda. This does not mean we are giving up the obligations towards the defence of our own country, but it means we have to make a better use of the defence capabilities of our country especially in the initial steps of a potential breach of sovereignty, up to the activation of article 5 of the use of allied forces.

The future security environment is demanding for light, deployable, and interoperable forces with the allies and partners. This is the reason why these forces have to be further developed with greater priority. On the other side, I do believe that investing in heavy, static and Cold War oriented forces is not any longer relevant to the new reality.

Bibliography:

1. Roins, Sheila R. "*Project on National Security Reform, Vision Working Group, Report and Scenarios*", SSI, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, USA.
2. Edmondus, Timothy. "*What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe*", the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
3. Clark, John L. "*What Roles and Missions for Europe's Military and Security Force in the 21st Century*".
4. Ratchev, Valery. "*Context Scenarios in Long-Term Defence Planning*", Information & Security, an International Journal, Vol.23, No.1.
5. Rees, Wyn. "*A strategic Defence Review: Lessons from the past*", the Political Quarterly, Vol.81, No.3, July-September 2010, Blackwell Publishing LTd, Oxford, United Kingdom.
6. Manual "*Operacioni i Bashkuar Shumëkombësh*", Defence Academy, Tirana 2009.
7. Gray, Colin S. "*Hard Power and Soft Power: The utility of military force as an instrument of policy in the 21st century*", SSI, April 2011.

SECTION III

PROFESSIONAL FORCE AND ITS CHALLENGES

The Editorial Office expected to receive a larger number of articles about the consolidation of Professional Forces, at analysis level.

This is because the point of reference of all strategies and plans we develop at the Armed Forces is closely connected with the Professional Force, its recruitment, education and consolidation of the military in general, at all levels.

Two articles under this section surely treat the topic exhaustively with regard to the professional force but they also bring perspectives based on the experience of the military who have dealt with training and exercise aspects.

In this context, we promote the participation in this edition of human resources military experts, in terms of the recruitment of the quality military personnel at all levels.

Therefore, we look forward to articles written by persons who know what to say but who also know how to say it. This observation applies to all types of articles under all Sections.

Military Profession and Professionalism

Colonel Idai Qorraj,
Commander of the Training Centre, Bunavi

Abstract. *This article, based on different approaches of the military professionalism, brings the message for a wider assessment of professional forces including: aspects of intellectual, physical, operational, leadership, command and control, and other qualities which are of fundamental value for the development of higher operational capabilities. These values are becoming a necessity for the increase of professional performance of the Armed Forces as a whole.*

The article analyses the difference between professional forces and professionalism in the armed forces. It examines the forms, ways and methods of professionalism development, and offers some opinions about the training professionalism, the increase of the standards related to the recruitment of professional soldiers, the need to develop, in accordance with supporting infrastructure, standards in favour of the increase of professionalism.

Introduction

One of the major goals of the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) in their way ahead of reforms has been its transformation to a smaller force in size, but a better force in quality. This means that the trends are to compensate quantity with quality, through increase of operational capabilities. With this concept, the AAF have gradually changed into a fully professional force. Since 2010, the Armed Forces are completed with fully professional contingents.

The product of this transformation has not only “*substituted*” the conscript soldiers of the obligatory service with professional soldiers, but has also developed more qualitative soldiers with regard to the intellectual values and mentality. Today, soldiers express their free will to serving as professional soldiers in the Armed Forces and they make their decision to dedicate to the military carrier. This fact is enough to withdraw the conclusion of the prevalence of the professional soldiers against the conscript service, together with their educational formation (secondary school and university) as a fair basis for a more professional approach towards the soldier’s profession. Reality shows that the soldier’s profession was therefore favoured by thousands of boys and girls, who

after the selective process have joined the lines of military units. Actually, the remaining challenge still has to do with their professionalism, the development of their military values according to the best modern standards.

Professional soldier

In order to develop a right opinion concerning professionalism and to be accurate in our below-cited reasoning and arguments, let us first respond the following questions: “What is a profession and what is the professionalism?”, “Is the professional soldier a real profession?”, “Which are the forms, ways and methods of professionalism development?”

Referring to the “Albanian Language Dictionary”, the word “*profession*” means: “the main activity of a person in a certain field; a mastery, which requires a certain level of knowledge, expressions, training, practice”, while by the word “*professional*” we do therefore understand: “very good preparation in order to do a job, a mastery”.

Basically, these two definitions do therefore differentiate from the clause “*very good preparation*”, which does therefore enable the division of the concept: military-men’s profession to his professionalism. So, one of the terms does indicate the gained profession in a certain level degree of preparation, while the other, shows the very good level of performance. Being an officer, non-commissioned officer, or even a professional soldier is therefore a profession, while being an officer, non-commissioned officer or even a soldier at the professional level, means being among the best person of the respective group, or an expert of their profession (expert in the meaning of specialized in a specific area).

In the US *White Paper* on military-man’s profession, published in the army on September 2010, when talking about the soldier’s *credo*, it is clearly expressed: “I am an expert and a professional soldier.”¹ So, even here, we can see the difference of the term professional from expert/professional. As a response to the second question, I have the opinion that not every “professional soldier” is a professional and for analogy not every AAF military-man is a professional. The professionalism of the professional soldier and of the servicemen remains generally an objective of the military formation. In this sense, if we further clarify the professionalism in a military formation, we shall hereto discuss on officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers’ level and performance, always based upon the quality of the performance of their missions and tasks, in accordance with the best accepted standards.

Answering the third question, relating to the forms, ways and methods of development of professionalism, we can therefore say that the *basic forms* are the military education and other qualifications. The *main* ways of professional development are the military-man’s self-development, through daily training for the maintenance of current capabilities, the utilization of the lessons learned and other’s experience, the participation in combat and non war-fighting missions, staying into contact with the contemporary developments of the military area, the use of digital technology, internet, foreign languages and foreign literature for the information intake.

¹White Paper-approved for distribution and discussion in the American army from TRADOK SHBA on December 8th, 2010, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/611545>.

In another way, while education and qualification in the military institutions is the basis of professionalism (you get a profession), the dimension of individual self-development through daily training, experience, actualization of the know-how for the absorption of contemporary developments of the profession, do therefore constitute the building of the professionalism performance. Simpler, education gives you the key knowledge (profession), while the practice of daily work gives you self-development and professionalism. Consequently, we do therefore understand that professionalism cannot only be donated by education, nor can it be gained by willpower, work, duty, continuous training and perpetual training; it is both.

Approaches to professionalism

The level of professionalism for each and every military-man, and within a military group (in comparison to one-another) is therefore different and changeable in relation to the education, individual will for self-development and motivation. While the education and qualification programs are the same for each respective servicemen's group, they do therefore give the same knowledge for all, the one who is the difference in their professionalism remains the level of *self-development will* (the individual's will to be better trained, to better use of the individual's experience and the experience of others, the devotion to continuous study, to learn foreign languages, to use information technology, the internet, and other modern ways in order to be in touch with contemporary knowledge and its implementation in the profession, etc). As in every other profession, even the military-men differentiate from one-another, precisely by the self-development dimension and by the will to *exercise* it.

Within a soldier's group we have individuals with *a different dimension of will for self-development*. That is why these types of individuals are the same as far as the professional values are to be concerned, as their commander or instructor would highly wish. The individual will to self-development raises his professionalism in new levels month after month, year after year, to reach higher standards in the sense of progress. He does understand that there is no definite station in this long way. This is not the case of other individuals who are not characterised by the right will. The latter abides in regression, risks his own performance and is affected by the danger to fall into the so-called dilettantism, and gradually they become an obstacle for the group by risking its entire compatibility.

However, for the commander it is clear that the will of individuals is to be therefore cultivated. This is the place where the difficulties and the key to success is located; education and training of the individuals and groups with the team spirit. The experience shows that the dimension of the individuals' will is increased when he is motivated, promoted and orientated towards the work with clear objectives and standards.

Consequently, we do therefore draw the conclusion that the will to self-development of each and every individual in group increases when the commander/instructor is a professional in the training organization, when he is a methodological trainer, and when he understands the weaknesses of each individual, and works carefully as for their elimination. He also should provide additional training, promote team work and assistance to one-another. The military-men with good professional achievements are the best players in group achievement; that is why they shall be rewarded by their commander and the

other group members and promoted towards professionalism.

Everybody has something to teach

Under the motto “*anybody has something to teach*”² (Umberto Ecco) the commanders must incite their subordinates to develop individual work, to study, to experiment in their field of responsibility, to perform individual duties. All these individuals have to express the professional individuality in front of the group.

The preparation of the individual topics, training methodologies, various lectures, indicatory lessons, compilation of different tactic schemes and adopted training duties in accordance to the platoons conditions of the command, the preparation of training analyses and lessons learned, training or demonstration of a technical or highly professional tactical action, are some of the effective forms which do therefore orientate the individuals towards the engagement to study, research, experimentation, additional training events towards professionalism. Moreover, they are therefore discussed in group and when their values are applied to all they are hereto generalized.

This is a way to engage the entire group towards professionalism. The commanders truly utilize these kinds of innovative working forms, but sometimes bureaucracy does not bring productivity. There are commanders who do thereto transform these activities in quite important events for the entire command; they engage the fully attended auditorium with their subordinates to attend a lesson or even the platoons to observe an indicatory move, in taking to this intellectual or practical activity the mere concrete product. The commanders who do therefore utilize with effectiveness these work forms, progressively increase the possibilities to create a more professional group. Visionary commanders plan and assign individual tasks for each and every member of his own group members, eliminating the daily routine and the lack of action, which are the main ‘enemies’ of professionalism.

Other forms for professionalism

Professionalism is a requirement of war, and as such, it is therefore a challenge for all the members of the Armed Forces. Thus, the professional progress is required to be performed daily, weekly, yearly, so to be developed as an uninterrupted process. Work experience and examination of the experience from the others are two of the most important forms of soldier’s development, which flow naturally to each individual when there exists the ambition to self-development. Likewise, the development of pre-mission training events, where the concentration of instructors and soldiers will increase progressively for the achievement of higher standards, do therefore outgrow the professionalism levels.

The participation in training events together with military personnel from other NATO countries, the participation in combat or supporting missions, in places where such operations are being developed, is of extraordinary values for our military-men. Such an experience is more than a school. Here the knowledge and professionalism show their real values and the lessons learned will never be forgotten. So, it is to be promoted

² Gjovalin Shkurtaaj, - Njazi Kazazi, “Hyrje në metodikën e punës shkencore”, Tiranë, 2004. Cited Umberto Eko.

the professionalism through self-development in the digital era, grown by use of the internet, use of literature in foreign languages, study of war battles and tactics and the development of military technology,.

It is therefore encouraging the fact that it is very difficult to find any individual in the Armed Forces who does not utilize the computer or who does not thereby navigate the internet: the majority are actively involved in English language training; others do currently use NATO operational language in missions.

The orientation of professionals' contributions

Unlike some other professions, where the individuals enjoy 100% of the fruit of their professionalism (doctors, engineers, artists, writers, scientists, etc), the professionalism of the military-man wins the maximal points when it does therefore have an impact in the enhancement of values of the group/team where he works. A team has therefore not consolidated values when one individual is a good marksman and another one is not. In this team, the professionalism of the individual becomes vague and when the team is assessed to be of weak performance, the adrenaline of success decreases. So, the military professionalism take full values when it has a positive influence in the group, when it drives the group goals, strengthens the group spirit, leads the group towards accomplishment of tasks and strengthens the responsibility of the mission.

We do therefore withdraw two conclusions: at first, the military man professionalism is not as it does simply appears. It is orientated towards greater contributions in group/team in order to do the best towards the success as a team; otherwise, it remains hermetically isolated. Second, the commanders shall take into consideration and therefore shall be masters in the utilization of the individuals' professionalism to intake a positive product and to increase the performance of the group they have been given to command.

The professionalism of instructors' troop

The US general of the Second World War, McArthur, speaking about the importance of professional preparation has therefore cited: "*In no other field is the price to be paid by the utilization of the unprepared troops as terrible and irrevocable as in the military area.*"³. As we highlighted above, professionalism is a war requirement and consequently a product of teaching/training must be a professional soldier in the professional level which may become possible only by professional officers/instructors.

We are bound to ask the question: Do we really have a professional instructors' troop?

Based on my practice in command duties, it is thereby observed that there several shortages in this direction. Much energy and work is therefore dedicated to those superior commanders in order to become professional and capable in teaching. In the Non-Commissioned Officers Academy, there are periodic courses for instructors. *For the sake of truth, this course does not offer you any military rank, that is why they are not*

³ John G.Meyer, "Komandanti i kompanisë", Tirana, 1995, page 58. Cited - Dagllas Macarthur (1880-1964) - A remarkable american general of the Second World War. He did therefore play an important role in the wining of the allied forces in the Pacofoc oceans.

preferred by the non-commissioned officers. Consequently, a lot of non-commissioned officers with the duty of “instructor” do not therefore hold such a certificate.

They are therefore entitled as instructors and further on, by the experience taken at the empiric manner (daily practice, assistance of experienced instructors, in the best case through the organization of any educational short-term meeting), try to raise in the instructor’s level. Up to the raising of the instructor in an intermediate teaching level, the instructor is at the same time object of preparation (he is therefore trained to lecture, when in fact such a specific course does exist) but even subject aiming at the preparation of the soldiers of his own group. In other words, that means that uncertified instructors try to train certified professionals. But, what about the product of his own work, when at the same time as we know he tries to get affirmed as an instructor? We do therefore understand that during the entire time, the level of soldier’s preparation will not be the rightful one.

A quite valuable solution for the new officers shall be the following: the organization of a shorter course for teaching, with duration of 2-3 weeks, including all of the officers, directly after the termination of the officer’s basic course, the program of which is assisted by specialists of the pedagogic area. The troop of professional instructors is a very important asset as for the command/institution, because the practice has shown that it is not an easy task to be certified as a trainer. That is why their change of duties outside the training has to be very carefully studied.

The Soldier’s Profession

As we analysed above, the novelty of the recent years for the Armed Forces is the enlargement of the concept “*professional military*”, his absorption and the inclusion in the military troop concept.

During the last two years a considerable number of boys and girls interested in the military profession have therefore applied to join the Armed Forces. On one side, this shows the interest of the young men to work in the AAF and on the other side it slightly increases the competition of the best candidates. But, amongst the soldiers’ troop, as in every other profession, there are different tendencies. Lapsing from these tendencies, it is thereby observed that within the groups there are individuals who consider the soldier’s profession only limited in being a job for their families.

These individuals are badly informed, because the soldier’s profession is much more than a job: it is an profession of arms, war fighting techniques, psychological combat capabilities, war fighting and a lot more than that. I think it is necessary to have a full concept for the soldier’s profession starting from the selection criteria for recruitment, soldier’s qualities, tests standards that must be accomplished in the BIT (Basic Individual Training), work contract, various limitations, the rights and duties of the soldier when they get this status, etc., taking into accurate consideration the engagements of the AAF deriving from NATO membership, the participation in international combat and peacekeeping missions, etc?

With this in mind, I do therefore judge that it is for the good sake of the citizens the performance of an all-inclusive promotion of this profession, maybe by means of a *white book for all the citizens*, because the non accurate understanding of this profession

is damaging, and bringing about disillusion and consequences for the citizens who do therefore apply, but even for the performance of the AAF.

The above-cited analyses explain the following: before making a selection of the soldier's profession, one must fundamentally understand this profession, its benefits and difficulties. This is the mere reason why, it is thereby required a professional "marketing" in order to better orientate the citizens' will at full consciousness. Thus, it can be possible for the mere uninformed (who do thereby cause problems once accepted in the military) not to be part of the troop of professional the soldiers just by being obligated by a momentary decision to get a job.

During the process of professional soldier's recruitment, it is therefore judged that during the intellectual test besides questionnaires selected and compiled by professionals (with the assistance of psychology specialists) it becomes possible (in accordance to their response) an interception of the possible reaction of the candidacies towards the soldier's profession, discipline, feeling of duty liability or of national feeling, team work and sacrifice for the other.

Role of Individual Training Centre (ITC) to the cultivation of professionalism

In parallel with the intensive work for the achievement of the training standards, it is also a good work even in the area of education for the individual will of the students for self-development. This is highly related to the commanders and instructors' work and to the role to the achievement of professionalism. The basic training aims at the headway of the physical, technical and tactic capacities of the soldiers in much higher parameters that the one possessed by the first coming soldiers in the ITC. The most important thing for them is the achievement of the standards and norms in order to certify to more than 100 assignments positions. By experience we can say that not everyone has been able to achieve the required aims and standards within the programmed time limit.

A great deal of number of them do therefore perform self-training (being encouraged by their instructors) in the most difficult assignments during evening time in the so-called "additional training" (during sport time, or in their free time). Further on, through their gradual education of will, they continue to train in order to pass all the required norms. Precisely, all this shows that the soldiers' will is therefore trained and later on it turns into education. This tempering of will propels towards self-development. The later assists the military-man to increase his professionalism in every step of his carrier.

Training Infrastructure and Professionalism

The construction of platoons in accordance to the programme topics and training assignments is a necessary requirement for the development of the training in accordance with the standards. So, it is not enough the mere terrain. The best thing is to adapt them on behalf of troop's preparation.

The platoons have therefore been adopted in accordance to testing standards. This has well served for troop preparation in compliance to the approved standards. In case when platoons are constructed to serve to the development of specific assignments, they perform their pre-destined role as a "proof" for the accomplishment of allocated standards from each soldier.

The forthcoming construction of platoon which shall therefore serve for the performance of all the firing in a real distance comprised with movable figures in various distances and directions, during day, night, individual or group firing, etc, will therefore be an extraordinary asset for the ITC, for the qualitative preparation and certification of the real marksmen.

Conclusion

Our military, commanders or soldiers, in the framework of the reforms in AAF, are under an accelerated development process towards their professionalism, having concrete and ambitious goals, to reach the same values of the NATO countries' militaries.

The professionalism, as a requirement of the full NATO integration, remains an ambitious goal to be achieved by each individual and military formation of the AAF. It is to be achieved through a process, where each individual plans, organizes, accomplishes the actions and maintain the responsibility to increase the professionalism in the units is responsible for.

Bibliography:

1. AAF Education and Training Doctrine.
2. Terry F. Pettijohn, Psikologjia-Një hyrje koncize , Tirana, Albanian edition, 1996.
3. John G. Meyer, Komandanti i kompanisë, Tiranë, 1995, Albanian edition, page 58.
4. Gjovalin Shkurtaj, - Njazi Kazazi, Hyrje në metodikën e punës shkencore, Tirana, 2004. Cited Umberto Ecco, page 45, Albanian edition.
5. Strategjia e Menaxhimit të Burimeve Njerëzore, 2011-2015, Albanian edition.
6. Standard procedures of testing evaluation of the individual training duties.
7. Përhapja dhe standardizimi i poligoneve të qitjes, Albanian edition.
8. Albanian Language Dictionaries, Tirana, 1985.
9. White Paper-approved for distribution and discussion by TRADOC USA on December 8th, 2010. <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/611545>.

Socialization, Learning and Adjustment

Dr. Gaço Tanku,
Lecturer at “Aleksandër Moisiu” University, Durrës

Abstract. *The socialization is a normal process in every organization, including the Armed Forces. It has to do with the new coming personnel in units (military or civilian), through which people learn norms and necessary roles to make the unit functional. It includes learning on tasks, roles, groups, units, achieving high levels of individual work and individual-unit adaptation. The phases of the process are given an analytic overview in the article.*

Job descriptions help the new coming personnel handling the first difficulties. In such conditions, through orienting programs, responsible structures of human resources management are responsible for the socialization of the newcomers with the group. The establishment of institutionalized socialization helps reducing insecurities and create consolidation of the organization. The object of this article is focused on management of problems in the period of socialization.

Socialization is the process by which people learn the norms and roles that are necessary to function in a group or organization, it is a learning process in which new members must acquire a variety of knowledge, attitudes and behaviors. Socialization is also the primary means by which military units communicate their culture and values to new members.

An important goal of socialization is to help newcomers assimilate and fit healthy into their unit or subunit. There are two kinds of fit that are important for socialization. First, newcomers must acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to perform their tasks and roles. This is known as person-job fit, which refers to the match between an officer's knowledge and requirements of a job. Second, newcomers must also learn the values and beliefs that are important to the group or military unit. This is known as officer-military unit fit and refers to the match between officers' personal values and the values of the military unit¹.

An important objective of military unit socialization is to achieve high levels of both fit among new members. Research has found that both fit are strongly related to the work

¹ Saks, A.M., dhe Ashforth, B.E (1997). A longitudinal investigation of the relationship between job information sources, applicant perception of fit and work outcomes. Personnel Psychology.

adjustment of newcomers. In particular, both high level fits tend to have more positive job attitudes².

Some of this process might occur before newcomers formally begin their tasks, while some occurs once the members enters to the military unit. Furthermore, socialization is an ongoing process by virtue of continues interaction with others in the workplace³.

The socialization process

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Realistic Work Previews | 1. Task/Job requirements | 1. Job attitudes |
| 2. Employee Orientation Program | 2. Role Responsibilities | 2. Stress |
| 3. Socialization Tactics | 3. Group Processes | 3. Job performances |
| 4. Mentoring | 4. Organizational processes | 4. Turnover |

Stages of Newcomers Socialization

Anticipatory Socialization. The important of socialization might occur even before a person becomes a member of a particular military unit. This process is called anticipatory socialization and includes a formal process of skill and attitude acquisition, which might occur during the time of military socialization in military academy. Other anticipatory socialization methods might include watching the portrayal of military unit life in television shows and movies. Naturally, not all anticipatory socialization is accurate and useful for the new member⁴.

Encounter. In the encounter stage, the new officer armed with some expectations about military unit life, encounters the day-to-day reality of this life. Formal aspects of this stage might include orientation programs, training programs as well as visits at different sub military units. Informal aspects include getting to know and understand the style and personality of superior and colleagues. At this stage, military units and their experienced officers are looking for an acceptable degree of conformity to military unit norms and the gradual acquisition of appropriate role behavior, which include creativity, team working and risk taking. On the other side, the newcomers are interested in having their personal needs and expectations fulfilled. If successful, the newcomers will have complied with critical military unit norms and should begin to identify with experienced unit members.

² Kristof, A.L.(1996). Person-organisation fit: An integrative review of its conceptualization, measurement and implication. *Personnel Psychology*,49. Saks,A.M., dhe Ashforth, B.E (2002). Is job search related to employment quality? It all depend on the fit. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87.

³ Van Maanen, J., dhe Schein, E.H.(1979). Toward a theory of organizational socialization. *Research in Organization Organizational Behaviour*, 1,209-264.

⁴ Feldman, D.C(1976). A contingency theory of socialization. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 21.

Role Management. Having survived the encounter stage and acquired basic role behaviors, the officer's attention shifts to fine tuning and actively managing his active role in the military unit. Every newcomer might be expected to exercise some idiosyncrasy credits and modify the role to better serve the military unit. This might require forming connections outside the immediate work group. The officer must confront balancing the now-familiar organizational role with non work roles and family demands. Each of these experiences provides additional socialization to the role occupant, who might begin to internalize the norms and values that are prominent in the military unit⁵.

Psychological Contract. When people enter military unit hold many expectations that they will get from the unit benefits based on their work. Such beliefs form what is termed as psychological contract. The psychological contract is referred to the belief hold by the military personnel related to reciprocal responsibilities among them and the unit. This is an unwritten deal⁶. E.g. a military officer might hope to get bonuses and promotion as a reward to the work and results achieved during mission. Contract violations appear when a military employee perceps that the unit has failed in completing one or many of its tasks. This often is reflected through nervous reactions that will influence negatively in the unit's performance⁷.

Why do violations of contracts occur? As in the case of unrealistic goals expectations, recruiters often ate tempted to promise more than the real possibilities, in order to attract the best in their formations. The newly comers lack minimal information to shape their own perceptions regarding the psychological contract. As a result, there are discrepancies or differences, among members of the unit regarding promised goals. Furthermore, changes within the unit, like the personnel reduction and restructuring may obligate the unit to consciously break promises and say aloud that is not able and willing to keep them.

Methods of socialization include a realistic job description, orienting programs, socialization tactics and counseling.

Realistic Job Description

We notice that often the newly comers have unrealistic expectations, exaggerated and imagining how their workplace would be. When work starts and expectations fail, individual experiences are turned into "real shocks", when the only result is job dissatisfaction. As a consequence, circulation phenomenon and its costs, happen to the newly comers, who are not able to survive the discordance of hope and reality. For the unit, this event represents failure of socializing. Realistic job description secures equilibrium, a realistic view of the positive and negative job aspects to the applicants⁸.

How do units act in projecting and leading realistic job descriptions? Usually, experienced personnel opinion and human resource specialist is taken in consideration related to

⁵ Wanous, J.P.(1992). Organizational entry: Recruitment, selection, orientation and socialization of newcomers.

⁶ Morrison,E.W dhe Robinson, S.L.(1997). When employees feel betrayed model of how psychological violation develops. *Academy of Management Review*,22.

⁷ Morrison and Robinson, 1997Robinson, S.L(1996).Trust and breach of the psychological contract. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 41.

⁸ Wanous, J.P and Reichers, A. (2000). New employee orientation programs. *Human Resource Mngt*, 10.

positive and negative job aspects. Later, these are included in booklets or CDs given to applicants.

Sometimes, realistic descriptions make use of simulations delivered by applicants. E.g. in recruiting military personnel, a 5-day training camp is set, where many activities are held like, shooting practices, physical training, simulating many fighting scenarios etc. Those who are successful go in the next phase. Realistic descriptions make possible to who doesn't want to leave the job opportunity, even though offered another position and not leaving the application process. As a result, applicants that percept a good adaptation among job-person and person-unit, are more willing to stay in the application process and accept the job offer. Even though circulation reduction is generated by the realistic job description is minimal, it may result in substantial savings for the units finance. Assuring a realistic description helps in minimizing psychological contract violations.

Orientation Programs

As the newly comers start socializing during meeting phase, this is done though orienting programs, which are compiled for presentation regarding the job and people that are going to work in the unit. The main aim of orientation programs consists in security issues, health, time, job conditions and information regarding history and traditions. Another aim of the programs is the start of transmitting and shaping the psychological contract, learning how to handle stress situations⁹. The newcomers are taught relaxation techniques, given principle guidelines for interpersonal relations in the work. People are taught to know that why this unit is, what it wants to achieve and what is important to it. They learn who VIPs are visiting, not only within the unit but also further. After 90 days, even a counselor is set to them by the aim to get extra assistance and build a relationship with their colleagues.

Orientation programs are an important method of socializing as may have a long term influence in stances and behavior in the workplace for these newcomers. Studies show that the personnel who follow thoroughly training programs are willing to stay for a longer time in the unit¹⁰.

Socialization Tactics

Although realistic job description and the importance of orienting programs in youth socialization, this process does not end with the conclusions done in the last day of orienting program. John Van Maanen and Edgar Schein developed a socialization theory that helps to understand and explain this process. They suggest six socialization tactics¹¹.

Tactics

Units may use collective or individual socialization tactics, formal-informal, sequential, random, variable, fixed, and serial and investure tactics. When using collective tactics it

⁹. Schetler, J. (2002, August). Welcome to ACME Inc. Training, 39.

¹⁰. Van Maanen, J., and Schein, E.H. (1979). Toward a theory of organizational socialization. In B.M. Staw, Research in organizational Behaviour. Vol.1. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

¹¹. Ashforth and Saks, 1996, Cable, D.M., and Parsons, C.K. (2001). Socialization tactics and person-organization fit. Personnel Psychology, 54.

includes socialization in group, where the same experience and challenges are received. Military boot camps for training events seem to be of the same nature as classes for training of sales and flight attendants. In contrast to them, individual tactics consist in socializing through experiences that adapts for any newcomers. Training in work and working period as apprentice to develop skilled personnel constitutes the individual socialization.

Institutional-Individual Socialization. Research related to socialization tactics points out two main groups. Institutional Socialization consists of collective, formal, sequential, fixed, serial and investiture tactics. Individual Socialization consists on individual, informal, random, variable, and disjunctive and divestiture. Institutional socialization reflects a more structured program of socialization and as a result will help reduce to the newcomers' feelings of uncertainty. On the other hand, individual socialization reflects relative lack of structuring and as a result the beginning experience is somewhat not certain.

Institutional socialization tactics are effective in promoting loyalty to the unit, the spirit of it and uniformity of behavior among the socialized. The last characteristic is very important. There is no importance in which part of the globe the militaries are, they will know who to salute.

Institutional socialization tactics are effective in stimulating uniform behavior. Furthermore, the socialized individual may pressure to peer for things to be made precise. As such, in the institutionalized socialization, the peer is proven to be an important source of information to the other.

When the socialization is individual, the new members of the unit are more ready to act according to personal characteristics of the one socializing. So, two officers newly trained and employed "*on-the-job-training*" by their superior officer, may think and act like him.

Institutional socialization is always accompanied by individual socialization as soon as the newcomers go to their units. E.g. new soldiers start on their job of security guarding with someone experienced. At these moments they start developing their individuality through task completion¹².

Mentoring

During this material, it is underlined the importance of superiors and peers, who play the active role in socialization process. A special and important relation exists among the newcomer and the person in charge of counseling.

The counselor is an experienced or the eldest in the unit, who devotes a particular attention to the newcomer, by giving advice and enabling opportunities for career advance. Many researchers have underlined the necessity of the counselor in the first phases of career¹³. In order for the counselor to be effective, they should be successful in two directions: career and psycho-social functions.

¹². Dalton, G.W., Thomson, P.H. and Price, R. (1977, Summer). The four stages of professional careers-A new look at performance by professionals. *Organizational Dynamics*.

¹³. Allen, T.D., McManus, S.E., and Russell, J.E.A. (1999). Newcomer socialization and stress: Formal peer relationships as a source of support. *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, 54.

Psycho-social Functions of Counseling. Counselors may offer psycho-social advices that grow self-confidence, understanding the identity and possibility in handling emotional trauma, which may damage the effectiveness of the newcomer. This includes- Role modeling (provides attitudes, values and behaviors that a newcomer may try imitate). Acceptance and Confirmation - counselor may encourage, support and help the newcomer to gain self-confidence. Counseling - opportunity to discuss personal issues regarding career advancement, family conflicts etc.

In a last study for counseling based on other peers' experience, found that functions of career and psycho-social counseling were related to the successful socialization of the newcomers and that socialization was negatively related to job stress. On other words, successful socialization required fewer efforts for handling stress. Both counseling functions were related to the quantity of assistance given to handle stress that the newcomers had taken from their counselors¹⁴.

While all mentors, by definition, provide some subset of the career functions, they do not always provide the psychosocial functions. People starting their careers should be aware of the importance of these career and psychosocial functions and should attempt to establish a social network that will fulfill them. A mentor relationship is usually a key element in this broader set of relationships. To some extent, a supportive and well-connected social network can substitute for not having an effective counselor¹⁵.

What Newcomers can do to socialize themselves?

Based on what we have mention above, we might have the impression that individuals are at the organization to socialize them and help them progress in their careers. This however is not the case. Individuals also learn by interacting and observing the behavior of others and through self-management. People with proactive personality have a tendency to behave proactively and to effect positive change in their environment. Thus, it should not surprise that newcomers can be proactive in their socialization and in the management of their careers through the use of proactive behaviors. In fact, observation has been found that this is one of the most common ways that newcomers learn on the job. As a result, newcomer self-management behavior is related to lower anxiety and stress and to a more successful socialization¹⁶.

Proactive socialization refers to the process in which newcomers play an active role in their socialization through the use of a number of proactive tactics. One of them is to request feedback about their performance, seeking information about their work tasks and roles as well as about their group and unit. Recall that organizational socialization is about learning the attitudes, knowledge and behaviors that are necessary to function as an effective member of a group (unit). One way for newcomers is to seek information from others in the unit.

¹⁴. Chao, G.,Walz,P and Gardner,P.(1992).Formal and informal mentorship: A comparison on mentoring functions and contrast with nonmentored counterparts, *Personnel Psychology*, 45(1988).

¹⁵. Ostroff,C., and Kozlovski, S.W.J.(1992). Organizational socialization as a learning process: The role of information acquisition. *Personnel Psychology*.45.

¹⁶. Morrison, E.W.(1993).Newcomer information seeking: Exploringtypes, modes, sources and outcomes. *Academy of Management Journal*, 45.

In order to seek information and feedback, there are some other proactive tactics that newcomers can use such as building relationship with colleges, job change negotiation, career-enhancing strategies, involvement in work-related activities and informal counseling relationships. As mention above, informal counselor is extremely important for career development and socialization. Thus, newcomers should be proactive in finding a mentor if their organization does not have a formal counseling program.

Conclusions

Socialization is a process through which people learn norms and necessary roles to make the group or the unit functional. It is a process that involves learning on the task, role, group, unit and achieving high levels of person-job and person-unit adaptation. The newcomer personnel learn norms and role requirements, through three-step socialization phases: anticipation, meeting and role management.

Realistic job description assists to the newcomer in handling their unrealistic hopes and expectations in the beginning. Orientation programs, present the newcomer personnel with the workplace, tasks and people on the job within the unit. Institutionalized socialization reflects a structured program, which helps reducing newcomer's insecurities. Individual socialization reflects a relative absence of the structure and lack of experience to the newcomer, which are going to be present. Counselors may help the new members during socialization, influencing in their career path, by performing career and psycho-social functions. The newcomers may play an active role in their own socialization through use of proactive socialization tactics.

Bibliography:

1. Saks,A.M., dhe Ashforth, B.E (1997). A longitudinal investigation of the relationship between job information sources, applicant perception of fit and work outcomes. *Personnel Psychology*.
2. Kristof, A.L.(1996). Person-organisation fit: An integrative review of its conceptualization, measurement and implication. *Personnel Psychology*,49. Saks,A.M., dhe Ashforth, B.E (2002). Is job search related to employment quality? It all depend on the fit. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87.
3. Van Maanen, J., dhe Schein, E.H.(1979). Toward a theory of organizational socialization. *Research in Organization Organizational Behaviour*, 1,209-264.
4. Feldman, D.C(1976). A contingency theory of socialization. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 21.
5. Wanous, J.P.(1992). Organizational entry: Recruitment, selection, orientation and socialization of newcomers.
6. Morrison,E.W dhe Robinson, S.L.(1997). When employees feel betrayed model of how psychological violation develops. *Academy of Management Review*,22.
7. Morrison and Robinson, 1997Robinson, S.L(1996).Trust and breach of the psychological contract. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 41.
8. Wanous, J.P and Reichers, A. (2000). New employee orientation programs. *Human Resource Mngt*, 10.
9. Schetler,J.(2002,August).Welcome to ACME Inc. Training, 39.
10. Van Maanen, J., and Schein, E.H.(1979. Toward a theory of organizational socialization. In B.M. Staw, *Research in organizational Behaviour*. Vol.1. Greenwich, CT:JAI Press.

11. Ashforth and Saks, 1996, Cable, D.M, and Parsons, C.K.(2001). Socialization tactics and person-organization fit. *Personnel Psychology*, 54.
12. Dalton, G.W., Thomson, P.H. and Price, R.(1977, Summer). The four stages of professional careers-A new look at performance by professionals. *Organizational Dynamics*.
13. Allen, T.D., McManus, S.E., and Russell, J.E.A.(1999). Newcomer socialization and stress: Formal peer relationships as a source of support. *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, 54.
14. Chao, G, Walz, P and Gardner, P.(1992). Formal and informal mentorship: A comparison on mentoring functions and contrast with nonmentored counterparts, *Personnel Psychology*, 45(1988).
15. Ostroff, C., and Kozlovski, S.W.J.(1992). Organizational socialization as a learning process: The role of information acquisition. *Personnel Psychology*.45.
16. Morrison, E.W.(1993). Newcomer information seeking: Exploring types, modes, sources and outcomes. *Academy of Management Journal*, 45.

SECTION IV

SECURITY ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

In this section the authors of articles treat a wide range of topics on security and defence, worth being in the attention of everyone. With the selection, we believe we have been realistic in our efforts.

Most of the articles of this Section explore vital issues for the present and the future of our country and of the Albanian Armed Forces. Worth mentioning are the articles regarding to reactivation of domestic air transport, stress during combat operations etc.

Further, articles of study background are mainly distinguished by the analysis of the security concept. Currently, everyone is talking about security, but we should probably examine it in each of its elements, in order to better understand the evolution of this definition.

In the next editions, the Editorial Office will call for papers related to issues of training and exercises in the Albanian Armed Forces, law enforcement and many other related issues which are directly linked with the life of the Albanian military.

There are people at all levels who have what to say about their experience. However, we encourage the contribution of people who are daily facing the challenges of professional forces. Above all, they have to give opinions and recommendations for their solution.

Security within the Framework of International Relations

Col. ® Zeno Jahaj,
Specialist, Strategic Policy and Plan Directorate, MoD

Abstract. *What is security? What gets in the way of the people and their powers that do not leave them achieving a certain level which will provide either intended or a real security? Security from whom? How much security?*

The security has been always the deepest anxiety of the nations states in order to survive and develop within the framework of anarchy that is generated precisely because of their unique right to have and exert the supreme monopoly of using force, militaries and weapons, as well as lawmaking to their citizens. The spectrum of international relationships has been widened in the first decade of the 21-st century, but a variable has not changed: the mistrust. The world has become more cooperative, but craftier as well, more global, but much more dangerous and unpredictable and hence, much more uncertain.

The history makes it evident that contradictory tendencies are and will remain within the international relations game where each part takes care of its eternal interests and attempts to achieve more power.

We have seen an essential and immense change of the security concept along with last two decades. The security agenda doesn't consist of only defence and military issues. The political, economic, social and environmental security has become already natural part of the former traditional security concept. Even the military concept of security has been evolved to include the so-called "third kind of wars", or "hybrid wars" or "asymmetrical wars". We may say that the security issues that have been coarsely qualified as "military" have been widely civilized and vice versa, the issues that have been coarsely qualified as "civilian" have been widely militarized. The War against Terrorism specifically has blurred the classical distinction between them.

There is not only one answer against these questions. We know that the social sciences have more than one history to tell. In the following writing we will try to reach a comprehensive approach in order the security concept be defined in a complementary classical and modern way. The aim is finding an acceptable term which would define that line or gap, beyond which, the security becomes insecurity.

Introduction

If, as it is said, belief and hope stimulate people as they are born, the need for security is not that far behind. Hope and belief work to overcome the eternal insecurity of life. While life is conditioned by nature, it is mostly belief in God that provides security through the promise of eternal life after death, and thus man trusts his life to a higher power – to the divinity. The need to ensure security is an anxiety that accompanies man throughout his life. This has been true even after man founded the State – a supernatural entity intended to shut the door on eternal insecurity.

Paradoxically, when mankind gained power and wealth, this simultaneously made it more difficult to attain fundamentally desired security. This symbiotic paradox incorporates the well known international relations term “Security Dilemma”. (In the literary version this is also Shakespeare’s dilemma: “To be or not to be – that is the question”). The paradox also drives the need to understand security functions within the uncertain international system of States.

What then is security? What prevents individuals, or the States created by people, from becoming not only subjectively but objectively secure? Secure from whom? For whom? How much security? From which risks?

The “Grand Prix” of International Relations

The discipline of international relations exists because of, and within, the full spectrum of relations between States. Socially, individuals exist within political, social, racial, linguistic, and moral structures, which are conditioned by each other, and which are part of the world order. “Security is a relational phenomenon. Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded.”¹

Historically, concepts of security have been focused mostly on political States as the primary international actors. Ensuring the existence of society has been the greatest concern of all States emerging from within an otherwise uncertain international system. States remain unique in commanding a monopoly on power, through armed forces, lawmaking, and enforcement over citizens and other members of society. In this system...”The relationship between states are characterized by distrust...this is the predicament of states...an indispensable feature of all anarchic systems”².

According to Kant, States in the international system exist in a fashion similar to that of people living within the natural condition, wherein no rule of law exists (lat. “statu injusto”). This condition of eternal uncertainty causes the anxiety that is the source of confrontation and the struggle for power and hegemony among States. A. Jones says that our field [of international relations] should be interested first of all in the relationships between states and those between societies and nongovernmental actors, in the scale that these affect relationships between states and exert influence upon them³.

¹ Buzan, Barry, “People, States and Fear”, pg. 187

² Holsti, Kalevi J. “The state, war and the state of war”, Albanian edition, 2008, pg. 9

³ Jones, A, “Interview with Kal Holsti”, 2002, fq. 621

Although the spectrum of international relations in the second decade of the 21st century is very wide, it is obvious that a constant feature of such relations remains unchanged, and is the element of distrust. The world has become more cooperative, but simultaneously craftier in this cooperation. International relations are more globalist, but remain equally dangerous, unpredictable, and uncertain. History tells us that in international relations contradictory interests have been, and continue to remain, part of the game wherein States work toward the eternal goal of gaining more power. Patrick Morgan says that as far as states are armed, they are threatened and threatening, dangerous and afraid⁴.

Thus, the “Grand Prix” of international relations belongs to the issue of security. All international relations are primarily security relationships, and various instances of international chemistry produce neither more, nor less, than basic issues of security. Hence, the famous Holsti’s expression that if you want a sovereign state system, the price is general uncertainty and successive wars⁵.

Definitions with question marks

1. *Definitions of security within the anarchic system of states*

Linguistics shows that the meaning of security is a *situation* linked with a *danger*. Professor Collins also provides a very interesting qualification telling that independently from the contested nature of security, at the end, we are interested in how *referred objects are threatened* and what they can do in order to *survive*⁶. Thus, the definition of security can take the form of *absence of a threatening situation linked to the survival of the referred objects*.

Collins cites Buzan saying: “The security problem should be articulated as an existential threat”⁷. The term *existential*, is equal to the *survival* concept. Wolfers, gives us a much more detailed concept when he says: “Security, according to any objective meaning, measures the lack of threat against derived values, while according to any subjective meaning, it measures the lack of fear from the attack against these values”⁸.

Is the fear referred to real, or illusive? To escape from the clutches of subjectivism, Herd adds a very interesting detail: “Simply put, ‘danger’ can be qualified as the possibility of creating a happening which is negatively estimated”⁹. In the context of our analysis therefore, the *likely happening* is the threat itself - a scale or outcome of the *danger*. Then, the term security can be defined as: *The absence of a dangerous situation that may bring about a real threat to the survival of referred objects, and, as a consequence, the loss of obtained value*.

Now the issue is to identify the “referred objects” that may be threatened. Referred objects, says Ralf Emmers, are those which if threatened, bring about the upset of security and its conversion into insecurity. These are: *the state, sovereignty, the national economy,*

⁴ Collins, Allan (Morgan, Patrick), “Contemporary Security Studies”, Albanian edition, pg. 28

⁵ Holsti, Kalevi J. “The state, war and the state of war”, Albanian edition, 2008, pg. 10

⁶ Collins, Allan, , “Contemporary Security Studies”, Albanian edition, pg. 17

⁷ Collins, Allan, (Emmers, Ralf) “Contemporary Security Studies”, Albanian edition, pg. 154

⁸ Wolfers, Arnold “Discord and Collaboration”, 1962, pg. 15

⁹ Herd, Graeme P, “The security”, pg.21

*collective identity, and/or the environment*¹⁰. With this information, the definition will thus become: *The absence of a dangerous situation that may bring about a real threat to the survival of the state, sovereignty, the national economy, collective identities the environment, and, as a consequence, the loss of obtained value.*

Turning now to definition of *obtained values*, we may take it for granted that these are all national values that are inherited, obtained, or created during the course of national history. They consist of the core of national interests. According to Morgenthau, “*The national interests of a peaceful country may be defined as related to the national security*”¹¹.

What then are those national interests which, if violated in an irreversible way, alienate the national security and convert it into national insecurity? Morgan helps by defining the content of national interests as related to national security in this way:

A country’s security contains: physical security – security from attacks; independence – the freedom from the obligation to render obedience to the others’ orders and control; national prosperity – economic, social, educational; order – the capability to administrate the overall territory of the country, or in other words, the guaranty of the power, means and the legitimacy to obtain obedience and to extinguish or crush disobedience ¹².

It is common to use the term “physical” when referring to the territory of a country, and to add “constitutional” when discussing the concept of national “order”. Thus, definition of security would include: *The absence of a dangerous situation that may bring about a real threat to the survival of the State, sovereignty, the national economy, collective identities, and the environment, and as a consequence, the physical loss of territory and the independence, national prosperity, and the constitutional order of the people and the State.* This definition realistically includes all of the relevant terms that define the *hard power* elements of national security. All that is left is to include the *soft power* consisting of moral elements.

Ever oriented toward realism, Morgenthau offered an interesting method for determining the soft power elements of national security. He stated, that the withholding of power, increasing power, or the demonstration of power correspond to three basic national policies: maintenance of the status quo policy, imperialism, and the maintenance of national prestige¹³. The struggle for influence by States incorporates these policies, and the attainment of prestige and national honor constitutes an element of all political endeavors.

History provides abundant examples about why the attainment and maintenance of national prestige is an important national security issue. The American retaliation following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US as an example, was motivated not only by the physical damage caused by these attacks, but also by the damage that they inflicted on the national prestige of the US. For this reason *national prestige* is a legitimate element in formulating the definition of national security. Thus,

¹⁰ Collins, Allan, (Emmers, Ralf), “Contemporary Security Studies”, Albanian edition, pg.151

¹¹ Morgenthau, J.Hans, “Politics among Nations”, Albanian edition, 2008, pg.421

¹² Collins, Allan (Morgan, Patrick), “Contemporary Security Studies”, Albanian edition, pg.28-29

¹³ Morgenthau, H, “Politics among Nations”, English edition, pg. 52

that definition now becomes: *The absence of a dangerous situation that may bring about a real threat to the survival of of the State, sovereignty, the national economy, collective identities, and the environment, and, as a consequence, the physical loss of territory and the population, independence, national prosperity, constitutional order, and national prestige.*

What has been discussed until now was framed within the context of the nation state. However, in the global international system, no country can afford to live isolate from the rest of the world. Thus any country is, and remains interested in developments near or far. International influences create additional national commitments and obligations. As Waltz emphasizes: “[National] survival depends upon the material capacities of a state and from its alliances with other states”¹⁴. With international influences, the previous definition of national security expands to: *The absence of a dangerous situation that may bring about a real threat to the survival of of the State, sovereignty, the national economy, collective identities, the environment, and allies, and, as a consequence, the physical loss of territory and the population, independence, national prosperity, constitutional order and national prestige.*

2. The definition of security in the 21st century

The concept of national security has undergone basic changes during the first two decades of the 21st century. Defense and security agendas have been expanded with additional political, economic, social, and environment security considerations. National security issues have been “civilianized”. Put another way, the civil security agenda is necessarily linked with the national defense issues. Former conceptual boundaries have been blurred by the so called War on International Terrorism (WOIT). As a result, national security has been put in question marks due to globalization and changes in the State’s role. The international war against terror, wars taking place within various countries, coupled with the privatization of conflicts in failed states, forced the international community to come to grips with the need to protect individuals and social groups rather than just the state¹⁵.

Previous concepts of national security have been complemented with the knowledge that when all things are said and done, security for individuals and social groups is the measure of national security. Although national security remains the key responsibility of the State, no state can ignore the security of its citizens as its first concern. Within this framework, the definition of security must relate not only to the population as a group, but to individual citizens as well. Accordingly, the definition becomes: *The absence of a dangerous situation that may bring about a real threat to the survival of the State, sovereignty, the national economy, collective identities, the environment, and allies, and as a consequence, the physical loss of territory and the population, independence, national prosperity, constitutional order, national prestige, and the individual citizen.*

Conclusion

The purposes of this essay were exploration of classic formulations of the concepts of security, a review of the resulting evolution of those concepts due to globalism and the

¹⁴ Waltz, Kenneth N. “Theory of International Politics”, 1979, pg. 103 -104

¹⁵ Bryden Alan, Hanggi Heiner “Reform and Riconstruction of the Security Sector”, pg. 5

changing world order, and a reformulation of the definition of national security resulting from those changes. In this examination it was not possible to include every conceivable definition of security, and the results do not constitute the only possible answer. In this context, Henry Kissinger observed, that nations have generally followed their own interests rather than abstract supreme principles, and that they have been rivals, rather than cooperative partners. One cannot say that this has changed, or that it will change in the near future¹⁶.

Thus although by no means perfect, as a result of this examination, we may offer a comprehensive definition of national security that includes the necessary elements of the modern world. National security is *the absence of a dangerous situation that may bring about a real threat to the survival of the State, sovereignty, the national economy, collective identities, the environment, and allies, and as a consequence, the physical loss of territory and the population, independence, national prosperity, constitutional order, national prestige, and the safety of individual citizens.*

Bibliography:

1. Buzan, Barry, "People, States and Fear".
2. Holsti, Kalevi J. "The state, war and the state of war", Albanian edition, 2008.
3. Jones, A, "Interview with Kal Holsti", 2002.
4. Collins, Allan (Morgan, Patrick), "Contemporary Security Studies", Albanian edition.
5. Holsti, Kalevi J. "The state, war and the state of war", Albanian edition, 2008.
6. Collins, Allan, , "Contemporary Security Studies", Albanian edition.
7. Collins, Allan, (Emmers, Ralf) "Contemporary Security Studies", Albanian edition.
8. Wolfers, Arnold "Discord and Collaboration", 1962.
9. Herd, Graeme P, "The security".
10. Collins, Allan, (Emmers, Ralf), "Contemporary Security Studies", Albanian edition.
11. Morgenthau, J.Hans, "Politics among Nations", Albanian edition, 2008.
12. Collins, Allan (Morgan, Patrick), "Contemporary Security Studies", Albanian edition.
13. Morgenthau, H, "Politics among Nations", English edition.
14. Waltz, Kenneth N. "Theory of International Politics", 1979.
15. Bryden Alan, Hanggi Heiner "Reform and Riconstruction of the Security Sector".
16. Kissinger, Henry, "Diplomacy", Albanian edition, 1999.

¹⁶ Kissinger, Henry, "Diplomacy", Albanian edition, 1999, pg. 19

The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosova

Prof. Dr. Bejtush Gashi*,
MA. Sc. Sali Rexhepi

Abstract. *This study analyzes international circumstances that have affected the deployment of EULEX Mission in Kosova. The EULEX mission is the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosova. The main goal is to advise, assist and support the Kosova authorities regarding rule of law issues, particularly in the area of police activity, judiciary and customs. Also this mission has the responsibility to develop and further strengthen the justice system in an independent multi-ethnic Kosova, ensuring that rule of law institutions are not politically oriented. Also, EULEX helps rule of law institutions to adopt internationally recognized standards and European best practices.*

This mission was planned to be deployed in Kosova under the Ahtisaari proposal for resolving Kosova's final status, but due to disapproval of the UN Security Council, its full scope was extended until December 2008. EULEX operated within the framework of Resolution 1244 of UN Security Council and has a unified chain of command in Brussels. EULEX officials have supported the Kosova Police, Judiciary and Customs of Kosova, through MMA action for achieving objectives and targets, which are submitted to the EULEX Strategy program. However, the efficiency of EULEX has shown modest results. In the northern part of Kosova EULEX has failed, as a consequence of its incoherent and ambivalent mandate and the Foreign Policy and Security of the Union.

Key words: *EULEX mission, security, state security, collective security, human security, EULEX Police, the Kosova Police, Judiciary, Customs and Kosova.*

EU stance on Kosova independence

European Union, in case of recognition of independence for Kosova, once again proved that it is able in foreign policy, to speak with one voice. Major countries and most member states of the EU countries, in total 22, have recognized Kosova's independence. Only 5 EU member countries, for reasons of national interests and alliance with Serbia, as a subject eligible in international relations, even after the Opinion of the

* Deputy Minister of FSK (Kosova Security Forces), lecturer of Pristina University and University Colleges in Pristina and South East Europe University, Tetova, Republic of Macedonia

International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence, have not recognized so far the Kosovo independence.

Kosovo is first and foremost a European problem and the European Union has the primary responsibility and interest to resolve it and to stabilize the region. Sadly, the EU, in the case of Kosovo, showed its inability to agree on a common policy, which weakened its role at the international level, while this is done in disunity through major obstacle to determine action within the Kosovo, creating discrepancies between policies (ESDP and enlargement) run by various institutions of the EU's (Council and Commission).¹

Although the European Union has not managed to unify the common position of all member states to recognize Kosovo independence, EU bodies continue to be present and active in Kosovo, through various instruments to support development of political processes towards European integration.

The presence of the European Union in Kosovo

European Union, as a factor in international relations, failed to prevent and manage the crisis in Kosovo during the 90s. But the EU has joined other stakeholders to manage the Kosovo crisis and its member states, within the North Atlantic Treaty-NATO, who participated in the bombing of Serbian military targets in Kosovo and Serbia and forced it to withdraw forces from Kosovo. After the war (1999) and placing Kosovo under the administration of UNMIK, the EU has played an important role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Kosovo.

In 1999, Kosovo was opened to European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). This office provided emergency assistance to people who were displaced, and refugees who returned to the country, immediately after the entry of KFOR in Kosovo. It provided a valuable aid in the humanitarian field in the first phase, immediately after the war and ended its mission in 2001.²

Another activity that has taken the EU to support Kosovo after the war is the establishment of the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) in 2000. Under the political direction of the European Commission, EAR initially supported the reconstruction of Kosovo, then it supported construction and development of Kosovo institutions³.

EU in the framework of UNMIK, which is known as the fourth pillar, was made †with reconstruction and economic revitalization of Kosovo, which was destroyed during the war. The main activities of the fourth pillar are focused in the area of reconstruction, industry, public services and the Central Fiscal Authority.

The EU has been the main donor and has supported the Kosovo society after the war and contributed to building and institutional development of Kosovo. Currently, the European Union is present in Kosovo through the EULEX Mission, Office of Special Representative of the EU and the European Commission Liaison Office.

The EU, regarding the development of capacities in the field of security and defense

¹ Steven Blockmans & Ramses A. Wesesel, 2009/1, f. 19.

² Rama, B.Z. (2005), f. 15.

³ Ibid, page.16.

policy (ESDP), has increased its interest, except in economic aid, and appear as an important actor in international relations in the field of crisis management. With the development of new circumstances, which required the status of Kosova, the EU has expressed interest and willingness to help through the EULEX Mission in the rule of law.

The circumstances of the deployment of EULEX Mission in Kosova

Deployment of the EULEX Mission in Kosova has preceded a series of activities of international actors, committed to resolving Kosova's status. By placing Kosova under UNMIK administration, according to Resolution 1244, it was envisaged to start in the right time negotiations between Kosova and Serbia-parties to a full settlement of Kosova status.⁴

But the actors of international politics, preoccupied with major international issues following the events of 11 September 2001 in the U.S., the Iraq War, 2003, for a certain time were not engaged to resolve the issue of Kosova and its status.

To keep the situation under control and continue with *the status quo*, international actors involved in resolving the Kosova issue, started talking on the status and had been subject to so-called "standards before status", which according to SRSG Michael Steiner (Michael Steiner), in cooperation with the IPVQ, were summarized in eight points⁵ and approved by UN Security Council. To evaluate the implementation, after the events of March 2004, the Ambassador Kei Eide was appointed. The Report prepared for the Council, had determined that the application of standards was in compliance with the Resolution and that the situation is appropriate for launching negotiations to resolve Kosova's final status⁶.

The UN Secretary General appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to mediate in talks between Kosova and Serbian authorities, to resolve Kosova's final status. Chief negotiator Martti Ahtisaari, along with his team in the Office of UNOSEC, after a year and a half of mediation in negotiations between Kosova and Serbian authorities had concluded that continuation of negotiations is not possible due to diametrically opposed views on the future status of Kosova⁷.

Chief negotiator Martti Ahtisaari prepared the "Report and recommendations on the future status of Kosova". In the recommendations, based on the political history of Kosova, the political reality and the need for political and economic stability for resolving Kosova's status, he notes as follows:

- a) The reintegration of Kosova into Serbia is not a viable option;
- b) Continuation of the international administration of Kosova is not sustainable;
- c) The independence of Kosova, with international supervision, is the only sustainable solution⁸.

⁴ Annex 2, point 8 of Resolution 1244 of UN SC

⁵ Plan for implementation of standards, 2004.

⁶ Kai Eide Report, 2005.

⁷ Martii Ahtisaari Report, 2007.

⁸ Report of the Special Envoy of UN Secretary General on Kosova status.

Mr. Ahtisaari had drafted a comprehensive proposal for resolving the Kosova status, which regulates the political system foreseen in Kosova, the protection of minorities, in particular the Serbian one, the role of the international presence in Kosova, the role of the ICR and the EU in the field of law enforcement. The Comprehensive Proposal for the Settlement of Kosova Status of Mr. Ahtisaari was accepted by the authorities of Kosova, while Serbia rejected them.

UN Secretary-General, on March 26th, 2007, sent to the President of the Security Council the Report and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Settlement of Kosova Status prepared by the Special Envoy, whom he had supported as a whole and asked to examine approval of the SC.

Then, the report and the proposal of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, was set to be reviewed in the UN Security Council because the Security Council permanent members, Russia and China didn't agree with this proposed solution.

Later, international efforts continued to find a consensual resolution, which would reconcile both sides. For this purpose, the trio (Troika) was formed, consisting of representatives of the U.S., EU and Russia to renegotiate between Kosova authorities and Serbia to reach an acceptable solution.

But even after three months of additional negotiations, mediated by the Troika, no agreement was achieved and both sides (Kosova authorities and Serbia) were diametrically opposed in positions.

Proclamation of Independence

Kosova authorities have continued to coordinate international political actors, who supported independence for Kosova with the U.S. and major countries of the EU. Thus, on February 17th, 2007, the Assembly of Kosova upon the proposal of the President and the Prime Minister, in solemn session, declared Kosova an independent, sovereign and democratic country⁹.

The Kosova Assembly, during the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, made the invitation to send a European Union Civilian Mission in the framework of ESDP, to support institutions of the rule of law sector. The text of the Declaration states: "We invite and welcome an international civilian presence to supervise implementation of Ahtisaari Plan and the rule of law mission led by the European Union"¹⁰.

Establishment of the EULEX Mission

The whole concept of the establishment of the EULEX Mission in Kosova was envisaged in the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosova Status Settlement¹¹ of which the supervised independence will be conducted through the EU role of oversight in the rule the law area.

Council of the EU, assessing unwillingness of all member states to recognize Kosova's independence and using new ways of decision making - *constructive abstention* (Article

⁹ Declaration on the proclamation of the independence of the Kosova, 17 February 2008.

¹⁰ Declaration on the proclamation of the independence of the Kosova, 17 February 2008, point 5.

¹¹ Comprehensive Proposal for the Settlement of Kosova Status, By Martii Ahtissaari, 2007.

23 (1) TEU), which five member EU countries (Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus) opposed Kosova's independence, but did not hinder the decision making process on February 16th, 2008, a day before the declaration of independence, it had taken the decision for sending the EULEX Mission in Kosova¹² and Mr. Pitter Feith was appointed EU Special Representative in Kosova¹³.

EULEX is the largest civilian mission of the EU in the framework of ESDP, which is located outside its territory. This Mission had about 3,000 officers (1900 internationals, 1000 local). In this mission were present all participating EU member states, but also other countries such as USA, Turkey, Canada, Switzerland, Norway and Croatia. The mission was open to other states, which wanted to join. It consists of three components: police, courts and custom.

The deployment of EULEX in Kosova began to challenge Russia in the international level. The UN Security Council insisted that the engagement of EULEX Mission is in accordance with Chapter VII of UN Charter, by 1244 resolution. While Serbia developed its activity on two fronts: at the international level Russia required to respect international law, Resolution 1244, that EULEX maintain a neutral approach to Kosova. On the other side, in Kosova, especially in the north, which were to be led by the Serbian state structures, who opposed the EULEX deployment. They demanded that UNMIK continued its mandate under Resolution 1244.

Meanwhile, international actors, in overcoming obstacles of diplomatic maneuvers, made efforts to find an acceptable solution for the deployment of EULEX. During May and June 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and EU High Representative Javier Solana made efforts to find a compromise between the authorities of Kosova and Serbia, by which the UNMIK function in parallel with reduced responsibilities and staff, and EULEX, which would take the lead role in overseeing the implementation of the law.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in the Report presented to Council, on June 12th, 2008¹⁴, and outlining the situation in Kosova, had included the letters he had sent to Serbian President Boris Tadic. With this he announced a new strategy for the UN Mission in Kosova, EULEX. Ban Ki-Moon's letter, which had made concessions to Serbia, containing *six points*. The new strategy, which the Secretary General of the UN had proposed, through six Points, prescribed that "EULEX mission will have an operational role in the rule of law, in accordance with Resolution 1244 and will operate under the UN umbrella. EULEX, would gradually take operational responsibilities from UNMIK to the field of police, justice and customs"¹⁵. This proposal covered the temporarily and specifically regulated areas of police, customs, justice, transport and cultural and religious heritage in Kosova for the Serb minority there. Kosova authorities rejected six Points and responded with their proposal of *four points*.

Former Kosova President Fatmir Sejdiu during the meeting with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Daniel Fried, had presented the views of the institutions of the country,

¹² Vendimi i Këshillit në OJ L042, 16 shkurt 2008, fq.92.

¹³ Vendimi i Këshillit në OJ L042, 16 shkurt 2008, fq.88.

¹⁴ Raporti i Sekretarit të Përgjithshëm të OKB-së , S/2008/354.

¹⁵ Dzhic, V. dhe Kramer, H. (2009), fq.17.

formulated in four points, on the basis of which EU mission can begin expansion in the entire territory of Kosova, but respecting the constitution and territorial integrity of Kosova¹⁶.

After the UN Security Council meeting, held on July 26th, 2008, in which no consensus was reached on the restructuring of the international presence in Kosova, the initiative to act and take the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. He, with the tacit consent of other international actors, ordered his Special Representative in Kosova to take action for gradual reconfiguration of UNMIK. Meanwhile, EULEX gradually began to recruit international and local staff, while at the same time reduced UNMIK personnel.

On November 24th, 2008, a UN Secretary General's report was submitted to the Security Council, which analyzed the political situation, security, rule of law, local government, the return of displaced persons, property, cultural and religious rights, economy, the reconfiguration of UNMIK and EULEX's extension, dialogue with Belgrade. In the report, except the six points, where it was foreseen to protect the rights of the Serb minority in Kosova in connection with the police, justice, customs, transport and infrastructure, boundaries, and Serbian Orthodox religious heritage. As a separate annex it was included attitudes of institutions formulated in four points, which are explained above¹⁷.

The report was adopted by the Security Council, where it had six points, including Ban Ki Moon's, which were agreed by all actors of international politics, except Kosova institutions.

In response to the six Points, organized by Civil Society in late November 2008, in Prishtina was held a demonstration attended by some 50,000 citizens. EULEX officially spanned the entire territory of Kosova, on December 9th, 2008, and achieved operational capability on April 6th, 2009.

The mandate of the EULEX Mission in Kosova - truly valuable

From a legal perspective, the mandate of EULEX Mission in Kosova is based on the Joint Action Council of February 4th 2008¹⁸. Under this act, the EULEX tasks are to monitor and mentor the competent Kosova institutions in all areas of rule of law, including the Customs Service, but simultaneously maintain several executive responsibilities¹⁹.

Thus "it is the rule of law, public order and security as necessary, in consultation with international civil authorities. EULEX can reverse or annul the decision of the competent Kosova authorities."²⁰

So, according to the Joint Action Plan Ahtisaari, EULEX has a mandate to ensure the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law, public order and safety, in which may include restitution or set aside the decisions of local authorities²¹.

¹⁶ The Four Points of Kosovo Authorities.

¹⁷ Report of the UN Secretary General, S/2008/692, dated. 24 November 2008.

¹⁸ Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, OJ L 42/92, 16.02.2008).

¹⁹ Article 3 (a) of the Joint Action,

²⁰ Ibid: article 3 (b),

²¹ Article 3 (a) and (d) of the Joint Action (12).

Political and Security Committee had taken a decision on February 7, 2008 to appoint French General Yves de Cermabon, Head of EULEX, which earlier was the commander of KFOR in Kosova. EU Council, on February 16, the day when he decided to send a Mission in Kosova, was appointed the EU Special Representative, Mr. Pieter Feith²².

EULEX chief operating under the political direction of the Special Representative of the EU, which is also the International Civilian Representative and has the mandate to oversee implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan by the institutions of Kosova²³. PCN is appointed by the International Steering Group on 28 February 2008 and operates under the political direction of this group.

EULEX's mandate, in legal terms, it would be very clear and, in the political and practical, more effective, if placed under the Ahtisaari Plan and Joint Action Council, dated February 4th, 2008. But, as explained above, after opposition from Serbia and Russia, EULEX, reached the "legalized", after many diplomatic actions of international actors, on December 9, 2009 when the UN Security Council approved the Report of the Secretary-General, with the where / under which EULEX is placed under the UN umbrella, namely Resolution 1244 mandated the Kosova status-neutral²⁴. This status, which had agreed to all except the Government, under which EULEX is placed under the umbrella of UN Resolution 1244 respectively and the term of the Kosova status-neutral²⁵.

EULEX's mandate, in Resolution 1244 and the neutral status of Kosova independence, is inconsistent with the concept and spirit of the Ahtisaari plan, Kosova's Declaration of Independence and Constitution. The mandate of EULEX in the field of law creates legal uncertainty and difficulties in the political operation and its effectiveness.

Kosova's constitution, which entered into force on June 15th, 2008, Republic of Kosova, defines "an independent, sovereign, democratic, united and indivisible²⁶. While the sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Kosova is inviolable, inalienable, indivisible and protected by all means provided by the Constitution and the law²⁷.

The Constitution states that the sovereignty of the Republic of Kosova stems from the people, belongs to the people and exercised through elected representatives²⁸. Thus, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova does not recognize any international organization entitled to violate the sovereignty of the Republic of Kosova, or to exercise supreme power in the name of the people of Kosova.

But, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova, in the transitional provisions recognized the authority of the International Civilian Representative, organizations and other international actors, in this case EULEX, which was given the mandate and powers prescribed by the Ahtisaari Plan, including legal capacity and privileges and immunities included in it²⁹.

²² Joint Action of OJ L042, 16 February 2008, p88.

²³ Main dispositions of the Joint Plan (11).

²⁴ Report of the UN Secretary General, S/2008/692.

²⁵ Report of the UN Secretary General, S/2008/692.

²⁶ Article 1.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova.

²⁷ Ibid: article 2.2.

²⁸ Ibid: article 2.1.

²⁹ Ibid. article 146.1.

EULEX's mandate is also contradictory to the fact that, on the one hand, the legal level based on UNSC Resolution 1244 and the neutral term independence, while on the other hand, it operates within the legal system of Kosova, as defined the Constitution. Resolution 1244 and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova. These are in contradiction with each other.

In practical terms, difficult for EULEX officials is the fact that according to the mandate under Resolution 1244 and the neutral status during their daily operational work with their Kosovar counterparts, who are obliged to implement the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Kosova. Another difficulty for the operation and effectiveness of the EULEX officials present the six points of Ban Ki-Moon. There are also other authors, who consider the contradictory mandate of EULEX in Kosova difficult to succeed in practice.

In these circumstances, on one hand, it can damage the stability of the EULEX mission beyond the initial term and, therefore, complicates the governance of Kosova as a unified territory" ³⁰.

EULEX, in place to support local institutions in the rule of law, with its multifaceted approach leads to legal confusion and results which can not be fulfilled. In a fragile environment like Kosova, it can quickly turn against the flow of political events of EULEX"³¹.

Working in partnership with local institutions

Under 36 Action Program of MMK, the General Directorate of Border Police (BP) developed at BP level the Project and the Steering Committee was established to coordinate activities between EULEX Police and the fulfillment of 36 points of BP for MMK action. Under this program all sectors of BP were charged, each of its scope, to meet the MMK *fiche* action demands.

Objectives of the Combating Crime Sector are related to creating a safe environment for the citizens of Kosova, by coordinating actions with other agencies responsible for law enforcement. This section was responsible for meeting the 11th (30%) MMK actions demands.

The 2010 Report of the programs EULEX and BP Report, showed that five (5) operations were ongoing, one (1) was in the planning stage and five (5) actions were postponed. Operative Sector, which contained the largest number of BP members in uniform, was charged to meet the 8th (22%) of MMK action. Under the 2010 program report of EULEX and BP Report, showed that an action was implemented, while seven (seven) others were ongoing. According to the analysis that was posted by EULEX, in close collaboration with the Steering Committee for implementation of BP, it can be concluded that there was progress.

The objectives of the Border Police Sector focused on the work of the personnel of border crossing points regarding free movement of people and goods, keeping control

³⁰ Wel, Erika de, (2009), fq. 9.

³¹ Muharremi, R. (2010) fq.22.

of the border space, providing quality and professional services to all citizens of the country and to foreigners entering or leaving Kosova. This Department was responsible for meeting the 8th (22%) MMK action and established eight working groups charged with tasks and deadlines. Under the 2010 program report EULEX and BP Report, showed that six actions were being implemented, one was in the planning phase, while one was postponed.

The objectives of BP Administration intended to provide quality and effective services, impartial and professional BP employees, in order for it to be a stable and efficient organization of law enforcement, to ensure law and order, the safety of citizens and their property, while respecting the rights and freedoms. The Department was charged with meeting the ninth (25%) MMA actions for the implementation of which eight working groups were established.

According to reports, seven actions are being implemented, one is in the planning phase, while one is postponed. While the statistics of the reports mentioned above, shows that progress has been MMA's actions, which are being implemented³². There is a belief in public opinion that Kosova EULEX operations are very slow in effectiveness.

Civil society, through NGOs pressure made EULEX to restore order and rule of law in the North of Kosova and fighting high level corruption in government. So IPOL, had published two reports on EULEX, states: "As regards this aspect, we believe that EULEX has two options: either to work seriously on the completion of pending cases and to execute a series of high-level cases that would affect the roots of the problem, regardless of national and international interventions, or (second option) pass from possession of an executive function and focuses on strengthening local institutions, rule of law"³³. While well-known American analyst David Phillips, in analyzing the current situation in Kosova on the role of EULEX Mission, writes: "European mission to the rule of law mission (EULEX) was created with executive powers to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate specific categories of crimes, including corruption. However, this mission had a very slow start and so far has not realized expectations. He is suffering from a lack of consensus in Brussels"³⁴.

EULEX, until now, has had modest success in fulfilling its mandate. It has supported local institutions for the rule of law, which have recorded significant progress in three components. But consider that the weak point is the lack of support from EULEX to Kosova institutions and omissions to functionalized courts, to establish the rule of law and order in Northern Kosova and to operational duties in point 1 and 31.

EULEX has not supported the Government's strategy for the country's north. EULEX's unwillingness to establish order and security and the functioning of state institutions in northern Kosova, testifies that the neutral position of the Mission to Kosova's independence is an obstacle to achieving the objectives it has set itself. Also, another important factor for the failure of this mission in northern Kosova is the implementation, tacitly, the 6 points of Ban Ki-Moon.

³² For more details on the progress of Kosova police, see Sali Rexhepi study (2011) FON, Scopje, page. 91-105

³³ IPOL Report, 2009, pg.13.

³⁴ The analysis is published in World Policy Journal and Koha Ditore Newspaper, 21 August 2010.

The action of the Government, on July 25th, 2011, to bring under customs control points 1 and 31, was not supported by EULEX³⁵. Also EULEX police did not prevent Serbian gangs when, on July 26th, 2011, burned a border crossing facility and also tried to burn the 31st. It is disturbing that when viewed TV broadcast images, the EULEX police leaving so cowardly, in respect of the territory of Serbia, rather than to defend the burning of customs infrastructure.

The action of the Government was supported by KFOR forces, which later also took control and declared these two points as military area until authorities find a solution between the two countries. It is no coincidence that KFOR and the Kosova Police, local and international, have greater confidence from the citizens of Kosova³⁶.

EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton, the action of the Government of Kosova, July 25th 2011, to extend state authority at customs in northern Kosova, consider it as unilateral action and invited the authorities of Kosova and Serbia to return to dialogue mediated by her office to resolve problems between the two countries³⁷.

Kosova President, Mrs. Atifete Jahjaga regarding the EULEX declared: “Reviews of EULEX are right, because EULEX should implement law and order and fight organized crime and smuggling, which in the past were not eliminated very successfully”³⁸.

The action of the Government of September 16th, 2011, to take control of customs points 1 and 31, supported by KFOR forces, this time by EULEX, marks a turning point in attitudes and actions of EULEX support institutions, responsible for law enforcement. While the action of the Government of September 16th 2011, which had supported the EULEX officials, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton, through a press statement to the Office assesses that “EULEX and KFOR have begun to implement the Agreement on customs, aimed at restoring the normalization of trade relations between Kosova and Serbia, which were disrupted two months ago. It is not stated that EULEX officers along with Police and Customs officers are located in Kosova customs points 1 and 31, although such a thing exists on the ground. It emphasized that the implementation of the Agreement on Customs seals does not prejudice to the Kosova status issue³⁹.

EU commitments to mediate the dialogue between Kosova and Serbia have modest results before accepting the customs seals between the two countries. Let’s hope that the hitherto neutral stance EULEX will move toward full support of the Republic of Kosova institutions to put the rule of law and order throughout the territory of Kosova. But attitudes and actions of EULEX are dependent on unification of Foreign Policy and Security of the EU in relation to Kosova.

³⁵ Speech of Kosova Primeminister in the Parliament, dated. 23 August 2011, pg.2, in www.assembly-kosova.org

³⁶ UNDP Report, 27 March 2010

³⁷ Declaration of Catherine Ashton, A 300/11, published 28 July 2011, in www.eeas.europa.eu.

³⁸ Interview with the President of Kosova Atifete Jahjaga, to the Free Europe, 01.08.2011

³⁹ Deklaration of Catherine Ashton, A 362/11, published in 16 September 2011, in www.eeas.europa.eu

Conclusions

Work of this mission has favored a number of facilities, such as the presence of legal support necessary for placement and the conduct of this mission, the presence of KFOR and KSF as security forces, the presence of a criminal-law legislation government on the basis of which the justice system works in Kosova, etc. But, this mission has followed many challenges, among which we distinguish: the ambiguity of the executive functions of EULEX, the presence of a non-steady state of security in the country, operating system *and power-triplet* (UNMIK-EULEX- Kosova Institutions), the existence of parallel structures, social problems, the issue of missing persons, the mixed composition of EULEX Mission, etc.

The EULEX mission, despite the difficulties of its first term, has provided modest results in the rule of law. Kosova police, judiciary and customs in Kosova, under the support of EULEX have managed to improve their performance. The number of cases where criminal acts were prevented, some actions had been taken to prosecute organized crime and corruption, the method of police work with communities has changed, the efficiency of integrated border management with Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro has increased. Also, the number of cases that courts have reviewed and improved performance of customs. EULEX, which had manifested apart sluggish in meeting the targets in northern Kosova has completely failed to restore order, rule of law and support the functioning of courts and customs in point 1 and 31.

EULEX could not be effective enough due to his ambivalent term, with a neutral attitude towards independence. Other factors that have led to inefficiencies of EULEX, especially in northern Kosova, are the six points of Ban Ki-Moon. Also, another factor that has contributed to inefficiencies of EULEX, was a defiance right between the Kosova government and EULEX. Also, the incoherence of EU Foreign Policy and Security, namely the position of the five states that do not recognize Kosova's independence, has contributed to the success of EULEX deficiency.

In order that EULEX succeed in meeting the objectives set by the Joint Action, it is necessary that the Political and Security Committee, in coordination with the Commander of the Civil CSDP missions, to assess the performance of EULEX Room and meeting its objectives. On that basis, it should recommend to the EU Council to review the mandate of EULEX to have a clear stance against Kosova's independence and to support local institutions in the rule of law, in accordance with the Constitution of Republic of Kosova, internationally recognized standards and European best practices.

Bibliography:

1. Barroso, MJ (2008) The EU and Peacekeeping: Promoting Security, Stability and Democratic ValBEs, in: <http://www.eurunion.org/eufocus>.
2. Blokcmans, S. and Wessel, R. (2009) The European Union and Crisis Management: Wil the Lisbon Treaty make the EU more effective? In: CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2009/1 (<http://www.cleer.eu>).
3. Demiel, J. and Schmidt, GA (2009) Kosova 2009: Uncertain Future, in: *spotlighting europe*, nr. 2009/1.
4. Erika de Wet (2009) The Governance of Kosova: Security Concil Rezolution 1244 and the Establishment and Functioning of EULEX, in: *America Jurnal of International Law*,nr.83.

5. Guttry, A. (2009) The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosova: Remarks on its legality, in: International Training Program for Conflict Management, no.1 April 2009 (www.itpcm.sssup.it).
6. Grevi, G.(2009), EULEX Kosova: The EU role of the Law mission in Kosova (EULEX Kosova).
7. Kërveshi, K. (2006): Politika e Përbashkët e Jashtme dhe e Sigurisë si instrument i integritit: përputhja ndërmjet detyrimeve të BE-së dhe të drejtës së BE-së, bot: DREJT EUROPËS, Prishtinë, f. 225-253.
8. Muharremi, R. (2010), The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosova (EULEX) from the Perspective of Kosova Constitutional Law, in: Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (Heidelberg Journal of International Law) 70 (2010), pp. 1-23.
9. Novotina, K. (2009), Kosova,s post-Independence-test for the EU,s Common Foreign and Security Policy. What role has the EULEX Mission to play in Kosova?, in COFOLA the Conference Proceeding, 1. editon, ISBN.
10. Pond, E. (2008) The EU's Test in Kosova, in: The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008 *The Washington Quarterly* 31:4 pp. 97-112.
11. Peters, S. (2010) Strategic Communication for Crisis Management Operations of International Organizations: ISAF Afganistan and EULEX Kosova, in: EU Diplomacy Papers, nr.01/2010.

For a Reactivation of Domestic Air Transport

Dilaver Goxhaj,
Air Traffic Lecturer, Troop School, TRADOC

Abstract. *This study launches a concept in the interest of central and local governmental officials, politicians and Albanian business community in support of an operational Domestic Air Transport (DAT) in Albania, both for passengers and goods.*

The study is based on making use of huge economic investments of the past in the area of DAT. This is also imposed by the massive movement of population from rural areas to big cities. Further, we cannot underestimate the Albanian population in Kosova, Presheva, Montenegro, Macedonia, and our economic immigrated population as well.

Introduction

The reform of domestic economy has to take into consideration and make use of Domestic Air Transport (DAT) Service. This ready-made infrastructure may be also used as the Albanian terrain is too broken, with 26 % of mountains. The north-south air distances, with Tirana as the center, reach up to 170 km, and Tirana-East about 100 km, and in this context DAT service reactivation proves to be cost-effective. Further, the substantial increase of population, which in 2010, amounted to 3,194,972 inhabitants¹, with a natural increase scale of 2.588 %², and a net immigration ratio of 4 in 100 immigrants³, is an additional supportive factor. During 2010, there were 1564 road accidents where 2372 citizens⁴ were dead, but they could have been prevented through DAT service.

The economy is developing where 32.8% of the labor force works abroad². Exports during 2010 reached 161.504 million ALL and imports reached 478.708 million ALL⁵. GDP composition, according to relevant sectors, is as follows: agriculture at 55%, where about 50% of the national labor force is employed; industry at 24%; services at 21%. The transport activity during the first trimester of 2011 suffered an increase of 1,6 %

¹ <http://www.instat.gov.al/graphics/doc/downloads/lfs/2011>

² <http://passthrough.fwnotify.net/download/www.instat.gov/2011>

³ According to the 1998 statistical yearbook

⁴ <http://www.instat.gov.al/graphics/doc/downloads/lfs/2011>

⁵ <http://www.instat.gov.al/graphics/doc/downloads/lfs/2011>

compared to the preceding⁶ semester whereas the labor force of immigrants is 352.000⁽⁷⁾. A total of about 2 million Albanian people live in Diaspora, distributed as below⁸: Turkey up to 300 000; Italy 420 000; Greece over 600 000; USA over 500 000 (since 1990:113661 persons); Germany 11 630 (only from the Republic of Albania); Canada 14 935 (only from the Republic of Albania); England 50 000 etc. We should also consider the Albanian population in Kosovo with 2 100 000 inhabitants; Macedonia 700 000; Montenegro 180 000; Preshevo 80.000. The number out of political borders of the Republic of Albania reaches 5 million Albanians.

All these factors should be taken into consideration for a functional DAT Service and for the International Air Transport. Considering that the industrial production is increased by 9% each year⁹, exports reached 1645504 tons of goods¹⁰. Imports reached 643212 tons of goods¹¹ being another positive drive in respect of DAT Service. Considering that the main export partners are Italy 67%, Greece 15%, Germany 5%, Austria 2%, former Republic of Macedonia 2%, the activation of local airports extremely facilitates both our exports and imports, where the main import partners are Italy 37%, Greece 28%, Turkey and Germany at 6%, with which we have direct airlines.

Current transport situation in Albania

As regards the road transport, it is 18 000 km of which only 7.700 km are paved¹² while the railway transport is 447 km, where 1435 km are a standard line and 230 km are a secondary railway line. About 250.000 vehicles move in the road transport, of which about 64% are cars, 8% vans and the remainder is used for the transport of goods.

The railway network is distributed from the Port of Durrës in three directions: North-ani Hotit; South-Ballsh and Vlora, East-Pogradec. After 90-s, this type of transport suffered a considerable decline. As regards the maritime transport, it is carried out through four ports.

Albania has favorable conditions for conducting transport via hydroplane as there are many lakes far from Tirana, such as the lake of Prespa, Shkodra, Ohrid, Lura, Butrint and Farka Basin in Tirana.

A short overview of Air Transport in Albania

The beginning of the Civil Air Transport in Albania dates back to November 1924. In August 1927 it was purchased by the Italian company, Ala Littoria, which maintained it until 1943¹³. In spring 1925, after the construction of a grass airfield sized 400 x 200 m in Tirana, the first internal air flights were launched, with Shkodra and Vlora as destinations. The Italian company expanded flights in the direction of Elbasan, Korça,

⁶ <http://www.instat.gov.al/2011>

⁷ <http://www.instat.gov.al/graphics/doc/downloads/lfs/>

⁸ <http://www.mpsc.gov.al/emigrim> & <http://feshgroup.blogspot.com/2009/03>

⁹ *ibidem*

¹⁰ <http://www.instat.gov.al/graphics/doc/downloads/lfs/2011>

¹¹ *ibidem*

¹² "Standard" Newspaper, 24.10.2011

¹³ History of Albania, Academy of Sciences, Tirana, 1984, v.3, pg. 61

Peshkopia and Gjirokastra, and opened international lines with Rome, Milan, Thessaloniki, Sofia, Belgrade, Podgorica. Lapraka Airport was built in 1935. After the Second World War, the DAT service was interrupted. Aerodromes and runways of airfields were used for military aviation exercises, and for agricultural and health needs.

Rinas Airport was built during 1954-1957, for initial military purposes. The “State Enterprise of International Air Transport (Albtransport)” was established on 25 January 1957. The Airline Companies which operated until 1960 were Aeroflot, Jat, Malev, Tarom and Interflug. Some interruptions of airlines occurred during 1962-1978.

The Republic of Albania acceded to ICAO in 1989 and tasks of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) were specified. Negotiations for the opening of the Albanian Airspace started in the beginning of 1988, upon IATA initiative, favoring the division of ATC activity from Albtransport. During the same years, governmental agreements of the Civil Air Transport were concluded with Bulgaria, Federal Republic of Germany, Slovenia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Macedonia. In the early 1992, ATC activity was separated from Albtransport, and the National Air Traffic Agency (ANTA) was established. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was set up on 3 February 1992 to handle the development required at that time. The overflight of the first aircraft was completed at 09:16 hrs on 19 October 1990. The initial traffic of overflights was low, 4-5 aircrafts per day, while presently it is 500-700 per day. The initial cost calculated with IATA in 1991 was charged 100 \$ per overflight. In February 1992, ANTA was registered as a legal entity, the first of this level in Balkans. The foundations of the security of civil transport aviation were laid in 1994, with a loan of 50 million \$. From legal perspective, the process of air traffic international recognition and of membership in ICAO started in 1990. The membership in ECAC was made possible in 1998 and in 2004 Albania became a member of Eurocontrol and in 2009 it was CANSO member. With the beginning of the war in Kosovo, our airspace was totally closed and was transferred under the authority of NATO forces. Currently, ANTA is a modern center according to the NAMP project with Lockheed/Martin Global inc Company. Presently, there are 14 airline companies operating in Albania. Two of them are Albanian, covering 49,42% of the total number of flights to and from Rinas¹⁴ Airport. Based on the annual report for Albania, ECAA, the air traffic flow in “Mother Theresa” Airport-Tirana-2005-2010¹⁵ is shown in the following table:

Year	Aircraft flights	Luggage (in tons)
2005	15 400	2 000
2006	15 856	1 603
2007	18 258	1 695
2008	19 194	1 987
2009	20 064	1 711
2010	20 768	1 785

¹⁴ <http://www.instat.gov.al/graphics/doc/downloads/lfs/2011>

¹⁵ ECAA Report for the Air Transport of the Republic of Albania, dated 31.01.2011

Out of this number of passengers, 998 756¹⁶ have come in 2010 only for tourism and holidays. The total number of passengers entering Albania during 2010 is given below¹⁷:

Passengers	Albanians	Foreign
By Air	752.561	246.192
By Sea	328.429	216.079
By Land	1.418.840	1.955.5
Total	2.228.645	2.417.7

Out of this number, 3.338.687 persons have visited Albania only during 2010 for holidays and visits of friends and relatives while the air exports and imports of goods included 671 tons¹⁸. If we admit that only 50% of those who enter by air and sea will use DAT service, the number reaches 770 thousand passengers and 1,5 million passengers, if they return by air, without calculating the local inhabitants. Accordingly, the number of passengers for DAT service during one year may exceed two million, in addition to the transport of goods. If we compare the time of the domestic road transport with the air transport, the conclusion is that we save 5 to 10 hours of time. Later, the need of direct lines between different towns or cities will arise.

No	Line	Distance
		By Air
1	Tirana-Vlorë -Tirana	147
2	Tirana-Kukës -Tirana	208
3	Tirana-Peshkopi -Tirana	183
4	Tirana-Korça -Tirana	181
5	Tirana-Shkodër -Tirana	111
6	Tirana-Gjirokastër -Tirana	232
7	Tirana-Sarandë -Tirana	284

Based on these data, we may calculate for these seven DAT terminal lines, an average number of 200–300 thousand travelers per year for each line. The number is the same if we admit that even only 6% of the travelers of current domestic road transport travel by air transport and we will have a double number of passengers by air, reaching a minimum number of 300-400 thousand.

¹⁶ <http://passthrough.fwnotify.net/download/www.instat.gov/2011>

¹⁷ <http://passthrough.fwnotify.net/download/www.instat.gov/2011>

¹⁸ *Ibidem*

Airports (airfields) situation of DAT Service

Lapraka Airport. It is situated Northwest of Tirana, with a runway 1200 meters long and 60 meters wide, with the coordinates: N- 41°20'09" and E- 19°47'37". The height above sea level is 90 meters. The landing-takeoff course is 3080–128°. Until 1996 the surface area was 29.4 hectares. It was built by the Italians by the end of 1935, according to the optimal technological modern standards, with an asphalt concrete runway sized 1200 x 400 m, accompanied by technical equipment and appropriate buildings. After the Second World War, it was used for humanitarian, military, governmental, agricultural, medical purposes and international flights. The following military aircrafts with/ without propellers have been deployed in this airport until 1961: PO-2, Jak 18, Jak 61, AN-2, IL-4 and MI-4 helicopters (until 1968). After 1968 this airport was used for flights of AN-2 and IL-14 aircrafts and for medical emergencies. Lapraka Airport was supplied with the necessary operational means. After 1992, by decision of both the Council of Ministers and the Defense Council, it turned from a Military to a Residential and Hospital Area, being reduced to a heliodrome facility.

Vlora Airport. Situated 1 km west of Vlora, at a height of 1 meter above sea level, with the coordinates: N-40° 28', and E-19° 30'. The landing and takeoff course is 166° and 346°. The runway is sized 1200 m x 80 m and paved; the connecting road is 100 m x 12 m long, paved with asphalt concrete. It was built during '30-s by the Italians where about 30 military transport and light air fighters were operational. As a civil line in the years '41- '43, "Ala Litoria" Company was operating on a daily basis, following the itinerary Tirana-Vlora-Gjirokastra, Tirana-Korça-Gjirokastra and return. After the national liberation, it was used for military, governmental, agricultural and medical purposes, where aircrafts of Jak-61, Mig-15, An-2 type were operational, supplied with air operation accessories. The existing infrastructure creates only minimum requirements for such a service. There is a possibility for medium capacity aircrafts to operate in this airport, including turbo-propeller type, but also turbo-jet, charter and small aircrafts. The airport is supplied with functional drainage pipeline. The integral parts of the runway surface area are: asphaltting with three layers, 2,5 cm asphalt concrete, asphalted and pebbled roll and finally the basic ground.

Gjirokastra airport (field). It is situated 0.8 km east of Gjirokastra, about 300 meters far from the national road Kakavijë-Tepelenë, at the height of 190 meters above sea level, with a surface of 1.573.000m². It proves to be a state owned property. The flight runway is 1200 m x 100 m. The landing and takeoff course is 320° and 140°. It was built by the Italians during '30-s, where about 30 military transport and fighter aircrafts were operational. After the national liberation it was used for military, governmental, agricultural and medical purposes, where aircrafts of different types were operational. In 1997 it was slightly damaged. Gjirokastra is a large economic-cultural and touristic center. There had been continuous demands from an English company to operate charter aircrafts in support of foreign tourists from Corfu to Gjirokastra. Also, the vast majority of the Greek minority lives in Gjirokastra district, which has massively immigrated in Europe and the USA.

Saranda (Vrion) Airport (field). Situated 3 km east of Saranda, about 6 km far from the national road, with coordinates: N-39°53'15" and E-20°03'35", at a height of 20

meters above sea level. The field is sized 780 m x 70 m. The landing and takeoff course is 30° and 210°. This runway was built during the years of the Nazi-Fascist invasion and was further maintained by the Ministry of Defense. The existing infrastructure creates only minimum conditions of a helirome. Hydrogeology is a relevant factor enabling the execution of air operations. Saranda district has a population of over 100 thousand inhabitants and antiquity heritage property such as Finiqi, Butrinti, Mesopotam village and Delvina.

Pish-Poro Airport (field), Vloora. It is situated 13 km from the national road, with coordinates: N-40°43'30" and E-19°28' and a surface area of 343.200 m², at the height of 1,4 meters above sea level. The runway is currently 2750 meters long and 60 meters wide. It was built during 1962-1963, where about 20 MIG-15, Mig-17 military aircraft and about 25 training propeller aircraft: JAK Tip- 61 and An-2 have been operational and functional until 1994. In 1997 it was out of service. The airport was designed and a study was conducted by the Italian Military Mission in Albania, in cooperation with FUA, in view of ensuring the continuity of flights of the Aviation School.

Hydrogeology is a relevant factor enabling the execution of air and land operations. It has a complete and sustainable sanitation system which is still operational. One of the problems encountered may be the continuous functioning of the existing embankments and the creation of a regular electric line with two supply options.

Airport (field) of Shtiqën-Kukës. It is situated in the south of Kukës, about 6 km from its center, at a height of 355.65 meters above sea level, with coordinates N-020°24'47", E-42°01' 37", with a landing and takeoff course of 12° and 192°. In 2007, the foreign company "ZAYED" finalized its construction with all of its respective annexes, where the runway is sized 1900 m x 30 m.

Airport (field) of Lumalas-Korça. Situated about 8 km from the center of Korça, at a height of 830 meters above sea level. It has a surface area of 343.200 m². The flight runway is sized 2500 x 100 m, with a landing and takeoff course of 191° and 11°.

Airport (field) of Muriqan-Elbasan. It is situated 13 km from the town of Elbasan and 5 km from the town of Cërrik, at a height of 75 meters above sea level. It has a surface area of 343.200 m². This field was exploited by the Ministry of Defense and further by NATO forces during the war in Kosovo. It proves to be a state owned property and its design plan is available.

Airport (field) of Shtoi-Shkodër. Situated 9 km in the north of Shkodër, at a height of 43 meters above sea level. It has a surface area of 193.200 m². The flight runway is sized 1200 x 100 m, with a landing and takeoff course of 178° and 358°.

Field of Kastriot-Peshkopi. It is situated about 10km from the center of Peshkopi, at a height of 459,60 m above sea level. Its coordinates are E-20°15'47" and N-4°10'21". The field is sized 1100 m x 100 m. No design plan is available for this field.

Field of Plugu-Lushnja. Situated northwest of Lushnja, about 8 km from its center, with coordinates N-40°57' and E- 19°37', at the height of 10 meters above sea level. The field represents a surface sized 800 x 80 m, with a landing and takeoff course of 330°2' 30". No design plan is available for this field.

Summary table with runway sizes

No.	Aerodrome location	Catego t
1	Lapraka Aerodrome	
2	Vlora Airport	
3	Pish-Poro Field	
4	Field of Lumalas, Korça	
5	Field of Gjirokatra	
6	Plugu Field, Lushnja	
7	Field of Muriqan, Elbasan	
8	Field of Shtiqni, Kukës	
9	Field of Shtoji, Shkodër	
10	Field of Fushë-Kastrioti, Peshkopi,	
11	Field of Fier	It is

Comparing the current prices of the road transport tickets for Tirana-Gjirokastër line with its cost by aircraft or helicopter, it results as follows:

Type of vehicle	Road Transport			Time of (Pro Aircraft
	Time	ALL	Euro	
By bus	6 hours	1700	13,5€	20' (37')
By van	5 hours	2000	15,7€	20' (37')
By taxi	4 hours	5700	42,7€	20' (37')

Conclusions

The reactivation of these airports does not have to be simultaneous. These airports may be also used for direct lines with the closest neighboring states.

The rehabilitation of these airports may be made possible by the funds of municipalities of the respective towns/cities or by concession. The incomes will be sufficient to make the loan repayment.

If these airports are used by helicopters rather than aircraft, the investment for their infrastructure will be much lower and the ones for flights in the airlines of the closest neighboring states may be also used.

Bibliography:

1. History of Albania, publication of the Academy of Sciences
2. Geography of Albania, publication of Tirana State University, 1998
3. Agustin Gjinaj: "Albanian Aviation, 1951-2011", botart, Tirana, 2011
4. Petro Dudi: "Background of Regiment 1 of Albanian Aviation, Peza", Marin Barleti, 2011
5. Statistical Yearbook 1998, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010
6. <http://www.instat.gov.al/graphics/doc/downloads/lfs/2011>
7. <http://passthrough.fwnotify.net/download/www.instat.gov/2011>
8. <http://feshgroup.blogspot.com/2009/03>
9. ECAA Report for Air Transport of RoA, dated 31.01.2011
10. Central Army Archive, Air Defense Fund, D31, 1956; D53, 1968.
11. "Standard" Newspaper, 24.10.2011

Balanced Force and today Challenges

LtC Afërdita Blaka,
Expert of the Centre for Defence Analyses, TRADOC

Abstract. *As a new member of NATO, Albania and AAF are required to fulfil the objectives that the Alliance has addressed in order to face the existing risks and those expected in the future. In this context, a detailed analysis is required to determine civil and military capabilities in order to accomplish effectively all the commitments of the Alliance. Currently, Albania is in the process of a Strategic Defence Review and Defence Capabilities Review, which will drive the development of the required military capabilities posed by the security environment.*

The focus of this article is on the relationships and tensions in the debate for greater concentration on counter-insurgency vs. conventional operations. The risk of adopting one over the other for future operations will also be discussed. To determine which of these is more appropriate nowadays, the paper will consider the positive and negative sides of each of them, and based on this analysis together with considering the relationship and tensions between these two approaches, a correct approach will be recommended for NATO military capabilities.

It will be demonstrated that a balanced NATO force capable of operating in both COIN as well as conventional war (CW) is required to meet the present and future challenges. Readers are also welcomed to add their opinions when discussing this topic through analysis, comments and relevant suggestions.

“The alliance should agree... to an effective NATO role against the new threats presented by international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.”¹

NATO is a vibrant organization. It has played important role for the past 62 years. Its biggest achievement was the disintegration of the Soviet Union without fighting a war. Since 1989, the operating environment of NATO has changed drastically. In post Cold War era, NATO is expected to operate across the globe, not just confined to European theatre against Warsaw Pact countries.

¹Jose Maria Aznar, http://thinkexist.com/quotes/jose_maria_aznar/2.html; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.

Recent developments indicate that there will be more counter-insurgency threats in the future to be faced by NATO rather than conventional conflicts. The ongoing Iraq operation is just a start in this direction. Today, the debate continues on whether or not NATO should focus on counterinsurgency vis-à-vis the conventional wars.

Nowadays relationships and tensions between two approaches are being constantly discussed: the need to focus on counter-insurgency or conventional operations, and, the risk of adopting one or the other for future operations. As Ralph Peters and Eduard Luttwak have stated, now is the time to re-examine “the fundamental questions, current Army doctrine and where it is going.”² NATO being a large military and political organization is not a stranger to this ongoing debate.

A comparison of the different approaches will give a clear idea of what are the reasons for choosing one or the other or alternative choices, available. Warfare is a complex matter as it includes social and cultural, as well as political, behaviour.³ As such it has to reflect the characteristics of the communities that wage it. The paper will begin by examining the risks of adopting COIN or conventional war for future operations. The paper will then, explain pros and cons of the COIN operations, as well as conventional operations. It will be highlighted that the balances of these capabilities for COIN as well as conventional, is the critical aspect for NATO’s to be maintained to meet the prevailing challenges.

Counter Insurgency

Warfare theory has attempted to explain the complexities of war throughout history. Periods of history have seen wars guided by economic, political and social factors. Colin S. Gray has explained insurgency, a type of warfare or conflict as “... a purpose, typically to take power by means of a tolerably, certainly variably, popular campaign of violence to destabilize and ultimately defeat the established government.”⁴ Also “the violence of them is not instrumental to end-state akin to the policy goals of a ‘normal’ government.”⁵ Insurgencies can be anchored by a religion or ideology its members or “true believers” not representing the nation, or the key triangle of Government, people and Army (or Commander).

On the other hand they are not “filled by the professional warrior subordinated to political elite”, an “example of holy warrior, prepared to die not for a political end state but for a transcendental truth, judged by their capacity to inspire other violent non-state actors.” The al Qaeda (base) has been the face of the irregular threat groups.

During insurgencies the enemy remains invisible, there is no front, rear and boundary, the bigger weapons like aircraft, tank etc, have no role. The war is dragged longer, but the politics play important role on solving the conflict. (Author’s emphasis).

²Gian P. Gentile, “Let’s Built an Army to Win All Wars.” Joint Forces Quarterly issue 52 (1st quarter 2009), 27

³Colin S. Gray, *Strategy and history...*, 187.

⁴Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Warfare,” *One Nature, Many Characters. Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 2007, 42

⁵Sebastian L.V.Gorka, “The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what?” in *Influence Warfare*, ed. James J.F. Forest. (New York: Praeger Security International, 2009), available from <http://www.ndu.edu/press/irregular-warfare.html>; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.

An insurgent organization typically consists of four elements: leadership, combatants (main forces, regional forces, and local forces), cadre (local political leaders that are also called the militants) and mass base (the bulk of the membership) and they are characterized as *non-state actors*.⁶

As a military term, Counter-Insurgency (COIN) represents the commitment in armed conflict against an insurgency, by forces that are recognized by government in which this conflict takes place. Security forces “need to help local authorities establish safety, security, and stability, because insurgents thrive on chaos and instability.”⁷ COIN is characterized as an operation between government armed forces or occupiers and the armed rebels, which sometimes can be difficult to recognize them because they penetrated on the population.

To understand the counter-insurgency operations in detail, it is a reasonable way to know the root cause that created insurgency. The counter-insurgency includes all the government actors to defeat insurgency and will be successful, if in it are included the population. The examples of such approaches are Philippines, Peru, and Malaya insurgency. During these situations a way to separate the population and to treat it with humanity and dignity proved beneficial. This is not only a good practice, but it represents the main difference of swing of the population from the irregular groups towards.

Insurgents are difficult or impossible to recognize as they operate among the population. The situations in counter-insurgency operations are often confused and *the violence is in the low level as compared to the conventional war*. The fundamental questions faced by state forces are: What is the nature of enemy? Is it an organization network, movement, or ideology? What are long term objectives of this enemy? Does it have a Clausewitzian centre of gravity?⁸

Understanding these questions gives the right vision and helps in determining the new strategies by exploiting widely available technology and weapons and integrating tactics which are useful in the spectrum of conflict. FMI 3-07-22 stated about COIN operation that “it is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power” and “it can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict.” It includes “strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; material, technical, and organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations.” The criteria of measuring successes during the counterinsurgency missions must focus on the following tasks: protecting the population, establishing local political institutions, reinforcing local governments, eliminating insurgent capabilities, and exploiting information from local sources.⁹

Clausewitz argued, “...all war has the same nature”. Describing of the nature of war Clausewitz was right, because the actresses of the war are the same, but the difference of the irregular threat group is because they are not nation-states. Sebastian L.v.Gorka,

⁶ FMI. 3-07.22. Army HQs Department (Washington, DC., 1 October 2004), *Counterinsurgency Operations* <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-07-22.pdf>; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Gorka, *The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what?*

⁹FMI. 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations....*

who referred Martin van Creveld at the National Defence University, had stated that “What (Clausewitz) never imagined was a world in which many perhaps even most, belligerents consist of non-sovereign, non-territorial organizations”¹⁰

Nowadays it is important to understand and build the new future strategy. The idea that “Next-War-it is’ is illustrative of a pernicious mindset that irregular warfare is fleeting phenomenon of lesser importance than conventional conflicts”¹¹ indicates the thought process where insurgencies are not given adequate attention in the name of preparation for the conventional war.

Conventional War

The fight, which is characterized as the battle between two political systems, economies and different ideologies, with state monopoly on violence is known as conventional war. The classic fight consists of three pillars: government, citizens, and military (or commander).¹² As Clausewitz has stated in *On War*, the military is privileged because “the artful commander who harnesses the population’s passion and might so the national may realize its goals”¹³ This scheme operates on the basis of a particular doctrine and strategy, it is less complicated. This facilitates achieving certain objectives. Conventional war is characterized by the participation of *the state actors*. It has a specialty that this war is carried out *in a short time* where at the end *the winners are determined*. Participants in the conventional war *are regular forces of the combatants*, who develop the fight *in front and with defined boundaries on it. The decisive combat occurs on the battlefield*. The influence of the *politics* in it *is lesser and at high levels*, because it is militaries responsibility to resolve this situation and achieve the objectives, although, politics get involved at the end of war.

The conventional war is also characterized “by offensiveness, aggressiveness, seizing and keeping the initiative, and maintaining a high tempo of operations.”¹⁴ During these operations the aim is “to defeat the enemy in short time by combination of manoeuvre and firepower.”¹⁵ The full spectrum capability of militaries has attracted significant attention from all. The task of getting out from the cold war mindset is proving a tough one.

Colin S. Gray has described, based on Clausewitz idea in his book, he stated that “War, its threat and its actuality, is an instrument of policy”. This idea is further described with the idea that, “War is politics, and politics is war.” “Today, we face a foe who knows that war starts with ideas and depends on them, far more than it depends on weapons.”¹⁶

The conventional war is different from a COIN operation. In a conventional war setting, the objectives are to gain a decisive victory in a short time, at a low cost of in live and effort, and with infliction of the fewest possible casualties on the enemy.

¹⁰Gorka, *The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what?*

¹¹John A. Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In”, *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Jan, 2009), 24.

¹²Gorka, *The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what?...*

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴Gray, *Irregular Warfare....*, 45.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Gorka, *The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what? ...*

NATO Operational Environment

NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security in the international arena. Through its crisis management operations, the Alliance demonstrates both its willingness to act as a positive force for change and its capacity to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.¹⁷

Today, in the post Cold War era, when the environment has changed, “uncertainty and risks lie beyond Alliance borders, trends that could escalate into instability and conflict.”¹⁸ Facing these new challenges, armed forces must be prepared to conduct stability operations and other forms of irregular warfare. Also, they must refocus toward conventional war-fighting skills with knowledge that, if called on, it can more easily shift to nation-building and counterinsurgency... In *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu described flexibility on the battlefield, as “water shapes its course according to the ground over which it flows;” and thus the “the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe that he is fighting”

In this environment NATO has adopted a new Strategic Concept, which plays a major role in the structuring of NATO militaries, generally focused on conventional war. The Iraq war and the situation in Afghanistan made things worse, both undermining “confidence that NATO would be unified in facing a threat closer to home.”¹⁹ In these situations, a new NATO strategy for this challenging environment is required. The solutions are to rebuild a military focus exclusively on achieving decisive operational victories on the battlefield.²⁰ Actually NATO “possess sufficient forces and capabilities to handle two major missions, e.g., Afghanistan, and six small missions, e.g., Balkan and African peacekeeping, its current assets can perform only one major mission and three small missions.”²¹

If NATO uses conventional war in the COIN environment it will fail. For example, the “United States failed in Vietnam because it did not use its military power to maximum advantage”²². The Soviet Union failed in Afghanistan along similar lines.

Today, to muddy the waters even more, the world is faced with what are known as *hybrid threats*. John A. Nagl, in his article “Let’s win the wars we’re in” referring to Frank Hoffman, in determining of these adversaries, is required to “... incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare, including and conventional capabilities.”²³ He explains that the different risks appeared as, “irregular tactics and formations, terrorist act including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder...coordinated

¹⁷NATO, “NATO operations and missions,” (27 Oct 2010) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.

¹⁸ Ronald Asmus, et al, NATO’s Strategic Concept and the Role, Reassurance: (Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University February 23, 2010) http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/NATO_SEMINAR%20FOUR%20%20WORKING%20PAPERS.pf; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In.” Joint Force Quarterly, Jan, 2009. 21

²¹ Asmus, et al, NATO’s Strategic Concept and the Role, Reassurance...

²²Nagl, Let’s Win the Wars We’re In..., 21.

²³Ibid., 23.

within the main battle-space to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimension of conflict.”²⁴

After the Cold War, conventional wars were fought in Georgia during Russia-Georgia war, in 1991 in Iraq war, and also in Afghanistan. But there are other threats that NATO must be prepared for such as the North Korean threat and the spectre of a nuclear Iran... On the other hand, COIN is an ongoing requirement in NATO operations in Afghanistan.

Now, what about the pros and cons of preparing for one type of operation, either COIN or conventional war?

If NATO focuses only on COIN operations, it would not necessarily use the assets that require defeating an opponent state force, because as Gian S. Gentile has pointed out, “hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars, consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry, is in danger of atrophy”²⁵ *Aircraft, tank, Air Defence, and other big weapons are not required* to be used because they are not flexible to meet the COIN requirements. Preparing only for COIN operations can make a military force into a *constabulary (police)*, and runs the risk of it losing their role and missions as well as denying effective preparation for various combat operations. As COIN operations is the fighting between people it can also include non-state actors?

If NATO focuses only on conventional war, armies which are organized, equipped, and trained to fight other armies with characteristics similar to theirs. This will neglect the present reality, because it is waged between state and non-state adversaries. On the other hand, NATO military forces and all armies “must be prepared to be able to deal with the full range of operations and the full range of capabilities that we face,”²⁶ Because, as Davenport notes, some small, or non-state actors “*may one day possess large, conventional military capabilities* [sic], as well as possess the ability to operate in several potential threat environments.”²⁷

This requires adaptation and production of new flexible weapons, with greater fire power and easier for transportation, which could be used with equal utility in conventional and COIN theatre. This requires a financing of the armed forces, increasing their budget. But actually in the current financial crisis this poses problems and provokes further debate on which approach to adopt.

A rational balance of conventional war capabilities in tandem with preparation and training for counterinsurgency would be more appropriate alternatives. This latter “hybrid” approach demands a comprehensive integrated, adaptive, networked focus in operating in today’s security environment.

²⁴Ibid., 23

²⁵Nagl, *Let’s Win the Wars We’re In...*, 20

²⁶U.S., NATO Global “Hybrid Warfare” 20 November 2009 <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:DxCjcEjd7JUJ:wfol.tv/stop-nato/2274-us-nato-global-qhybrid-warfareq.html+Nato+conventional+warfare&cd=9&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca>; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.

²⁷Ibid.

Conclusion

The future of NATO lays in preparation for all types of conflict, both conventional as well as counterinsurgency wars. These two types of warfare are different from each other. In conventional war, the enemy forces are well defined. The focus is on achieving a quick victory. Politics plays important roles at the highest level. On the other hand, an insurgent movement is low on spectrum of conflict. The insurgents operate within the population. A counterinsurgency operation demands cooperation and synergy from different agencies as well as great will, effort and resources on those trying to defeat it. Political engagement, especially when coalitions are involved, becomes paramount.

The elimination of Soviet threat has brought a new era in the world, and NATO is one of the most affected organizations. The huge asymmetry between the US and other militaries leaves little choice for weaker enemies than to wage on asymmetrical warfare. With the adoption of new mandate, NATO commitments are likely to increase especially in COIN operations across the world.

In the present time both kinds of threats, conventional as well as insurgency, are likely to exist. For good or bad, NATO will have little choice to choose which kind of war it desires to engage.

The question of whether NATO should focus on conventional or counterinsurgency ops remains an important debate. If NATO only focuses on training and equipping for conventional warfare then ongoing operations combating insurgencies will suffer. In reality, NATO *needs a balance to execute both kinds of warfare.*

Bibliography:

1. Jose Maria Aznar, http://thinkexist.com/quotes/jose_maria_aznar/2.html; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.
2. Colin S. Gray, "Strategy and history", in *Essay on theory and practice, Principles of Warfare and War*. (New York: Routledge, 2006).
3. Gian P. Gentile, "Let's Built an Army to Win All Wars." *Joint Forces Quarterly* issue 52 (1st quarter 2009).
4. Martin Van Creveld, "The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq"; available from http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/show_tag?name=counterinsurgency; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.
5. Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare," *One Nature, Many Characters. Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2007.
6. Sebastian L.V.Gorka, "The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what?" in *Influence Warfare*, ed. James J.F. Forest. (New York: Praeger Security International, 2009), available from <http://www.ndu.edu/press/irregular-warfare.html>; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.
7. FMI. 3-07.22. Headquarters Department of the Army (Washington, DC., 1 October 2004), *Counterinsurgency Operations* <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-07-22.pdf>; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.
8. John A. Nagl, "Let's Win the Wars We're In", *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Jan, 2009).
9. NATO, "NATO operations and missions," (27 Oct 2010) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.
10. Ronald Asmus, et al, *NATO's Strategic Concept and the Role, Reassurance:* (Center for

Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University February 23, 2010) http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/NATO_SEMINARFOURWORKINGPAPERS.pdf; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.

11.U.S., NATO Global “Hybrid Warfare” 20 November 2009 <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:DxCjcEjd7JUJ:wfol.tv/stop-nato/2274-us-nato-global-qhybrid-warfareq.html+Nato+conventional+warfare&cd=9&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca>; Internet; accessed 08 January 2011.

SECTION V

HISTORY STUDIES

The article chosen to be published for this Section, introduces to the readers an important period during the history of the Albanian Armed Forces.

“Albania - from Yalta to Warsaw Treaty” attempts not only to revoke an ill-spoken period, but through detailed surveys in the light of facts, it further expands the knowledge of our readers about that period.

What we, as an editorial office, believe should happen in the future is that authors who have a lifetime experience and knowledge of the history, in and beyond the Armed Forces, should offer their contribution.

We expect realistic studies of the authors, especially from the Academy of Defense and Center for Defence Analyses, which have scientific degrees in this field. It is a history which they have the privilege to write “with clear mind”, after such a certain period of time for the purpose of an objective judgment.

Albania - From Yalta to Warsaw Treaty

Colonel Ahmet Leka,
Chief of Doctrine and Manual Center, TRADOC

Abstract. *After the Second World War Albania was a vulnerable country in all areas, including economic, political and military-strategic aspects. Albania was merely a small country with a very poor economy, without any infrastructure, and as such, it was not attractive at all. The state leadership deemed the recognition of Albania by the communist bloc as a prerequisite. Notwithstanding the establishment of diplomatic relations between Albania and the Soviet Union, the connections of Moscow with Tirana until 1948 were kept only through Belgrade.*

This was one of the factors which intensified the increase of Yugoslavian influence over Albania. At that time, our country had indeed sensitive issues regarding the relations with the neighboring countries. "The friendship" with Yugoslavia started to be seriously affected. In the meantime, the Greek guerrilla fighters appeared dangerously across the border with Albania, often provoking incidents. Accordingly, Albania was still under the unexploded "fire" of its neighbors. In this way, the participation in such coalition as Warsaw treaty made Albania more protected.

Prior to the termination of the Second World War, the US President, Roosevelt, the president of the Soviet Union, Stalin and the prime minister of England, Churchill met in Yalta, Crimea. During the conference, these three statesmen discussed about the subsequent developments of war. Above all, these three state leaders proved the decision taken in Teheran for the division of Germany and Poland and the share of spheres of influence after war.

There was no agenda and specified items in Yalta Conference. No points of discussion were prepared and no questions were properly considered. One of the main points of discussion was the capitulation of Germany. They decided to defeat Nazism and fascism, thus providing a contribution to the victory of "democracy".

Finally, Churchill managed to approve the occupation of German Empire and to join it under the administration of winning powers. The principle for the division of Germany into 4 areas was adopted in Yalta.

The debates about Poland evolved for a long time during the conference. The Soviet Union was promised the eastern part of Poland until Curzon line whereas Poland had to

be compensated with the German area of Oder-Neisse. In this way, Poland became a country satellite to Moscow and served as a protector against West. At that time, the Soviet Union had occupied a large part of the Eastern and Balkans countries. In this way, there were hundreds of millions of Europeans scattered in the Soviet Empire.

Countries such as Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the eastern part of Germany were liberated from the Red Army and Albania was liberated from the National Liberation Army. This certainly occurred after the allied forces both from East and West, finally attacked the Nazi Germany. After the Second World War, it did not belong to Albanians to decide in which areas of influence they would stay. It was to be decided in Yalta, during the Conference of the three great statesmen of war, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, which left Albania (without mentioning it at all) in the eastern area.

The compromise in Yalta was not made in the form of a contract but mostly in a declaration form. We cannot underestimate the fact that the USA and Soviet Union interests were more important than those of Europe. It is really surprising that the decisions of Yalta Conference held in February 1945, namely, less than three months after the Albanian communists usurped the power and maintained it by force for almost 45 years, never mentioned Albania in this conference as if it did not exist in the world?!

As we will see below, it may be logical that Stalin had no kind of information on our country as he had never had any relations with Slavs. Yet, how is it possible that Roosevelt (1882-1945) and Churchill (1874-1965) could forget Albania, in contrast to the president Wilson (1856-1924) who persistently protected the territorial interests of Albania, specifying in the Peace Conference in Versailles (1919-1920) that there was a small country in Europe but with ancient history and traditions, with an ancient culture, which for 500 years has been conquered by the Turkish empire. However, it managed to preserve its language which does not resemble with any other Balkans or European languages, traditions, culture... etc.

This may be also explained by the fact that it was a consequence of the “division” of area of influence in Yalta made by Churchill with Stalin and, when it was about Yugoslavia, Albania might be considered part of it¹.

This is another tragic truth testifying once more that Europe, even regretfully, including this time even the United States, did not pay attention to this country and this people, thus reminding us of the well known verses of the poet, Gjergj Fishta, with which he addressed to Europe of that time...

Hence, like Berlin Congress in 1878 when the German chancellor, Bismarck, denied the existence of the Albanian nation, a congress which by its arbitrary decisions detached from the Albanian trunk entire northern regions such as Plava and Gucia, giving them to Montenegro and also giving to Serbia other lands of Albanian population in the regions of Vranja, Nishi etc, until the vicinity of Gjilan, and when the London Conference donated Kosovo to Serbia in 1913, this time the “three above great statesmen” acted in

¹ Ramiz Alia “Jeta ime”(Albanian edition) page.133.

Yalta even worse. This is because, without any decision, they meant Albania was part of Yugoslavia. Therefore, they gave it the right that one day it could occupy it...

In Yalta, Churchill and Stalin decided that Romania and Bulgaria be 80 per cent under the influence of the Soviet Union and 20 per cent under the Western influence. 50 % of Yugoslavia was under the influence of the Soviet Union and 50 per cent under West. 80% of Greece was under the influence of West and 20 per cent under the Soviet Union. Albania was not concretely mentioned at all but as clearly indicated from the latter developments, it was included in the framework of Yugoslavia, which was fully transferred under Russian influence².

Consequently, this was the fate of Albania. What would happen if the “three great statesmen” had taken in Yalta a decision specifically for Albania, so, it could not be naively considered part of Yugoslavia as it was not a Slavic country but to be 80 per cent under the Western influence and 20 per cent under the Soviet Union influence? Or, so that Albania could be equally connected both with East and West because forces which were not communist and represented other political directions had also participated in this war.

As it was expected, the second post world war resulted not only in winners and losers but also in a deep divide between the winners. The allies withdrew in their entrenchments not as allies but as adversaries. Two political and military blocs were confronted in a new war, which, in historical and political terms is called “Cold War”, a name used for the first time by the US journalist, Walter Lipman.

After the Second World War, Albania was politically connected with the Soviet Union. Right after the war, in the perspective of the Soviet Union, Albania was simply a small country, with a very poor economy, without any infrastructure and as such, it was not attractive at all. The Soviet Union was interested in Albania only in the context of military strategic interests, in order to have it under its sphere of influence. The Soviet Union support in the UN about Albanian issues had exactly this objective. Until 1948, notwithstanding the creation of diplomatic relations between Albania and the Soviet Union, the connections of Moscow with Tirana were kept only through Belgrade. This was one of the factors intensifying the growth of Yugoslavian influence in Albania. Until 1948 it was left under the Yugoslavian influence. The “eternal good faith” with the northeastern³ bordering neighbors continued for some four years (1944-1948).

Albania entered the sphere of influence of Soviet interests only after the Soviet-Yugoslav disruption. The truth is that instead of helping Albania economically, the Yugoslavians regarded it as “a cow to be milked”, misappropriating the stocks of goods remained in Albania from the fascist Italy, which, for propaganda interests, had brought large supplies in Albania.

In this context, the well known writer, Petro Marko, transmitted the appeal made to him by a merchant from Shkodra in 1945, when he was an editor in chief of “Bashkimi” newspaper, the only daily periodical in the country: “Why, Mr. Petro, the Slavs are

² Ramiz Alia, Idem. page.136.

³ Ana Lalaj, “Momentet më kyçe të historisë së Shqipërisë në vitet ‘50” (Albanian edition).

stripping us of? At least they get part of it and we may keep the rest. Where will we find all these goods of each category from construction materials, manufacture, machinery, and drinks, up to hygienic supplies”?

Stalin abandoned Yugoslavia after creating a buffer zone between the Soviet border and the West, wishing to imply with the abandonment of Yugoslavia that it had no expansionist objectives but only security objectives for the Soviet Union.

The abandonment of Yugoslavia was in fact a gesture of self-restraint of Moscow and in parallel to it, progressively reduced to minimum the aid until it had fully interrupted it, blaming for this the treachery of Tito. Following the abandonment of Yugoslavia, Stalin kept Albania as an advanced post, something like Kaliningrad⁴ after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, also because the Albanian leadership chose to not take the side of Stalin in the conflict between him and Tito.

After the Soviet Union interrupted its relations with Yugoslavia, the suffocating Yugoslav custodianship over Albania was put to an end and the aids administered to Albania by the Soviet Union were given directly to Albania. Hence, there was already a harmony in the relations of Albania with the Soviet Union both in political and economic field.

There is a large number of records in the US documents testifying the opposite. The US government has traditionally and constantly declared itself a supporter of the national independence and territorial integrity. Albania was of no strategic importance for the USA but it remained important in the context of its most major interests toward Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia. According to the USA, these states had conflicts of interests in Albania so they showed due care to not aggravate them, destroying the political status quo in the Balkans, which would lead to a broader and uncontrolled conflict. Apparently, the US purpose was to isolate this conflict as much as possible and to detach Albania from the communist bloc, without any international complications.

Accordingly, the period 1948-1960 may be considered normal in the context of Soviet-Albanian relations. This is certainly when we consider the abnormality of the orientation of Albania to the Soviet Union. However, it is very curious that until the Soviet-Albanian relations acquired an economic dimension other than the political one, they remained without proper dimensions in the military area although the communist leadership of that time had made such a request.

With the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953, no-one knew what would occur in the Soviet Union after his death. With the death of Stalin, a liberal trend was displayed in the policy of his successors, and the internal and external state of the Soviet Union had completely changed.

The new leaders distanced themselves from the methods of Stalinist leadership and decided to bring changes which promised an improvement of mistakes occurred during Stalin governance. In parallel to these developments, measures were taken against massive oppression followed by a liberal approach in the Socialist states which were under the

⁴ Kastriot Myftaraj “Paralele sovjeta-jugosllave dhe amerikano-greke për Shqipërinë” (Albanian edition).

⁵ Ana Lalaj, Idem.

influence of the Soviet Union (except Albania). This process lasted until the end of 1955 and caused many improvements in the living conditions of that time.

However, since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union started to enter into agreements with the states which were under the sphere of its interest. When the Soviet Union was against the membership of Germany in NATO, it concluded an agreement with the states of eastern bloc for full support and multidimensional protection. The agreement for association, cooperation and mutual support was signed on 14 May 1955 in Warsaw. This socialist forum was attended by the following states: Soviet Union, Poland, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania.

The Warsaw Pact was an alliance of the European communist states led by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, signed on 14 May 1955 in Warsaw, for the purpose of the development of friendly relations, cooperation and mutual assistance between Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Romania, Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Pact obliged its members to make consultations on issues of mutual interest and for immediate military assistance in case of any attacks in Europe against one or more members of the pact.

The Soviet-Albanian military relations were fully developed in April 1957, when Sazan Island was offered to the Soviet Union to use it as a military basis, being a small 5,5 km² island but a favorable point at the entry of Otranto channel, 5 km far from the Albanian coast and the closest point with Italy, 65 km. This act was signed in October when the USSR Minister of Defense, Zhukov, paid a visit in Albania, and signed the decision to move the Russian military fleet to Vlora base.

Albania was a base of major strategic importance for the protection of the communist camp as for the Black Sea Fleet; a main barrier was the Dardanelle and Bosphorus Strait and numerous Greek islands. Demands were also formulated that the Soviet Union would not be asked a specific number of armaments. Instead, demands would be answered that the Albanian defense had to be considered a protection of any points of the Soviet Union and if Sevastopol was important, Vlora would be more important than Sevastopol⁵.

Apparently, from the military perspective, Vlora bay along with Sazan was a sensitive knot in the fragile political and military balance of the Balkans region.

Not merely for military security but in particular to assure prestige and power, the leadership of that time insisted and created this military base in the framework of respective agreements with Warsaw Treaty.

The creation of the Soviet fleet in Vlora caused panic in the West and Khrushchev was obliged to withdraw it using it as a wild card in negotiations with the West for Berlin, definitely interrupting the diplomatic relations with Albania, to give to the West an additional evidence of withdrawal from Albania. It is very curious to admit and know that the disruption of Soviet-Albanian relations was a *deja-vu* of Soviet-Yugoslavian disruption when the Soviets were the ones to claim the disruption, planning it for an alibi to the other party.

On 28-29 March 1961 the Consultative Political Committee (CPC) of Warsaw Pact was convened in Moscow. This meeting was held at the highest level of first secretaries of

central committees and chairmen of the councils of ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, and ministers of defense, representatives of state plan commissions and of the Chief of General Staff of Military Forces. Since 22 March 1961, an Albanian document (24 pages) and a Soviet document (6 pages) were submitted to the CPC of Warsaw Pact about the incidents in Vlora⁶ base.

Finally, the commander of the Joint Command, Marshall Grecko, asked from the Albanian Government that “if it was interested in the further stay in Vlora Base of the Soviet submarines and of other military ships”, they had to be supplied only with Soviet crews. ...Otherwise, they had to report in this respect to CPC and to pose to the Soviet government the issue on withdrawal from Albania of all soviet ships of war, of militaries and specialists.

In some consecutive letters sent to the governments of Warsaw Pact member states, the Albanian government declared that it categorically refused to hand over the military-maritime Vlora base to the Soviet crews and if the Soviet government decided to move its military forces from the base, the Albanian government would not impose any barriers. The communist leadership of that time advised “To make clear to the people that in case of bad days to come even amounting to war, it had to tighten the belt and portion the daily food”. One month later, in November 1961, the communist leader Enver Hoxha would directly address to the Albanian people with a pathetic speech, where, inter alias, he declared: “We tell Khrushchev that the Albanian people and its Labor Party will even eat grass and we will not violate the principles of Marxism-Leninism”.

At this point an initiative was launched for the detachment of Albania from Warsaw Treaty and we may admit that the communist leadership was thus leading Albania to isolation, militarization and extreme poverty. The Albanian military forces had never taken part in the maneuvers conducted in the framework of Warsaw Pact.

From 1960 Albania did not any longer participate in any activities or meetings of Warsaw Pact. On 4 June 1961, following a series of conflicts between the communist party of Albania and of the Soviet Union, the Soviet military fleet was obliged to leave the most important maritime strategic point in the Mediterranean, the one of Pasha Liman.

When they left the base, the soviets managed to secretly bring with them necessary parts of logistic armament so as the locals had no possibility to carry out military duties by the means they had forcedly taken.

After the disruption of relations with the Soviet Union, the support of Albania by China remained the pillar of its international position. China was the only state wherefrom Albania also accepted military assistance. The Albanian state sent military experts in China for the provision of military equipment to restore the military readiness of units.

The Warsaw Treaty as a political and military structure played its role as a balance vis á vis the Atlantic Alliance and in terms of duties and commitments it launched within the participating states. However, if we consider it from the current perspective, this has generally been a regressive role rather used as an intervention instrument, whenever the member states have not been ratified under the political Soviet guidance.

⁶ Central Archive of the Albanian Labor Party, Stock No 14, List 1, File 24.

Albania, in and out of Warsaw Treaty, (1961 -1968) neither the agreements of 1957 and 1959, nor Khrushchev visit in Albania consolidated the prestige and status of Albania as the most dedicated state to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Even the analysis made by the US CIA to the visit of Khrushchev in Albania, highlighted that Khrushchev left Albania two days before the planned deadline.

The tense situation and the history of these days are widely known as also the powerful means of totalitarian propaganda had highly stressed this history of conflicts, which, according to some military analysts, was deemed as one of the most serious strategic losses of the Soviet Union after the Second World War.

Bibliography:

1. Erik Hobsbawm “Epoque of Extremes”.Tirana,1997.
2. Welter Laker “Europe in our time” 1945-1992,Tirana,1996.
3. Leon Poliakov “Totalitarisms of XX century”,Tirana,1987.
4. Henri Kissinger”,Diplomacy” .Tirana,1999.
5. Karl Grimberg “World History and Civilization”.Tirana,2005.
6. Political-social studies-Tirana-1989. Ramiz Alia- Book “Jeta ime” “Rreth marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-jugosllavo-sovjeto-kineze (1944-1976)” (Albanian edition).
7. Ana Lalaj, “Panorama - Një nga momentet më kyçe të historisë së Shqipërisë” (Albanian edition).

SECTION VI

NEW RESEARCH TALENTS

For this edition, the following Section is introduced for the first time in the Review, with a large number of articles in terms of quantity and quality.

The purpose of the Review and of the Center for Defense Analyses is to elicit the opinion and feedback of Master to doctorate program students. The authors have used a large literature, but what the editorial office is interested about is deep analysis, critical thinking and logical reasoning of the new talents about key issues at the security, in support of the development of security institutions.

We encourage the young talents and analytical experts who courageously treat the issues addressed for solution in the respective fields, offering the best courses of action.

Everyone is welcomed, but with their own “products” and focused on the context of the Albanian reality.

Security Schools and their development

Msc. Albert Hitoaliaj,
Doctorate Degree Program on Security,
Academy of Defence “Spiro Moisiu”

Abstract. *European security approaches differ not only from security studies in the U.S., but they stand apart from the rest of the studies performed in other parts of the world. The reason why European theories differ from the U.S. and other countries depends partly on the political nature of the regions where theories arise. Can they solve local problems and provide solutions for other areas of the world?*

An in-depth study of theories for security studies can provide an original way of looking at our regional and national problems related to security issues. This paper gives a brief summary of opinions of some leading security schools. Information given here tends to bring ideas that will serve as approaches that will aim at building our national studies in the field of security.

Introduction

A number of theories or research programs with regard to security, which are also called “security schools”, have emerged in Europe. Despite studies on security are usually seen as a sub-branch within the field of international relations, these “schools” were not the main sector theories of international relations, as they are called in frequent debates. They are not also an imitation of American theories. Debates over them have proved to be very fruitful in security field. In recent decades, this area has become one of the most dynamic areas of international relations debates. In particular, we may say that this has been transformed into a key forum in which social constructivist approaches have challenged traditional approaches, broadly realistic and unrealistic ones, offering some new approaches to the analysis of international politics.

Debates in security studies in the U.S. and Europe, have been almost in totally separate directions. In Europe, it is common to present theoretical picture of critical studies, like in Copenhagen School, traditionalism and feminism, while in the U.S., it is common to see the main debate within security studies as one between offensive and defensive realism. However, it seems that changes have occurred since previous times, where all theoretical inventions in the field of security were U.S. made, while recently created

separate theories, are associated with names like Aberystwyth (Critical Studies on Security), Paris (Didier Bigo workings) and Copenhagen (security).

Definitions of Security concept¹

“Self safety is a relative freedom from war, accompanied by a relatively high expectation that the loss would not be consequence of any war event.” (*Ian Bellamy, 1981*)

“A nation is considered safe when there is no danger that force it to sacrifice its fundamental values, or if it wanted to avoid war, and it is able - if challenged, in event of a war, keep them through victory ”(*Walter Lipman, 1991*)

“National security can be defined as the ability to deal with external aggression and to resist it.” (*Lucian Giacomo, 1989*)

“As a national security threat is considered an action or series of actions that (1) threaten drastically within a short time period the quality of life of residents of a state, or (2) threatens significantly narrowing the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or private entities, organizations (such as individuals, groups or corporations) within the state.”(*Richard H. Ullman, 1983*)

“Security and uncertainty are defined on internal threats as well as those external ones that are capable of prostrating and/ or weaken state structures - such as territorial and institutional - and governmental regimes”. (*Mohammed Ayob, 1995*)

“Emancipation means freedom of the people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop to realize what they would choose to do in terms of freedom ... Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Therefore emancipation, not power or order is one that produces true security. Thus, theoretically, security is emancipation. ”(*Ken Booth, 1991*)

“If people, be they government ministers or individuals, simply perceive an issue as a threat to their life in any way, then the matter would be considered a security issue.”(*Peter Hough, 2004*)

“Security ... means coercive tools to control or balance an aggressor, as well as convincing one, supported by the prospect of sharing mutual benefits, to transform aggression and hostility to cooperation.” (*Edward A. Kolodziej, 2005*)

School of Wales or Aberystwyth

Aberystwyth has been one of the most important key to the development of so-called Critical Security Studies (CSS). For this approach, the name of Wales’ School is used. CSS argue that researchers should avoid viewing the world through the eyes of the state, as implicated in the use of the term “national security” as a key category. The state is often the problem, as well as the solution, and the solution must be performed in connection with human beings and not with an institution. The best way to security is conceived a way that connects people, rather than the rule, is its definition in terms of emancipation².

¹ “Studime mbi Sigurinë”, UET, Tiranë 2010

² “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods”, Mershon International Studies Review, 1996, f. 233-245

Inspired by the notion of emancipation of the Frankfurt School, and a disappointed realistic explanation of the Cold War, the School of Wales, and especially Ken Booth makes absolutely clear that emancipation not power or order is the goal of security research. "Security" means the absence of threats. Emancipation means freedom of the people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop to realize what they would choose to do in terms of freedom.

War and the threat of war is one of those restrictions, along with poverty, poor education, and political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Therefore emancipation, not power or order is the one that produces true security. Thus, theoretically, it means emancipation is security³.

Copenhagen School

The so-called Copenhagen School of security studies is built on three main ideas: 1) safety, 2) sectors, and 3) regional security implications. Sectors and regional security stem from the work of Barry Buzan's reflected in his books, "Security, A New Framework" in 1998, and "Regions and Powers" in 2003. In "People, States and Fear", Buzan seeks to broaden and deepen the concept of security, including threats beyond those such government and military economic, social and environmental threats and levels except state and society including individuals. Copenhagen School rejects the view that security can be given objectively, but regards it as a social process applicable to any existential threat, from any of the selected reference object, which requires contrary measures.

Share of insurance is known as "... a word act. By saying 'security', a state representative moves a particular case in a given area and thus requires a special right to use the necessary tools to block that development." ⁴

Copenhagen school was criticized for not going far enough to completely break away from central state-realist notion of security. Along with Wæver and de Wilde, Buzan has argued mostly about centralist state notions, arguing that in making an issue as security issue, should make it "*so important that it should not be exposed to normal bargaining policy, but should be dealt decisively by top leaders, ahead of other issues.*"⁵

Although it acknowledges that with a 'speech act' any object of reference can be at risk and become a security concern, addressing the threat from the state lies in solving a security problem and not necessarily to encourage/achieve emancipation tendencies. Booth is opposed to the notion of security from the Copenhagen School regarding centralization of state or society, emphasizing that "it is illogical; to spend numerous amounts of money and effort to protect the house against flood, drought, and thieves breaking in if this is at the expense of the wellbeing of residents".⁶

³ Ken Both, "Security and Emancipation", 1991, Review of International Studies, vol. 17, f. 316-320.

⁴ O. Wæver, 1995, 'Securitization and Desecuritization.' in R. Lipschutz, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 55.

⁵ Buzan, B., Ole Wæver & Wilde, J.d. 1998, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, f. 29

⁶ Booth, K. 1991, 'Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, vol. 17, f. 320

The Paris School

Paris has been the main leading theoretical development, inspired by Bourdieu and other sociologists and by a dose of Foucault. Didier Bigo is a key figure in this development and his magazine of “Cultures & Conflicts” has published a series of important works on these research programs. Also Jeff Huysmans, who has written for other innovative approaches, has clarified and developed several new assumptions of the Paris School. Bigo, experimentally, showed among other things, how internal and external securities come together, when agencies compete for de-territorial duties of military police. Bigo starts from the conception of an area and its stakeholders and raises the question: what do they do⁷.

If this is simply done, players based approach can easily be transformed into something similar to conspiracy theories. But this approach has now evolved into well-oriented practices, the unusual and well documented, even in low levels, from security agency. A significant advantage of this field is that it, better than others include routine practice even such as deviations from official policy it is less oriented toward speeches and more toward agency practices⁸.

This is a demanding job, as should penetrate in different agencies, but has the advantage in a growing and changing society to be at the right height to see who “makes security”.

The Frankfurt School

The first meaning of the term critical theory was that defined by Max Horkheimer, the Frankfurt School of Social Sciences, in 1937 in his essay “Traditional and Critical Theory.” According to Horkheimer and Adorno also Critical theory seeks to “liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.” For Horkheimer, a capitalist society can become more democratic, when “all the conditions of social life that are controllable by human beings depend on true consensus”⁹.

However, Horkheimer and Adorno, in later works on the Enlightenment dialectic, presented a rather pessimistic view on the possibility that sometimes people would be able to overcome the power of instrumental rationality (material development) and to achieve emancipation. An alternative approach to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, which was separated from the production focus of previous supporters, was brought into theoretical discussion of Habermas, where decisions are made based on consensus through discussion coming free from any domination. In the later Communication Theory, Habermas argues emancipator power should be found in the field of communications interoperability, where great emphasis is set on the language.

In general, the approach of the Frankfurt School is essentially emancipator in nature. It can be said that while the origin of the Frankfurt School is of Marxist background over the years it has moved towards a mix of regulations and a post-modernist rationalism.

⁷ Didier Bigo, “International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration”, London: Routledge 2000, f. 180-190

⁸ Referuar faqes se këshillit “Social Science Research Council” “after September 11”, “To Reassure and Protect, After September 11” <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/bigo.htm>;

⁹ Horkheimer, M. 1982, Critical Theory, Seabury Press, New York:, f. 244

Post-structuralism and post-modernism influences

Members of this debate are traditionalists on one side and the crucial post-modern feminist currents on the other. These criticize the post-modern security as such. Connecting it directly to Nietzsche and Heidegger, they raise the question of why we are concerned about security. The start of post-modern approach is attended mainly by Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche attacked “the philosophical concepts of the subject, representation, causes, truth, values, and the system, replacing a perspective orientation for which no facts - only interpretations-no objective truth, but only structures of different individuals or groups”.

Post-modernists generally criticize absolute truths or identities and emphasize the importance of interpreting the relations of power to power, personalization and discussion. Post-modernism argues that knowledge itself is associated with time, place, social position and other factors by which an individual builds (constructs) its views¹⁰.

Foucault says that “to discover constructive knowledge, it is necessary that it be criticized and deconstructed. Seen from afar, is the only interpretation, and interpretation is itself understood as a practice of domination that occurred in the area of history”¹¹. According to Ashley “nothing is stable in the final and no constant, no meanings certain, no secure reason, no deep secrets, no final structure of the limits of history”¹². To summarize in one sentence, the method of analysis of post-modernists, one can say that they have a tendency to make question “how” and not “what”.

Critical Security Studies and emancipation¹³

To better understand the critical security studies is necessary to first examine the term “critical”. The strength of criticism is not intended to distinguish right from wrong, positive from negative, but to leave the existing assumptions and practices and provide strength and conviction to search for new meaning. Criticism provides power to have choices. Problem then arises that this situation should be better or new ways of living, or where should it lead us this new understanding and whose perspective. It is at this moment that we begin to see a divergence of the proponents of critical security studies. Some critics want to remain firm, with the goal to be a continuation of the understanding or alertness, while others want to make this world a better place for all mankind, and now others want a more pluralistic world, tolerant to different values and its norms. Is there a thread that can link all these seemingly different approaches to Critical Security Studies (SCS)?

Emancipation

According to Booth, “Emancipation means freedom of the people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop to realize what they would

¹⁰ Der Derian, James, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, f. 30-40;

¹¹ Foucault, “Nietzsche, Gyneology, History”

¹² Ashley, R.K, ‘The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory on International Politics’, *Alternatives*, 1987, vol. XII, f. 408.

¹³ Booth, K. 1991, ‘Security and Emancipation’, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 17, f. 315-330

choose to do in terms of freedom ... Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Therefore emancipation, not power or order is one that produces true security. Thus, theoretically, security is emancipation”¹⁴.

Emancipation is a very controversial term, with regard to critical security studies. There are those who see it as a central concept, while there are others that are very critical of the image that these studies bring. These safety studies, taken separately, seem to give the idea of a state of fulfillment of the golden equilibrium. The solution may be remote but can be essentially based on its vision of Foucault’s thought which is a search for “the truth shall make us free”. True freedom is beyond security and insecurity, because of fears beyond redemption needing to be sure because the truth about the destruction of liberty and threats.

Conclusions

Review of National Defence (Strategic Defence Review) is an important point of Albanian Defence Directive 2011. In relation to the Directive it states that: “The preparatory work for a Strategic Defence Review will be the focus of 2011 activity of the General Staff. Undertaking such a process is necessary for *the new security requirements*.

This is a process that involves the Ministry of Defence as a *leading player in the field of security*, but the Albanian legislative and executive bodies. Defence Review and the results that will emerge from this process will force the prerogatives of *national security*, whether in terms of the missions of our Armed Forces, whether about operational or financial terms.

All this will require a radical change in how the General Staff and Armed Forces will conduct *analysis and political-military assessments*”¹⁵.

It is easily observed that the term ‘security’ is the key term that should be at the foundation of key strategic documents. At the centre of this term is certainly deep knowledge of this area. Education and research institutes of the Armed Forces should be the leader in this field. This is the positive ambition quoted by Defence Directive 2011 (Ministry of Defence as a leading player in the field of Security).

Being leader of the security field still needs to study its latest developments undertaken by the Defence Academy in relation to education, Master and PhD degree programs, which are not only a step to be commended, but also to further our thoughts ahead. Why? For studies in this area, Western countries not only have a long tradition, but they also invest a lot in the interest of their constant evolution. So, not only the Defence institution should acquire the legal right of being leader in this field, but also it has to increase the education and research capacities, to produce analytical studies in this field. This is not something unnecessary, a luxury, or a matter of waiting, but it is a requirement for the defence institution to accomplish the mission.

Based on this observation, the field of security studies and its changing nature is a challenging issue for the strategic leadership. We need to undertake concrete steps in

¹⁴ Booth, K. 2005, “Emancipation”, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, London, f. 180.

¹⁵ Defence Directive 2011, page 6

the security study area, develop the right capacities and structures, in accordance with our conditions and priorities.

Bibliography:

1. Security Studies, UET, Tirana 2010.
2. Krause, Keith, "Critical Theory and Security Studies", 1998, f.298-333.
3. Ken Both, "Security and Emancipation", 1991, Review of International Studies, vol. 17, p. 316-320.
4. Buzan, B., Ole Wæver & Wilde, JD 1998, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, p. 29.
5. Booth, K. 1991, 'Security and Emancipation', Review of International Studies, vol. 17, p. 320.
6. Didier Bigo, "International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration", London: Routledge 2000, p. 180-190.
7. O. Wæver, 1995, "Securitization and Desecuritization". in R. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 55.
8. Referring to the council site "Social Science Research Council" "After September 11", "To Reassure and Protect, After September 11" <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/bigo.htm>.
9. Horkheimer, M. 1982, Critical Theory, Seabury Press, New York., pp. 244.
10. Jone, RW 2005, 'On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity, and Concrete Utopia', in K. Booth (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., London, pp. 225.
11. Der Derian, James, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard", New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 30-40.
12. Ashley, RK, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory on International Politics', Alternatives, 1987, vol. XII, p. 408.

SECTION VII

CONTEMPORARY RESEARCHERS ON SECURITY

Two articles of most distinguished international researchers in the field of security, Richard Ned Lebow and George Friedman are introduced in this Section.

The first one comes with a fragment from his book titled “Why do nations fight”. In this part, the author investigates the causes of wars during the last 400 years. He blames Security we currently perceive, for a certain number of these wars. Probably, even for this aspect, we believe this article is of special interest for the readers.

Meanwhile, Friedman’s article is presented in the framework of geopolitics, and addresses an issue which has currently become not only a trend but also a necessity in the spirit of globalization: multiple citizenship.

This issue becomes critical as the relations of the individual with the state, which have not lost their importance, but following the global trends, are aiming at a multiple citizenship.

Nationalism and Dual Citizenship

George Friedman,
Executive Director of STRATFOR, US

Abstract. *Geopolitics is central to STRATFOR's methodology, providing the framework upon which we study the world. The foundation of geopolitics in our time is the study of the nation-state, and fundamental to this is the question of the relationship of the individual to the nation-state. Changes in the relationship of the individual to the nation and to the state are fundamental issues in geopolitics, and thus worth discussing.*

Many issues affect this complex relationship, notable among them the increasing global trend of multiple citizenship. This is obviously linked to the question of immigration, but it also raises a deeper question, namely, what is the meaning of citizenship in the 21st century?

Nation vs. State

It is difficult to make sense of the international system without making sense of the nation-state. The concept is complicated by a reality that includes multinational states like Belgium, where national identity plays a significant role, and Russia or China, where it can be both significant and at times violent. In looking at the nation-state, the idea of nation is more complex, and perhaps more interesting, than that of state.

The idea of nation is not always clear. At root, a nation is a group of people who share a fate, and with that fate, an identity. Nations can be consciously created, as the United States was. Nations can exist for hundreds or thousands of years, as seen in parts of Europe or Asia. However long a nation exists and whatever its origins, a nation is founded on what I've called elsewhere "love of one's own," a unique relationship with the community in which an individual is born or to which he chose to come. That affinity is the foundation of a nation.

If that dissolves, the nation dissolves, something that has happened on numerous occasions in history. If a nation disappears, the international system begins to behave differently. And if nations in general lose their identity and cohesion, massive shifts might take place. Some might say it would be for better and others for worse. It is sufficient to note here that either way would make a profound difference.

The state is much clearer: It is the political directorate of the nation. How the leaders are selected and how they govern varies widely. The relationship of the state to the nation also varies widely. Not all nations have states. Some are occupied by other nation-states. Some are divided between multiple states. Some are part of an entity that governs many nations. And some are communities that have developed systems of government that do not involve states, although this is increasingly rare.

The relation to the nation is personal. The relation to the state is legal. We can see this linguistically in the case of the United States. I can state my relation to my nation simply: I am an American. I cannot state my relationship to my state nearly as simply. Saying I am a “United Statian” makes no sense. I have to say that I am a citizen of the United States, to state my legal relationship, not personal affinity. The linguistic complexity of the United States doesn’t repeat itself everywhere, but a distinction does exist between nationality and citizenship. They may coincide easily, as when a person is born in a country and becomes a citizen simply through that, or they may develop, as when an individual is permitted to immigrate and become naturalized. Note the interesting formulation of that term, as it implies the creation of a natural relationship with the state.

In the United States, the following oath is administered when one is permitted to become a citizen, generally five years after being permitted to immigrate:

I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.

I should say I took this oath at the age of 17. Although I became a citizen of the United States when my father was naturalized years earlier, receiving my own citizenship papers involved going to a courthouse and taking this oath personally. Being confronted with the obligations of citizenship was a sobering experience.

The American oath is one of the most rigorous; other nations have much simpler and less demanding oaths. Intriguingly, many countries with less explicitly demanding oaths are also countries where becoming a naturalized citizen is more difficult and less common. For the United States, a nation and a state that were consciously invented, the idea of immigration was inherent in the very idea of the nation, as was this oath. Immigration and naturalization required an oath of this magnitude, as naturalization meant taking on not only a new state identity but also a new national identity.

The American nation was built on immigrants from other nations. Unless they were prepared to “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore

been a subject or citizen,” the American enterprise could fall into chaos as immigrants came to the United States to secure the benefits of full citizenship but refused to abandon prior obligations and refused to agree to the obligations and sacrifices the oath demanded. The United States therefore is in a position shared only with a few other immigration-based nations, and it has staked out the most demanding position on naturalization.

The Dual Citizenship Anomaly

It is therefore odd that the United States — along with many other nations — permits nationals to be citizens of other countries. The U.S. Constitution doesn’t bar this, but the oath of citizenship would seem to do so. The oath demands that the immigrant abandon all obligations to foreign states. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Afroyim v. Rusk* in 1967 that revoking citizenship on grounds of voting in foreign elections was unconstitutional. The ruling involved a naturalized American who presumably had taken the oath. The Supreme Court left the oath in place, but if we are to understand the court correctly, it ruled that the oath did not preclude multiple citizenship.

It is impossible to know how many people in the United States or other countries currently hold multiple citizenship, but anecdotally it would appear that the practice is not uncommon. Not being required to renounce one’s foreign citizenship verifiably obviously facilitates the practice.

And this raises a fundamental question. Is citizenship a license to live and earn a living in a country, or is it equally or more so a set of legal and moral obligations? There are many ways legally to reside in a country without becoming a citizen. But the American oath, for example, makes it appear that the naturalized citizen (as opposed to just the legal resident) has an overriding obligation to the United States that can require substantial and onerous responsibilities within military and civilian life. An individual might be able to juggle multiple obligations until they came into conflict. Does the citizen choose his prime obligation at that time or when he becomes a citizen?

The reality is that in many cases, citizenship is seen less as a system of mutual obligations and rights than as a convenience. This creates an obvious tension between the citizen and his obligations under his oath. But it also creates a deep ambiguity between his multiple nationalities. The concept of immigration involves the idea of movement to a new place. It involves the assumption of legal and moral obligations. But it also involves a commitment to the nation, at least as far as citizenship goes. This has nothing to do with retaining ethnicity. It has to do with a definition of what it means to love one’s own — if you are a citizen of multiple nations, which nation is yours?

It is interesting to note that the United States has been equally ambiguous about serving in other countries’ militaries. John Paul Jones served as an admiral in the Russian navy. American pilots flew for Britain and China prior to American entry into World War II. They did not take the citizenship oath, having been born in the United States. While you could argue that there was an implicit oath, you could also argue that they did not compromise their nationality: They remained Americans even in fighting for other countries. The immigration issue is more complex, however. In electing to become American citizens, immigrants consciously take the citizenship oath. The explicit oath would seem to create a unique set of obligations for naturalized immigrants.

The Pull of the Old Country

Apart from acquiring convenient passports on obscure tropical islands, the dual citizenship phenomenon appears to operate by linking ancestral homelands with adopted countries. Immigrants, and frequently their children and grandchildren, retain their old citizenship alongside citizenship in the country they now live in. This seems a benign practice and remains so until there is conflict or disagreement between the two countries—or where, as in some cases, the original country demands military service as the price of retaining citizenship.

In immigrant countries in particular, the blurring of the line between nationalities becomes a potential threat in a way that it is not for the country of origin. The sense of national identity (if not willingness to sacrifice for it) is often stronger in countries whose nationhood is built on centuries of shared history and fates than it is in countries that must manage waves of immigration. These countries have less room for maneuver on these matters, unless they have the fortune to be secure and need not ask much of citizens. But in those countries that are built on immigrants and that do need to call for sacrifice, this evolution is potentially more troublesome.

There are those who regard nationalism as divisive and harmful, leading to conflict. I am of the view that nationalism has endured because it provides individuals with a sense of place, community, history and identity. It gives individuals something beyond themselves that is small enough to be comprehensible but far greater than they are. That nationalism can become monstrous is obviously true; anything that is useful can also become harmful. But nationalism has survived and flourished for a reason.

The rise of multiple citizenship undoubtedly provides freedom. But as is frequently the case, the freedom raises the question of what an individual is committed to beyond himself. In blurring the lines between nations, it does not seem that it has reduced conflict. Quite the contrary, it raises the question of where the true loyalties of citizens lie, something unhealthy for the citizen and the nation-state.

In the United States, it is difficult to reconcile the oath of citizenship with the Supreme Court's ruling affirming the right of dual citizenship. That ambiguity over time could give rise to serious problems. This is not just an American problem, although it might be more intense and noticeable here. It is a more general question, namely, what does it mean to be a citizen?

Past and Future Motives for War

Richard Ned Lebow,
Political Scientist, US

Abstract. *Richard Ned Lebow is an American political sciences academic, with a very famous American University degree. He is prominent specifically in international relations studies and USA foreign affairs policy. He is a constructivist and worldwide known for the conflict management strategies, for the Cold War studies, etc.*

Richard Ned Lebow has written many books as: “A cultural theory of International Relations” that has been qualified bestseller in international relations; “Why nations go to war”, “Coercion, cooperation and ethics”; “The tragical vision of Politics”, etc.

Clarifying the causes of the wars has been a great incentive to consciously know their repercussions in the people’s life. The realist concept on war ties these causes with the security. Anyway, is it the only cause of the war?

At the very base of the wars it may be identified that more than security incentives, they have even spirit, appetite, interests or other fears. The ambitious level of all these incentives is: more power, more hegemony.

Clarifying the causes of wars is not, of course, an isolated aim. Nations and states have plentiful ways and manners in order to promote their interests without war: The cooperation, the alliances and a lot of other alternatives have demonstrated that are the best strategies, specifically for modern times.

In a nutshell

There is a burgeoning literature on war and its causes. Almost all major studies approach the problem from a realist perspective. They assume security is the principal motive of states and insecurity the major cause of war. Realist theories elaborate mechanisms (balance of power) and conditions (security dilemma, polarity, power transition) that they consider responsible for conflict and war.

My dissatisfaction with the existing literature on war, and international relations more generally, was an incentive to write *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, published by Cambridge in 2008.

That book develops a theory of international relations based on a parsimonious model of human motivation. Following Plato and Aristotle, I posit spirit, appetite and reason as fundamental drives with distinct goals. They generate different logics concerning cooperation, conflict and risk-taking. They require, and help generate, characteristic forms of hierarchy based on different principles of justice. A fourth motive—fear—enters the picture when reason is unable to constrain appetite or spirit. Fear is a powerful emotion, not an inborn drive. In real worlds, multiple motives mix rather than blend, giving rise to a range of behaviors that often appear contradictory.

In modern times the spirit (*thumos*) has largely been ignored by philosophy and social science. I contend it is omnipresent. It gives rise to the universal drive for self-esteem, which finds expression in the quest for honor or standing. By excelling at activities valued by our peer group or society, we win the approbation of those who matter and feel good about ourselves.

Institutions and states have neither psyches nor emotions. The people who run these collectivities or identify with them do. They often project their psychological needs on to their political units, and feel better about themselves when those units win victories or perform well. Transference and esteem by vicarious association are especially pronounced in the age of nationalism where the state has become the relevant unit.

I documented the relevance of the spirit for war in a series of case studies in *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. In *Why Nations Fight* I extend my analysis to war throughout the modern era and analyze war initiation in terms of the relative power of states and their respective motives for war.

I constructed a data set of all inter-state wars involving great and aspiring rising powers from 1648 to the present. The data set identifies initiators of war (often multiple); their motives (security, material advantage, standing, revenge, and domestic politics); the outcome (win, lose, or draw); the nature of the rules, if any, governing warfare; the duration and intensity of the war; and the character of the peace settlement.

Contrary to realist expectations, I find security responsible for only 19 of 94 wars. A significant number of these wars pitted great powers against other great powers and none of them were associated with power transitions. This does not mean that security is unimportant in international affairs; it was a primary concern of all states that were attacked. Material interests are also a weak motive for war, being responsible for only 8 wars, and most of those in the eighteenth century.

Security and material interest sometimes act in concert with one another, and more often with other motives. In some wars they are secondary to these other motives.

Standing, by contrast, is responsible for 62 wars as a primary or secondary motive. Revenge, also a manifestation of the spirit, is implicated in another 11. There can be little doubt that the spirit is the principal cause of war across the centuries, and that it and its consequences have been almost totally ignored in the international relations literature.

The character and robustness of domestic, regional and international societies and ideas about the efficacy of war determine the relative importance of various motives for war

and its overall frequency. Interest shows a sharp decline once mercantilism gave way to more sophisticated understandings of wealth. Security-motivated wars show no similar decline by century but come in clusters associated with bids for hegemony by great or dominant powers.

The most recent clusters of security-related wars were associated with the run up and conduct of the two world wars of the twentieth century. They were in turn a product of the dislocations brought about of modernization in an environment where great power competition and the drive for hegemony were conducted primarily by violent means.

Now that this era has passed in Europe and is receding in much of the Pacific rim, and hegemony achieved by force is no longer considered a legitimate ambition, the security requirements and fears of great powers should decline.

Wars of standing can also be expected to decline. During the post-war era, and even more since the end of that conflict, war and standing have become increasingly disengaged in the sense that successful war initiation no longer enhances standing.

Successful war initiation may actually lead to loss of standing in the absence of United Nations' approval of the military initiative in question. The Anglo-American intervention in Iraq—a war in which territorial conquest was not an issue—is a case in point.

Changing values and norms encourage rational leaders to find other, peaceful ways of claiming standing. To the extent that this happens, the frequency of war involving either rising or great powers can be expected to diminish sharply.

The wide angle

Three shifts in thinking influenced the frequency of war and its motives.

The first concerns the nature of wealth. Until Adam Smith and modern economics, the world's wealth was thought to be finite, making an increase in wealth for any state thought to result in a loss for others. Once political elites learned that total wealth could be augmented by the division of labour, mechanical sources of energy and economies of scale, economic cooperation became feasible and increasingly important. It all but put an end to wars of material aggrandizement.

The second shift began in the nineteenth century and is about collective versus autarkic pursuit of security. Alliances assumed new meaning at the Congress of Vienna as they had the goal of conflict prevention. Later congresses helped great powers ease regional tensions through agreements and moral suasion. Following World War I, the League of Nations was given the more ambitious task of preventing war by means of collective security, but failed miserably. The principle of collective security endured and the United Nations, established in 1945, made it the principal mission of the Security Council. The UN's record is mixed, but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been more successful. It and other international groupings have played a prominent and arguably successful role in keeping the peace or terminating wars in the post-Cold War world. Collective security has become the norm and an important source of regional and international stability.

The third and most recent shift in thinking concerns the nature of standing in international affairs. Historically, military success was the principal means of gaining standing and

recognition as a great power. There are other of achieving status within states. The European Union, Scandinavia, Canada, Japan and Brazil all claim standing on grounds that have nothing to do with military might.

The more robust regional and international orders become, the more multiple hierarchies of standing will also emerge at the international level. States will feel more confident about seeking standing in diverse ways and devoting resources toward this end that might otherwise be reserved for the military.

A significant increase in standing of countries associated with alternate visions of the international system was indicated, for example, by a BBC World Service poll conducted in early 2007. As reported in Australia's *The Age*, Canada and Japan topped the list of countries that respondents (54%) viewed as exerting a positive influence in the world, followed by France (50%), Britain (45%), China (42%), and India (37%).

If peace continues among the major powers, claims for standing on the basis of military power will become even less persuasive. As standing confers influence, states will have additional incentives to shift their foreign policies to bring them in line with the dominant incentive structure. In such a world states would view even more negatively the use of force in the absence of unqualified international support.

From the vantage point of say the year 2030, we might look back on the Iraq war as one of the defining moments of the international relations of the twenty-first century because of the way it delegitimized the unilateral use of force and fore grounded and encouraged alternative, peaceful means of gaining standing.

A close-up

The Iraq invasion of 2003 was justified by the Bush administration on the grounds of national security. But all of the principal advisors of the administration of president George W. Bush's father privately told the president that no security or economic interest was at stake-and that intervention could put them at risk.

Oil is another unsatisfactory explanation for the Iraq invasion. The oil companies themselves did not favor war, but wanted the administration to end sanctions so they could buy and distribute Iraqi oil.

The invasion is best understood as an attempt to exploit America's comparative military advantage to lock in "the unipolar movement" for reasons of standing. Rather than making friend and foe alike more complaint, it provided the need and opportunity for them to become more recalcitrant.

Lastly

The three shifts in thinking I identity have two common features. Each developed slowly and progressed in fits and starts.

Changes in beliefs took a long time to become sufficiently widespread to affect practice, and practice was at first halting and unsuccessful. Over time, however, patterns of behavior changed and the motives in question become increasingly disaggregated from war. The revolution in thinking about wealth began in late eighteenth century, did not fully become the conventional wisdom until the late nineteenth century and did not act

as a check on war until at least one half century later. Collective security, a product of the early nineteenth century, took almost 150 years to show meaningful political consequences. The shift in thinking about standing is a twentieth century phenomenon and only began to affect political practice during the Cold War.

This author can only hope that a book that demonstrates how traditional conceptions of standing have been responsible for war can help accelerate this change, and, with it, the search and acceptance of alternate means of claiming and receiving standing.

SHORT GUIDANCE

FOR ‘MILITARY REVIEW’ RESEARCH PAPERS

Dear contributors to the Military Review!

“Military Review” is a research review focused on security and defense aspects. It is the magazine of the AAF military elite and prominent civilian analysts, through their research papers. The papers are not based only on information, but primarily, they provide recommendations and solutions to the most important security and defense issues, at the strategic and operational level. That means that priority number one of the Military Magazine is the applied value of the research papers.

With this purpose, we invite talented students of high military studies of Albanian Defense Academy, instructors, lecturers, researchers, analysts, commanders, chiefs and trainers of all institutions and units of the Albanian Armed Forces, and beyond, independent analysts, civilian or military security and defense, to engage and organize their community, creating highly valuable and respected research works.

In order to facilitate the efforts of the researchers, the Editorial Board of the Military Review provides the following guidance and technical data on the structure of the articles for the author (authors) of the Military Review, which should be respected by all contributors.

Structure of the Article

Title. Title of the article

The author, co-author: Name of the article’s author or co-author

Abstract: The abstract is a short commentary of an article. It precedes the full article. It is a brief summary of about half a page or some 400-600 words of the main findings of the article (such as, fundamental issues in the article, intentions of the author’s view, conclusions or recommendations, etc.).

Length: The main part of the article (including introduction and conclusions) written in Albanian/English should be 6-8 computer pages with a maximum of 15.000-25.000 characters, including “footnotes” and additional information.

Format: Page must be A4: Type of script: “Times New Roman” size of font 11, 5. Indent (new paragraph) is determined by a blank line. Presentation of the text is to be simple and to a minimum of styles and formatting options. Paragraphs should not be

numbered; text should be a structure of 3 levels maximum. Highlighted bold text or colored letters should be avoided. Writing steep and quotes should be used only for quotations and literature sources used.

Graphs, tables and other images should be in-group formatted by avoiding their disintegration. They should be clear and closer to the text explaining them. All images should be reflected in the way that readability is not affected by reducing the size and black and white printers. If an image is taken from another source, it is essential that the respective source is quoted.

Articles should be sent in printing format and electronically to the editorial board of Military Review. For those items that do not meet the above requirements and language format, the editorial staff decides to return to the authors for improvement, or to exclude them from the submission process.

Documentation: All contributors of the Military Review should respect all rights reserved policy and provide references and “footnote” throughout the article and finally to identify all the literature used for the article. “Footnotes” should respect the national and international rules correctly to include: Surname, name (referring to copyright), title of reference material, the name of the entity editor, publication place, publication year, number of pages where it relates ISBN number, website where the item is published. (E.g. SMITH, James Carl, Nowak, George. *Security in the 21st Century: History unknown. 2nd edition. New York, London: Oxford University Press, 2006. 235 p. ISBN 0071448209, <http://www.iir.cz/display.asp?LNG=uk&ida=.>)*

Biography: Along with the article, the author should also send an electronic photo, and a short CV of about 100 words including: name, surname, military and research degree, job position, education, research efforts, phone number and email address.

Style: Writing must present a simple structure, using titles and subtitles. It is important that author use at the end of the article conclusions and recommendations on the key issues.

The article should not contain classified material and must apply the rules of classified information. Also, the article should not contain political positions or views on the issues concerned. It must respect the research orientation of this review.

For further information, please contact:

Publications Branch, Center for Defense Analyses (CDA), TRADOC Command

Mail: Komanda e Doktrinës dhe Stërviçjes, QAM, Dega e Botimeve
Kutia Postare 24 23, Rruga e Dibrës, Tiranë, Shqipëri

Nr. Tel: 00355(4)23 63 465 ext. 1076, 1037

Nr. Fax:00355(4)23 69 179

Email: revistaushtarake@aaf.mil.al or qam@aaf.mil.al

Editorial Board of the Military Review

