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Analyses, assessments, syntheses in the domain of national, regional, and global defense and security

SECURITY AND ITS EVOLUTION AS A CONCEPT

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Abstract.

This article consicely focuses on the views and attitudes of different philosophers about the concept of security, causes of war, development of conflicts, and various arguments for mitigating or avoiding conflicts. In order to cover this rather complex subject of war and its causes, as an inevitable part of human existence, political philosophers have crystallized two lines of thought and attitude that constitute an essential difference between "realist" and "idealist" thinkers. In addition to these two schools of thought, the article deals with a third line of thought, neither pessimistic nor optimistic, represented by the Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius, widely reflected in the literature of international relations, which opposes both Hobbesian and Kantian approaches.

Next, realistic and controversial views about the concept of security are addressed. What is the difference between the realist and the controversial approach? What role do the state and international system play in relation to security? When referring to the term "security", what kind of security is it meant - national, individual or group one? What are the dimensions of security as regards state, nation, military, and classic threats?

In conclusion, an analysis and assessment is provided for the scientific work done about security over the past decades, as well as for the necessity of considering it as a subject of study and scientific research, and the inclusion of security issues as an academic discipline in the curricula of our schools and universities.

Keywords: strategic concept of security, conflict, war, threat, danger, Hobbesian, Kantian, Grotian thought etc.

Introduction

Human history is linked to the history of wars. In his classic study "Man, the State, and War", Kenneth Waltz[1] describes the disagreements among classical philosophers about the causes of war. There are many views and attitudes about war: some regard it as the result of incompatibilities in human nature, others consider the structure of the state as a decisive factor of war. Many scholars and philosophers focus their attention on the anarchic nature of the international system in which individuals and states must operate.

In order to cover this rather complex subject of war and its causes, as an inevitable part of human existence, political philosophers have crystallized two lines of thought and attitude that constitute an essential difference between "realist" and "idealist" thinkers.

These two schools of thought, in turn, reflect distinctive "Hobbesian"[2] and "Kantian"[3] traditions in classical philosophy. Alongside these two currents, there is also a third tradition, the "Grotian" school[4], reflected in the international relations literature, which opposes the Hobbesian and Kantian approaches. What are the differences among them? While Hobbesians see no possibility of moving beyond the profoundly violent world we live in, Kantians, on the other hand, argue that it is possible to transcend violent conflict and move into a more peaceful existence. Grotian scholars, in contrast, acknowledge that violence and war are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to completely eradicate, while also argue that it is possible to establish rules and norms that

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[1] Waltz, Kenneth, American political scientist, author of "Man, the State, and War", 1959.

[2] Hobbes, Thomas, English philosopher, author of the book "Leviathan", 1651.

[3] Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804), German philosopher and one of the major thinkers of the Enlightenment, known for works on epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics.

[4] Grotius, Hugo, (1583–1645), Dutch lawyer, philosopher, writer, and diplomat during the 17th century.

help to mitigate the evil of violence and war. In this context, Grotians are more optimistic than Hobbesians and more pessimistic than Kantians.

The perennial question whether war and violence can be eradicated has been at the heart of the study of international relations since it became a systematic academic discipline after the First World War (1918), when the subject began to be widely addressed in the English departments and institutes. Initially, until 1945 the idealist theory of a greater peaceful international order prevailed, claiming widespread support as the League of Nations seemed to offer some hope. Later, however, during the Cold War, realism became the dominant school of thought, which meant that war and violent conflict were seen by many thinkers in this confrontational era as permanent features of interstate relations that characterize human history. During the Cold War, due to the emergence of two ideological blocs - East and West - it was deemed necessary to establish alliances in security matters. With the creation of the Warsaw Treaty (1955), the security of the Western countries was at risk, so NATO's first strategic concept for the defense of the Alliance was adopted[5], whose mission was: "to coordinate military and economic power in peacetime, with the aim of creating a powerful deterrent to any nation or group of nations that threaten the peace, independence, and stability of the North Atlantic family of nations."

This constituted a realistic approach in dealing with security issues in the global aspect, constituting at the same time a re-dimensioning in the field of international relations. However, with the end of the Cold War, the end of intense ideological conflict between East and West was a major turning point in international history, ushering in a new paradigm in which interstate violence would gradually become a thing of the past and values the new community would bring greater cooperation between individuals, societies and states. It was at this time that the debate about war, conflicts and security issues was reawakened. A new idealism began, which reflected more optimistic views of the development of a peaceful global civil society, although for some others, "old" realism was considered the best approach to thinking about international security. By the latter, cooperation was seen as temporary, anticipating that the harsh realities of national and international insecurity would soon re-emerge. This perspective was reinforced and validated after the events of September 11, 2001 and others later, which proved the realist approach to be true.

The new post-Cold War era was a new approach to thinking about the nature of security in general, which has had a significant impact on the domain of international relations. A new security environment was created, as well as a

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[5] Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, known as DC 6/1, adopted in December 1949.

new way of thinking about "security" from its traditional origin to the newer perspectives that emerged in the post-Cold War period. Traditional views of the relationship between national security and international security and the influence that these ideas have had on contemporary thinking began to be studied. In this manner, it was followed by a new perspective of the term "security" and a study of "new mindset", including a reconceptualization of security on a global level.

After the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to disarm itself, hoping to "hang up the sword and shield", replacing them with a "balanced mix of forces" to implement the new comprehensive approach to security. NATO's post-Cold War strategic concept (the fifth since the creation of the Alliance) stated that: "Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with defense requirements". Pursuant to good faith and partnership, NATO's strategic concepts furthered this transformation, aiming for "an optimal balance" between high-alert crisis response forces and those capable of preparing for " the worst" – but very distant – scenario on a broad scale" – collective defense operations (1999 and 2010).

These concepts of the Alliance, over time, were re-dimensioned giving importance to the need to prevent conflicts by adding new important political and military power to its ranks. In recent years, the realist approach has been reasonably challenged by alternative approaches (which provide important new insights) and yet realism remains a powerful approach to both the study and practice of international security relations.

1. Theories and views about the concept of security

Traditional "realist" views about security. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, states have been considered as the most powerful actors in the international system. They have been the universal standard of the highest political legitimacy to regulate relations with each other. In this respect, this means that security is seen as the primary obligation of state governments. They have been of the opinion that there is no alternative but to seek their protection through what has been described as a "self-help" world. In the historical debate about the best way to achieve national security, philosophers, such as: Hobbes, Machiavelli[6], and Rousseau tended to paint a rather bleak picture of the implications of state sovereignty. The international system was seen as a rather brutal arena in which states would seek to achieve their own security at the expense of their neighbors. Interstate relations were regarded

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[6] Machiavelli, Niccolo (1469-1527), politician, diplomat, philosopher, historian and poet from Florence, Italy.

as fight for power, as states constantly tried to take advantage of each other. According to this view, permanent peace, in the "cellar" sense, was unlikely to be achieved. The only thing states could do was try to balance the power of other states to prevent any from achieving overall hegemony. This was a view shared by historians and political scientists, such as: Edward H. Carr[7] and Hans Morgenthau[8], who founded what became known as the realist school of thought after World War II. This mainly pessimistic view of international relations was embraced by more researchers, political scientists and other contemporary philosophers, such as: Kenneth Waltz (1979), John Mearsheimer (1990) etc.

According to these 'neo-realist' scholars, security or insecurity is primarily the result of the structure of the international system ('structural realists'). The structure of anarchy is seen as very stable. The implication of this is that international politics in the future is likely to be as violent as international politics in the past. In his book "Back to the Future", John Mearsheimer[9] argued that the end of the Cold War was likely to bring a return to the traditional multilateral balance of power politics of the past, in which extreme nationalism and ethnic rivalries would lead to a crisis of confidence, widespread instability, and conflict. Mearsheimer considered the Cold War as a period of peace and stability brought about by the prevailing bipolar power structure. With the collapse of this system, he predicted that there would be a return to Great Powers' rivalries that had marred international relations since the seventeenth century. For neo-realist philosophers, such as: Mearsheimer, international politics involves a ruthless process of competition in all areas, especially through war, which implies that regardless of the relations between states, such cooperation has its limits. It is "constrained by the dominant logic of security competition, which no cooperation can eliminate." Therefore, true long-term peace, or a world where states do not compete for power, is highly unlikely to be achieved. The aim of realists, both classical and neo-realists, is to 'explain' the world as they see it. In a positivist sense, they claim to develop universally valid, general concepts and laws that provide a basis for predicting the future. Because the world has been largely violent in the past, it is likely to continue to be so. The lessons of the past suggest that the best way to achieve security is to seek power.

Security as a controversial concept. Traditionally, most scholars, political scientists and philosophers have agreed that security is a "controversial concept". Many theorists in the field of politics, by the term "security" mean preservation of freedom from various threats, preservation of essential values (both for

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[7] Carr, Edward H., (1892-1982), historian, diplomat, journalist and theorist of international relations.
[8] Morgenthau, Hans Joachim (1904 – 1980), German-American lawyer and political scientist.
[9] Mearsheimer, John Joseph (1947), American political scientist and scholar of international relations.

individuals and groups), but there remains a great disagreement in terms of whether the main focus of the study should be on "individual", "national" or "international" security. Historically and traditionally, the literature has been dominated by national security, defined mainly in militarized terms, i.e. national security, state integrity. The main area of interest tends to be in the military capabilities their states need to develop to deal with the threats they face.[10] So, security is defined in broader international terms. This involves states overcoming "overly self-referential security policies" and thinking about security interests of their neighbors. Thus, in this context, security as a concept has evolved, as has the essence of national or international security threats. "The Security Framework adheres to the broad Concept of Security, which is defined by State Security, Social Security, and Human Security".[11]

At first, it was all about conventional military threats. NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991 (the sixth since its creation), in its reformulation, had made a great evolutionary change, in that not only conventional threats were defined, but the five dimensions of new security: military, political, social, economic, and environmental were determined[12]. Since 2010, concerns at NATO level have evolved from non-traditional threats to new security challenges, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks, disruption of energy supplies, climate change and migration, then hybrid threats added to the list of evolving complexity of security issues[13]. All these changes in the domain of security brought about a new approach of the Alliance, responding to these challenges with a new concept for NATO's strategic defense[14].

The foreign military and economic policies of states, the converging of

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[10] Buzan, Barry, "People, States, and Fear", pp. 214-242.

[11] State security is more related to measures for traditional security and defense of the country and is mainly concerned with the preservation of sovereignty, protection of territorial integrity, and independence. Albania, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, respects the basic principle of security and collective defense.
Social security is related to security and protection of civilian population and social groups from emergencies caused by nature, industrial incidents or human errors, as well as from terrorism, asymmetric and hybrid threats, organized crime, corruption, etc. Protection of society in times of peace, crisis and war is one of the main tasks of the country's security institutions.
Human security aims to protect human rights according to UN Resolution 1674 in the framework of the "responsibility to protect" populations from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, etc. As appropriate, Albania participates and contributes to human security, based on international law and the country's constitution, joining efforts with international institutions of which it is a member.

[12] According to the classic definition of the European School of Copenhagen.

[13] Chifu, Iulian "Technology and Democracy. The Impact of the Evolution of Security and International Relations", 2019, p. 24.

[14] Lisbon Summit, Portugal 2010.

these policies in areas of change or dispute, and the overall structure of the relationships they create are analyzed with a view to achieving national and/or international security. Security is mostly related to mitigating threats to valuable assets. However, while in the security environment we have many unknown variables related to different risks and threats, this remains a fluid, vague definition and a reflection of the inherent nature of security as a "fundamentally contested concept".

Security in the modern context has many key concepts associated with it such as: insecurity, war, terrorism, genocide and mass murder, ethnic conflict, coercion, human security, poverty, environmental damage, health and of course the traditional notion of military security. Such concepts necessarily generate intractable debates about their meaning and application because, as Richard Little[15] points out, they contain an ideological element that renders empirical evidence irrelevant as a means of resolving the dispute. The security of the Alliance has been and may be affected by political developments beyond its borders. As a concrete and quite significant example is Russia's unjustified aggression against a sovereign state such as Ukraine, which has endangered security not only in Europe, but also beyond. The use of destructive conventional weapons by Russia shows that the conventional danger remains eminent, which brought a different reflection and approach to the design and development of a new strategic concept of NATO, in the last summit[16].

"The secret of NATO's longevity has been the ability to accurately read the external environment, but also its adaptation to the circumstances. NATO is the only organization and the primary factor for the organization of the West in this period of stronger geopolitical, but also ideological competition"[17].

2. Security dimensions

Beyond state security (dimension of reference). When we talk about the security dimension, the first thing that comes to mind is who we are referring to as a concept, that is, whose security should be protected. Historically, the true concept of security has been linked to the consolidation of the nation, where the state as the only legitimate guarantor actor in the politics of relations ensured sovereignty.

The most interesting and original part of Hobbes's philosophy[18] is his teaching

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[15] Little, Richard, former President of the British International Studies Association and currently Emeritus Professor at the University of Bristol and Fellow of the British Academy.

[16] NATO Summit, Madrid, June 2022.

[17] Wess Mitchell, former US Assistant Secretary of State, member of the "NATO 2030: United for a New Era" Reflection Group.

[18] Hobbes, Thomas, one of England's most distinguished philosophers.

on morality and the state. Since human society was born, people were, in reality, equal by nature. However, in the natural state before the existence of the state, everyone wanted to preserve their freedom and secure it through power over others. In this context, when there was no law, no natural property, no justice and injustice, there was only war with its two elements, force and deception. As human society evolved, this state of insecurity and immorality could not continue as it was equally dangerous for all people, so they were forced to end war in the interest of peace. People created the guarantor and insurer of their security which was the state. All power was delegated to the sovereign, who held absolute and indivisible power in his own hands. However, the security of the state remained in relatively uncertain terms in the context of an interstate system of international relations, that is, in ruling the nation's territory and guarding its borders against other states. "The meaning of national interest is survival - the defense of physical, political and cultural identity against the usurpation of other nations"[19].

In the framework of an international monopoly of power and authority, all states place national survival as their primary task. The strategic environment today is much different from the previous one, a change that has brought about a different way of conceiving and dealing with risks and threats to global and national security. The dire situation in which a multipolar world is today and threatened by atomic weapons is nothing but the extreme manifestation of a dilemma that human society has had to face since the beginning of history. Nowadays, the most typical case is Russia's unjustified aggression against a sovereign state such as Ukraine, which has endangered security not only in Europe, but also beyond.

The use of destructive conventional weapons by Russia shows that the conventional danger remains eminent, which should be reflected in a different approach in the drafting and development of strategic documents.

In this context, states trying to achieve security from such an attack, are driven to gain more and more power to escape the influence of the power of others. Consiquently making others more insecure and forces them to prepare for the worst. Since no one can feel completely safe in such a competitive world, then security challenges and increasing national power remain fundamental priorities for states. "In anarchy, safety is the highest ultimate goal"[20]. However, this national idea, as a solution to the security challenge to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state, did not remain undisputed, but was followed by numerous debates by various theorists. Historically, liberal theorists such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant emphasized that the state is only an

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[19] Morgenthau, author of the book "Politics among Nations", 1948.

[20] Waltz, Kenneth, "Theory of International Politics", 1979.

instrument for public security. They raised the idea of time by challenging realist thinking that the state is the center of everything and arguing that security is a broader concept and that society should be the main reference point for people's politics, while the focus of politics and international relations in general it must be society. So the concept of social security was born, which means that a group or collective lives in security and freedom so that it can develop its productivity and wealth[21].

Beyond military security (issue's dimension). The signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 ended the Thirty Years' War and marked the birth of modern Europe as a continent with sovereign states. With the creation of modern states, security took on a new conceptual dimension, linking it mainly to military issues. This was due to the fact that the greatest security and main concerns for states were determined by military attacks and the risk of being invaded. In this view, traditional national security interests were almost exclusively of a military nature. Military security was equated with national security, so military security was considered more endangered by hostile states.

The term security was associated with state military affairs and took a realist perspective on state-to-state threats and deterrence during the Cold War, focusing on Soviet nuclear strategy and decision making[22]. After the 60s, with the creation of the national liberation movements of the so-called "Third World", in addition to state military threats, non-state military threats were also born, perceived at the time as "communist" threats to the interests of the USA and the West, bringing at the same time time and the need for the development of new "limited war" and counterinsurgency strategies"[23].

Non-state asymmetric military threats continued to become more sophisticated in later times, culminating in the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, carried out by the Islamic militant network Al-Qaeda against the United States of America. Time has shown that even small groups have acquired the capacity to cause disproportion, damaging and thus seriously challenging the security of a state. Nowadays, dangerous components have been developed that challenge security, beyond the classic military component. This is the reason why the concept of security today does not only refer to hostile states, but also to non-state actors as a source of military threats.

Beyond national security (geographical dimension). When we talk about the term "security", the first thing that comes to mind is security at national level,

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[21] Wæver, Ole, professor of international relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, "Securitization and Desecuritization", 1993.

[22] Kissinger, A. Henry, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", 1957.

[23] Blaufarb, S. Douglas, "The Counter-Insurgency Era," 1977 ed.

in the traditional sense of this term. The question that arises is: When we talk about the notion of national security, what is the extent of security concerns geographically? Historically, traditional security realists understood only the official security strategy (policy) implemented at the national level. They considered it wrong to design security policies beyond the state even if global security problems existed, the solutions required in any case at the national level. National security therefore refers to the security of the territorial state by correctly defining the goals, ways and means. However, over time, security problems increasingly took on a global character, due to global threats and risks. "The problems that were turmoiling the world required global solutions, but there was no global agency to provide them"[24].

Countries in general and in particular those at the regional level, share almost the same or similar risks and threats. The ever-changing security environment necessitated a new approach to meeting security challenges. States began to develop common strategies to protect their common interests at the regional level.

At the global level, the establishment of NATO in 1949 marked the development of a transatlantic "security community". Common security strategies and organizations develop when states integrate politically with each other, renouncing violence as a means of resolving conflicts between them and developing common ideas and plans on how to establish and maintain regional stability and beyond. Security policy at the regional level is profoundly shaped by those states that live within an international community and tend toward peaceful relations. Researchers, scientists and philosophers conduct studies and examine security issues in organizations, in different historical and regional contexts in the countries where they exist, appear and perhaps where they are difficult to detect. It is worth noting that in many regions of the world there are many joint security initiatives, projects and committees, already overcoming the narrow notion of national security[25]. Typical examples for our Balkan region are many joint initiatives and projects in the field of security and beyond.

Beyond classical threats (risk dimension). The fourth and perhaps most important dimension of the conceptual shift in security relates to the understanding of risk. Traditionally, political challenges and threats to states have been defined based on relational threats, military alliances, hostile intentions, military capabilities relative to each other. After the Second World War, the world was divided into two blocs with completely different ideological bases, the western one representing the capitalist system and the

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[24] Waltz, Kenneth, "Theory of International Politics", 1979.

[25] Adler, Emanuel; Barnett, Michael, "Security Communities", 1998.

eastern one representing the communist system. The explosion of the first Russian atomic bomb in 1948, for those who signed the Brussels Pact, would mean that the balance between East and West in Europe had been broken. In order to avoid, reduce and mitigate threats and risks between states and blocs, the development of alliances became necessary. So, it was necessary for the western states to create a military bloc that was obviously much wider than their real possibilities[26]. Under these circumstances, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington. The main purpose of this pact was mutual assistance in case of aggression in Europe and North America. This pact found its expression in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was tasked with creating a military force under a joint military command[27].

The creation of NATO and the development of anti-communist movements in Europe, the Soviet Union looked at with fear and suspicion and came to the conclusion that it had to take countermeasures against the Western Bloc with other communist countries in the sphere of influence of its interest. Thus, in 1949 the Council for Reciprocal Economic Assistance (SEV) was founded, while in 1955 the Military-Political Bloc was formed - the Warsaw Pact, where Albania was also a member of this pact.

Now, East and West stood armed against each other.

This case marks the paradigm of political and military tensions, hostilities, dangers and future threats between the Western Bloc (the United States and its NATO allies) and the Eastern Bloc (the Soviet Union and its satellite states). This period called the "cold war", according to the Truman doctrine, lasted from March 12, 1947 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991.

In this geostrategic security environment, nuclear weapons became the instrument of the politics of violence, but on the other hand, they had the effect of avoiding a war between superpowers of world proportions and unpredictable consequences. In the security concept of the two superpowers lay the techno-technological factor. In these conditions of tension between the two superpowers, the theory of negotiations from "positions of strength" was also born. Agreements are born from tough situations.

These agreements and treaties reached in balancing and limiting conventional nuclear weapons almost maintained the "status quo" until the end of the Cold War. Beyond the dangers of military threats, other widespread dangers were perceived for the social condition and well-being of societies, this concept of insecurity as a symmetrical threat became unstable. In times of great social

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[26] Karl, Grimberg, "World History and Civilization", vol. 12, "Uegen" publishing house, pg. 185.
[27] Yes there.

and economic interdependence of a country, the risks are not necessarily only of the nature of military threats from the adversary. Insecurity had to be measured in alternative ways, including both threats from external influences and socio-economic factors. "If the security dilemma for all states were military power, its supporting components (which of course include a large economic element) would clearly be the dominant source of power"[28].

It should be emphasized that during the Cold War period, two main concepts of security were developed in balance, that of balanced technological development and the concept of social-economic development.

With the change of security policy, after the Cold War, with the concept of "vulnerability", we understand only a small step towards the paradigm of future security. Today, risks dominate all discourses on the politics of international relations. The so-called "clear and present danger" of the Cold War has been replaced by the vague and unpredictable "dangers and challenges" of the future. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), transnational terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation, global climate change and pandemics and many other issues are discussed in terms of insecurity and risk. Their similarity lies in their relative indeterminacy.

3. Security and its academic treatment

Strategic security as a separate discipline. Despite the fact that security in terms of study appears to us as a contested concept, this has not prevented political decision makers, policy experts or various academics and researchers from developing a continuous interest in the meaning of security, accompanying it with an increase in studies security, as well as scientific research in this field. This expansion of the understanding of security has had its own impacts on social life, state policies, as well as reformulations of the concept of security at the state level, within the Alliance and at the global level. Security is the universal and fundamental basis of society, therefore everyone's issue. "Security is the universal basis of human society materialized in sovereign states"[29]. Today, while the concept of security has become comprehensive, there is an interest and an increase in the number of academic sub-disciplines within political science in general and international relations in particular, reshaping theories, agendas and methodological research programs of security studies, in institutions academic and scientific.

This academic development has led to security being treated as one of the main contested concepts within academia and politics in the last century. This has also made us see the issue of security and its study as a constantly changing topic.

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[28] Keohane, Robert O.; Nye, Joseph S., "Power and Independence", 1977.

[29] Hobbes, Thomas, "Leviathan", 1651.

So, alongside numerous studies in the field of history, sociology and beyond the appreciation and fear of an increasingly fragmented field of research, great importance is being given to studies in the field of security. The security environment continues to be unpredictable and today's risks and threats continue to evolve increasingly towards asymmetric, hybrid and cyber nature. The world of the next decade will be very different, where the big competing powers have agendas to expand their power and influence on the global, but also regional and national levels. Now, in addition to known risks and threats, new risks of a global character are emerging, especially from pandemics, climate change and "technological risks". This complexity and unpredictability of the security environment lays the need for scientific research aimed at identifying, analyzing, evaluating and defining approaches for coping with them. The field of security and defense is very broad and multidimensional, including military, economic, human, health, energy, environmental, food, border and cyber security, which are permanently affected by the variability of the security environment and the risks of threats of today. In this view, the objective of scientific research is to increase the knowledge and understanding of the reality of the security environment and military phenomena, which begins with the presentation of one or several research questions on the issue that preoccupies us or the phenomenon that interests us. Scientific research in the field of security and defense is the determination of predictions in the form of visions and scenarios of possible future developments, as well as the challenges to face them, which directly influences the transformation of security issues as a concept. Military science in general and scientific research in particular have been present and accompanying issues of military theory and technology application as a single discipline.

Military Science, in general, according to the book "On War" is defined as the discipline that describes the theories, concepts and methods for the engagement of armed forces[30].

Scientific research today is a comprehensive and influential process in the transformation of security issues, which is defined as "...a deliberate, systematic and scientific process of collecting, analyzing, classifying, organizing, presenting and interpreting data for the solution of problem, for predicting or discovering the truth, or for expanding or verifying existing knowledge, all this for preserving and improving the quality of human life".

Through studies in the field of security, first, the current state of security studies is determined, as a starting point, highlighting its contested disciplinary status

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[30] Clausewitz, Von Carl, "On War", edited and translated by Michael Howard And Peter Paret, Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey, see: https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691018546/on-war; accessed on 07.09.2021.

and, on this basis, the close connection between the conceptual history of security and the concrete development of security studies.

The continued interest in international security studies shows us that security represents a growing central value within modern societies. Genuine studies in the field of security have their beginnings after the Second World War, evidencing two main final moments: the invention of the atomic bomb and ideological tensions. In this period, the development of nuclear technology brought at the same time ideological clashes about the conditions for deterrence and mutual destruction, that is, an ideological clash between East and West that lasted until the end of the Cold War. The introduction of nuclear weapons, through the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, necessitated a re-dimensioning of nuclear military strategy and power, as well as dealing with pre-emptive strikes during the Cold War.

Nuclear war was 'unthinkable'[31]. With the increase in the nuclear race between the two superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, it became necessary to adapt new strategies of reciprocity and gradual reduction of nuclear weapons. The strategy of tension between the superpowers and the development of strategic scenarios brought a great development and competition in the technical-technological revolution in the military field and consequently a great attention of researchers and scientists in this field. The American professor and psychologist Charles Egerton Osgood proposed a new strategy "Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction" (GRIT)) in 1962, which implies a different psychological approach to resolve the tension brought about by the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers[32].

The tradition of scientific research in the field of security extends much further and wider than analyzes that focus on the consequences of the nuclear revolution and bipolarity. Some researchers have noted that security studies and strategic studies were synonymous in the early period of their (joint) development with the theory of deterrence.

There are different point of views regarding the areas of research in the field of security. They are summarized in two main currents, that of strategic research studies with a narrow focus on national security strategy and that related to the notion that security is broader and at the same time constantly expanding. Attempts to redefine the concept of security have often focused only on the policy agendas of nation-states, ignoring a number of new areas of security, such as human rights, the economy, the environment, epidemics, etc., which

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[31] Brodie, Bernard, with the book "Strategy in the Age of Missiles" he helped create an intellectual environment for avoiding a nuclear catastrophe.

[32] Osgood, Charles Egerton (1916-1991), American psychologist and professor, author of the book "Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction".

have been identified and argued. strongly, both in the normative and empirical view as conceptual issues related to security. The lack of conceptual clarity in the field of security often exaggerates the differences and obscures the similarities between different understandings of security[33].

Historical events and academic debates have had an impact on the institutionalization of security studies as a distinct field of research. The development of various disciplines in academic structures, institutes and study centers, the promotion of political thought, funding, publications, public contacts and scientific research networks take a decisive role for security studies. In fact, in the history of security studies, we will see that we have distinct periods in terms of international relations that are dominated, mainly, by security issues, starting with the so-called "golden age" in the 50s and 60s, the growth of issues military and the development of arms control treaties in the 1970s and 1980s, the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the post-September 11, 2001 era, as well as the end of the period that coincides with the Russian aggression in Ukraine in February 2021 and beyond. In all these periods, especially starting from 1980 until today, the debate between the defenders of a narrow and broad concept of security has almost served as a starting point in the development of various theories on the topic, theories and methodologies of security studies as well as the disciplinary status of this field.

In recent years there has been ever-increasing academic interest in the visual politics of security, which has long been a key term in an object of study. The development of alternative strategic concepts has had a significant impact on the way security-related issues have been studied. We think that a comprehensive and critical understanding of security issues is required and, on this basis, an increased attention to their treatment by the whole society and especially by the community of researchers, academics and scientific researchers. Despite the fact that security issues occupy an important place in their handling within international relations, the time has come for the importance they have acquired, they should be included and treated as a separate discipline not only in the Defense Academy and College, but also in civil schools and universities.

Conclusions

1) Analyzes on security prove that contemporary security means security at the level of the individual, society/state and the international system, which is manifested in the efforts of the aforementioned entities for their security, with different means in their relations.

2) Security has been, is and will remain the universal basis of values,

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[33] Osgood, Charles Egerton (1916-1991), American psychologist and professor, author of the book "Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction".

development and prosperity of human society.

3) Different forms of security, such as needs, goals, values, condition, conscious will or action, constitute the basis of the structural elements of the individual at different levels of the social structure.

4) Continuous and unpredictable changes in the global security environment, especially in Europe after the Cold War, dictate new approaches and aspects of security assurance at the level of the international system.

5) Security remains an open field of study in terms of its definition, always having a contested character, due to the constantly changing environment, risks and threats.

6) In the field of different theories and views, "Realist theory" remains the most powerful approach both for the study and for dealing with security in the practice of international relations.

7) National security should be seen as closely connected in a symbiosis process with regional and global security.

8) The development of security capacities should take into account the construction of a regional and global security and defense approach.

9) The development and treatment of security issues as a discipline in itself in academic curricula, institutes and study centers, takes a decisive role for security studies.

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THE NEW CONCEPT OF "STRATEGIC WARNING" THROUGH "PUBLIC INFORMATION"

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Abstract. *Providing timely warning to political and military decision makers of military aggression by an enemy power has been the primary mission of military intelligence throughout the history of warfare. The digital age of warfare, among others, brought about a radical change in the concept of information use for political and military leadership, leaning towards "coercion" for the domestic and international public. Access to the "public intelligence" of every citizen of Ukraine, and even around the world, with real-time information, was achieved only through a smartphone that had access to the Internet. Russia's preparation for aggression thanks to public information was publicly denounced in the media, avoiding the channels of diplomacy and confronting Moscow with clear evidence, by picture, sound, footage and image mainly from OSINT[1]. The postulate "The secret of the power of the secret service lies in the secret" was shaken and is believed to be the subject of re-evaluation for the NATO intelligence committee and doctrines for the future. The digital century will undoubtedly change and adapt many concepts and doctrines, where intelligence and its two main categories, secret sources and open sources, I believe will be subject to revision and updating.*

Keywords: strategic warning, public intelligence, military intelligence, secret (hidden) source of information, open source of information, secret, media, concept, doctrine

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[1] OSINT - Open Source Intelligence (Open sources of intelligence based mainly on media, social networks, publications, official statements, etc.)

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to propose, through the analysis of the collected and published facts, methods, studies of traditional categories of intelligence gathering information, together with the experience gained by states and armies in a real armed conflict, adaptations and changes in the doctrines of detection, counterintelligence, and security. The digitalization of war in particular has highlighted new challenges for solutions, in the relationship between "secret sources" and "open media sources of information". These require courage to accept and adapt to intelligence agencies' documents, which change slowly and carefully. "Vigilance for the timely discovery of the opponent's plans in the informational "river" with disinformation[2]. "Strategic warning" for a military aggression, as a strategic reconnaissance mission for the political and military leadership, I believe should be done in parallel with "public information". The people, in order to send their sons to war, deserve to know and be convinced that the intelligence and the armed forces are in their constitutional mission, in defense of the territorial integrity, the sovereignty of the country and the lives of its citizens.

1. The importance of the dilemma between leadership information and the informed public

Unitl today, the idea of intelligence has dominated as an information product only for the political decision makers and military commanders at war. The public only had to look at the results and, based on them; guess that this was the result of intelligence work. The "need to know" principle limits the users and the connoisseurs of the produced information product by intelligence. Intelligence success has so far been acknowledged with the "necessary secrecy" of conducting operations away from the public eye. The intelligence lecture, after 6 months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, showed that "secrecy" is not always useful, as it delays informing the population, whose lives are at risk and

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[2] Ivana Stradner is an advisor to the Barish Center for Media Integrity at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where her research focuses broadly on the intersection of international law and security. More specifically, it is focused on cyberspace, cyberattacks, and Russian hybrid warfare.

there is no time to morally prepare to send his sons on the war front. There is also a prejudice that intelligence as a product belongs only to the educated class and the heads of institutions, mainly to improve and correct decision-making. Information to the public, on the part of the intelligence services, has to date been very limited, controlled and possibly prohibited to some extent.

From February to September 2022, Russian aggression on Ukraine is proving to be "the most digitally covered war in history"[3]. Western states in this war dared for the first time to avoid the secrets of information of their intelligence services, unjustified by immediately "declassifying" them. The warnings about the preparation of Russian aggression were thus made persuasive and coherent, both for the allied governments and for the public opinion. H.J. Davies[4] appreciates the change in the approach of the consumer of intelligence from the leadership to the public as an innovation that should be embraced. The appearance in the media of "secret" information made it possible to refute Moscow's attempts at denial, deception, propaganda and disinformation in a timely manner. The discrediting of the plans of the Russian invaders could not be done "live", in the spectrum and quality required only with "secret" information, since it is activated slowly, loses time and is quickly invalidated.

The role of open source media was essential in this operation, perhaps for the first time in the history of wars. Asked why he thought the Russian attack on Ukraine would happen, Biden replied: "We have very accurate intelligence data"[5]. The US and allied intelligence community sifted through open sources and deliberately gave journalists access to see and report on how Russia was arming and preparing for war.

The effort to inform the ordinary public until now required carefully selected and analyzed declassification, but also rapid intelligence, for the achievement of the maximum positive effect. The "hybrid" campaign of the Western allies aimed to "bombard" the media space with "truths"?! The hybrid war of Kiev's allies with "truths" was pitted against the hybrid war with "disinformation", espionage, sabotage and subversion" directed by Moscow and described in the Gerasimov Doctrine[6].

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[3] According to the British researcher Matthew Ford, writing for" The Telegraph"; September 17, 2022.

[4] Written by Professor Philip HJ Davies, Director of the Brunel Center for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) at Brunel University, London, on intelligence, counter-intelligence and US and UK intelligence doctrines, in Ukraine, on 19 May 2022.

[5] At the press conference on February 21, President Biden states that he is certain that Putin has decided to attack Ukraine.

[6] The Doctrine of General Gerasimov, Russia's SHSHP, published in 2013, states: "The rules of war have changed. The role of non-military means for achieving political and strategic goals has increased, and in many cases they have even surpassed the power of firearms in their effectiveness."

Intelligence-supplied media presented visible, quantifiable, and tangible facts about Russian military intent and aggression that was being prepared. The need to share the truth in Ukraine, in the face of Russian disinformation, was central to the new strategy of informing and gaining public support[7].

The case of Ukraine is a new strategy of direct and timely intelligence impact, since intelligence is theoretically described as a "perishable food" which, if not consumed in time, becomes useless. In order to reach this point of "coherence", special attention has been paid to the initiatives taken by the UK and the USA, as well as some of the smaller states of Europe, for a new concept of the effective use of warning intelligence. This concept will bring Western countries closer to gaining massive public support and condemning the aggressor and his plan before the attack takes place.

The new strategic warning scenario, implemented for the Russian scenario in Ukraine, "bought" time to help, sensitize, equip and train the Ukrainians in their defensive combat preparations. Western governments, for their part, began in January 2022 to declassify information, analysis and assessments, to support Kiev and prepare national and world public opinion. Preventive intelligence used the concept of "warning", in which the public found out the proven truths of the intentions and capabilities of the adversary in real time, who tried to keep them hidden, but without success. "Intelligence from open sources from the population is essential for my country, as the Ukrainian government's public service application, Diia[8], allows citizens to post photos and videos, along with geographic locations. Ordinary citizens, with their mobile phones, have the opportunity to imagine themselves as an "operator" of the Bayraktar drone[9].

2. Digitalization of war, necessity to adapt intelligence and security doctrines

Military information related to the enemy has historically had the speed of its spreading related to the means that transmitted it: first by courier, later via horse, vehicle, ship, plane, and more recently digitally, or in other words, in real time.

Russia's preparation for war against Ukraine could not be concealed, in fact was attended and happened in front of every individual anywhere in the world who owned a smartphone. Search engines and private commercial satellites provided "free" views, photos and videos directly from the ground. Images

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[7] Taken from A Blinken's public statement on April 12, 2022.

[8] Diia - Ukraine's digital utility service application with 23 million users and motto; the state as a service and not as a fraud.

[9] Taken from the interview of Mykhailo Fedorov, Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, for "The Washington Post".

from American space technology company "Maxar[10]" and the posts collected on social media in early 2022 showed unusual massing of Russian forces and tanks. These appeared for the first time in the world and social media, marking a new step of public information. These irrefutable images together with secret data and HUMINT[11] led to the conclusion that Russia was soon preparing to launch an aggression against Ukraine. The warning was clear and Russia's armament was being "live", in the eyes of the whole world, thanks to the media.

Intelligence in the digital age, starting with the invasion of Ukraine, opens a whole new chapter in the political, military, and diplomatic use of intelligence, as well as in international relations. During 2022, for the first time there was an increase in public transparency through "classified" military intelligence, dominated by "open media sources".

Before February 24, in preparation for the next war, there was an exchange of information between the allied states and governments, as well as informing the public about the truth of Moscow's intentions. Perhaps for the first time intelligence services information was shared with the prestigious world media. The release was not overwrought, complicated or open to misinterpretation, despite the media hype and Russian disinformation. Dr. Neveen Shaaban Abdalla[12] analyzes on May 11, 2022, how threats are related to each other, emphasizing the need for interaction between agencies with each other on the one hand, as well as with the media on the other.

This intersection of information made it possible for politicians, diplomats, and generals within NATO and beyond to detect and give timely "warning" about Russia's aggressive preparations. The success of early warning intelligence about Russian aggression was essentially the nimble application of methods and techniques developed over a century ago, but not implemented. Today, the digital terrain of war has made "fake" scenarios and reality spread faster and farther, even using the same communication channels.

In a post titled "#Stop the lies and share the truth[13]" proven by video, real eyewitnesses, survivors, with pictures and sound; Russian fraud in Ukraine. It is everyone's duty, - says Blinken, - to spread the truth about what is happening in Ukraine, calling this the starting point of opposing and condemning this brutal and bloody aggression. The Russians have prepared an army of disinformation hackers, whose mission is to penetrate the social networks of

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[10] Maxar is the US government's private satellite partner, providing satellite imagery, qualitative intelligence, spacecraft and robotics for space exploration, scientific research and national security.
[11] Information gathered from human sources and secret intelligence agents.
[12] Dr. Neveen Shaaban Abdalla, lecturer in international defense and security relations, specializes in the field of terrorism, counter-terrorism and intelligence for the Middle East and North Africa.
[13] Antony Blinken, speech dated April 24, 2022 "Stop the lies and spread the truths".

important political and military figures and comment "positively" on the attack in Ukraine, as well as to strike with espionage, subversion and sabotage[14].

Despite the high capabilities demonstrated by the Western allies to detect Russian plans in time, not all partners arrived at the same predictions. In real time, they managed to join many "stones" of the "Russian mosaic", which became clearer day by day.

Intelligence about the capabilities of the enemy's personnel, equipment, combat technique, weaponry and infrastructure is relatively simple, compared to assessing the "target" and "timing" that the adversary chooses to attack. The accuracy of the assessment of the attack, of course, did not prevent Putin from starting the war, but convinced and gave time to Ukraine and the Western powers to enter the armed conflict prepared, having been warned in time[15].

3. The success of strategic military warning: is the answer to the question "when?"

No war has started with an announcement and notification of the day of attack by the aggressor. It is the opponent who determines the time frame of the attack he plans to carry out. In all war doctrines, surprise is valued as an advantage that works on the enemy's side until the moment of attack. The timing of an attack has been and will always be difficult to predict, therefore, strategic military intelligence must be careful about giving "the war cry". This means that we must always be ready for the unexpected, for the surprise that is a weapon in the hands of the enemy. The challenge of military intelligence in any war has always been discovering the "intention" of the leader and the time "when" the opposing army will attack.

During the Russian aggression in Ukraine, although live footage of Russian soldiers and tanks could not be hidden, the timing of the attack and Putin's intention were not "visible" and had to be found based on the judgment and the analysis of several facts and factors. The answer to the question "when" becomes more complicated and difficult if we try to understand the intentions of autocratic leaders, especially when these are also secret service experts, like Vladimir Putin.

Projecting our logic and reasoning as military experts into the adversary's decision-making is difficult and this might lead to wrong results. It has been proven that only playing the "devil's advocate" is one of the paths to success. To discover the opponent's decision, you have to get inside his head; try to think,

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[14] "The Guardian" newspaper, edition of May 9, 2022.
[15] Erik Dahl, professor at the University of Copenhagen "Success and failure of intelligence"; http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/intelligence-and-surprise-attack, July 2013.

judge, analyze and function like him. Reasoning like an American, German or Albanian about the possible behavior of a Russian is wrong because the construction of the judgment and reasoning processes are not similar. The unexpected collapse of the Afghan army, starting after the departure of the coalition troops, happened as a result of this analytical error, where the historical, social, religious, educational, geographical, economic, political, etc. factors were not evaluated properly.

"The essential point, which must be analyzed for discovering the enemy's intentions, is the planning, preparation, and training of the army, which can last up to a year. The period of deployment of forces and means in combat formation and the beginning of the attack is quite short[16].

Almost every war has come and gone with speculation, accusations and counter-accusations about the failure or success of military intelligence predictions about the timing of its initiation. To uncover Putin's "intent and possible timing of the attack," the West relied primarily on the increased Russian military exercises throughout 2021 and Putin's two patriotic "essays"[17], published a few months before the attack. "We are now seeing the largest concentration of Russian forces on Ukraine's borders since 2014"[18]. Security experts were convinced by the exercise "Zapad-21"[19], which highlighted the long-term goal of uniting Belarusian forces under Russian military structures. In "Zapad-21" there were up to 200,000 troops while the published data [20]estimated that Russia was deploying up to 175,000 troops along the Ukrainian border, including 100 battalion groups, capable of a conventional strike by early 2022. DIA analysis[21], formulated Blinken's warning to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during talks in Copenhagen that; "Russia would face serious consequences if it launched a military attack against Ukraine."

The heads of MI6[22], on their side, were convinced of the possibility of an invasion, because they saw that the main combat units deployed for Zapad-21 did not return to their deployments, but remained in Belarus, with large

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[16] Douglas Nicoll, former British intelligence officer MI6, report published in "The Telegraph", 21 February 2022.

[17] "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," 5,000-word essay published in Moscow government media and translated into multiple languages, June 17, 2021.

[18] Statement by Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a meeting at NATO headquarters on 17 January 2022.

[19] Zapad-21 was a military exercise led by Russia and held from September 3 to 16, 2021. 17 countries were invited, of which nine were participating countries: Mongolia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Russia, India and Belarus. The other eight were observers: Pakistan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Uzbekistan and Sri Lanka.

[20] "Washington Post" newspaper, December 21, 2021.

[21] DIA- US Defense Intelligence Agency.

[22] MI6 - United Kingdom's Foreign Intelligence Service.

reserves of ammunition. Satellite images showed the world the build-up of Russian troops, tanks and logistics needed to support an aggression.

Välisluureamet[23] precisely informed about the conventional military operation: "In our estimation, the Russian Armed Forces are ready to launch a frontal military operation against Ukraine, from the second half of February with the involvement of over 150,000 troops, who are deployed from all military regions of Russia. This is the largest military concentration by Russia in the last 30 years."

However, there were also differences in opinion among the NATO allies. The Chief of Staff of the AF of France[24] stated to the press that: "A Russian invasion was part of the past 2021 options. If that happens, our intelligence services think that the invasion of Ukraine would have a monstrous cost, and the Russians had other options planned." Two weeks after the attack, it was reported in the media that General Eric Vidaud of DGSE[25] would leave his post prematurely, for "insufficient information" on the Russian threat to Ukraine. The French were right that the invasion has come at a "monstrous cost" to the Russians, but this is unacceptable only by Western European standards. They did not understand what cost Putin was willing to pay to achieve his goals. Western leaders' concerns about lost lives, destroyed economies, jobs, trade, public welfare, popularity and electorate turned out not to be important for Moscow's strategic goals.

Likewise from Germany, the head of the BND[26] Bruno Kahl was rescued by the German Special Forces after he was in Ukraine on February 24 for previously scheduled talks[27]. He did not believe and had no information about a conventional Russian attack on that day.

In addition to France and Germany, even an adviser close to Zelensky believed and declared that Putin was bluffing. It was believed that Putin would achieve his goals by pressure, without a fight, as Russians' assessment of Zelensky's leadership was underestimated and Ukrainian resistance was minimized.

Despite the obvious facts, US officials maintained a reserve of confidence whether a decision had been made on the timing of the attack or not. Unlike in Afghanistan, the US and UK moved quickly not only to arm Ukraine militarily, but also to boost their morale. "Putin hasn't made the decision yet, but the Russian government is putting a lot of emphasis on operational planning

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[23] Estonian Intelligence Service.

[24] Statement by General Thierry Burkhard, at a press conference on January 14, 2022.

[25] French intelligence service.

[26] German intelligence service.

[27] Published in the newspaper "Der Spiegel" on February 26, 2022.

for an imminent military strike.[28]" The US began releasing information on Russian subversion to the media: "Russia has directed its intelligence services to recruit current and former Ukrainian government officials to prepare to take over the Ukrainian government and control its critical infrastructure, with an invading military force"[29]. "We have not seen evidence to date that Russia has withdrawn its forces from Ukraine's borders. Russia continues to increase military capabilities near Ukraine's border[30]. Putin, as a senior intelligence expert, feared leaks and American espionage, so he kept it under wraps.

The assessment of US and NATO intelligence services that Putin would not announce the decision until the last minute to protect himself from "fear of internal leakage" turned out to be correct. Five days before the invasion, President Biden said he was "convinced" that an attack would occur in the "next few days."

Even in this war, American intelligence and the allies accurately determined the answer to the "when" question.

Conclusions

1. Authoritarian leaders, in both peacetime and wartime, fear an informed public more than an adversary's army.

2. The era of digitization of war, Artificial Intelligence, cyber war, psychological operations, and disinformation have also changed the concept of information use.

3. Intelligence prediction success as well as failure should be contrasted, compared, and analyzed to prepare the lessons learned.

4. Successful "strategic warning" helps us prepare for future crises, even future wars, because they will happen sooner or later.

5. Finding the answer to "when will the attack happen?" it will continue to remain a strategic military intelligence mission even in the future, as long as external risks and threats exist.

6. Component (I) of national power[31], after February 24, 2022, has dictated a change in the ratio of media sources, compared to covert sources (HUMINT,

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[28] Statement by White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan following CIA Director Bill Burns' visit to Moscow on December 21, 2021.

[29] Statement by Secretary of State Blinken at the White House on January 9, 2022.

[30] Statement by UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and the UK's Chief of Defense Intelligence, Lieutenant General Sir Jim Hockenhull, on 19 February 2022.

[31] Components of national power: diplomacy, information, military, economy, finance, intelligence, law enforcement.

SIGINT, IMINT, COMINT, TELINT[32] etc.).

7. We must closely follow the security situation in our region, as Russia is really threatening Albania[33] and the region[34], as with Russian military bases in Serbia[35], as well as with weapons and hybrid methods in Kosovo[36].

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9. Douglas Nicoll, "The telegraph" 29 February 2022

10. Newspaper "Washington Post", December 21, 2021.

11. "Der Spiegel" newspaper, February 26, 2022.

12. Statement by White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan, December 21, 2021.

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[32] Intelligence with agency, signal, satellite, communications and telemetry.

[33] 33-year-old Svetlana Timofoeva and 23-year-old Mikhail Zorin, with a Russian passport, are arrested for secretly collecting secret military information at the arms plant in Gramsh and using nerve agents against our military guards on August 19, 2022.

[34] British Foreign Minister Liz Truss' statement "The Balkans and Kosovo are Russia's next targets, after Ukraine" on April 18, 2022.

[35] Statement of the Russian ambassador in Belgrade Aleksander Bocan Harceko, on August 2, 2022 to "Kosova Press".

[36] On August 7, 2022, the "Reuters" agency, referring to Interior Minister Svelca, writes that Russian journalist Daria Aslamova, who works for Komsomolskaya Pravda, was detained for Russian espionage activity on the northern border in Kosovo.

CLIMATE CHANGE – A THREAT TO SECURITY AND ITS IMPACT ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

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Abstract.

This study topic addresses the meaning of the term "security environment" and the military approach to environmental security concepts, with a special focus on understanding the security threats posed by climate change. It briefly describes climate change, the relationship to the security environment, and the impact of climate change on AF operations. Climate change poses an unconventional threat to security and modern civilization. In addition to the non-traditional threats, the impacts of climate change are a "threat multiplier", which influence the growth of security problems. In this regard, climate change is a growing threat to overall peace and security and, as such, will become an issue of increasing importance for the AF as well. Given the fact that our region is bordered by some areas most vulnerable to climate change, environmental degradation, resource scarcity and population growth, the phenomenon of migration, economic challenges and cross-border issues in the region, together with political instability, will make our security system more vulnerable than ever before.

These phenomena can also have effects on our country and our Armed Forces, in terms of participation in economic development programs, crisis management, as well as in the way it carries out its mission. The AF may be called upon more frequently to support civil authorities and provide humanitarian assistance and relief to more frequent and intense natural disasters. These impacts increase the frequency, scale and complexity of future defense missions, requiring higher maintenance costs of military equipment and affecting the success of troops and

equipment. But military activities can also affect the environment. It is clear that military operations during wartime can cause large-scale environmental damage. But armies exist even in times of peace, therefore army's everyday life can hold environmental risks and the AF should make efforts to find "more ecological" solutions.

The main issues that will be addressed in this article are: climate change; impacts of climate change on security and AF; increasing the role of AF; military operations and the environment, training, education and environmental awareness in the AF; NATO and climate security and finally some conclusions and recommendations.

Keywords: climate change, environment, AF, NATO, peace, emergency, epidemic, natural disaster, etc.

"Climate change is the existential threat to humanity. Unchecked, it is going to literally bake this planet. This is not hyperbole. It is real. And we have a moral obligation."

Joe Biden, January 28, 2021

Introduction

The political and strategic changes that occurred after the Cold War have dramatically affected/changed the global security environment. Today's world is a much more complicated place than before, the system characteristics of our world have changed and it has become more dependent on people. The progress of science and the development of technology caused a number of serious challenges, dangers and threats to people and their environment. If in the past we were able to talk about a direct connection between economic growth and the expanded reproduction of national economies, now we have a multitude of complex relationships between the environment, economy, agriculture, energy consumption, emergencies, development strategies of countries and international cooperation. "During the last two decades, the world has experienced a period of significant changes in the political, social, economic and environmental fields, significantly influenced by developments in technology. The confluence of several political, socio-economic and technological trends is redefining the global security context resulting in complexity, disorder and uncertainty becoming the new norm"[1].

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[1] US Joint Staff, "JOE 2035, The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World", 2016, p. ii.

A few years ago, national security was synonymous with defense, but today, national security has a broader meaning than just military. The reason is the fact that modern threats are mostly asymmetric in nature, especially, in the stage of development and exploitation of threats, when it is possible to act in a preventive manner, to stop the creation of conflicts and the escalation of the crisis. Given the fact that countries constantly try to fulfill their political, global or economic goals with the use of force, a completely new spectrum has appeared in non-traditional asymmetric challenges to security and stability. Regardless of how countries today view their security interests in the new global reality, it is important to reassess the questions and factors that endanger the stability and security.

Today, in the focus of security are more social issues, such as: climate change, environmental issues, epidemics, emergencies, etc., which have become more frequent and versatile, with more serious consequences for people, infrastructure and the environment. Climate change poses an unconventional threat to global security and modern civilization. Poverty, hunger, disease, decreasing water supplies, forest fires, storms and floods that are becoming more frequent and destructive will continue to be serious problems for various parts of the developing world. They significantly affect the continuous increase in tension in the global security environment.

In addition to the non-traditional threat, the impacts of climate change are a "threat multiplier"[2] that increase the flow of refugees and migration and even act as a catalyst for the spread of disease, potentially causing or exacerbating deadly pandemics. Ultimately, the increase in extreme weather events and major natural disasters amplifies the risk of significant population displacement, causing further political and economic problems. Many countries see current and projected climate change as contributing to geopolitical concerns. They also have the potential to increase rivalry over access to resources in particular regions. The combined effects of resource scarcity, of mass migrations and weak governments are likely to increase the potential for armed conflict between states seeking to protect or obtain vital resources even within states themselves. Security failures and conflict usually arise from the interactions of many factors.

The main purpose of the Armed Forces (AF) is to maintain national peace and security. In this context, "peace" does not mean only the absence/lack of war, but the situation of stable conditions that provide the minimum for the basic needs of people. In this regard, climate change is a growing threat, worldwide, to general peace and security and as such, will become an issue of increasing importance for the AFs well. These phenomena may also have effects on

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[2] Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021

our country and our Armed Forces, in terms of participation in economic development or crisis management programs. Recent history in the world and in our region has changed the attitude regarding the concept that AF is only for fighting and that security is exclusively a matter of peace and war. So, climate changes as "threat multiplier"[3], are becoming a threat to national and international peace and security, as well as presenting new security challenges.

The Armed Forces will need to adapt to the changing environment and consider the impacts of climate change on military infrastructure and operations. They may also be influenced by global demands to change technologies and reduce emissions of gases into the atmosphere. Climate change is a security threat of the 21st century. It is a threat to people of all classes, nations, political ideologies, countries and most worryingly, it is difficult to predict. The issues of deployment of military forces in changed climate conditions and the relationship between climate change and military security are areas that have not yet been explored in detail.

1. Impacts of climate change on AF

Climate change is occurring at such an accelerated rate that the effects on military operations cannot be sufficiently understood. So is it possible that climate change, both internationally and domestically, will affect military operations more than ever imagined? If so, what are the impacts on AF? Will AFs be able to respond effectively to the crisis? Therefore, it is important to note that ignoring climate change trends raises serious concerns about the country's capacity to protect its security and that of its allies.

Climate change today is a fact. No one can say it does not exist, it not only has an impact on the population, but also on the AF, which they must consider in their planning and training. So it is clear that there is a link between climate change as well as security and furthermore, this will be related to the AF. In today's security environment, the complexity of contemporary and future environmental elements and the subsequent military activities of AFs have a complex interaction related to: climate change, its relation to the security environment and how it will affect AF operations as part of overall crisis management.

The contemporary security environment is a complex of factors and is greatly influenced by political regimes, climate change, population growth, globalization and industrialization. The projected effects of climate change over the coming decades may include extreme weather events, drought, wildfires, floods, melting glaciers, sea level rise, mass migration, settlement changes and the increasing prevalence of life-threatening diseases. These conditions have the potential to worsen our way of life and force us to take measures for

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[3] Climate adaptation plan, Department of Defense, September 2021, page 3.

our safety. It is worth noting that, if climate change is not the main reason to worry about security, it acts as a multiplied threat to stability. So, the security environment will continue to be complex and partially unpredictable.

On the other hand, intuition, long-term and visionary plans as well as lessons learned are vital for AFs to adapt and improve existing capacities or develop new ones, so that they are able to face new challenges with which the current or future security environment will encounter. The Armed Forces should be concerned about climate change because it is their mission to address all credible threats to the nation's security. These threats come in direct and indirect forms, including direct threats to military infrastructure, from rising river levels and extreme drought, and indirect threats, through worsening instability in critical regions.

Although natural disasters are not the only source of conflict or instability, they can cause and exacerbate complex crises. Natural disasters will have a greater impact, in part, due to the increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events, but also due to changes in the weather in the areas and times of year where these events are likely to occur, as well as an increased size of the exposed populations. In this way, AFs can be required not only to provide humanitarian aid for disaster relief, but also to plan and carry out the entire spectrum of operations described in NATO doctrine AJP 3.4.3[4]. A large-scale disaster caused by the environment within a NATO nation is increasingly likely to require a large use of AF in relief operations. The increasing involvement of the AF in disaster response to assist civil authorities will have an after effect on military training, readiness and availability of forces and assets.

In 2007, the CNA Military Advisory Board issued a report titled "National Security and the Threat of Climate Change," in which the authors argued that "climate change could increase the chances of conflict and affect weapons systems, platforms, bases and military operations"[5]. While in a special issue Journal MCU, "Climate Change and Policy", 2016, published by Marine Corps University Press, it is emphasized that "we must face the future challenges from climate change for military operations in three categories: operations, capacities and (posture) positioning. Operations are the activities that the Armed Forces carry out to accomplish their missions. Capacities are the resources and assets needed to carry out these operations. Positioning refers to the force structure, geographic positioning, international approach and agreements relevant to the

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[4] Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.3(A): Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance, 2017.
[5] Journal MCU, Climate Change and policy 2016, Impact of Climate Change on US Military Operations in the Western Pacific, published byMarine Corps University Press2017, page 99.

conduct of these operations"[6].

Climate change can impact three elements of military effectiveness: readiness, operations, and strategy.

Readiness: Readiness refers to the ability of AFs to conduct operations in a timely manner. Climate change can directly affect military readiness by affecting military infrastructure and operations in several ways including: land and space availability, reduced water supplies, major floods, fire hazards, and weather hazards to supplies with electricity etc. Installations near coasts can be threatened by coastal erosion and sea level rise, damaging infrastructure and reducing land available for operations. Intensified heat or cold waves will present challenges to field training and troop efficiency.

Climate change can also affect the military supply chain, how it is transported and stored. Difficult access to key resources, damaged infrastructure and mass migration present challenges to ensure the stability of regions abroad, creating suitable environments for terrorist activity. Most countries already recognize the threat of climate change to their military infrastructures and emphasize the need for more resources and monitoring systems to increase preparedness.

Operations: Climate change affects military operations, be they combat operations or humanitarian missions. For example, climate change may cause significant difficulties in the supply chain and logistics capacity of AFs engaged in the field of combat. "Some operations have to be postponed or canceled as in the Iraq war, where, due to sandstorms, the life of technical equipment was reduced and repair costs increased significantly. Sandstorms made it more difficult to transport supplies, which mainly jeopardized fuel supplies. In a war where nine million liters of fuel were moved into the theater of war every day, any weather anomaly has jeopardized or is endangering the success of operations.[7]"

Extreme drought or flooding in areas where AFs are engaged in combat operations can damage water supply lines and thus threaten military troops. It can also increase the likelihood that non-state actors can use water resources as tools against populations and adversaries. An increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters may strain AF's capacity to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The future security environment and operational conditions shaped by climate change may further affect naval operations at all

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[6] Ibid.

[7] National Security and the Threat of Climate Change pdf SecurityandClimate.cna.org, Direct Impacts on Military Systems, Infrastructure, and Operations 2007, page 37 https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/national%20security%20and%20the%20threat%20of%20 climate%20change.pdf.

levels - strategic, operational and tactical with an emphasis on maritime areas, operations, base protection and coastal installations. The maritime equipment should be important for the relief and emergency missions caused by climate change.

Slow or long-term impacts of climate change will force gradual adjustments in military operations. Detailed and clear studies and plans will be required in relation to: the combat campaign season; logistics; mobility; weapons; impacts on health due to the spread of new and old diseases (on humans and animals) etc.

Strategy: Climate change may affect military strategy by increasing the likelihood of unstable conditions in strategically important regions. At the strategic level, strategic interests and mission types will need to be reviewed in view of changing geopolitics, energy security dynamics, possible future gas emission limitations, operational conditions, changes in marine bio systems and increased relief, as well as in the humanitarian commitments that are formed by climate change. Securing lines of communication - an important mission factor - will present new dimensions.

Arctic ice melting could be associated with rising tensions between Russia and other Arctic nations, increasing the likelihood of conflict. In the Middle East and North Africa, the effects of climate change on water security may increase the probability of future instability. In Central Asia, increases in ice melt and flooding, along with existing security dynamics (such as terrorism and proliferation of nuclear materials) could create an unstable mix. In the wider Asia-Pacific region, rainfall variability will interact with a growing urban and coastal population, as well as a growing demand for energy, posing major challenges to security in this increasingly important part of the world.

All these risks may increase the likelihood that AFs will be called upon to resolve conflicts or provide post-conflict assistance, dynamics which would require strategy, skill and professionalism from them. Humanitarian missions, extreme weather changes and potential future emission constraints require appropriate force structure and operations planning, anticipating future scenarios while balancing current strategic and operational requirements.

2. Climate change and the increasing role of the AF

The 2021 Evaluation Report[8] of the United Nations International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that, referring to the long-term warming trend since pre-industrial times, the observed average surface temperature (GMST) for the decade 2006-2017 was 0.87°C (likely between 0.75 ° C and 0.99 ° C)

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[8] Report of International Nations Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2021, chapter I, page 51.

higher than the average over the period 1850-1900[9]. Projected global warming is currently increasing at 0.2°C (likely between 0.1°C and 0.3°C) per decade due to past and ongoing emissions. The effects of climate change can have beneficial or adverse outcomes for livelihoods, health and well-being, ecosystems and species, services, infrastructure and economic, social and cultural assets. Climate change seriously and disproportionately affects the lives and livelihoods of people in developing countries, increasing vulnerability to poverty and social deprivation. Its impact is enhanced by limited human, institutional and financial resources. As we have already seen, the effects of climate change are well known and soon, there may be an increase in problems related to security and disasters - especially migration conflicts and "resource wars". Therefore, if the consequences of climate change increase, we will have new and acute humanitarian crises that may lead to regional instability, in particular, more conflicts not only between nations and states, but also within states.

This means that peace support operations will be needed for stabilization in specific regions. So, not only will we have "Peace Keeping Operations" and "Peace Enforcement Operations", but as a challenge to the consequences of climate change, we will also have to fulfill more and more Humanitarian Operations. The AF will need to focus more on the tasks of the Petersberg Declaration[10] of June 19, 1992, Bonn, Germany, in an increased involvement in major disaster relief operations. While military forces have a role in disaster relief, the broader impact of serious climate change will require multinational, multi-agency cooperation.

But it also means there is a new role for AF. This will require the addition of types of forces that deal more with Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), specialized training, especially for disaster management operations, liaison and cooperation in humanitarian operations both inside and outside the country. The new challenge for the AF is clear: more humanitarian operations need more specialized training at all levels and for all structures. To achieve this high degree of interoperability, it is necessary to know about the different systems and their training possibilities.

The consequences of climate change are altering geostrategic realities with significant security implications and necessary consequences for military

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[9] The current level of global warming is determined as the average of a 30-year period centered on 2017 assuming that the recent rate of warming continues.

[10] The Petersberg Tasks are a list of military and security priorities incorporated in the European Union's European Security and Defense Policy (renamed as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) for the Treaty of Lisbon). They are formulated as:
- Humanitarian and rescue tasks
- Peacekeeping duties
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping

operations and planning. The impact of climate change must be factored into military planning, even though it is, to some extent, unknown and complicated by an uncertain timeline. In this regard, research about the impacts on security should be added. But, in addition to the new challenges for the AF, the training systems, which are related to Humanitarian Operations, must be further improved. AF should adapt training, especially, for UN, EU and NATO disaster relief operations. Military forces must prepare for these new missions. Force structure, training and equipment must be evaluated against these new challenges to peace and security. The most important change that needs to happen is cooperation with countries in the region to develop plans and coordinate responses to future disasters to limit the human impacts of climate change.

AF will need to implement a stronger and more coherent approach to addressing climate change. More precisely, AF should develop the capacities of forces to manage environmental security crises; improve knowledge sharing related to climate change; integrating climate risk issues into their training and exercises. AF have proven they can master traditional threats, but AF must improve and accelerate current efforts to develop a concrete strategy that responds to climate change as an unconventional threat multiplier and a security risk.

3. Military operations, climate change and the environment.

AF, in addition to having to adapt to climate change, must themselves have a positive impact on the environment where they perform their activity. The environmental impacts of military operations are becoming a factor in the planning and implementation of military operations. The AF has a new assessment for the dependence between military missions, the community and the environment. Avoiding negative impact on the environment must be a priority for our Armed Forces.

Military operations, by their very nature, are not environmentally friendly. The main mission of AFs is to fight and win, but this is destructive to people and the natural environment. The environmental impacts of military actions can be limited and managed to some extent. Integrating environmental considerations into the planning process helps to identify, prevent and mitigate potential threats to the environment (including those affecting historic and cultural resources) and environmental threats to troops.

Military activities affect the environment not only in times of war (with immediate and long-term effects), but also in times of peace. AFs today carry out their activities both inside and outside the country and include activities/operations that are carried out on land, air and sea. Air, land and water pollution in peacetime is caused by activities that include the production and testing of

equipment, weaponry, firing with infantry weapons, training and exercises, the creation of military bases and installations, maintenance for readiness, various accidents during exercises, the use of various substances (poisonous, combustible, imitation, smoking, etc.), throwing waste, spilling oil, oil, etc., on land or sea, dismantling/destruction of armaments and ammunition, use of land, waters, etc., which create problems for the environment. So, AF have a very important role in the environment protection.

Military training and exercises require permanent or temporary sites, which must meet all conditions and be subject to environmental protection. Most of the environmental damage occurs in local areas and from the use of heavy transport vehicles. Various noises create concerns for the livelihood of people, animals or birds in the area or pollution. Military training areas should be built depending on the terrain, the population of the area, as well as the use of the amount of military resources. Military operations or training activities present different challenges, which are related to the environment that surrounds us. Although operational requirements are high, integrating environmental considerations into all aspects of operational planning, training and implementation is essential for the preservation of the environment, health and well-being of the troops themselves and the population. In addition, early planning for environmental considerations and ongoing risk management are essential to prevent irreparable damage to sites of natural, touristic, cultural, and historical significance that damage or complicate the overall achievement of force mission objectives.

Most military operations are generally characterized by accepted phases varying in duration, depending on their nature, intensity, and complexity. In more complete terms, these phases can be defined as: planning, pre-deployment, deployment, re-positioning and post-deployment, including lessons learned. Once it is decided to participate in a military operation, or exercise/training, environmental considerations must be included at every stage of the planning process.

For reliable information in the planning process on environmental issues, lessons identified or learned from previous operations are important. In addition, information may be collected from a variety of other sources, including: Geographic Information System (GIS) data; legal documents (for internal and international agreements, laws on the contribution of troops, laws of the host country, etc.); interactions with NGOs, host country authorities or field experts, civil-military cooperation groups (CIMIC), etc.; data from open sources available on the Internet, newspapers, magazines, etc.; reconnaissance/intelligence assets. The experience of operations and exercises has reinforced the importance of integrating environmental considerations into the operational planning process.

4. Climate change, training, education and environmental awareness in AF

Integrating climate change and environmental considerations into the training process is very similar to integrating security and force protection issues. Training is key to mission accomplishment. Climate and environmental change considerations should be included in the planning and implementation of the training process. For this purpose, climate and environmental change considerations must be taken into account and implemented throughout the training cycle, as specified in the manual FM 7-1 / FM 25-101[11].

Training on climate and environmental issues should be improved in all areas. Improving doctrine, planning, and PSOs is important, but adopted practices must also be enforced through training. Lessons from field experience should be incorporated into all levels of training. To ensure good environmental practices in contingency operations, training is also important. Training should emphasize specific regional issues, including climatic conditions, environmental conditions, local culture and local environmental concerns.

Climate and environmental change education/training is provided directly in the field. Military personnel is obviously busy with many tasks, but quick and easy environmental training instructions can be given to help them. Special field specifications should be developed and issued to units showing the plant and animal species or cultural areas in the area of operation to educate troops regarding such concerns. Specific guidance and educational posters on key environmental climate concerns about appropriate environmental procedures should be available in this area. In addition to general climate and environmental awareness education training, specialized training is also necessary, based on assigned duties and responsibilities. Specialized training can be done through integrated learning or additional materials, as part of the unit's ongoing training programs.

Training, education and awareness should be incorporated into existing individual and collective programs of AF personnel. NATO provides a brief summary of considerations for routine training and environmental education in STANAG 7141 EP[12]. "Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and growing energy needs, will further shape the security environment in NATO's areas of interest and have the potential to significantly influence planning and NATO operations"[13].

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[11] Battle Focused Training, Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 15 September 2003

[12] STANAG 7141/AJEPP-4 Joint NATO Doctrine for environmental protection during NATO-led military activities Edition B Version, 1 march 2018

[13] "Environment, climate change and security" by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 22 April 2021

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, on June 24, 2021, emphasized that: "...climate change considerations will be included in the full spectrum of NATO's work, including defense planning, the development of skills and readiness and civil exercises. NATO will issue its first Climate Change and Security Progress Report at the 2022 Summit to track progress and reassess the level of ambition."

Individual training should be different in duration and specific, depending on the rank and responsibilities of the personnel. At the command level, training should focus on how climate change and the environment can affect mission performance, as well as be done in the interest of the environment.

For this, we must focus on:

- environmental protection and conservation of natural resources;
- specific tasks and requirements, tools and resources;
- creation of an Environmental Management Plan;
- the network of available resources;
- responsibilities for environmental training of personnel.

Our military environments should be an example of the preservation, maintenance and development of a clean ecological environment, through the expansion of green spaces, the addition of trees and different vegetation. Every military personnel of the AF must protect and preserve the natural environment as an individual responsibility, taking effective measures to preserve it throughout the activity of the AF, in order to minimize the consequences arising from military activities. Obviously, the role of the Armed Forces in the management of environmental protection is important and has been increasing. However, the current status as a NATO member country and the importance of protecting the environment on their part requires improvements in the Planning System, i.e. in the drafting of the Climate Adaptation Plan, detailing the ways to reach a final state where the AF can operate in the conditions of climate change, maintaining operational capability and improving natural and man-made systems, achieving all standards to enable us to interact and coordinate as well as possible for activities and operations within the country and abroad.

5. NATO and climate security

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has not been immune to the threats posed by climate change. This issue is extremely important for the Alliance because it is directly related to NATO's operational capabilities and response to security challenges. (e.g., preparing for and responding to natural disasters, adapting military assets to a hostile physical ambience/environment, addressing the negative impacts of climate change, etc.). The

Alliance has developed policies, structures and units responsible for addressing climate change as a non-traditional security threat. NATO has incorporated the geostrategic implications of climate-related threats into its planning, contingency planning and crisis planning processes.

NATO defined and recognized environmental challenges as a potential security threat in 1969, establishing the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. Since that time, the Alliance has developed several initiatives that address the non-traditional nature of the climate change threat. In 2006, NATO created the "Science for Peace and Security" program, which is a policy tool and platform for dialogue, based on scientific research, innovation and knowledge exchange. The Alliance officially recognized climate change as a threat in the 2010 Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of NATO Members, which states: "Environmental issues and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and growing energy needs will further define the security environment in NATO's interest/concerning areas and have the potential to significantly impact NATO planning and operations"[14].

In the same year, the "Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD)" was created in response to a growing range of non-traditional threats and challenges, where climate change was one of them. The purpose of the division is to monitor and anticipate threats arising from non-traditional risks and to drive/propose non-traditional security challenges to NATO's focus and actions in the field.

Additionally, NATO adopted the "Green Defense" framework/structure, which, among other things, emphasizes NATO's willingness to explore smart energy (meaning the application of renewable energy for military use in order to reduce emissions and reduce exposure to reliance on fossil fuels as an energy source). "Green Defense" includes several areas, such as: operations, logistics, engineering and defense planning, as well as a wide variety of actors: civil and military, allies and partners, international organizations and the private sector. "NATO activities, in particular operations and exercises, which involve the movement, deployment, sustainment and redeployment of significant amounts of equipment and troops, have a significant environmental impact"[15].

NATO has responded to natural disasters or civil emergencies in the past, including incidents caused by extreme weather events, such as those estimated to become more frequent (and severe) as a result of climate change. In May 2014, NATO successfully tested its climate security response mechanism when floods and landslides in Bosnia and Herzegovina caused the worst damage

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[14] "Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", 2010.

[15] Green Defense Framework, Resolution 427 of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly "Climate Change and International Security", September 2015.

on record in their history, costing billions of dollars. Twenty-one NATO members delivered humanitarian aid and critical supplies throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the request of the Bosnian government, NATO activated the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC), which conducted operations in the flooded territory of Bosnia. Since 2000, EADRCC has organized natural disaster response exercises and coordinated direct response operations, on numerous occasions - including some where extreme weather conditions played a major role.

In 2015, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly came out with the 427 "Climate Change and International Security" resolution, where, among other things, it is emphasized that: "...risks related to climate change will affect international security through increased natural disasters ; stress/problems on economic, food and water security; risks to public health; internal and external migration; resource competition"; and that "risks associated with climate change are significant threat multipliers that will shape the security environment in areas of concern to the Alliance and have the potential to significantly impact NATO planning and operations"[16].

Even in NATO's Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report (SFA), a special place is occupied by the heading: "Environmental and climatic change and natural disasters", which includes climate change, climate adaptation and mitigation measures, water and food problems, natural and man-made disasters. "Developments in the security environment will increase the number of conflicts based on a mix of different trends and factors in combination with environmental and climate change. These conflicts may threaten global stability and security and therefore may directly or indirectly affect Alliance members "[17].

Climate change will bring challenges and opportunities. Changing climate regimes will also shape the security environment in indirect ways that impose attention on current ways of life, on the ability of individuals to exist, and on the abilities of governments to keep pace and provide for the needs of their population. Scientific understanding and general understanding of climate change is growing and will be available for the Alliance to work systematically when conducting long-term planning and risk assessment, as NATO must "become the leading international organization when it becomes words to understand, adapt and mitigate the impact of climate change on our security"[18].

The global focus on climate adaptation and mitigation can also provide

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[16] Resolution 427 of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly "Climate Change and International Security", September 2015

[17] Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report (SFA), pg. 9.

[18] Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council with National Security Advisors, October 7, 2021

improved efficiency technologies that can be useful to military forces, especially if they ensure more efficient use of supply chain resources, greater energy independence or improved elasticity. New data on improving climate and weather forecasting can be used to inform planners and decision makers.

In the NATO Report for 2021, naturally arises the question: What are the global trends identified in the Strategic Forecast Report 2021?

The Strategic Forecast Report 2021 has identified one of four global trends that include: climate change and other environmental challenges: "Climate change will continue to accelerate. On the current trajectory, global warming will probably exceed 1.5^0C in the next 20 years and head towards 2^0C by mid-century, exacerbating pressure on water and food security worldwide. By 2050, 200 million people on an annual basis are expected/predicted to need humanitarian assistance in part due to ecological effects. Climate stress will challenge vulnerable groups and contribute to population displacement and migration, the spread of conflict and potential violations of basic human rights."[19]

Climate change, together with increasing human exposure and vulnerability, is expected to increase the impact of natural disasters, as extreme weather events become more frequent and intense over the coming decades. Natural disasters can have different effects on NATO countries. While many may escape the extremes of change, there is an increasing likelihood that a member state could suffer a major disaster, which could affect its ability to contribute to existing operations or to the development of the Alliance. Allies will work more often in the areas of humanitarian aid, which will require truly comprehensive (military, governmental and non-governmental) interaction.

However, climate security initiatives are limited in size and scope when compared to initiatives dealing with traditional security threats. The complex and rapidly changing security environment will continue to be a key driver for the adaptation efforts of our Armed Forces as well. These efforts are focused on transforming the military capabilities of the AF to ensure that they remain relevant and reliable, now and in the future, in order to fulfill its core tasks: collective defense, cooperative security and crisis management.

Conclusions

Climate change is now a global emergency that threatens modern civilization. Natural disasters will have an increasing impact, partly, due to the severity of the weather and the prevalence of severe events, but also due to changes in the regions and times of the year where these events can occur. Climate change has limited impact on our national security, but it is a fact that climate change poses a growing threat to peace and security, provoking disasters, the

[19] Strategic Foresight Report – Questions and Answers, 8 September 2021, Brussels.

consequences of which will present significant challenges to the country and the AF. It is important to take a number of measures to reduce potential threats to the lowest possible level.

Climate change acts as a "threat multiplier" to security, amplifying vulnerabilities and increasing existing threats to populations that lead, indirectly, to increased risks of violent conflict. AF have proven that they can contribute to the elimination of traditional threats, but they need to improve and accelerate efforts to develop a concrete strategy to respond to the increasing threats of climate change as a security risk. The impact of climate change should be included in military planning (operational and tactical plans, logistics plans, equipment and infrastructure in possible climate change scenarios) and in the education, training and exercise process of the AF.

Recommendation

- Climate change may come sooner than expected or planned, using faster and more unpredictable ways of behavior. We must acknowledge and prepare for the full range of climate change risks and its existential implications for country and society. Existing risks require a different approach to conventional risk management and this requires structures, new risk management techniques and special precautions that go far beyond what could be applied until now. We need a precise articulation of disaster risks and the right time of response to them. A true and accurate definition of the problem is 90% of the solution. Awareness of climate change and its consequences, through education, preparation of topics, discussions, debates or other forms/methodologies requires commitment to transformation, to face the challenge, so that risks can be addressed by responding urgently.

- Environmental protection is a priority, which is also emphasized in the National Security Strategy and our Military Strategy. Environmental degradation represents a potential short-term and long-term threat to the safety and well-being of the people. Therefore, it is necessary to support national and international efforts to protect the environment. The information and experiences documented in the AF show that environmental issues are inseparable from the AF's ability to meet national objectives and those desired in operational activities. AF must adapt to threats from climate change, but at the same time, must implement all measures during the use of the environment, to reduce their environmental impact, including addressing this issue during training and during the planning and development process of exercises. AF must maximize environmental protection forces through efficiency, conservation of force structure funding, modernization and training. Balancing environmental considerations with other factors that contribute to mission success is an ongoing undertaking and requires better awareness,

training, information, doctrine and guidance. Today, AF must strive to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment not only in training, but also across the spectrum of operational tasks. AF must be able to find ways to protect the natural environment while performing the full range of their duties. Albania, as a member of NATO, must meet international standards and requirements, where, of course, one of them is the protection of the environment and the reduction of threats to it, as a result of the military activity of the Armed Forces.

- AF will have an increased role under conditions of climate change and must develop responsibilities regarding the response to the consequences that climate change causes. It will be necessary for more humanitarian support, especially, in disaster management operations, which will require truly comprehensive interaction, as well as a greater role of civil-military cooperation structures. Also, it is important to improve the cooperation with the central and local government bodies or with different organizations, in order to take into consideration climate and environmental changes for planning and carrying out emergency operations. AF will need to develop new capacities or adapt existing capacities and, together with the agency, support research to improve conditions in order to prevent climate-induced natural disasters and disruptions/damages to critical support infrastructures. Life or not, lead to important security problems, such as: political instability, violent conflicts, humanitarian disasters, migration, etc. AF will need to implement a stronger and more coherent approach to addressing climate change. More precisely, AF should develop the capacities of forces to manage environmental security crises; improve knowledge sharing related to climate change; integrating climate risk issues into their training and exercises. Also, the National Civil Defense Agency and AF will need to improve and accelerate current efforts to develop a concrete strategy that responds to climate change as a non-traditional threat multiplier and security risk.

-The reflection of climate changes and the consequences they bring in the main strategic documents, such as: the National Security Strategy, the Military Strategy, as well as in the operational, tactical documents, in the education and training programs of the AF, in the possible scenarios of climate changes would be necessary, as it would make it possible to draw up plans and take measures to avoid or adapt operations to climate change conditions. Likewise, factors in the impacts of climate change should be planned in the full spectrum of planning and the anticipated impacts of climate change, being fully integrated into national plans, such as the National Civil Emergencies Plan, etc. Also, the National Civil Protection Agency and the AF could create a working group to examine the existential risks of climate change and to develop risk management techniques and appropriate policy-making methodologies to face the challenge.

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GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE REGION, THE BASIS OF STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY

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Abstract. *In the last two centuries, our region has continued to be a hotbed of ethnic, religious, political, ideological and military conflicts. It has been continuously perceived as a gray area, where the influences of different powers clash, with the aim of seeing this region as a window or opportunity to reaffirm the status of their power, as it was previously shaken in other conflicts. Recent events, mainly the Russian attack on Ukraine, have definitely changed the global security order, which had taken shape after the end of the Cold War. This new order will require new configurations and agreements for regional security, as in the case of strengthening the influence of the West, including the region completely under the umbrella of its security institutions (the EU and NATO) or to be recognized as a region of influence of other countries (e.g. Russia, China). In both cases, different arrangements would be required for countries that would have to be integrated into these spheres of influence. This would be done under the diplomatic term of "adjustment of relations", with the aim of separation from one area and alignment with another. We will explore/develop these two hypotheses through scenarios, in order to see their implications on the security of RSH for which the Security and Defense Strategy documents should take into consideration to reduce or neutralize these scenarios which in themselves are threats to national security.*

Keywords: new security order, geopolitical and geostrategic scenario, zone of influence, regulation of relations, national security, threats.

"Predictions" lead to preparation. Preparation shapes actual future,
making conflicts we predict less likely…

Introduction

After the 1990s, our region, experienced several key events in relation to regional security, which can be called "milestones" from the security point of view. These events completely redefined the regional security order after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The European countries, which were part of the former Soviet Union influence sphere, would be involved in two European security pillars, that of the EU and NATO. Immediately, ethnic wars began in the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina). Then it continued with the uprising and the liberation of Kosovo from the suppression of the security forces of Serbia, and these wars ended with the uprising of the Albanian factor in North Macedonia for the acquisition of constitutional rights in this Republic. The third event is the admission of the states of our region to NATO. The fourth is the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in 2014. The events that preceded the Crimean attack are also the re-intensification of Russian policy towards Europe and its request for the recognition of "Spheres of Influence" in 2008[1] to and not expanding the EU to the East to include it in its Zone of Influence[2]. Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2022 definitively changed the security order in Europe. This change in the security order in the Region will also require various adjustments in the Western Balkans to regain the balance of power.

1. The ongoing upheaval of the regional security order in historical perspective (predefined scenarios)

It is a fact that the region has historically had a lack of stability and continuous crises, which had a great intensity in the 19th and 20th centuries, to be continued to the 21st century. Mainly in the 20th century, a series of conflicts, such as: the Balkan wars, World War I, World War II, Civil War, ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia created continuous changes in the map of political formations participating in this region. The conflicts left a continuous legacy for these countries to find solutions or ways to solve them, through cooperation with each other or even by being involved in regional and continental alliances, as well as with European powers. Countries such as: Russia, France, England,

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[1] Kramer, Andrew E. "Russia Claims Its Sphere of Influence in the World". The New York Times, USA, 2021.

[2] https://www.britannica.com/topic/sphere-of-influence "a country or area in which another country has power to affect developments…" or "In the field of international relations, a sphere of influence (SOI) is a spatial region or concept division over which a state or organization has a level of cultural, economic, military, or political exclusivity".

Italy, etc., through Balkan states, aimed to project their strength in the region or beyond. Many security initiatives have been launched over the past decades (alliances, peace conferences, cooperation treaties, etc.), but they have not managed to achieve stability, since many influences and problems, whether ethnic, religious, etc., are combined in this region. For centuries, the region has been seen as a gray area in which different influences, whether from the West or the East, have collided to achieve their objectives, since its geographical position, between the East and the West, as well as with the Mediterranean Sea and does this best.

The 19th century opened the door for wars during the 20th century in the region. First, the Congress of Vienna established the cooperation of European powers/ countries and the avoidance of conflicts between them. Through this initiative for their security, it opened the possibility to project their influence in the Balkans, where the Ottoman Empire was not part of this initiative. Without forgetting the weakness regarding the choice of issues, modernization, embracing the reforms of the time to make a modern country in which the peoples of the Balkans feel part of this empire. More or less all the forces of the time influenced this weakening. But the product of this aggressive policy of the European powers towards the Ottoman Empire was the annexation of different territories from it, such as the acquisition of Bosnia from Austria-Hungary, Cyprus from England, Crimea and Dobruja from Russia, etc. After the Crimean War (1856) and 1887 with the Congress of Berlin, the Western powers agreed that the ethnic groups in the Balkan region should create new independent states and not be conquered by any other power such as: Russia (with the exception of the case of Greece which was an agreement of the powers Russia-France-England). Therefore, under this policy, after Russia's victory (often under the guise of Pan-Slavism) against Turkey, the independent states of Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and Bulgaria were formed. But these countries which were established under the support of the powers, we can say, became almost completely a tool in their hands to project influence in the region. State political formations such as the former Yugoslavia were even formed by France in order to support their policy on the continent by uniting Regions without historical, political, ethnic and religious ties. In order to achieve their objectives, the countries of this region changed their alliances many times or participated in the theater of regional and continental conflicts. The legacy of various conflicts remained one of the persistent issues between the countries.

Another factor that greatly influenced the region in the XIX-XX centuries was the spread of Enlightenment ideas with the key issue, the one of the nation state, after the French revolution. To achieve this ideal, the citizens of various ethnic groups in the region began to rebel and resent the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and British Empires. This desire of the ethnic groups was strongly supported

by the empires as they were in competition with each other to become an area of their economic, social, religious, cultural, etc. influence.

There was a different interest of the powers on the Balkans. One aspect of this interest was the opportunity to see this Region as a way to reaffirm the status of the power, after it had been shaken in other conflicts. After its humiliating defeat in the 1905 conflict with Japan, Russia invested a lot in political/ethnic (pan-Slavism), religious (pan-orthodoxy), human resources in the Balkans, to reaffirm its power or to include this region in its own sphere of influence. Moreover, it aimed to acquire territories and have access to the Adriatic Sea to rival Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and England in the Mediterranean. But, during the 19th century and early 20th century, its success in the Balkans was minimal, as it was under the influence of Austria-Hungary, Germany, England, but it contributed to the launch of WWI. Besides, after losing the conflict with Prussia (1866) and the area of influence over other Germanic states, Austria-Hungary turned to the Balkans to project its imperial power. Its influence was manifold in the religious, economic and political fields (until 1905, Serbia was under the Habsburg influence[3]). During the first and second decades, it had a leading role in preventing Russian influence in the Balkans, Serbia's exit to the Adriatic Sea, as well as in the formation of Albania.

After the end of WWI in the region, a primary role was taken by France, which, in order to realize its European policy against Germany, formed the state of Yugoslavia. Then, by means of England's support to maintain the status quo established by the Versailles Conference, as well as to minimize Italy in the Mediterranean, it formed the "Balkan Pact" in 1934 with the Balkan countries: Yugoslavia, Turkey, Romania and Greece. Bulgaria and Albania were not invited to take part in this initiative for regional security. Thus, it comes out clearly that this policy of great powers divided our region into spheres of influence. Meanwhile, Germany became stronger and the conflict approached Europe, Albania was occupied by Italy. But, France and England did not oppose its invasion, as a blatant act of disrupting regional security in exchange for having Italy on their side.

World War II in the Balkans established two spheres of influence, the Italian and the German. Under their influence, attempts were made to settle conflicts between states by exchanging or annexing territories. But after the defeat of the Axis forces in the East and the arrival of Russian troops in the region, the states were freed from the Red Army (except Albania). With troops on the ground, BS continued the policy of bringing the entire region under its influence. This was recognized by the agreement between the powers at the Fourth Moscow

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[3] K. Jirecek "History of the Serbs, Part Two" Publisher, Publishing House 55, Tirana, 2010, p. 256.

Conference in 1944, in which the Balkans were divided into two Zones of Influence between the West and Russia[4] in order to legitimize the interests of the powers in the region.

After the end of the WWII, countries of the region became part of the Cold War organized by the non-European powers, USA and BS, to project their powers after the WWII. Immediately, the civil war started in Greece due to the consolidation of the Spheres of Influence. Meanwhile in Albania, incursions began to overthrow the government of Tirana first by the West, England and then the USA. Tension escalated further with the creation of the NATO military blocs and the Warsaw Pact. After leaving the Warsaw Pact in 1968, our country contributed to the formation of the so-called "2-2-2" security format (Turkey-Greece with the West, Bulgaria and Romania with the East and non-aligned Albania and Yugoslavia). Through this format, a balance of the regional security order was achieved.

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, European countries that were part of the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union would be included in EU and NATO, the two pillars of European security. Part of this policy was a series of regional initiatives, tables and security formats to formalize Western influence in these countries, as well as to codify this new division of the region. In 1997, NATO and Russia signed the "Pact of Joint Relations, Cooperation and Security", with the aim of creating European space, a safe and stable space without division on influence lines...". During the ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia, the region was under NATO exclusivity. Meawhile, EU started the "Stabilization - Association process" for the countries of the region, with the aim of bringing them closer to its policy and with the final objective of full integration into the European Union. These EU actions were also supported by the US, which continued to play a leading role in terms of regional security, investing to end the ethnic wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. In addition, NATO started expanding by accepting the countries of the region into its fold.

After the 2000s, the influence of other countries such as China, Turkey and Russia began to crystallize in the region. The latter had not forgotten the Balkans as a region where it could oppose the West as an area of its influence[5]. The war on terrorism and the economic crisis diverted US attention to the region. While the EU in the region did not have great success in their integration, especially towards the centers of tension in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It did not give these countries a clear perspective for their integration into

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[4] Weinberg, Gerhard (2005). A World In Arms A Global History of World War II. Cambridge: C.Uni.Press. p. 167.

[5] John Radcliffe "To Maintain Spheres of Influence, US Must Engage", 2016; https://www.mwi.usma. edu/maintain-spheres-influence-us-must-engage

the EU, making this region again a gray region of different influences and the reactivation of nationalist circles.

2. Hypotheses of security in the region

The change in the format of regional security began with the World Economic Crisis (2008). After the occupation of Crimea by Russian forces in 2014, the West under the US leadership was very focused on the problems of the economy, meanwhile the US was concentrated on the conflicts in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Asia. The radical change of the global security order happened with the attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine and its consequences were felt and will be felt in the coming years, as the countries of the region will review the whole aspect of their security under the perspective of "Real Politics"[6].

These changes ultimately shook the Euro-Atlantic security policy and optimistic predictions after the Cold War, as well as Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all of them...". Due to the new geopolitical and geostrategic situation, Article 3 was also emphasized "...shall maintain and develop their individual and collective ability to withstand armed attack...". To reflect these changes under the new light of the regional and global security order, NATO was engaged with the new Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid. While non-member countries of NATO or other regional security initiatives expressed a willingness to achieve their objectives through the intensification of politics, even through military instruments, openly violating the regional security order. Part of this security discourse is the rearming of these countries with weapons and systems.

Under the light of regional security changes, taking into consideration the historical aspect of the region, and the above cited facts, we can say that it is portrayed as an unstable region, a region of power projection or as an area of contestation of influences. Moreover, the powers interfere in this region as there is a possibility of an agreement between them to exchange it for another region. The Western Balkan countries have not made any progress towards inclusion in the EU institutions and are even at a standstill without a guide. Based on these facts, we will compile two possible hypotheses, in order to paraphrase the scenarios (under these hypotheses) for the safety of AL:

a. The departure of the West (USA/EU) from the region and the recognition of the country's influences others and the consequences that this recognition would bring to the achievements of the Albanian nation.

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[6] "Politics based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical or ethical objectives" https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/realpolitic

b. The region will be completely under the influence of the West, through political agreements countries will be compensated which will be forced to leave other influences such as Serbia.

3. Security scenarios

3.1. The departure of the West (USA/EU) from the region and the recognition of the influences of other countries and the consequences that this recognition would bring to the achievements of the Albanian nation.

As mentioned above, our region continues to be dominated by various political, religious, economic and influence issues from various powers. The region experienced constant security instability and became part of world and ethnic wars. After WWII. Russia's influence was achieved thanks to the agreement in which the Balkans were mainly recognized as a zone of Russian influence. The fall of the Iron Curtain, realized with the agreement on the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (1991), brought an involvement of the West under the leadership of the USA for the integration of these countries into the two pillars of European security (NATO and the EU) to re-adjust the security balance. The West, through diplomatic, economic and military means (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) created its almost indisputable influence on this region. After 2001, the US was focused on the fight against terrorism, then it went on the Middle East and Asia. While the EU, ambitious to affirm its power, created political guidelines for the inclusion of the countries of the region in the union (Thessalonica Summit 2003[7]), but failed to achieve this goal. After the world economic crisis (experienced more by the western countries) the old ideas of influencing other powers such as: Russia, China and Turkey returned to the region.

The West showed weakness in terms of security and added bureaucracy for their approach to the EU. It was even possible to discuss the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova. In the latter, the idea discussed by the US administration during D.Trump presidency[8] had an impact for the withdrawal of military troops, and then this idea was also adopted by other countries for the withdrawal from Kosovo. This discussion (withdrawal from Kosovo) and the rapid uncoordinated withdrawal of the US and other allies from Afghanistan brought an enthusiasm in nationalist circles in Serbia that this would also happen in Kosovo[9]. Other countries

[7] http://integrimi-ne-be.punetejashtme.gov.al/anetaresimi-ne-be/historiku; "approved the Stabilization-Association process, thus confirming the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkan countries"

[8] https://www.botasot.info/aktuale-lajme/1250951/djali-i-donald-trump-ben-thirrje-per-terheqjen e-trupave-amerikane-kosova/

[9] https://www.dw.com/sq/serbianfantasy-p%C3%ABr-usa-leaving from-kosova/a-59060495/; "The immediate withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan has made even some government politicians fantasize about a possible withdrawal of the unwanted world power from Kosovo as well"

directly interested in achieving their objectives, as well as contesting the power of the West in this region, continued to influence the two hotbeds, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo for destabilization.

During the last years, Western Balkan countries have not taken any steps towards getting closer to the EU, mainly due to the blocking policy of some EU countries, even Kosova has been asked to make an agreement with Serbia through which it will lose much of its sovereignty; North Macedonia agreement first with Greece and then with Bulgaria, while Serbia intensified its policy towards the Region, investing in destabilizing or keeping ethnic and religious tensions open in Bosnia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Part of the intensification of Serbia's provocative policy is the modernization of the Serbian army with modern equipment, such as: anti-aircraft systems and UAVs from China, tanks, armored vehicles, Mig 29 aircraft from Russia, attack helicopters from Germany, anti-aircraft missiles from France and in recent weeks and the discussion on the purchase of jet aircraft (12 pieces) of the "Rafaele" type, also from the same country. We emphasize that the strengthening of the arsenal of the Serbian army is being carried out in the complete absence of any threat. These purchase contracts, apparently, are aimed at also obtaining political support by the producing countries of these systems towards open political issues for which Serbia is politically invested in the Western Balkans, mainly towards Kosovo. Consequently, it is not surprising that Kosovo has not progressed in getting closer to the EU or the liberalization of visas. Also, through the modernization of the army and their massive advertising in the media and the use of a threatening discourse by mobilizing the army at the border with Kosovo,[10] Serbia aims to undermine popular support for the governments and leading elites[11] of the Western Balkan countries. While the West has failed to prevent this destabilizing policy of Serbia.

The recent global security events, mainly those in Ukraine, which changed the global security order, in Serbia and other pro-Russian circles in the region were taken as an irreversible trend of the decline and weakening of the US and EU- and the strengthening of Russian influence in the region and in the world. The US is currently re-dimensioning its world policy from unipolar[12] under its multipolar influence, as it cannot maintain an uncontested zone of influence in the region and the world. This withdrawal from our region will most likely be completed by Russia and other interested countries. In

[10] Daniel Serwer "Serbia may try to copy the Russian playbook in Kosovo", 05.06.2022

[11] Ch. Brose "The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare" USA, 2020, fq 55.

[12] John Radcliffe "To Maintain Spheres of Influence, U.S. Must Engage" 2016 "The U.S. cannot view the world over as its own sphere-of-influence. Today, the U.S. seeks UN approval; without it, American politicians seek NATO support"

hypothetical conditions, Russia will continue to expand its influence (and it would be with great intensity if it had won in Ukraine without great political, military, strategic cost) while not respecting international rules (the Treaty of Westphalia on non-intervention in the internal work of the states and the recognition of the sovereignty of the respective countries). Our region would be directly exposed to this intervention. The US would be focused on Asia where all trends show a greater focus to concentrate on that Region. Under the continuing failures of the EU and the need to economize resources, it would be unlikely to continue to invest in maintaining an undisputed sphere of influence on two continents[13], against a Russia that would have been greatly empowered by the victory/peace over Ukraine, as well as through the alliance with China.

A non-acceptance of European countries' responsibilities for the entire continent due to their political divisions would lead to an agreement between the US and Russia aimed at reducing the latter's support of China in Asia, as well as its non-advancement towards the countries other European countries such as Moldova, Baltics, Finland, etc. This pragmatist power policy would not be a new thing as we have examples from history such as England with Russia after WWII[14], the US with China in the 1970s, the withdrawal from Afghanistan after a US deal with the Taliban, etc. In the USA, proponents with an important political profile support an agreement with Russia, in order to focus its attention and resources on China, such as former Secretary of State H. Kissinger, who is in favor of handing over territory from Ukraine to Russia[15]. And this is only a way of compensating the latter for the loss in Ukraine or in Eastern Europe. These same proponents have previously spoken out against NATO's intervention in Kosovo[16] and for the recognition of Serbia's sovereignty in Kosovo. Also in Germany there will be a review of the foreign policy in general and towards the Western Balkans after the departure of Chancellor Merkel[17], which influenced for about 15 years the policy of Germany and the EU towards the region and Russia.

After a comprehensive analysis, we can say that an agreement would be reached for a new geostrategic division of the region into two Influence Zones, Russia's

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[13] Po aty "U.S. military barely possesses the capability to pivot to the Pacific while maintaining an effective presence in the Middle East. Adding major new requirements in Europe will stretch the American military past its limits to a breaking point".

[14] Weinberg, Gerhard (2005)."A World In Arms A Global History of World War II"Cambridge: C.U.Press. p. 167

[15] The Washington Post, 2022 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henryki-ssinger-ukraine-russia-territory

[16] Henry Kissinger "Does America need Foreign Policy" Simon & Schuster, New York 2001.

[17] Europeans may have begun to lose their long-held aversion to what German Chancellor Angela Merkel calls "old thinking about spheres of influence".https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_spheres_of_influence_eu_external_security/

and the West's. The Western Balkans, with the main Sarajevo - Pristina axis would be included under Russian influence, and the latter would recognize the influence of the USA in the rest of the region and Europe. While an EU, tightly bound in its economic interests and dependent on Russian energy, and weak in terms of unified security instruments, would move towards an agreement with Russia to preserve the new members of the European Union: Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. Even the new formats proposed by French policy to bring the countries of the Western Balkans closer are considered by many experts in international politics as recognition of Russian interests in the region (with or without an agreement).

The scope of the agreement in maximum terms would be: a Western Balkans under Russian influence (without Albania). Russia would strengthen this influence by creating the Federation of Serbia with members from Montenegro and Kosovo. Serbia would achieve its historic dream of access to the sea under the creation of the new Federation. Part of this would be the departure of KFOR from Kosovo after a Kosovo-Serbia agreement in the name of the so-called "Normalization of Relations". While countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and North Macedonia would be under Russian influence but outside this Federation. This would be requested by Croatia and Greece in order to create a "sponge" area between them and Serbia. This request of Greece and Croatia would be supported by the West for the creation of this "sponge" space between the EU and Russian influence in the region.

Russia would also build a naval base in the Adriatic. This agreement would be similar in history to the so-called "Theodosius Line", in which Europe was divided into two parts at the border between the Bay of Kotor (Montenegro) and Budapest (Hungary). While in minimal terms we assume that the Sarajevo - Pristina - Belgrade axis is under Russian influence. But there would be other arrangements to reward Serbia as Russia's ally in the region. Other Balkan countries would continue to be under the orbit of the West[18].

3.2. The region will be completely under the influence of the West. But through political agreements, countries will be compensated as they will be forced to leave other influences such as (Serbia).

After Russia's attack on Ukraine, the global security order completely changed. Under this fact the West countries lined up on the side of Ukraine, helping it to resist and continue the war against aggression. This attack was a signal of danger for the circles in the West, already concerned about European security, which seemed to set aside contradictions and start taking steps to unify their

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[18] In terms of this scenario: NATO exists and will not expand further or Montenegro would withdraw at its request.

position on these issues. In a short time, the countries that were reluctant to be included in this alliance, such as: Finland and Sweden, requested to be included in NATO, under concerns for their security. Also, Germany, which was reluctant to increase its financial contribution and take responsibility for European security, changed its position. According to the facts we have, it will become the main contributor to security in Europe (together with France). It will exert influence in the unification of a voice concerning European foreign policy and security issues. The same thing happens with other EU and NATO countries that increased and will increase military spending, as well as bypassing the divisions between them. Russia, which after the defeat in Ukraine, would change its foreign and security policy towards Europe, would also accept an agreement that would keep its influence and other instruments away from Europe. Our region would advance towards EU integration. The US would continue to maintain a relatively significant military presence to maintain its influence in the region. This withdrawal of Russia from the continent has also happened in earlier periods, for instance, after WWI, and after the 1990s with the end of the Cold War.

After these political events, we can say that the region would be under the influence of the West. But this influence would offer "terms of agreement" for countries that have maintained close relations with Russia in terms of security and politics. These countries (mainly Serbia) with the aim of abandoning their current policy, and not approaching any other power interested in contesting or having a gray region of influence, would be compensated through the diplomatic efforts of the West, in other aspects with the aim of reapproching their policy with the EU. In the West, there would be proponents of this compensation agreement aimed at the approximation and integration of Serbia into European institutions. The most willing country to support this type of agreement would be France, which has historically supported it. And this support would also come through the lobbying of corporations that have or will have good agreements in the security field (purchase of anti-aircraft missiles and Rafaele planes, etc.) in Serbia. The proposed formats or the ones requested by circles in Europe and the USA would mainly be a rapprochement or integration in a different way towards the EU and NATO. But the most important thing would be that other powers would not have the opportunity to influence or view the Western Balkans region as an area of dispute.

The agreement for a new geostrategic and geopolitical division in the Western Balkans would most likely be on the main axis "Sarajevo - Prishtina". This axis, which has not been completely stabilized, would offer good opportunities to reach a compensation agreement with Serbia in order to renounce the close economic, political and military policy with Russia or other powers. The scope

of the agreement in maximum terms would be: a Western Balkans integrated into NATO and the EU under the West influence. Serbia would be compensated in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the name of "Normalization of Relations". This compensation could be offered through "Associations" models or the recognition of sovereignty over areas inhabited by Serbs. Part of the discussions could be the regulation of borders in the form of exchange or annexation. This agreement would be advertised in diplomatic terms with the aim of neutralizing radical elements and changing the constitution in Serbia. Part of the "Normalization of Relations" would be the departure of KFOR from Kosovo, after a Kosovo-Serbia agreement. And the latter would probably not happen in the near future. While in minimal terms, we assume that the Sarajevo-Pristina axis would be completely under the influence of the West, which would politically neutralize irredentist and nationalist factors in the region. Serbia would be compensated politically in the formation of an "Association of Serbian Municipalities" in Kosovo, but with executive powers.

Conclusion

According to these scenarios, the Albanian nation would be the first to lose more of its historical achievements in recent decades with the independence of Kosovo, the victory of the Albanian population in North Macedonia as a state-forming factor, and the rights of the population in Montenegro. The supporter of Russia's policy in the region would be the first beneficiary who has maintained close relations with it, as it would be normal in terms of realist politics that in addition to achieving its own objectives, Russia would also support Serbia's objectives in Kosovo and in the region. As regards the second scenario, with its complete orientation towards the West and the separation from the cooperative policy with Russia, release terms would be offered for the "Sarajevo - Pristina" axis. We must also take into consideration the worst scenario, that of the US leaving, the EU's disempowerment in terms of security, KFOR departure, as well as Serbia's request to enter Kosovo with troops according to UN resolution 1244. of. In Serbian districts, after the departure of KFOR from Kosovo or in cases where it would be minimal, under the pretext of the genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo, it would mobilize the army and intervene in the North of Kosovo, taking as an example the attack of Russia in Ukraine.

These scenarios, in which there would be concession terms to Serbia at the expense of Kosovo would cause the political death of Kosovo state, as it would become a non-functional state and would be an open focus of religious and ethnic conflicts in the region and a threat to the security order in the region. These security concerns arising from these scenarios should be included in the drafting of the national security documents of the Albanian and Kosovo states.

By addressing these concerns, it would be possible to take measures through national power to address them and not encourage other regional factors or even powers to realize these scenarios.

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Abstract. *The democratic developments and the Euro-Atlantic integration of our country have been accompanied by a series of reforms and standard increases also in terms of public information from the security and defense structures. The dilemma of what information could be shared with the public remains a dividing line, which can be regulated by special legal and by-law acts. The experience of other Western countries of NATO and EU is a compass orientation for our country as well. This is a process that is being developed and consolidated day by day. The discrete working nature of security structures has made it difficult for the public to penetrate to the information they need. The structures of these institutions often use special laws as a protective barrier, which have been issued for the information protection. The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces have progressively increased the capacities of handling requests for information, managing various requests and complaints, which come to its address in the traditional and contemporary forms and methods. Opening special portals as well as the creating the coordinator' network of information, in accordance with the law, has enabled their management on time and encouraging structures for providing accurate information, regardless of frontiers. The digitization process and addressing the requirements electronically in the future, requires further professionalism of the leaders in structures, units and commands, as well as staff members dealing directly with this process.*

Keywords: public information, national security, transparency, MoD, AAF, human rights, NATO, EU.

1. The right to be informed as a human fundamental and constitutional right.

The right to be informed is a human fundamental right. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it is emphasized that everyone has the right to seek, receive and provide information[1]. The approval by the United Nations Organization of this declaration imposes participant countries to take all legal, organizational and functional measures to correct the implementation of this declaration. This right is also sanctioned in the Constitution of Albanian Republic, where in its article 23 it is emphasized that the right to freedom of information is guaranteed[2]. Therefore, every citizen, in accordance with the law, has the right to receive information about the activities of state bodies, as well as individuals exercising public functions. In this context, the legal basis of the right to information, protection of personal data and access to public documents prepared by public authorities has been developed.

There are certain principles supporting the provision of information, summarizing the obligations of public bodies to provide them to physical and legal entities. Among these principles, it is emphasized that the information must be complete and ready to be available to the appellant, except the cases where it conflicts with national security or other legal restrictions.[3] The information distribution should be available to military personnel and their families in a variety of ways and methods. In the most advanced western democratic countries, it is noticed that there are a number of tools for its dissemination, such as: radio-television (in some cases there are channels dedicated to the defense department and the armed forces), web-pages, newspapers, magazines, leaflets etc. The information that can be shared to the public should not be classified with the intention of protecting and hiding the situation in a public authority, be it in national security institutions, avoiding possible criticism of the way the country and institution are governed or run. Public relations are sensitive, they must be strengthened for mutual benefit, since all these institutions are on behalf of our state taxpayers. For this,

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[1] Article 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, page 5, https://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/documents/udhr_translations/eng.pdf
[2] Constitution of the Republic of Albania, page 9; https://klp.al/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Kushtetuta-2017.pdf
[3] "Principles of Information",https://www.defense.gov/Resources/Principles-of-Information

public institutions must prepare clear and effective plans and work on their implementation in practice.

The right to be informed is a request coming from any, physical or legal person, local or foreigner, as well as from those stateless. Daily practice proves this. The way of requesting information is what separates professionals from those who do not have adequate knowledge in this field. The law defines clear rules on how to access request to information, as well as the cases when it is refused. The public has the right to get to know the documents, not only to be informed, but also to exercise the right to seek an account, in the framework of public accountability. The person seeking information is not obliged to ask for reasons why he is requiring it. The public authority is obliged to inform the seeker whether or not he/she has the required information. The person can examine the original document in the place it is stored and then can also request a copy of the document, for which the structures work to make it available to him.

The problem between open government and freedom of information has been increasingly addressed to. Based on the tradition of the previous system, information for the general public has been restricted. Public institutions initially published those data deemed necessary to the public. But, with the adoption of new legal acts, based on EU suggestions, we moved to a new stage, where we are today, in the stage where public is seeking for information they are interested in. Under these conditions, public institutions are obliged by law to provide the requested information. In this direction, the practice of how to address and receive information has also evolved. The transition to digitization has facilitated this process, by addressing these requests and complaints as quickly as possible.

2. Forms and methods of requests to information

Requests and complaints addressed to public authorities are still performed in traditional paper way as well as in electronic format of nowadays. Written complaints are submitted to the relevant institution by mail, or in person, according to clearly predetermined formats made available to the public. There are also other forms, which have been worked out to help citizens. In the Ministry of Defense and subordinate structures, this is performed using standard formats, which are filled out by citizens at public reception offices. Further, requests are received, registered and addressed by the special structures for their management. These requests are registered within 3 days after being received in the relevant registers of requests and responses that are created and managed by public authorities. In these cases, the deadlines for receiving the answer are those defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and the Civil Code of the Republic of Albania. In case of delay, the citizen has the

right to file an administrative complaint with the public body, and if he does not receive the appropriate solution, he can turn to the administrative or civil court as the case may be.

Electronic forms for filing requests and complaints are becoming perfect and integrated to help the public as quickly as possible. Among these forms that are being used more and more are the portals like: "Pyet shtetin", "Informimi_mm", "Bashkëqeverisjes – Për Shqipërinë që duam" etc. Even the structures of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces are using these forms effectively, enabling the increase in the range of requests-complaints, as well as increasing the structures involvement for their treatment and resolution.

- In the "*Pyet Shtetin*" portal, where citizens can register and choose the institution which covers the relevant field of activity[4]. This request is submitted directly to the coordinators for the right to information, acting on behalf of the public authority. The deadline is relatively short to receive an answer, therefore the relevant structures are mobilized to make available all possible resources in order toreceive the answer of the the request in time. If the request is not fulfilled within the deadline, then the requester can directly be addressed to the Commissioner for the Right to Information and Protection of Personal Data using the portal "pyetshtetin.al"

- In the *"Informimi_mm"* portal, requests come from different directions and entities, whether physical or legal, inside or outside the country. The coordinator for the right to information in the MoD is responsible for managing, coordinating and addressing all the issues coming to the portal. Assisted by his staff, the requests are addressed to all the structures of the MoD and AAF, as well as the coordinators' network created for this purpose. The flow, dynamic, and spectrum of the request area is diverse and often they are not similar to each other. Attention is paid to the requests coming from individuals or structures that are not made within the standard methods, or they are sent for other reasons. These are carefully managed and handled with protection against the interference of malicious and misinforming persons.

- In the "*Bashkëqeverisjes_mm*" portal, requests and complaints are forwarded by a higher structure that is subordinate to the Prime Minister's Office. Requests and complaints are generated either from the "e-albania" platform, or sent electronically, in which additional documents, indicators and justifications are attached. The deadline for processing them is relatively short and the information is required to be fully provided within the deadline. There are cases where the issue is not immediately resolved,

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[4] https://www.idp.al/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fletepalosja_pyetshtetin.pdf

but continues to be completed with additional data and information. It is important that requests-complaints sent to this portal receive a unique serial number where is monitored the progress of this process, by notifying and keeping informed the interested party.

Currently, there are a number of portals such as " Pyet Shtetin", "Platforma për Bashkëqeverisje" "Informimi", etc., in addition to the more traditional ones such as those addressed by writing and by mail. The important thing is to identify what is included in the public information. In this context, the corresponding explanations are also given, where in this category is included any recorded data in any type of format that may have been prepared as a document, or saved with audio-visual methods. Public authorities are obliged to make available to the interested parties the documents which are divided into three main categories: (1) documents created by the authority itself; (2) documents received from any other authority but available from the institution where it operates; (3) documents received from private entities. The question than arises about what documents are created by the public authority itself? Decisions, regulations, instructions, orders, contracts, various documents addressed to other structures are included here.

The coordinator for the right of information is appointed a public official with the appropriate professional training to manage this sensitive process. The law also recognizes the establishment and operation of the information coordinators network, who are experts in the field and manage requests for information professionally and within the required deadlines. These deadlines are relatively short in time, and there are punitive measures if they are not properly followed. The deadlines generally range from 10 days to 30 working days, according to the legal acts in force, the criminal procedure code, the civil code, etc. If the request for information has not complied with the required standards, then the public authority requires clarification of the request within 48 hours of its request, and this deadline is postponed in cases of holidays or weekly vacations (refer to table 1).

| No.	Field	TIME			Reply	Possible postponement
		DIP	Structures	DIP		
1	Bashkëqeverisja	1 day	5 days	2 days	8 days	0 days
2	Informimi_mm	1 day	5 days	2 days	10 days	5 days
3	Kërkesë-ankesa	1 day	5 days	5 days	30 days	30 days

Table no. 1. Procedural deadlines for processing requests and complaints

For the success of this process, it is necessary for the public authorities not to be satisfied with the appointment of a person who does not possess the information,

or does not know the organizational structure well, to coordinate all the requests addressed to the institution. Choosing the coordinator with the right skills helps the process and all the chain of the hierarchy dealing with its transmission. He should have the appropriate functionary status and the appropriate training to perform this task. The coordinator allows each requester the right to be acquainted with public information. This is done keeping in mind the legal requirements and making available to the applicant the original document, or its copy combined with the original, since it can be used in administrative or judicial appeal processes, when the request is not met.

The coordinator also enables the creation, maintenance, publication of the registry of requests and responses, enabling transparency with the general public. The register is updated every 3 months and published on the official website[5]of the public authority as well as in the premises of the reception of the public. This is a very good mechanism to demonstrate the effectiveness of the connection with the public, as well as the framework of accountability to them, for the mandate received. Vertical and horizontal cooperation is the key to success in the coordinator's work. This is achieved through continuous communication to address and solve certain requests, which often require voluminous work despite the limited deadline. In any case, the person who makes the request is informed, keeping them updated for cases where it requires more time to provide the answer.

As it is illustrated in figure 1, there has been an increasing trend requesting access to information from 2017 to 2021. This indicates the ever-increasing interest of the public for specific information on the defense institution.

Picture1 - Requests and complaints Register in the MoD for years 2017-2021

3. Transparency program and information restrictions

The transparency program includes information most frequently requested by the public. Their revising process is done at least once every 5 years according to

5   https://www.mod.gov.al/index.php/transparence

the law. The Transparency Program has been published on the official website of the Ministry of Defense[6], which includes main categories of information, where every citizen can click and find the information they want.

In the framework of the implementation of the law, the transparency programs and the rights to provide information to the public have been prepared and published. On national scale, there are 374 public authorities in total[7]. Such a thing has also been reflected in the Ministry of Defense, enabling to publish the main data, on which all citizens, or other interested physical and legal entities could receive information.

The MoD and AAF structures guarantee the sharing unclassified information to the public by designing and publishing these programs in accordance with the legal and by-laws in force. This information is not only limited to the official website of the Ministry of Defense, but also goes down to about 20 subordinate structures, which the required data is published[8]on their official pages. This makes it possible for those interested to find a large part of the required information directly by applying on these pages, with no need to be addressed to the structures with special requests. In addition, the transparency programs are revised and updated periodically. Fundamental of this are the analysis made for various requests addressed to the relevant information portals or requests-complaints made by different citizens.

This enables to reduce the demands that to addressed them to public authorities. Currently, these categories include: control and monitoring mechanisms acting on MoD; services provided by MoD; requests and responses register; legal regulatory framework with full texts; information on the budget and financial data of the MoD; the procedures/mechanisms to give advice related to the process of drafting legal/bylaws, public policies or related to exercising the MoD functions; social assistance or subsidies provided by the MoD; the right to be informed or to complain; information on procurement procedures, competitive procedures of concession, public-private partnership; the documentation keeping system; types and formats of documents; information or documents that are requested more often and that are deemed useful for publication by the MoD.

Information Restrictions. In case of security and defense bodies, there is a limitation and clarification in the law. The required information should only be for actions of an administrative nature and not beyond this. Restrictions must

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[6] Ibid.

[7] https://www.pyetshtetin.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Lista-e-autoriteteve-publike_2021_per_publikim_pdf.pdf

[8] Ministry of Defense, order no. 813 dated 18.05.2015 "On the approval of the transparency program and the right to provide information in the Ministry of Defense"

have their own legal basis, that is, they must be sanctioned in another special act. In our case, law no. 8457 dated 11.02.1999 ""For classified information as "State Secret" amended"" constitutes an important element to be taken into consideration. In support of this law are also sub-legal acts such as CMD, MoD orders, etc., which specify details related to the uniqueness of the institution. However, such laws provide legal framework for the "institution's security" and public authorities. But if the request is contained in classified documents, then their declassification may be required, if the public interest is intense and when they no longer the harm national security, etc. Other restrictions made by special acts are those related to freedom and other basic human rights, by protecting the human dignity, preserving personal and sensitive data, etc.

In the United States Freedom of Information Act established in 1967, it gave the public the right to request access to the records of any federal agency[9]. There are nine cases where the access of information is restricted, which are briefly addressed as following:

- *When the information is classified. The classification is made by special legal and by-law acts, whether this is an executive order to protect the secrets on behalf of the national defense policy and the country's foreign policy;*

- *Protects information related only to the internal personnel rules and practices of a public agency;*

- *Protects private information, excluded from its dissemination, by referring to another status;*

- *Protects financial, trade and commerce secrets, which have been obtained outside the government and which must be preserved in accordance with the acts provided on this purpose;*

- *Protects some registers, which circulate among agencies but have a retention period;*

- *Protects information about individuals, personal and sensitive data;*

- *Protects information related to the law enforcement, such as the investigation and analyzing process g, etc.*

- *Information related to the review, restricted work and conditional reports prepared by or on behalf of, or in use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.*

- *Protects geological and geophysical information and the related data, including maps related to wells.*

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[9] "The Freedom of Information Act", https://www.foia.gov/about.html

The protection of personal and health data is another important aspect in the field of the right to access information. For this there are special laws, which in the case of our country are sanctioned in law no. 9887 dated 10.03.2008 "On the protection of personal data". It is included any data related to a natural person, identified or identifiable, directly or indirectly in particular referred by the identification number of one or more factors for his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity[10].

Conclusions

The right to be informed is a universal right, which democratic states work to implement at their best. The Constitution of Albanian Republic has sanctioned this right as a constitutional right. For its implementation, a number of legal and by-laws have been amended, which are mandatory to public authorities, state administration employees, including the Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania and their subordinate structures.

The right to be informed, and national security, are two elements proportionally viewed to provide or restrict the dissemination of information. The basis for this is the national security, public interest, which prevails over the request of the individual. The restriction is sanctioned by separate legal and bylaw acts. Participation in collective defense structures, such as NATO, makes this restriction compatible with the security and preservation standards of classified information of these structures.

The right to public information requires taking all organizational measures to respond in a timely and professional manner to any request and to serve both the members of the national security structures and the general public as well as possible. The dynamic development of electronic communication requires the improvement of communication forms for the practical implementation of the right to information. The so far laid foundation serves as an important element in increasing professionalism and public service effectively and in real time.

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2. Constitution of the Republic of Albania.
3. Law no. 119/2014 "On the right to information".
4. Law no. 9887 dated 10.03.2008 "On the protection of personal data".
5. Law no. 107/2021 "On Co-governance".

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[10] Law no. 9887 dated 10.03.2008 "On the protection of personal data".

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9. MoD Instruction no. 9, date 09.10.2019 "On the handling, follow-up processing, and returning of the responses to the requests, complaints, denunciations, remarks and proposals, related to Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces structures ".

10. MoD order no. 528 date 13.04.2018 "On the administration and coordination of information through the co-governance platform".

11. MoD order no. 1626, data. 29.10.2021 "On establishing the team working group, on responding to the follow-up process of the complaints and requests which are handled according to the Legal Framework "On Co-governance"".

12. "The freedom of Information Act"; https://www.foia.gov/about.html

SECOND RUBRIC

Innovative development, new synergy in the domain of military capabilities

DEVELOPMENT OF INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM, A FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR SPACE AND SECURITY

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Abstract.

The paper projects the importance of cyber security as a policy, while reflecting the need to continuously improve the strategy, management and cyber-dimensional operations. There is a policy need for continuous innovation and entrepreneurship in security. At a time of strategic challenges and policy recommendations, the production of this paper is at the right time. This article presents the imperative need for innovation improvement, proposes a strategic framework for operations in cyberspace and new trends on which innovative development should be based. The aim, design and setting of this paper explicitly and methodologically evaluates innovation options in cyber security. It enables us to better understand global and regional needs in the framework of current and future cyber defense, while simultaneously seeking a holistic approach to innovation and entrepreneurship as new geostrategic and geo-economics challenges emerge.

Keywords: Innovation, military power, cyber security, technological innovation, artificial intelligence

1. Military innovation and technological change: preparing for the generation of cyber threats

Based on the latest developments in the world and the region, in order to achieve the most efficient protection, there is an urgent need for the development of military innovation in the domain of cyber security. Discovering the greatest opportunities for military innovation and where vulnerabilities are expected to develop or emerge are central to ensuring that our nation is not surprised by an illiberal adversary who discovers new ideas about military operations before we do so, risking a deterrence failure and losing any war that may occur.

The goal is to look into the future starting from today, to assess technological development and plan for appropriate innovation. Since many cyber defense systems take decades to develop, our task is to assess current capabilities and to plan for the necessary military technology development for years to come. According to a general prediction, the technological development of military innovation may be faster and more important in the next 20 years than it has been during the last 20 years, a possibility which is being promoted mainly in the domain of cyber security. It's entirely possible that the continued and rapid pace of computer innovation could make the next two decades more revolutionary than the last two. The dynamics in robotics and cybersecurity can only accelerate. They will also extend in important ways to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). This is especially true given the fact that many countries (most notably China and Russia) now have the resources to compete with Western countries in military innovation in the domain of cyber security. Among other things, this combination of factors and dynamics strongly argues that our country, as a NATO member state, should improve innovation in the cyberspace in anticipation of possible future attacks.

2. An Innovation Framework for Cyberspace Operations

Innovation is critical to improving society and is key to the cyber domain. The rapid growth of the Internet has meant that the tools for operating in cyberspace are constantly evolving. In general, states are fueled by an innovative spirit, while citizens have benefited from the growth and progress that has resulted from numerous innovations. Innovation has played a critical role in the past successes of every world army. Innovations in cyber warfare

are in both offensive and defensive operations. When the word "innovation" is used, most people will think of inventions and ideas that have an impact on society. However, these kinds of inventions and ideas are only one part of the picture. Recognizing that there are clear differences within "innovation", we can develop an innovation strategy to prepare for the next cyber conflict.

To better understand, we will consider four areas of innovation that contribute to the success of an organization: sustaining, incremental, breakthrough and disruptive.[1]

Sustained and incremental innovations tend to generate improvements within existing systems, but usually originate as reactive responses to market needs. **Breakthrough and disruptive innovations** target new markets and can proactively shape our environment. By applying the innovation framework of these four types, gaps can be assessed and opportunities for competitive advantage identified. This paper categorizes innovations in cyberspace to better understand the activities occurring in the defensive and offensive realms.

In this paper, we discover that almost all cyber-attack tools, including most computer viruses, worms[2] and other malware[3] represent a disruptive realm, the kind of innovations that are relatively cheap to produce, quicker to implement, and inherently more flexible because they utilize existing assets. Conversely, most defensive cyber capabilities, such as: intrusion prevention systems and automated self-healing systems are typically new breakthrough innovations that are expensive, technologically more complex, and require extensive research. To systematically defend cyberspace, every type of innovation is needed to ensure an acceptable level of cyber security.

Sustained and incremental innovations respond to existing market needs and are typically the types of innovation that support a company's bottom line. Successful innovation focuses on improving the performance and efficiency of an established product and tries to extend the product's profitable life cycle as long as possible. For example, every year car companies introduce new features in their cars by improving on the previous year's model. Promoting improved performance measures and new attributes is intended for auto companies to strengthen an already manufactured product. Incremental innovation is similar to that which tends to react to existing market needs, but is more evolutionary. Incremental innovation can be thought of as an innovation cycle, in which one actor comes up with an innovation that beats out the competition; the

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[1] EY Wong and N. Sambaluk, "Disruptive Innovations to Help Protect against Future Threats." Proceedings of the 2016 CyCon US Conference, Washington, District of Columbia, 2016.

[2] Type of virus, which has the ability to multiply itself and infect other computers

[3] Software intentionally designed to cause damage to a computer, server, client or computer network.

competitor then responds by coming up with an even better innovation to level up the game within an existing category.

The evolution of smartphones in terms of added features such as screen size, camera pixels, and built-in apps is an example of incremental innovation, where competing companies are constantly adding new features to increase sales and share of the market.

While sustaining and incremental innovations are reactive to market needs, breakthrough and disruptive innovations are proactive. They seek to change the environment, rather than adapt to the environment around them. Breakthrough innovations are cutting edge and represent a significant advance in technological complexity or sophistication that surpasses the curve of previous products and processes. Breakthrough innovation introduces a new product, causes product replacement, or introduces a new way of doing things that requires a new skill base. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) is an example of a breakthrough innovation that was developed by the United States government to provide geolocation capabilities, which created a new military, civilian, and commercial market worldwide. While breakthrough innovations tend to be expensive to create, disruptive ones are relatively cheap and revolutionary. Disruptive innovations also appeal to a new or underserved market and use assets that are readily available. For example, personal home copiers reduced the use of large corporate printers; large printers became so expensive and customized for expert use that it left the home and personal market underserved. Cell phones are another example of a disruptive innovation that offered consumers access to a communications product and service that was limited to landline availability.

In general, the four types of innovation can be distinguished by how they affect a target market, compared to technological complexity, and whether they are proactive or reactive. As discussed above, sustaining and incremental innovations target existing markets, while disruptive and breakthrough innovations affect unserved markets or create new markets. Disruptive and sustaining innovations are less complex because they rely on existing systems and technologies, while breakthrough and incremental innovations are more complex because they depend on the research and development of new technologies.

Two additional dimensions, success rate and potential impact, can be added to further distinguish the four types of innovations and provide insight into the potential risks and benefits of pursuing each type. Sustained and incremental innovation have a high probability of success because they rely on an established market. Disruptive and breakthrough innovation are the opposite because they are pursuing new territory. However, disruptive and breakthrough innovations

have a higher potential impact than sustainable and incremental ones because they are creating a new market. It is essential to understand the characteristics, risks, and benefits associated with each type of innovation to develop the best innovation strategy for outmaneuvering adversaries.

2.1. Categorizing cyber innovation

Having a better understanding of the cyber innovation taking place can provide insights into what entails competitive advantage in cyberspace and how military can strengthen their cyber capabilities in the future. Throughout history, there have been examples of cyber innovations that fit within the four categories of innovation and can be considered either an offensive or a defensive tool. Offensive cyber technologies seek to infiltrate, exploit or attack cyber infrastructure.

Cyber defense technologies seek to protect systems from any unauthorized access, action or attack. Breakthrough cyber innovations involve large technologically complex advances that often take considerable time and money to develop. The invention of Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) can be considered a new security innovation. TCP/IP connected network devices to the Internet and revolutionized the way network communications were conducted, passing them through four separate layers: application, transport, network, and data link. Security controls exist at all four layers of the process, allowing for more protection than previously available. Breakthrough innovations are less common in terms of attack, but the Stuxnet worm[4] serves as an example. Stuxnet was the first digital weapon of its kind to be developed for a specific target with the intent of physical destruction. Stuxnet was part of a covert technical operation and created a new market for the development and use of computer programs that could do more than just hijack or steal information.

The faster pace and unique approach of disruptive innovation to utilize assets that already exist support the most pervasive innovation in cyberspace. One of the best examples of a disruptive innovation used for cyber defense is when the US space agency NASA blocked all emails with attachments before the launch of the shuttle, to avoid hackers affecting the mission. NASA used a simple and low-cost solution to address a problem. Disruptive innovations are commonly used on the offensive side of cybersecurity, with malware being prominent examples. The overwhelming majority of malware have taken advantage of

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[4] Stuxnet is a malicious computer worm first discovered in 2010 but thought to have been in development since at least 2005. Stuxnet targets surveillance control and data acquisitions systems and is believed to be responsible for causing substantial damage to Iran's nuclear program.

existing flaws within systems or software to achieve their malicious goals.

Because sustainable innovations improve a product that has an established place in the market, the use of antivirus is a common defensive application of sustainable innovation. Antivirus software companies release updates and new additions to their security software to extend the life of their products for the average consumer. On the offensive side, an example of sustainable innovation is the use of later versions of viruses or worms that have successfully exploited a computer system.

In the cyber security domain, incremental innovations are a direct result of the actions of hackers and defenders responding to each other. For example, the creation of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) is an example of incremental defensive innovation. In the offensive domain of incremental innovation, software bugs or flaws in computer programming are an example.

Over time, breakthrough or disruptive innovations can become sustaining or incremental innovations as mainstream markets gradually adopt them. It is also important to note that some innovations do not directly fall into one category and may overlap multiple categories when initially developed. For example, the Creeper virus can be considered disruptive and breakthrough. The Creeper was developed to move between computers by duplicating itself and displaying the message "I'm the Creeper: Catch me if you can!". This virus was a breakthrough innovation because it was the first of its kind and created a new market for developing and using computer programs that could duplicate themselves in a rogue manner. However, it was also disruptive because it did not use any new science or expensive equipment. The virus simply exploited the systems it was running on and changed the system environment to perform a specific function. As the Creeper virus demonstrates, the distinctions between each type of innovation can be confusing. However, the general logic to categorize offensive and defensive tools is useful for understanding the location of capability gaps.

2.2. Defensive innovations to counter cyber attacks

It is important to emphasize the need to develop cyber defense tools in order to gain an advantage over potential adversaries. With low security measures in place, an adversary can take advantage of problems and vulnerabilities that exist within systems by using malware that has already been tried and even sold on the market; therefore, an adversary can achieve an effect without worrying about the complexity of the tool, and the cost is relatively low. Due to the decreasing cost of automation and cloud-based capabilities, a growing marketplace of threat actor information sharing and the ever-increasing attack surface, the attacker's job is getting cheaper and easier every day. This outlook

suggests that the cyber environment is changing so rapidly with destructive malware, so that there is no room for any type of innovation other than incremental evolutions to adapt to system breaches. Our current systems must develop defensive innovations that can change the environment at such a pace that offensive tools like computer viruses, worms, "Trojan horses"[5]and other malware can no longer keep up and the cost of doing so becomes prohibitive. Our defense systems must develop a more comprehensive innovation portfolio that balances the offensive and defensive capabilities needed to prepare for future cyber conflict. Such capabilities can be developed by leveraging and expanding current disruptive innovation in the cyber community, which is focused on increasing basic cyber education for the general public, developing partnerships for better information and intelligence exchange and harnessing the potential of "cloud" architecture.

Basic cyber education for security employees in the administration and private sector, but also for the general public is an example of disruptive innovation that offers economies of scale, uses a system that is already in place, does not require tremendous expense and targets an unserved market. The importance of initiating a national public awareness and education campaign to help employees and the public understand the need and value of cybersecurity is not a new idea. A strong awareness campaign can decrease vulnerabilities in networks attributed to human error. By supporting cyber education efforts, our forces can help the nation develop a defensive capability to decrease the success rate of adversaries by simply increasing awareness of best practices for securing information networks.

To prepare for future cyber conflict, the Albanian military is also participating in cyber education campaigns and exercises currently being conducted by NATO and may eventually develop an awareness campaign of its own. It is also suggested to develop and finance cyber awareness programs for different groups of society. This is an example of a low-cost technical solution with high impact potential and offers a product to customers outside of the expensive penetration market. Working to create a similar culture of cybersecurity awareness for the general public and the audience of defense institutions and organizations, the military can help strengthen cyber defenses by reducing human errors, making basic cybersecurity free and ubiquitous, and educating a new community of cyber defenders that will only continue to grow. This defensive capability would be both durable and devastating.

Another way to enhance cyber defense tactics is to strengthen partnerships with the private sector to improve information and intelligence sharing because

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[5] Malware that misleads users about its true intent.

"neither the government nor the private sector can adequately protect relevant systems and networks without enhanced and tight cooperation"[6]. A practice followed in the US is to sponsor initiatives aimed at sharing information and vulnerabilities that have not been discussed in the public domain.[7]. The knowledge gained through these initiatives then becomes applicable and can enhance the development of defense solutions. Using such platforms is not technologically complex or expensive. Over time, this partnership could set new criteria of market performance and norms of cooperation between government and the private sector.

To adequately protect our digital societies, it is essential to understand competition in order to move forward and not just react to adversaries. Sharing intelligence through partnerships can foster this understanding and make this knowledge accessible to a wider audience of consumers who need to build cyber defenses.

By collaborating with industry to identify points of failure and sharing information and higher-level intelligence about breaches, our systems can strengthen their ability to defend against cyber conflict by creating a common space for development of the most destructive techniques, tactics, procedures and technologies.

Improving situational awareness by better understanding someone else's network and system can be a way to identify and defend against cyber attacks faster. Given that 55% of organizations across all industries in the world now use some form of cloud computing[8] and government agencies are generally moving toward them, militaries can benefit from the same cost reductions that adversaries are using for cheap and easy exploits to develop defensive capabilities against them. "Cloud computing", which includes infrastructure, platform, software and security as a service, is an emerging market that creates a favorable ground for disruptive innovation. By developing software programs compatible with cloud architecture, entrepreneurs can compete with software companies for business because consumers can download products quickly and cheaply.

These cyber services began as complex and customized in-house security and storage solutions for large banks, industrial corporations, technology

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[6] KB Alexander, JN Jaffer, and JS Brunet, "Clear Thinking About Protecting the Nation in the Cyber Domain," The Cyber Defense Review, 2, no.1, 2017, 29-36.

[7] The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the US sponsored an initiative called InfraGard, a program that has created a channel for businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies and other participants to share information about cyber defense.

[8] PM Duggan, "Special Operations Forces in Cyberspace," The Cyber Defense Review, 1, no. 2, 2016, 73-79.

companies and sensitive government agencies. Today, companies are targeting the small business and individual user market with these cyber services as a simple and low-cost solution for outsourcing security and storage among other services. By understanding the cloud computing market landscape and architecture, defense agencies can foster conditions that support disruptive innovation. They should also collaborate with individuals and entities that do so to develop better protection techniques and knowledge of vulnerabilities.

The Armed Forces can also experiment with current big data and model analysis methods, available technology for an automated response, and intelligence from partners to determine which combination of these capabilities can provide the strongest situational awareness. and better attack response mechanisms. As various low-cost and off-the-shelf techniques are used to explore the cloud computing landscape, there may be a high failure rate, but success can have a large impact by providing protection capabilities that can be shared across a range of different "cloud computing" users.

3. Innovation trends in security and cyberspace

The global military apparatus is undergoing significant transformations and is using technology trends to strengthen its capabilities in cyberspace. Main trends include Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics and the Internet of Things to optimize defense operations and increase efficiency. Nowadays, conventional warfare is increasingly being replaced by hybrid approaches that combine cyberwarfare and other factors. New trends in military technology are changing the battlefield in four aspects: liaison, lethality, autonomy, and sustainability. Liaison solutions address concerns about how warring parties detect and locate their adversaries, communicate with each other, and conduct operations. Advances in missile and weapon technologies increase lethality, making battlefield operations more effective. From the point of view of autonomy, robotics and AI[9] are used to execute decisions with minimal or no human intervention. Sustainability is also being improved in the defense industry with technologies such as additive manufacturing and electrification. Below is a summary of ten trends and innovations in Military Technology.[10]

3.1. Artificial Intelligence (AI)

The use of AI in the field of cyber defense enhances the military computing missions for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Machine vision enables equipment safety management and empowers autonomous weapon systems, thereby reducing casualties in military forces. By using

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[9] Artificial Intelligence, human intelligence process simulation from machines
[10] Study conducted by "StartUs Insights Discovery Platform".

"machine learning[11]" and "digital twins[12]", defense manufacturers test new military products and enable predictive maintenance for military assets. Also recently, self-organizing intelligent systems that cooperate towards a strategic objective using swarm computing are being developed.

3.2. Advanced Defense Equipment

The militaries of various countries are developing more sophisticated and advanced defense equipment to counter emerging threats. Innovations range from hypersonic flight and guided energy weapons to the militarization of space. Investments in battlefield electrification techniques through electric propulsion and hydrogen fuel for military aircraft facilitate this transition. In addition, defense organizations are advancing the research in biotechnology and nanotechnology to create a self-healing armor and other innovative devices.

3.3. Robotic and autonomous systems

Defence forces, increasing situational awareness, reducing the physical and cognitive load of soldiers as well as facilitating movement in challenging terrain are some crucial objectives for the military. The integration of robotics and autonomous systems technologies allows militaries to achieve these objectives and control terrain, secure populations, and consolidate benefits. These technologies are increasingly important to ensure freedom of maneuver and mission accomplishment with the least possible risk to soldiers. The use of drones also enables obtaining information about the situation on the battlefield. Additionally, multi-mission robots facilitate land mine clearance, search and rescue operations, explosive ordnance disposal and logistical support.

3.4. Internet of Military Things (IoMT)[13]

IoT applications in defense include connecting ships, aircraft, tanks, drones, soldiers and operational bases into a cohesive network. This increases perception, field understanding, situational awareness and reaction time. "Edge computing[14]", IA and 5G support the smooth and seamless flow of data across all branches of the military and this strengthens the command and

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[11] The use and development of computer systems that are able to learn and adapt without following clear instructions, using algorithms and statistical models to analyze and draw conclusions from data patterns.

[12] The real-time virtual representation of a physical system or process that serves as its indistinguishable digital counterpart for practical purposes such as system simulation, integration, testing, monitoring, and maintenance.

[13] The Internet of Military Things includes a wide range of devices that possess intelligent sensing, learning and operating capabilities through virtual or cybernetic interfaces that are integrated into systems.

[14] Distributed computing model that brings computing and data storage closer to data sources. Architecture, expected to improve response time and save bandwidth.

control structure. In IoMT, sensing and computing devices worn by soldiers and embedded in their equipment collect a variety of static and dynamic biometric data.

3.5. Cyber warfare

Military systems are often vulnerable to cyber attacks, which can potentially lead to the loss of classified military information and damage to military systems. Over the past few years, the frequency and severity of cyber attacks have steadily increased. Predictive technology uses cybersecurity, AI, and automation to detect potential threats and stop them before they impact cyber warfare defense capabilities. Security of interconnected military equipment, cyber protection for key institutions as well as nuclear security are the main areas of focus. The militaries of various countries are also developing their offensive capabilities ranging from malware and ransomware[15] to phishing attacks[16].

3.6. Immersive technologies[17]

These technologies make it easy to create repeatable and flexible experiences, such as for flight or combat training. They use virtual reality to build synthetic training environments. These experiences enhance conventional training and mission practice, improving soldier and unit readiness. Beyond training opportunities, augmented reality makes soldiers in the field more effective in their missions. Glasses or headsets, for example, provide soldiers with mapping information, movement markers and other data. This improves real-time decision making for ground forces.

3.7. Production of Additives

Reducing the weight of protective equipment is essential for improving performance in speed, capacity and fuel consumption. 3D printing enables the production of components and parts using much less material than traditional manufacturing. It reduces production costs, creates new engineering design opportunities and enables localized production on demand, reducing logistics burden. Additionally, it facilitates the creation of new material combinations for body armor, self-heating military clothing and ammunition.

3.8. Big data and its analysis

The future of warfare relies more and more on information and the ability to

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[15] Type of virus from cryptovirology, which encrypts files on a device, rendering all files and systems that rely on them unusable.

[16] A type of social engineering attack, where an attacker sends a fraudulent message to the victim to reveal sensitive information or install malicious software on the victim's infrastructure such as ransomware.

[17] Integrating virtual content with the physical environment in a way that allows users to naturally engage in mixed reality.

penetrate it. Armies with the ability to extract the most vital data, analyze it accurately, and then quickly disseminate the information will have a strategic advantage. Quantum computing finds applications in cryptanalysis and execution simulations for informed decision making. Analytics also enable efficient interpretation of data collected by the IoMT infrastructure. Additionally, predictive analytics curbs threats and improves the safety and efficiency of risky tasks.

3.9. 5G networks

Accurate and timely information is extremely important to military operations. 5G, due to its speed, accelerates real-time decision-making in the military. It promises hyperconverged connections and secure data networks. This enables new command and control applications and streamlines logistics. Further, 5G networks facilitate the transfer of massive amounts of data to remote sensors and weapons in dense and resilient battlefield networks. This provides immediate situational awareness and enhances training and battlefield capabilities.

3.10. Blockchain[18]

Blockchain ensures the security of data while sharing it with all stakeholders. This is the reason why defense systems around the world are building blockchain-based solutions for protecting confidential military data and against cyber threats. Other applications of blockchain technology in industry include equipment tracking, simplifying the procurement process, and the security of supply chain .

According to some studies, Artificial Intelligence is one of the most prominent trends in the field of defense, as many countries and companies are spending more and more in this direction. Similarly, robotics and autonomous weapon systems improve the military's combat effectiveness, as well as influence other industry trends. Also, there is a significant increase in the use of IoT and 5G technologies. The breakdown on the impact of the ten latest military technology trends for 2022 is: IA - 20%; advanced defense equipment – 17%; robotics and autonomous systems – 14%; IoT – 10%; "cyber warfare" - 10%; immersive technologies – 9%; additive manufacturing[19]- 6%; data analysis – 6%; 5G – 5%; "blockchain" - 3%.

Conclusion

In cyberspace, milliseconds make a difference. The world is currently at an

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[18] Data storage technology designed to make it impossible to hack the system or falsify the data stored in it, making it secure and immutable.

[19] Additive manufacturing is the industrial manufacturing name for 3D printing, a computer-controlled process that creates three-dimensional objects by depositing material, usually in layers.

inflection point where the speed of offensive cyber prowess and innovation is outpacing the development of defensive cyber capabilities of even the world's best militaries. To be proactive in cyberspace, militaries must embrace a disruptive innovation mindset that considers simple and inexpensive ways to disrupt adversaries. Disruptive innovations are not the traditional innovations that most people think of in terms of solutions that are sophisticated, complex and highly technical. Disruptive innovation is about using ingenuity, imagination and experimentation to make the best use of readily available resources in new ways, that once implemented can be executed and advanced at a rapid pace to combat cyber adversaries. Ideas such as raising awareness through public education and strengthening cooperation and exchange among the cyber community are not new ideas, but they have a high impact potential to improve cyber defense. By seeking and exploring new ideas, processes and technologies from the cyber community, militaries can begin to develop better cyber defense capabilities.

It is important to understand that the landscape of warfare is changing at an exponential rate with new technologies. Countries such as China and Russia have the necessary resources and are constantly developing comprehensive innovation in cyberspace. Lethal autonomous weapons, quantum computing, robotics, Artificial Intelligence and hyper-converged and secure connectivity with 5G and blockchain are some of the most prominent trends as they improve the military's combat effectiveness as well as influence other industry trends. Many countries and companies are spending more and more in this direction.

This is why our country and the Armed Forces as a member of NATO must continue to develop technological innovations to protect the core of our cyberspace. It is important to develop all kinds of innovation to have a greater chance of success in defending against cyber attacks. Sustained innovations focus on improving what we already have and incremental innovations focus on adapting our current technology to the changing world. Penetrating innovations, where we should focus, are vital because they are at the forefront of the future and bring us ideas and technologies that change the current environment. Disruptive innovations are also critical because they use current systems and processes to produce unimaginable products and outcomes. Identification, the use and implementation of emerging technologies affects the acquisition of a superior position in the field of defense.

The risk of not diversifying multidimensional research and innovation efforts to prepare for the next cyber conflict could give adversaries a competitive advantage.

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CYBERSECURITY THREATS IN THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA IN THE FUTURE

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Abstract. *Cybersecurity is one of the latest aspects of national security policies that is becoming increasingly crucial in all security sectors of European countries. Policymakers are still catching up with the pace of technological developments being used by a variety of actors, both friendly and hostile. This requires new legal and policy frameworks to be developed quickly and comprehensively. In addition to ensuring national security, protected and secure networks are also important for boosting the national economy, as well as for modernizing public sector governance in Southeast European countries (consider, for example, the crucial importance of the secure network in terms of good functioning of the e-government services that are put into use).*

A safe cyberspace is also necessary to guarantee that citizens can exercise their rights, such as access to information and freedom of expression. Being aware of the opportunities, risks and threats that cyberspace brings is crucial. We all live digital lives, we work, learn and play online. The Internet is a shared resource and securing it should also need to be a shared responsibility. Therefore, cybersecurity starts with each of us, with every employee in the private sector or state administration, a teacher or a student, a banker or a policeman, as we will all be affected and will affect the security of cyber space. No individual, business, or government entity is solely responsible for Internet security.

Keywords: innovation, cybersecurity, risk, information, technology, etc.

Introduction

In recent decades, the development of the Internet and innovative changes in technology have brought radical changes and challenges to every society around the world. Our daily lives, human rights, economies and social interactions are profoundly affected by information and communication technologies. A shared and free cyberspace promotes social and political inclusion, breaks down communication barriers among countries, communities and citizens, ensures transparency as well as it provides interaction and exchange of information and ideas in real time across the globe. All developments and increased use of information and communication technologies bring great benefits, but at the same time bring threats, so cyber protection and security are crucial.

In cyberspace, there are constant efforts by individuals and groups with malicious interests, which affect the good administration and functioning of states. Intrusions of privacy and identity theft are also a growing problem and of great concern to the entire society. On the one hand, the government is increasingly investing in digital infrastructure to provide digital services to citizens. On the other hand, citizens are using the Internet more and more due to the advantages it offers. Albania, as a developing country, also relies on information technology, aiming to increase the standard of living and improve public services. In addition to the benefits of using new digital technologies, the use of the Internet brings its own problems related to cybersecurity. Cyber threats, taking advantage of technological weaknesses or the lack of knowledge in the proper use of these tools, are more and more increasing by compromising the security of information systems. One of the current and ongoing challenges of all countries is to build a digitally developed and cyber-protected society, equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to maximize benefits and manage risks. Currently, Albania has improved its rank in the Global Cyber Security Index compared to 2017 from 89th to 62nd globally and top 36th in European level. Undoubtedly, cyber attacks are among the most important security threats to the modern world and therefore, cyber security has become an important part of national security.

1. The current situation of cybersecurity in Albania

As a developing country lacking the necessary legal infrastructure for

cybersecurity, this field has developed only over the last two years, during which critical and important information infrastructures have been identified in the public and private sectors. In addition, the minimum security measures that need to be implemented to increase the level of cyber security in these infrastructures have been draw up and the methodological mechanism has been built for the establishment and operation of the sectoral Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) at the national level[1]. The legal framework related to the security of electronic communications is complemented by legal regulations for the security and integrity of electronic communications networks, telecommunication networks, which are part of Law No. 9918, dated 19.05.2008 "On electronic communications in the Republic of Albania"[2], as amended, which has adapted EU directives on electronic communications. The legal framework for cybersecurity has also defined the National Authority for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security (AKCESK) as the authority responsible for supervising the implementation of the law. Accordingly, the current situation regarding security in critical information infrastructures has improved compared to two years ago. In these infrastructures, significant security measures have been applied, which have been approved by AKCESK, as well as sectoral CSIRTs have been established, thus creating a secure cyber environment.

In critical governmental information infrastructures used by public institutions, which are respectively allocated at the governmental data center and managed by the National Agency for Information Society (NAFS), all security measures are implemented in accordance with the legislation in force and the ISO 27001 standard.

NAFS is a governmental sectoral CSRIT and was certified with this standard in 2018, and ISO 27001 standard policies are applied to each government infrastructure under NAFS administration.

Regarding digital infrastructure and electronic communications networks and/or services, considering that the majority of cyber threats and attacks come via electronic communications networks, cybersecurity issues in this sector are pursued and are under the responsibility of the Authority of Electronic and Postal Communications (AEPC). AEPC, based on Law No. 9918, dated 19.05.2008 "On electronic communications in the Republic of Albania", more specifically, Article 122 and on Regulation No. 37, dated 29.10.2015 "On technical and organizational measures to guarantee the security and/or integrity of electronic communications networks and/or services", requires taking appropriate technical and organizational measures to guarantee the

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[1] National Cyber Security Strategy 2020-2025, p. 8.
[2] Law no. 9918, dated 19.5.2008 "On electronic communications in the Republic of Albania"

security and integrity of networks and/or or of electronic communications services by entrepreneurs of electronic communications operating under the General Authorization Regime for all services, including the DNS service provided to their subscribers. AEPC has conducted and continues to conduct inspections and audits in entrepreneurs to verify the implementation of appropriate technical and organizational security measures and in cooperation with AKCESK follows up on security incidents reported by electronic communications entrepreneurs. AEPC is the administrator of the ".al" domain and has authorized 8 entities as accredited registrars to provide domain name registration services under the .al zone (TLD name registries). With the inclusion of this service in the list of critical and important information infrastructures, subject to the implementation of the provisions of Regulation No. 37, dated 29.10.2015 "On technical and organizational measures to guarantee the security and/or integrity of electronic communications networks and/or services" the registrars accredited by AEPC will be the one who will provide the domain name registration service under the area.al. Internet penetration in Albania is still developing and is presented at an average level of use. About 67% of the population and about 40% of families had access to the Internet in 2019.

2. Cybercrime in the Republic of Albania

Albania, like other countries, in many cases is target of malicious cyber activity, carried out by criminal actors, including state and non-state actors, who can use the network infrastructure in Albania and abroad. Along with the improvement of the Internet, Albania has also seen the emergence of various forms of cybercrime. Common forms of cybercrime in Albania include fraud related to Internet banking, such as: phishing and spam. Even when individuals responsible for cybercriminal activities against the Republic of Albania are identified, law enforcement agencies in the Republic of Albania and international organizations often find it difficult to follow them when they are in limited jurisdictions. Currently, it is noted that there is a lack of the necessary means to obtain and create cyber intelligence, using the human and logistical resources necessary to exercise law enforcement activity. Increasing the capacities to face the cyber challenges is essential, therefore the structures, the approach, technical and logistic capacities etc. must be changed. An important step forward in developing legislation and taking measures against cybercrime will be the first national strategy for cybercrime, which will be prepared by the respective authorities and will be implemented in a relatively short time. This document will determine the way to fight criminal activities in the cyber field, as well as it will ensure more appropriate tools in the function of this fight.

3. The legal framework of cyber security

A comprehensive national cyber security approach cannot be done using only technologies and services, but must be accompanied by a good and current legal framework, focusing on the dynamic nature of the ICT environment and the evolving nature of cyber threats. Various national and international structures carry out awareness campaigns for various interest groups, with the aim of protecting against cybercrime threats and other internet security attacks. A legal and regulatory framework that protects the various forms of abuse and electronic crime is essential for creating a reliable environment for electronic communications and transactions. The main laws related to security and cybercrime are as follows: - Law No. 7895, dated 27.1.1995 "Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania", as amended; - Law No. 2/2017 "On cyber security"; - Law No. 9918, dated 19.5.2008 "On electronic communications in the Republic of Albania", as amended; - Law No. 9887, dated 10.3.2008 "On the protection of personal data", as amended; - Law No. 8457, dated 11.2.1999 "On classified information", as amended; - Law No. 9880, dated 25.2.2008 "On electronic signature", as amended; - Law No. 107, dated 15.10.2015 "On electronic identification and trusted services", as amended.

Regarding the above, it is necessary to harmonize the legislation in the field of cybersecurity with the EU legislation, creating a complete and clear codified mechanism, in order to correctly address the problems and solve them. Moreover, it is necessary to achieve, where possible, the accession, signature, ratification and implementation of international Internet security instruments, including the allocation of sufficient resources, according to national priorities, taking into account technological developments and applying the principle of neutral technology.

4. Internet use by children

The ever-increasing Internet use by children is the biggest problem in terms of their safety in the online environment, not only in Albania, but also in other countries.

The safety of children on the Internet is one of the priorities of Albania and of all institutions that have it as the focus of their activity. In 2018-2019, UNICEF Albania, as the government's strategic and main partner in the protection and rights of children, carried out a study on "Children's experiences in using the Internet in Albania"[3]. The study surveyed 1000 children aged 9 - 18 years and their parents and its preliminary results are as follows: The average age when the surveyed children accessed the Internet for the first time is 9 years

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[3] Study conducted by Unicef Albania, year 2017, p. 10-11.

old, of which 37% claim to have used the Internet from the age of 8 or/and earlier. While 51% of the children who participated in the survey resulted to have online access all the time (whenever they want). In general, the surveyed children use the Internet more and have more online technology skills than their parents. This poses an obstacle for parents to effectively accompany their children's online experience, not only by controlling their access, but also by helping children develop critical judgment about online experiences and content. The study showed that while surfing on the Internet, children encountered unpleasant situations.

More specifically, 14% of the surveyed children have experienced something online that have upset them, especially 15 -17 year old. 1(one) in 10 (ten) children (9%) has had an unwanted sexual experience on the Internet. Statistics from this research show that children are exposed to harmful content online such as: images of violence or abuse (1 in 5 children), content that talks about physical violence (17% of children) or content that talks about suicide (1 in 10 children). 1(one) in 5 (five) children have been the subject of derogatory and hateful messages, which is also an indicator of possible situations of online bullying. Meanwhile, the study shows that children find it difficult to share the difficult situations they experience and ask for help: 1 in 5 children has not told anyone about the incident that upset them, while 75% of the surveyed children seek help and support from their peers and not from adults.

More than 20% of children surveyed accept all friend requests on social networks, while 25% of children admit that they have interacted online with someone they do not know in real life and 16% of them have met someone in person who they only knew him/her on the internet. Parents are informed about only 9% of the above cases. The children surveyed claim that they have no control or supervision from their parents when they watch online videos (78%), visit social networks (58%), use messaging applications (57%) or use the computer or phone camera (56%) . As noted by the study, the use of the Internet by children in an uncontrolled manner is very high. This problem is often accompanied by serious consequences. The lack of information among parents regarding the dangers posed by the insecure Internet is also at a high level. Regarding parental control, although it is offered as a technical option by some internet service providers, it is not implemented. Moreover, based on the study of the situation in seven regions of the country carried out through awareness campaigns, in which participated about 12,000 elementary school children, to a large extent the children confirm that their parents are not clearly informed on the dangers of unsafe internet use by children. The study found that, beside the fact that the Albanian legislation as a whole is in accordance with the relevant international standards on the sexual abuse of children, it is

often fragmented and lacks very important definitions related to the sexual abuse of children, their engagement and coercion in sexual activities and in other inappropriate activities.

Another important finding is related to the Albanian legislation that regulates the operation of Internet service providers, which is unclear in terms of charging administrative authorities with the powers of blocking or deleting certain materials. This prevents these authorities to clearly understand their roles and functions and to have the proper mechanisms for the exercise such roles and functions. Clear legislation is needed in this field regarding the powers and exact procedures of the administrative authorities. The Cybercrime Investigation Unit of the State Police lacks capabilities to conduct active online surveillance, undermining their ability to initiate ex officio and proactive investigations. The lack of quick response by Internet service providers to the requests of prosecution office and the difficulties in identifying the IP addresses of alleged offenders have a disturbing effect on the overall quality and efficiency of the investigation and, consequently, on the possibility of making authors responsible. The study shows that Child Protection Units, as well as other professionals who deal with the protection of children online, need capacity building and support to address cases of child abuse online. Moreover, there is no specific data collected and published on child abuse on the Internet.

5. Cybersecurity vision in the future

The guarantee of cybersecurity in the Republic of Albania must be realized through the establishment and operation of cooperative institutional mechanisms: legal and technical instruments, as a critical element of protection of cyberspace, regarding digital infrastructures, transactions and electronic communications; raising professional capacities, increasing nationwide awareness, as well as strengthening national and international collaborations for a safe digital environment.

In order to pursue the realization of specific objectives, translated into a detailed action plan, the basic indicators have been drawn up, which will serve as a guide to monitor the implementation of the Strategy. The indicators are designed to be understandable, measurable and easily comparable, according to monitoring periods. There are planned two basic indicators for each specific objective, which can be simple or composite, depending on the sub-objectives to be measured.

Due to the dynamics and speed of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) development, cooperation with the private sector must be strengthened. The ICT security and development of the state administration can increase only through a close cooperation in coherence with the developments

and the trend of technology. The increase of cooperation and coordination among state institutions will be strengthened to guarantee interaction and coordination in strengthening security and minimizing damage from cyber attacks. Albania supports and will be part of international initiatives aimed at increasing and strengthening security. In particular, NATO and EU cooperation will be strengthened, becoming an active part of joint initiatives for cyber security. Albania's membership in recognized international cyber security organizations and forums and cooperation enhancement remains a priority. As a NATO member country, Albania recognizes cyber space as the fifth domain of war, along with land, sea, air and space. Cyberspace presents challenges and security which can only be achieved by thinking globally and working closely internationally.

Conclusions

The digitization process is challenging not only in the drafting of laws, but mostly in the implementation of the legal framework. A positive step undertaken by the Albanian state is related both to the approval of various laws, such as: the Law on the Protection of Personal Data, on Electronic Communications or on Electronic Commerce, as well as the ratification of a number of international agreements and conventions such as the ratification of the European Commission Convention on Cybercrime.

It is rather difficult to achieve full law harmonization with the European law, as this process must be gradual and must be based on the Albanian context. The biggest challenge to the law in the field of cybersecurity lies in the fact that it is a new and dynamic legislation, since the field is new and is subject to rapid changes.

The process of identifying critical structures is a new method introduced in Albania. Information must be updated at least once every two years and incidents must be reported for all critical structures.

Although the EU has a list of indicators for these critical structures, they must be adapted to technological development and to Albanian institutions. Thus some of these indicators, such as space research, can be ignored as they are not applicable in Albania. Moreover, new indicators can be created such as: security and public order, which are considered priorities in Albania.

Strengthening human and technical capacities to fight cybercrime. It is noticed a lack human capacities in this regard. The focus should not only be on the training of police experts, but also on the training of the judicial system and prosecutors, deepening in this way the cooperation among institutions.

It is recommended that at least one judge and one prosecutor of each

judicial district be trained on cybersecurity and cybercrime, making the work coordination easier among the police and investigative and judicial institutions throughout the country. It is important that the employees of the police and other institutions have not only good technical knowledge and high expertise in the field regarding the their operation, but it is crucial to have a high level of knowledge in the English language. Therefore, it i suggested to conduct training within police institutions, with European or international police experts such as Europol or Interpol, as well as to exchange experiences or methods on how to identify cybercrime and how to investigate it. Moreover, judges and prosecutors need to attend such training as well in order to provide all the necessary information when needed.

Reporting and monitoring for a safer internet. There is a lack of attention to this sector, little is said and discussed, also due to the fact of its specific and technical character. More awareness and information campaigns on cyber risk and on the way how to protect ourselves from it are required. A continuous and periodic process of supervision and monitoring regarding computer subjects and events is necessary and a special register is needed to record both cyber incidents and reports.

Recommendation

In conclusion, I have highlighted some recommendations so that the Republic of Albania can guarantee cyber security at the national level. This can be realized through the protection of information infrastructures by strengthening technological and legal means.

1. Improving the legal framework that regulates and regulates the field of cyber security in the country, as well as its harmonization with the directives and regulations of the European Union.

2. The use of advanced hardware and software solutions for the identification, prevention and management of cyber incidents.

3. Analysis of critical and important information infrastructures for risk assessment and management.

4. Improving information infrastructures to combat cybercrime, radicalization and violent extremism.

5. Designing study programs in higher education in the field of cybersecurity, with the aim of creating a new generation of cybersecurity experts.

6. Increasing and supporting research capacities and business innovations by encouraging the establishment of scientific research centers in the field of cybersecurity.

7. Increasing the capacities of CSIRTs at the national level and the executive level of the public administration through training and cyber exercises.

8. Organizing awareness campaigns by the authorities responsible for cybersecurity with different interest groups, using the appropriate premises for their realization, including audiovisual or social media.

9. Creating an online educational platform for cyber security to increase awareness on the use of safe internet and digital infrastructure in different age groups of society.

10. Creating the necessary mechanisms for the safety of children in cyberspace, while preparing the new generation to take advantage of the information technology advances and to face the development challenges.

11. Establishing a flexible structure with the best cyber security experts in the country, in order to provide support in cases of cyber crises, as well as testing and evaluating the level of cyber security at the national level.

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THIRD RUBRIC

Historical studies

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ALBANIA – SOVIET UNION IN 1957 – 1959 IN THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE'S ARMY

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Abstract. *This paper aims to analyze the two agreements between Albania and the Warsaw Treaty in the context of the time when they were signed, as well as the consequences of their signing. During the process, I tried to answer questions such as; Were the agreements in favor of national interests and how much did they serve the defense of the country? What did Albania benefit from them, under the conditions of a poor country in the field of defense, considering the lists of military equipment, supplies of fuel, clothing and food? In reality, were the agreements violated by both parties? Why those agreements (especially the one reached in 1959) were considered as the starting point of the conflict and used as instruments for the irrevocable exclusion of Albania from the Warsaw Treaty, etc.?*

The documents used from the Albanian archives and, in particular, those brought by the Central Archive of the Armed Forces (AQFA) create in this paper a new panorama, which we believe is of interest to objectively evaluate the role played by these agreements in identifying the Vlora Base as the only Soviet base in the Mediterranean during the Cold War.

Keywords: Military agreement, Soviet Union, Vlora naval base, Cold War, Albania, Eastern Europe, Pashaliman.

Introduction

In the various studies of Western analysts and historians who have dealt with the examination of the main aspects of the Warsaw Pact, including the publications released after its collapse on March 31, 1991[1], it has been pointed out that the alliance was truly military and of the same type of what the Soviet Union (BS) had signed with other satellite countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

Even Albania could not escape the military influence of the US, despite its geographical distance from this country. But, unlike other countries, where Soviet troops were present before the signing of the Warsaw Treaty of May 14, 1955, in Albania they were massively installed, together with armaments and other means of warfare, only after the signing of these two agreements. Both of these agreements can be considered the knot of the Albanian-Soviet conflict in the years 1960-1961. The parties (Soviet and Albanian), referring to them, accused each other of violating the agreements and responsible for the aggravated and tense situation in the Base of Vlora, which was resolved with the departure of the Soviet military-naval forces from the Vlora Base , as it was decided at the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee (CPC) on March 29 1961[2], thus ending its history as a WT base.

The creation of the Warsaw Treaty legitimized the presence of Soviet troops in the countries of the Communist Bloc and paved the way for the creation of new Soviet military bases even in places where there were no Soviet troops before, such as the case of Albania. The creation of these bases was preceded by the process of signing military agreements. They were considered as agreements within the Warsaw Pact, despite the fact that they took the form of bilateral agreements between a member country of this pact and Soviet Union. Such were the two agreements reached between Albania and Soviet Union, in the period of 1957-1959, which were finalized with the construction of the Naval Military Base of Vlora. The decision to create this base was a

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[1] Vojtech Mastny and Malcom Byrne, *A Cardboard Castle? Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955 -1991*, PHP Publication Series, Washington. DC/ Zyrich, May 2005, Parallel History Project on NATO and Warsaw Pact (PHP); Denis Deletant and Mihail Ionescu. "Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1989, Widrow Wilson Center Cold War International History Project.

[2] *Central State Archives*(hereafter AQSH) Fund 14, Warsaw Treaty (hereafter WT), Year - hereafter V. 1961, File - hereafter D. 1, p.84, Decision of the CPC of Warsaw Treaty

key moment for the inclusion of our country in the USSR defense plans in relation to NATO. The interpretation of the agreements signed in 1957 and 1959 has sparked debate, as some of the witnesses of the events, who have written memoirs or given interviews, think they were emotionally influenced, have opposed researchers in the field, in particular for the establishment of the Naval Military Base of Vlora[3].

A question that can be raised is under what circumstances arose the USSR's interest in having a naval base in Albania, after its accession to the Warsaw Pact? Albania gained strategic importance for Moscow after the break with Yugoslavia, when it was seen as a point of support in the ideological war against Tito and as a counterpoint to the West. In the framework of the Cold War, Albania was located near the Yugoslav "dead zone" and needed help[4], because it no longer had land connections with the countries of the Communist Bloc, and aid could not be received through this route. With the severance of relations with the Yugoslavs and the expulsion of all their advisors to Albania, Soviet military missions would increase significantly. After the first military agreement, signed between the People's Republic of Albania and the USSR on June 1, 1949[5], the Albanian army would guarantee without reward half of its needs for food, clothing and other materials. This agreement was based on the total number of active members of the armed forces. The delivery of aid would take place through the ports of Durrës and Vlora. The agreement entered into force immediately after its signing and would remain in force the following year, unless its revocation was declared three months before. This agreement became the basis for the following agreements. It remained in force until 1961, when relations with Soviet Union were broken.

1. The 1957 agreement

Unlike some other member countries of the Warsaw Pact, no Soviet tactical unit (there was no soviet military presence) was stationed in Albania until the opening of the Pashaliman Naval Base. In Nikita Khrushchev's book "Memories, I am not a judge."[6], a clear analysis of the decision-making by the USSR to use Albania as a base to extend political-military influence in

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[3] The debate between researcher Prof. Dr. Ana Lalaj and military engineer Fatosh Voshtina published in the daily press, the newspaper "Shqiptarja.com". 2013

[4] Nina Smirnova, *History of Albania throughout the 20th century,* Ideart:Tirana, p.345

[5] *Central Archive of the Armed Forces*(hereinafter AQFA) Year – hereinafter V. 1949, file, hereinafter-D. 158
The agreement was signed in Moscow on 28.09.1949, for the Soviet Union by Marshal Sokollovski VD and for the MMP by the special representative of the RPSH in BS, Mr. Mihal Prifti.

[6] Nikita Khrushchev, Memories, I am not a judge Tirana 2004, Ombra Publishing House GVG, p.136

the Mediterranean is made. He appreciates the strategic position of Albania, stating openly that "we considered it at that time, as a powerful base of socialist countries". However, in Khrushchev's reasoning, there is no lack of dilemma, whether it was necessary to "keep our army there (in Albania) or to create a strong Albanian army". He gives the answer himself again, when he writes: "Realistically, Albania could only maintain a small army in number, which would not be able to impress our opponents. So we decided to help Albania materially for the creation within the possibilities of a large Albanian army ..."[7].

The strategic position but also the tightening of the relations of the USSR with the West after the Second World War, which did not exclude a possible military conflict in the Western Balkans, are for N. Khrushchev two of the main reasons why the Soviets "got along with the Albanians for the creation ... of a submarine base". The proposal for the creation of a military base was made to Enver Hoxha by Khrushchev himself in an unofficial way, during the dinner given at the Gorki villa in honor of the Albanian delegation that was in Moscow on December 23, 1956. "Prior to raising a toast, Khrushchev said, we must have the Mediterranean under our control and to make every connection with Albania. We told you, he continued, let's do it as soon as possible. We will do it to create strong bases for submarines.[8]. Khrushchev insisted a lot on this issue.

The above conversation did not go unnoticed by the senior leadership of Albania. Not even a month had passed since then, at the end of January 1957, a senior delegation of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Albania was invited for bilateral talks in Moscow by the commander of the United Forces of the Warsaw Pact and by the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. The talks held in the period from February 1 to 4, 1957 focused on several issues arising from Albania's commitment to the Warsaw Treaty, such as: the reduction of the number of armed forces in the framework of the disarmament system, the needs for equipment and weapons etc. The determination of some military naval bases in the territory of our country was also part of the talks[9]. This purpose would then be used for the preparation of a study, which would see the possibilities of deploying Soviet submarines in Albanian ports. Likewise, a mixed Albanian-Soviet commission would be created, which would deal with

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[7] Ibid...p.137

[8] AQSH, Fund 14 AP/OU, V.1957, D.6, p.17, Minutes of the meeting of the Political Bureau, date 13, 1,1957 of the delegation that went to Moscow in December 1956, near the Central Committee of the PKBS

[9] AQFA, Fondi 100/3, V.1957, D. 18. During the talks on point 4 of the protocol, the Soviet side proposed the temporary use of naval bases for the BS Navy. The Albanian delegation, on behalf of the government, proposed the permanent stay of some BS submarines in Albanian ports. This proposal was taken into consideration by the Soviet side.

the drafting of the agreement between the two countries. The protocol of these talks was signed on February 4, 1957 only for the first point by the marshal of the Soviet Union, Konjev, and the Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of Albania, Lieutenant General Beqir Balluku.[10].

After returning from Moscow, it seems that point 4 of this protocol took precedence. On February 7, 1957, Defense Minister Beqir Balluku received the draft agreement and the accompanying letter. Through the latter, the Soviet side wanted to know who would be the person authorized by the Albanian side to sign the agreement. The Albanian Minister of Defense issued the order for the creation of the commission, which would be chaired by Major General Arif Hasko[11]. The latter together with the representative of the Soviet side Vice Admiral Chursin[12]on April 26 to May 14, were tasked to consider the possibility of deploying warships and securing them in Albanian waters. On May 12, the joint commission signed the draft agreement that had 11 links and schedules attached. The deployment of the Fortification Battalion on May 23, 1957, by order of the Deputy Minister of Defense Major General Petrit Dume, marks the beginning of the works of the Naval Military Base of Vlora[13].

In the meeting of September 12, 1957, which is known as the day of signing the agreement, Admiral Fokin signed for the Soviet side, while Major General Arif Hasko signed for the Albanian side. This agreement was the second in a row signed with this country, starting from the one in 1949, but the first agreement that Albania signed as a member of the Warsaw Treaty. In the agreement, it was mentioned that both governments decided to complete the creation of the Military-Naval Base of Vlora, "in order to protect the People's Republic of Albania"[14]. The agreement has seven articles divided into several points. In point 3 of the first article, it is clearly stated that if the situation requires it and with the approval of the defense ministers of the RPSH and the USSR "the troops of the Naval Military Fleet of the USSR can be temporarily deployed"[15].

[10] AQFA, Fund 100/3, V.1957, D. 22, p.2. This point predicted the number of Armed Forces troops in peacetime and wartime

[11] AQFA, Fondi 100/3, V.1957, D. 22, p.1, The Commission of the Albanian side headed by Major General Arif Hasko had members: Major General Nexhip Vinçani, Colonel Todi Naço, Colonel Spiro Shalsi, cap. Second Rank Abdi Mati, Colonel Ernest Jakova.
?AQFA, Fund 100/1, V.1957, D. 31, p.1

[12] AQFA, Fund 100/3, V. 1957, D. 154, p.11. The commission of the Soviet side headed by vice admiral Chursin had members: captain of the First Rank S. Kostaninov, colonel Eng. V. Anfinov, ing captain Second G. Kozirfev, ing. major F. Inogemcief

[13] AQFA, Fund 100/1, V.1957, D. 31, p.1

[14] AQFA, Fund 100/3, V.1957, D. 20. p.1

[15] Ibid... p.1

While article 3, point 6 specified that the Soviet Union would supply Albania with technical assistance and armaments without compensation.

Article 3 of the 6-point agreement makes clear how the ships were to be taken over in the first quarter of 1958, after the necessary base facilities had previously been made ready. Regarding the operational use of submarines in point 5 of this article it is clearly stated that "it will be carried out according to the plans agreed between the Soviet and Albanian command". The agreement was signed for a 10-year term. It would remain in force as long as one or both parties did not file objections to its termination within 6 months before the 10-year term of termination..[16]

The Albanian army received considerable military aid thanks to this agreement. It is enough to see the appendices of the agreement and you can understand that a special attention was paid to the reinforcement of the Adriatic coast. In its first appendix, it is noticeable that Albania received 4 medium submarines, 4 submarine shooters, accompanied by auxiliary ships, floating base for submarines, floating dock (1 piece), etc. Appendix 3 of the agreement is related to the measures that should be taken to ensure the navigation of warships and auxiliary ships in the territorial waters of Albania, in defined time frames. The Soviet Union also undertook to provide navigation equipment in the period 1957-1958[17]. The creation of the Vlora Base was a means of facilitating the military position of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean and its direct response to the Sixth American Fleet, deployed on the Italian coast of the Adriatic. We should mention that after Turkey's entry into NATO, Turkish control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits was strengthened, while the movement of the Soviet Union's naval vessels towards the southern seas was made more difficult. The Turkish straits remained the only sea routes of passage of BS to the south. The creation of the Vlora Base was a direct and threatening response to the rival military bloc of NATO, but also a greater risk for Albania, in case of intentional or unintentional confrontation between the two largest blocs of the Cold War era. This danger was pointed out by the Albanian military attaché in Moscow, Halim Ramohito, who accompanied Soviet Marshal Zhukov on his visit to Albania in 1957. Ramohito claimed that "the dangers that could threaten the country did not cross the marshal's mind at all." ours from any possible eventual attack, but (he thought) only about the possibility of their hegemony from that strategic direction[18]. The agreement provided for a non-permanent deployment of Soviet ships in Albania, but

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[16] AQFA ...Fund 100/1, V.1957, D.154. p.2

[17] Ibid…appendix 3

[18] Halim Ramohito, In the service of my homeland, Grand Prind, Tirana 2010, p.64

in reality more was intended. Based on the memories of those who were important actors of the events, it is clearly implied that the Russians had "fallen in love" with the Vlora Base[19].

Just one month after the signing of the agreement, the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, Marshal Zhukov, visited Albania. His conversations with the Albanian leaders prove that during these meetings the foundations were laid for the signing of the second agreement, which would end in 1959. This agreement marked the second phase of the expansion of the Naval Military Base of Vlora and turning it into a base of the Warsaw Treaty, thus increasing the possibility of a potential conflict between it and NATO. From the minutes of the October 24, 1957 meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Labor Party of Albania, and precisely from the discussions of Enver Hoxha and the report of Beqir Balluku, it became clear that there were essential reasons that pushed the communist regime to accept the creation of a naval, military base, which would be staffed with a large number of Soviet soldiers, since the Albanian army lacked not only the material, but also qualified people[20]. "The minimum, it was stated there, is for Albania to have an airplane division and a bomber regiment which we lack. The needs of our army now are many, it needs people and most importantly qualified people..."

Zhukov's visit was appreciated not only for its political importance, in terms of strengthening the internal and international situation, but especially for its military aspect. It "has a great military importance, which is related to strengthening the defense of our country."[21]. The events that took place in Poland and Hungary and the difficult relations with the neighbors made Enver Hoxha feel insecure, more about the continuity of his regime than about the country's sovereignty. It was under these circumstances that the plan for the establishment of the Vlora naval base was accepted, which was further advanced during the talks with Zhukov, when it was proposed to turn the Vlora naval combat base into a more powerful naval base for operations against military forces -NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea[22]". In this way, the requests for armaments and military materiel, which were not few, would be justified. The agreements would even provide for the construction of airfields.

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[19] H. Ramohito, F. Voshtina, M. Qorduka and other soldiers who have written memoirs about the time when Albania was a member of the Warsaw Pact, share the same opinion, that the Soviets express a high enthusiasm for the bay of Vlora.

[20] AQSH, Fund 14 AP/OU, V.1957, D. 20, list 1, p.2, Minutes of the meeting of the Politic Byro of the Central Committee of the ALP, dated October 24, 1957, Beqir Balluku and Enver Hoxha report on the talks held with the marshal Zhukov.

[21] Ibid..., p.3

[22] H. Kaba, E. Čeku, Albania and Kosovo in the Russian archives, Pristina 2001, p.176

Enver Hoxha personally requested that, together with the military tools and equipment, they should bring the relevant specialists from the Soviet Union, who would train their Albanian colleagues. He connected this closely with the objectives of the defense of the country, but also with the propaganda aspect, considering it a great success of his policy, in the service of strengthening the internal state of the country. Enver Hoxha emphasized: "our people will see even better that our country is secured from any enemy attack"[23]. He saw the militarization of the country, its good armament and the arrival of planes and missiles as a means of defense, in relation to the risk of falling from power, selling the defense of the country as a defense of his regime. We must mention that the unchanged Stalinist policy of the Albanian leadership after the 20th congress was not welcomed by the USSR leadership and the creation of the Vlora Base somewhat strengthened its "torn" image in the eyes of the Albanian people. And the presence of a large number of Soviet soldiers was justified by the expressions that "how much the people love the Soviet people" and that "Albania is not like Poland"[24]. On the other hand, Zhukov, according to the statements of those who accompanied him, openly expressed his enthusiasm for the bay of Vlora, after viewing it from the highest point of Karaburun: "This is a wonderful bay! The Black Sea, where we have part of our fleet, is actually a lake. We should deploy here at this base the fleet we have there...".[25] The Soviets were clear in their intentions to increase their hegemony in the Mediterranean, while for Enver Hoxha, the base of Vlora, among others, was seen as a means to escape from the fear of being overthrown by the Yugoslavs, who had become significantly closer to the Kremlin at this time. Hoxha would affirm that "the appropriate solution of this issue is also expressed positively in our mutual relations with Yugoslavia, which will value Albania more"[26]. Thus, the existence of the Warsaw Pact naval base was seen as a means of increasing the prestige of the communist regime.

2. Second agreement, May 1959

Despite the material benefits, it seems that the 1957 agreement had some problems. According to the letter of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mehmet Shehu, addressed to N. Khrushchev on May 7, 1958, in the 1957 agreement "on the creation of the Vlora Naval Base", amounts of very important equipment had not been foreseen, the lack of which had a negative impact on military preparation[27].

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[23] Ibid...Fund 100/3, V.1957, D. 20. p.7

[24] Ibid.., p.7

[25] Halim Ramohito, In the service of my homeland, Grand Prid, Tirana 2010, p.28

[26] H. Kaba, E. Çeku, Albania.... Russian, Pristina 2001, p.176

[27] AQSH, Fund 490, V. 1958, D 1132, Letter of Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to Nikita Khrushchev

Likewise, the economic cost of the Base was very heavy for the poor budget of the Albanian state. It's in this letter and not in the 1957 agreement, that the phrase "free for us" appears for the first time, so the Albanian government expressed its belief and faith that its demands would be met for free by the Soviet government. This phrase, which will be part of the wording of the second article of the 1959 agreement, would turn the Vlora Base, according to the definition of Marshal Greçko, into "a bone of contention".

On May 4, 1959, the Minister of Defense of Albania, Colonel General Beqir Balluku, received a telegram from the Marshal of the Soviet Union, the Army General Antonov, with the draft of the second agreement between the two governments for "Strengthening the Defense of the Navy Base in Vlora Bay"[28], attached. The agreement itself, drafted in two languages, Albanian and Russian, notes that it was drafted in Tirana on May 3, 1959, with the authorization of the Albanian government represented by Beqir Balluku and the SU government, represented by Malinovski. It seems that the document had a discrepancy, as the SU Defense Minister Rodon Malinovski had come to our country as part of the official delegation that accompanied Nikita Khrushchev[29].

Both the aforementioned agreements were bilateral agreements between the two governments. According to Halim Ramohito's opinion, the Soviet party had constantly insisted that the problems of the Vlora Base not be discussed with the other member countries of the Warsaw Pact.[30], this is also specified in Article 11 of the agreement, as they considered this agreement as a special relation with the Albanian party. This is explained by the fact that the Soviets implemented almost all agreements as bilateral agreements and not as multilateral ones, and generally the decisions they made were not collective decisions, even though they were propagated as such. They always served the SU foreign policy and military plans. The opposite happened when the situation became tense. The problem of Vlora base was no longer seen as a problem between SU and Albania, but as a problem between the latter with the Warsaw Treaty. The existence of the base was repeatedly used by the communist regime of the time as a means of defense against possible attacks by American imperialism, but in the formulation of the 1959 agreement[31], in its article 3, the all-round protection of the base, ensuring the entry and exit of submarines in the bay of Vlora was left completely in the hands of the Albanian side. If the agreement left this to the hands of the Soviet forces,

[28] AQFA, Fund 100/3, V.1959, D. 247, p.7

[29] Ana Lalaj, "Albanien und der Warschauer Pakt", in: Der Warschauer Pakt, Von der Gründung bis zum Zusammenbruch 1955 bis 1991, Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2009, p. 42

[30] H. Ramohito, In my service..., Tirana 2010, Grand Prind, p.21

[31] AQFA, Fund 100/3, V.1959, D. 254, p.1

then this could be considered a form of occupation (by the Soviets), which could bring complications to the region and conflict with Article 8 to respect the independence and sovereignty of member countries, as well as non-interference in their internal TV affairs[32].

The Soviet side provided the materials and their use according to the plans coordinated between the Albanian command and the Soviet command. Contrasting the agreement written on paper and the memories of the military attache in Moscow, Halim Ramohito asserts that the Soviets never disclosed to the Albanian side their strategic plans, in case of an eventual aggression against our country, and that they never said in that period of what they would do in case our country could eventually be attacked[33].

The fourth article of this agreement is another hot point of debate these days, which requires further digging into the documents. In this article, it was foreseen that positions for the "Sopka" complex would be built on the coast of Peoples' Republic of Albania (PRA). The service in this complex would be done by Soviet crews, while in terms of the use of the combat complex it would be done by agreement between the Soviet and Albanian command[34]. Enver Hoxha, during his speech at the Čuka canal rally, on the occasion of N. Khrushchev's visit to Albania in May 1959, would claim that "we don't have rockets", but being aware of the agreement, he would add that "if they are needed, we will install them, if the situations require it"[35]. In various files published in Albanian daily newspapers after the 2000s, where the protagonists are Albanian soldiers who were active at the Naval Base of Vlora, or active in Karaburun, talk were mentioned about an attempt by the Soviets to turn Karaburun into an atomic weapons base. Even in the books with memoirs of these people we find such hypotheses, but they remain only hypotheses without concrete facts[36]. This is understandable since there was nothing written about this plan, or as they claim, the plans of the Soviets themselves were not known to them.

We think that Khrushchev's visit to Butrint was not accidental. The idea presented in his speech that the interests of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula and the Adriatic would be served by the creation of a zone free from atomic weapons was closely related to what was happening in the two neighboring

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[32] *Voice of the People*, May 15, 1955. p.1, Text of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

[33] H. Ramohiton, In my service, Tirana 2010, Grand Prind, p.31

[34] "Sopka" was the code name for land-sea missiles, with a medium range of action, which, according to specialists, covered and hit the entire Mediterranean area.

[35] AQSH, Fund 14 AP/OU. V.1959, file 15

[36] H. Ramohito, In my service..., Tirana 2010, Grand Prind, p.30

coastal countries with Albania[37]. At this time, talks were being held with Greece and Italy about the creation of missile bases. Although he was for a policy of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev could not miss the opportunity to convey the message to his rivals, that the possibility of creating bases with atomic weapons was also open in Albania.

Even in article 5 we find implications that later caused conflicts in the naval base of Vlora, but also in military relations in general, which had as the first cause the political disputes, made visible in the years 1960-61. For necessary equipment, spare parts and other materials that were missing in the PRA "to be provided by the Soviet side based on the demands of the Albanian side, free of charge[38]". Regarding this argument that was used by the Albanian side, on the ownership of the submarines, the researcher Ana Lalaj says that the Albanian side did not have sufficient legal arguments that they belonged to it, based only on the phrase "free of charge" and this was the reason which authorized the removal of 2/3 of them, using the slogan "for the sake of the eternal friendship that connects the Albanian people with the Soviet people"[39].

On the contrary, states engineer Fatosh Voshtina, who connects the ownership of these ships with the fact that "submarines and other warships of the brigade "40" from the moment of entering the bay of Vlora, after the ceremony will hold the flag of the PRA during the period until they are handed over for solitary navigation to the Albanian forces and personnel"[40]. But legally, there is no act that has carried out this transfer of ownership of these equipment, and their transfer to use by the Albanian crews would take place in the period 1960-1962, the time when the open political conflicts began.

Conclusion

The naval base in Vlora Bay was established by SU as an important stronghold of the Warsaw Treaty Organization[41], and in particular as a strategic point in the Mediterranean that should serve the Soviet Union for the location and navigation of the Naval Submarine Fleet, not only from the Vlora Base, but

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[37] H. Kaba, E. Čeku, Albania.... Russian, Pristina 2011, p.191, Letter of the USSR embassy in the RPSH, on the conclusions of the position of the delegation of the party and the Soviet government headed by N. Khrushchev in Albania.

[38] AQFA, Fund 100/3, V.1959, file 254, p.2.

[39] Shqiptarja.com, Dossier Prof. Dr. Ana Lalaj, May 5, 2013.

[40] Fatosh Voshtina, Albanian-Soviet relations in the naval base of Vlora, Tirana 2011, p.184.

[41] AQSH, Fondi 490, V. 1961, File 1149, p.5 Letter of the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. Kosigin, dated April 26, 1961.

also other possible points, such as, Butrint in Saranda[42]. The two military agreements that were signed in this context had a positive side, the arming of the military forces of the PRA and the training of Albanian soldiers without any expense. This can be considered a great achievement for the communist regime in the difficult economic conditions in which it was. Russian expenses for the construction of the military-naval base in the bay of Vlora were calculated at the value of more than 1 billion rubles[43](this does not count the cost of 12 submarines and other warships and submarines and auxiliaries that were also borne by the Soviet government). The presence of Soviet crews at the base undoubtedly backed off the neighbors, especially those of Greece.

But the establishment of the base turned Albania into a Soviet and Warsaw Pact defense outpost, putting it against the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Cases of possible incidents, according to the accounts of the Albanian soldiers who were on duty at that time, could turn into a major problem and sometimes even into confrontations. In this perspective, our country could become an arena of conflict[44]. The mentioned agreements, not because of legal equivocations, but because of ideological disagreements and interests of the moment, were used as a pretext by the parties to create a conflict, which would eventually lead to the de facto, but not de jure, exit of Albania from Warsaw Treaty.

They would be terminated unilaterally without completing the 10-year term, creating obvious problems in the supply of armaments to the Albanian army, as well as other material means, difficulties that were overcome with military aid provided by the new ideological partner China.

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[43] H. Ramohito, In my service..., Tirana 2010, Grand Prind, p.14.

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EFFORTS INTO CONSOLIDATING MILITARY SCHOOL DURING 1950–1971

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Abstract. *In the article "Efforts into consolidating military school during 1950-1970" detailed information is provided about the totality of the issues regarding the enhancement of military education such as: the curricula, cadets' level, the improvement of the organizational structure of the school in the course of its development, the improvement of the material resources for teaching-learning and training (firing ranges, cabinets), cycles as study units and cooperation among them with regard to the unification of methods, actions, terminology or ideas, the separation of the teaching faculty from the commanding body, issues of scientific research as well as various teaching and sports activities, which testify to a large-scale work done in this period, to consolidate the military school, established after the war.*

The improvement of the curricula and the introduction of new subjects from time to time, as well as the enhancement of the teaching and commanding bodies' level, created real opportunities and prepared the "ground" for the transition of the school to the three-year system and obtaining the "status" of the higher education institution, after the 70s.

Keywords: education, albanian military education, curricula, teaching-learning cycles, cadet, instructor, Military Scientific Association, military school, modernization, teaching, objectives.

Introduction

It was natural that after the liberation of the country, efforts would be made to revive and enhance the Albanian military school and education. The army emerged from the fires of war, would require its leaders, commanders, and officers. In this post-war period, short and medium-term courses would mainly prevail, which served the urgent needs of the country. The programs were simple and accompanied by a simple management structure. Until the end of 1948, the organizational structure underwent several changes, where the organization and division of the teaching faculty on the basis of teaching-learning cycles, which were evaluated as educational teaching-learning units, stands out. The training branch was established, which followed the implementation of training in accordance with the curricula and the objective of the school. The organization of courses based on company, platoon and battery (for artillerymen) began to be outlined. To increase the educational, background and teaching level for the commanding body and instructors, various courses were launched, such as foreign languages and general background courses. These courses helped significantly in expanding the social knowledge of the commanding officer and education cadre. The knowledge they gained fully benefited the training of the cadets.

1. Curricula design

In the early 1950s, the United Officers' School switched from preparing cadres with short- and medium-term courses to preparing them with a more complete military education system, varying in two and three years. During this period, relying also on the government's instructions for the modernization of our army, new branches were gradually opened in the school for the preparation of cadres of all types of weapons and services, so the school in this period took on the complete physiognomy for the preparation of the new officer cadre.

Thus, on January 19, 1950, the reorganization of the United Officers' School was carried out: "Starting from the new training year 1949-1950, it was emphasized in the order of the Ministry of Defense, - the preparation of officers should be carried out through regular 2-year courses".[1] This important decision set before

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[1] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 6, Year 1984 - History of the United Officers' School, page 90.

the school's command immediate tasks for the design of the complete 2-year program regarding the specialties of infantry, artillery, rear service (logistics) and engineering. Despite the limited experience, the cadres designed the first curricula.

The purpose of this program was to produce platoon commanders and impart knowledge on the company. For this reason, the main place in the curricula was occupied by the following subjects: Marxist-Leninist training, tactical training, fire training and physical training. These programs included general education subjects, such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, geography, history, languages, etc., in order for the students who had a 7-year education to receive a general background as a basis for acquiring the military and political preparation program.[2]

In the Tactics subject, the program mainly contained the preparation of the soldier, squad, platoon and knowledge of the company. While the fire training program contained knowledge of the infantry weapons that our army had as well as acquiring the rules of firing with these weapons.

A very important moment was the separation of the teaching faculty from the command team.[3] If before this period classes were taught by the commanders of platoons, companies, courses or by instructors in the political branch, now the cycles served as teaching and educational faculty. In addition to the previously created cycles (in 1948), new cycles were also created, such as that of fire and general education. All cycles depended on the training branch. The cycles consisted of the cycle leader, deputy leader and instructors.

Then the cabinets were established, such as that of topography, of infantry tactics, of fire as well as the one of special preparation of the rear (logistics). These cabinets directly influenced on the increase in the quality of teaching and the preparation of the future army officers.

In addition to the teaching-learning process, special attention in the school was paid to the organization and participation in sports activities. Thus, in 1952, there were created the teams of athletics, wrestling, boxing, weightlifting, gymnastics and the "Warrior" football team, participating in the National Championship of the first category.[4] Also, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the creation of the National Liberation Army, on July 10, 1953, the school organized and conducted several experimental demonstration shootings with a heavy machine gun, light grenade launcher model 55, mortar 82 mm and rifle model 30. High preparation, speed and accuracy, which

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[2] Ibid., page 21.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., page 27.

indicated the good work done with the cadets in the teaching-learning process, were showcased during these shootings.

Later, the school switched to the 3-year system, where the cadets, in addition to military knowledge, would also receive general background according to the reduced program of the country's high schools.[5] In this context, the command and the teaching faculty faced important tasks for the design of the curricula, in order for the future army officers to have even more extensive knowledge not only in the subjects of Tactics, Fire, Physical training, but also in the special ones. Thus, this year's curricula introduced new subjects for the first time, such as the History of Military Art and knowledge of defense against weapons of mass destruction. Special attention was paid to tactical preparation and fire preparation at night, which occupied about 20% of the new program. The 3-year program was designed as follows: 28 months of classes, 3 months of exams, 2 months of practice with troops, which took place in the second and third year, and 3 months of holidays.

The purpose of this program was to prepare officers to competently command the platoon, the company and give them knowledge of the battalion. In addition to the design of the program, it was worked on the creation and enrichment of the teaching resources. Other new cabinets were established, such as that of anti-aircraft artillery, ground artillery, engineering, liaison, and the existing ones were enriched. At the same time, tactical and fire ranges were built for field training of the school staff.

Also, in the following years, new branches began to open, and consequently new cycles. Thus, the course of topography and the corresponding cycle were opened (1953), the course of anti-chemical defense and the course of tankers with the corresponding cycles, (1954). In 1956, as a result of the increase in the number of anti-aircraft artillery cadets and the necessity for a more in-depth and qualitative preparation of them, the AKA cycle was created (whose instructors were part of the ground artillery cycle until then). Subsequently, the first course for light flamethrowers was opened (1965), also, from the AT cycle, the AKA cycle was separated and created separately, as well as the AT group was separated and the AKA group was formed separately[6] (1968).

It is worth noting that, in this period, two engineer cabinets were reconstructed, that of fortification and the destruction of obstacles with mines, as well. Field positions for the infantry squad and platoon, artillery firing position and fortification barriers were built on the ground. From the tank cycle, the tactics cabinet, the fire cabinet and the technique cabinet were created, which raised

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[5] Ibid., page 28.

[6] Ibid., page 88.

to a higher level the qualitative teaching process as well as the qualitative preparation of the cadets.

In 1956, as a result of taking measures by the government to modernize the army and equip it with new weapons, the school was equipped with new technology, such as: 57 millimeter and 100 millimeter electrified anti-aircraft guns, ADZAKA-6 and a radar station. This was a new modern technique that came from the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, as part of the Warsaw Pact. It required from the teaching staff further knowledge and from the cadets greater efforts in its acquisition. With the advent of this technique, the curricula of the AKA cycle underwent changes. This is how new subjects such as electronics and radio engineering were introduced. Even the infantry units and subunits were equipped with new automatic and semi-automatic weapons. Thus, the acquisition of these weapons arose as a necessity, consequently the fire cycle made significant improvements in the fire training program. The training program for shooting and the amount of hours for shooting changed. The school cabinets were further enriched.

Cooperation between the cycles was also evident. This phenomenon led to the unification of methods, actions, terminology, ideas, vision, etc. This was one of the concerns of the school's command. For this, referring to the measures of the plan-calendars of the command of those years, many of them served exactly to link the cooperation of the cycles with each other. Thus there were demo classes, methodical conferences, joint meetings that took place with the participation of many cycles, so that the topics were in one line[7]. Also, cooperation was required not only within the school, but also outside it, which meant that the cycles had to cooperate with the respective directorates or branches of MMP. This cooperation would ensure that the entire teaching-learning process and activities at the school served the vision and instructions of the Ministry. Another important point for the command body was to make the command bodies of the units and subunits available for the teaching-learning process, cooperating with the heads of the cycles and the relevant lecturers, removing the opinion that "we are only responsible for the order, discipline whereas teaching is their responsibility". This also required the increase of the professional and background level of the commanders, so that they would engage more in the teaching-learning process.

In September 1958, changes occurred in the structure of the United Officers' School within the framework of the 3-year school system. So it was decided that the first year would be preparatory, creating a special battalion, named the

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[7] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 2, year 1957 - Order, report, overview of the command of the military department no. 1200 Tirana, on the results of the political-military preparation for the year 1957 and the tasks for the 1958 academic year.

preparatory battalion, where general education subjects would be developed according to the reduced high school program. This became necessary due to the low educational level of the cadets. Thus, in the first year there was field training and at the same time subjects such as Mathematics, Physics, Geometry, History, Geography, Foreign language were developed, but now with a qualitative difference from before, because the ratio of classes and the pedagogical level of the teachers had increased[8]. In the second year onwards, military subjects were taught.

In 1960, the tactics cycle began to work on the drafting of the new regulation of the soldier, squad, platoon, company combat, in the designing of which instructors with theoretical and pedagogical experience were engaged. They worked for many years on this, in addition to the teaching load that they had. Also, the textbook "On the organization and development of combat actions in different types of combat of the subunits" was worked on, which included the curricula of that time.

As for the infantry, the tactical training program included soldier to company combat operations for all types of combat, as well as knowledge of battalion combat operations. In terms of the specialty courses, tactics comprised the combat operations of the battalion in combat types, providing knowledge of the brigade.[9] At the end of the topics on the main types of combat, in order to concretize theoretical knowledge and to create the habit of organization, direction and development of combat actions of subunits units, complex 2-3 day trainings were held with the cadets.

As a result of equipping the army with new equipment and weapons, the need arose for the fire cycle to make appropriate changes in the program according to specialties. The training program for shooting and the amount of shooting that took place with the trainees also underwent changes. The "Theory of shooting" subject required changes and a higher quality level. For this reason, work began on the compilation of the texts "Fundamentals of shooting with infantry weapons" and "Fire duties" that were completed in 1964. The peculiarity was that after 1961, the "Fire preparation" subject, which used to be taught by the commanding officers, was taught entirely by fire cycle instructors, which brought qualitative improvements in its development.

Also, to meet the needs of the teaching-learning process, from the chemistry cycle, the texts "Guide for degassing, deactivation and disinfection of MKK clothing, equipment and tools" and "Guidline for using the auto-degassing machine MAD-48D as well as the description of technical brief of self-spraying

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[8] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 6, Year 1984 - History of the United Officers' School, page 44.

[9] Ibid., page 56.

car AVS-120" were prepared and published.

To the radiolocation course, which was included in the AT group, several new subjects were added to the curricula, such as "Theoretical fundamentals of electrotechnics", "Theoretical fundamentals of radiotechnics", "Theoretical fundamentals of automation" and "Theoretical fundamentals of radiolocation", which helped in the theoretical development and the formation of practical skills in the use of the radiolocation technique.

The qualitative growth of the candidate contingent for cadets and the evolution of educational programs made since October 1961 the cadets graduating from the United Officers' School "E. Hoxha" had semi-high military education.[10]United Officers' School for the academic year 1963 requested that the requirements of the tactical regulations of combat in the conditions of the mountainous terrain and the organizational structure of the albanian Army be implemented in the school in a creative and courageous manner. The reorganization of the army led to the creation of units in the vicinity of the regions where they would carry out combat duty. It was the new changes that were made in the principles of combat, adapting to the structure and concrete conditions, adding here the underground works that began to be carried out in the regions of combat actions, that set the task of improving and enriching the educational programs, literature, of the concretizing material resources and especially of the preparation of the instructors themselves as well as the improvement of the teaching methods. For this reason, it was required to revise the curricula, lessons, methods and construct the tactical range.

The issues of military education were constantly managed by the Ministry of Defense. Thus, in the tasks left by the MMP control commission[11], it was emphasized that the school command had to direct the main attention to increasing the learning scores, raising to a higher level the teaching method as well as its content. It was also necessary to improve the content of the seminars in tactical preparation, reflecting in them the main principles of fighting in the conditions of the Albanian context and the ongoing structural changes. These became the subject of discussion in cycle meetings, in order to better define their content and the method that would be applied during the classes.

Moreover, to assess the cadets' level, at the end of the school year, they took state exams administered by the MMP commission, which was chaired by a military who held the rank of general. In the act on the conduct of state exams for students of the second year, in July 1963, the assessment levels were defined

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[10] Ibid., page 60. (VKM no. 381, dated 28.10.1961).
[11] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 1, year 1963 - Tasks for the United Officers' School, left by the MMP commission (letter no. 128, dated March 6, 1963).

by the relevant commission as follows: cadets that fell under the excellent category; cadets that fell under the first category; cadets that fell under the second category; cadets that fell under the third category.[12] All these categories were considered as passing categories, which meant: you graduate as an officer. In the results of these exams, among other things, it was emphasized: "...the trainees have mastered the programs satisfactorily. The degree of their preparation is completely sufficient to entrust them with the task of platoon commander at the beginning and in the near future, after a period of preparation in the unit, also the task of company (battery) commander".[13] The best results were given by the trainees who came from the "Skënderbej" Military School, especially those of weapons and services types.

In the academic year 1964-1965, the general education cycled was merged, because the trainees who filled the school contingents owned a secondary education degree, they graduated mainly from the "Skënderbej" Military School and from the high schools in the country. Of these subjects, only foreign language subject was taught[14]. This was an achievement for the time, as for the first time that year cadets were accepted only with a secondary education degree. This influenced on the increase in their educational level, which in turn influenced on the increase in the quality of new officers.

In the tactical cycle, attention was paid to the development of company and battalion themes and the direction of actions through maps and schemes. The tactical exercises of the infantry platoon squad in defense and training ended with combat shooting. A new element that was introduced into the curriculum of the tactical subject after 1961 was the marching, which was organized, processed and handled with care, especially when the officers went to winter camps (in Feken) and summer camps (in Karpen of Kavaja). The training in these camps had its own peculiarities, which took place within an extended schedule, especially the winter one took place in difficult atmospheric conditions, on mountainous terrain covered with snow and at low temperatures. The (complex) two-day exercises and the marches during the winter training were done in a tactical situation, processing the elements of setting up camps, building caves in the snow and elements of combat security.[15]

Upon the decision of the Council of Ministers no. 5, dated January 12, 1966, the United Officers' School changed from a three-year program to a two-

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[12] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 4, year 1963 - Act of the MMP on conducting state exams with trainees of the second courses of the command of the military unit no. 1200 for the year 1963.

[13] Ibid.

[14] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 6, Year 1984 - History of the United Officers' School, page 70.

[15] Ibid., page 73.

year program.[16] This happened because the cadets were all with secondary education degree and there was no longer a need for the preparatory year.

From the fire cycle in 1967, under the direction of the MMP, demo classes have been organized with the main cadres of the army on the organization and development of platoon firing in defensive combat. A year later, for the first time, chemical and toxic training with the real use of war chemicals took place in Biza, Martanesh. In order to successfully carry out the training using warfare poison and radioactive materials, we collaborated with the Central Laboratory of Chemistry and the Institute of Nuclear Radiation.

Also, during 1968-1971 period, the cadets and instructors of the engineers built the fortification range, a defense region equipped with infantry tunnels and monolithic headquarters, reinforced concrete trenches and ditches, where other courses took place. The obstacle and destruction range, as well as the wooden bridge range, where field classes were held, were also built in the school grounds. For that period, the engineering workshop (classroom) was created, which served for repairs of the teaching material resources. The AT cycle published the book "Teaching Text of Ground Artillery Shooting". From this cycle, the group of instructors of the AT tactics course published the textbook "AT tactics, cannon (team), platoon and battery" in the form of a summary of lectures. In June 1971, in the artillery shootings held in Martanesh, all participating cadets achieved very good results. One of the main reasons for these results was the improvement of the material resources.

At the end of the 60s, there were many discussions on the structure of the new military education system for the preparation of new cadres at the United Officers' School, and after that it was decided as follows: The contingents of cadets attending the school would perform one year of service in the army as a soldier, two years of schooling, one year of internship with the troops as a platoon commander. Their graduation would take place after a year of intership with troops as an officer (platoon commander).[17] The MMP required that the school prepare a cadre of excellent platoon commanders and good company commanders.

2. Military schools and their role

At the end of the 60s, the military schools, the relevant programs were seen with the eye of the continuity of education step by step and the completion of the knowledge of the student, trainee, officer with general and professional

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[16] AQFA, General Staff Fund, File no. 30, Year 1966 - Decision no. 5, January 12, 1966 on the transition to the two-year program of the "Mehmet Shehu" Military Academy and the "Enver Hoxha" United Officers' School.

[17] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 6, Year 1984 - History of the United Officers' School, page 90.

background according to the tasks level. This had to do with the educational policies of that period, especially during 1969, oriented by the government as an objective necessity to implement state policies, where, among other things, the idea of establishing the revolutionary triangle "learning, productive labour, military training" was proposed.[18] It was important that the military schools of different levels, such as the "Skënderbej" Military School, the United Officers' School and the Military Academy, were seen as an educational process serving each-other. In this context, it was necessary to review the teaching process to redefine the objectives, aims and structure of the programs of these schools, seeing them as links of the same "military educational chain".

In order to have a unique system, it was proposed the idea that the "Skënderbej" Military School be reorganized into a profiled military high school for the different types of specialties that the army had. The program would contain the following ratios: general background 47.2%, military training 27.8%, productive labour 5.55%, training with troops 5.55% and break 13.9%. With this composition, in addition to the general background, the "Skënderbej" students would receive sufficient knowledge of the soldier and the squad. More specifically, in order for the "Skënderbej" Military School to better play its role serving the purpose it had, to produce students with comprehensive knowledge and general military background to pursue any other higher military and civilian education school, it would remain a 4-year profiled military high school, better suited to the needs and nature of the army.

United Officers School produced capable officers for platoon and company (battery) commanders, battalion (group) service chiefs, who acquired knowledge of the battalion (group); as for the rear service (logistics) it prepared brigade service chiefs. To ensure the officer's comprehensive preparation up to company (battery) commander, it was thought that the candidates had to be high school graduates, while the teaching-learning process had to be developed based on the general higher education. This was necessary for several reasons:

Firstly, the United School had to prepare officers who were capable of acting independently in the military life (activity), and had the opportunity to further their studies at the Academy.

Secondly, the officer would be the educator of the conscripts and a lecturer who would train and properly prepare the sub-unit with the highest quality.

Thirdly, the versatile development of the country, and the equipping of the military

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[18] AQFA, General Staff Fund, File no. 133, Year 1969 - Material no. 23 of the protocol, dated February 20, 1969 "Report of the work committee of the "Mehmet Shehu" Military Academy on the problem of further revolutionizing the school", page 3.

with the techniques and weaponry of the time, required highly educated cadres.

Fourthly, in the near future the army force would consist of conscripts who would be high school graduates (or would probably have a semi-higher education), so their commander had to be well prepared and more knowledgeable, so that he could teach his subordinates.

Fifthly, teaching in the higher education had to make the trainee more interested in expanding cultural, educational and professional knowledge and at the same time give him the opportunity to, after having gained sufficient experience with troops, be able to perform other higher duties without continuing his studies at the Military Academy.

The fulfillment of these tasks required a three-year study period. This would ensure that the trainee would embody the officer's qualities as a commander, educator and specialist; acquire the necessary theory and practice to organize the combat of the squad, platoon, company (battery), and acquire knowledge of the battalion (group). This also called for a fairer, more harmonious distribution of subjects per academic year, as well as a more precise and methodical planning. This knowledge would be given through the main subjects (Marxism-Leninism, general and special tactics, special and technical subjects according to the types of weapons), the auxiliary subjects (all other curricula subjects and subjects of general higher education such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, mechanics, etc. in accordance with the relevant specialty) and the teaching internship in the troops.

The study cycle would be organized in this way: the first year - the reduced individual preparation of the conscript and of the squad, the subjects of higher general education, fall-in line training, basic regulations, etc.; second year - platoon training, special subjects, etc.; third year - company (battery) preparation, general knowledge of the battalion (group), as well as special technical subjects. The academic year would be divided into 8.5 months of teaching-learning process, 1 month of productive labor (or operational work), 1 month of internship in the troops and 1.5 months of leave. This is how the triangle of learning - productive labor – internship in the troops was combined.

In the **Military Academy**, the construction of the education system, the terms, the content and the basis of the development of the teaching process were closely related to the United Officers' School. Studying at the Academy was supposed to be the continuation and expansion of knowledge[19] for receiving

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[19] AQFA, General Staff Fund, File no. 133, Year 1969 - Material no. 23 of the protocol, dated February 20, 1969 "Report of the work committee of the 'Mehmet Shehu' Military Academy on the issue of revolutionizing the school even further", page 8.

higher military education.

The idea was for the Military Academy to prepare unit (battalion, group) commanders and tactical unit staff officers, as well as chiefs of weapons and service types for these units. This required the Military Academy to prepare cadres with deep tactical knowledge and to acquire good knowledge of operational art. This was based on the army's need for capable cadres who solved problems independently, both in the battalion (group) and in the brigade headquarters, with the advantage that after a period of internship in the troops, they would lead the brigade. However, at the same time, the idea was raised that the Military Academy should not prepare battalion (group) commanders, but brigade ones and higher. This had to do with the fact that the United School had to prepare battalion commanders.

Regarding the duration of studies at the Academy (as the 3-year idea for the United School had been launched), it had to continue to be 2 years. This was because the level of cadres had raised and in the future it would continue to raise both in terms of the general level of education and the military one too. The two-year term of studies at the Military Academy meant that the officer who graduated from the Academy would later continue studies in higher courses to expand his knowledge mainly in the field of operational art.

The curricula for the academic years was: the first year - the battalion (group) level, the second year - the infantry brigade and artillery brigade level, and the operational one. There was also another more ambitious idea that the preparation of the battalion (group) be half a year, of the brigade (artillery brigade) be one year, and that of the corps half a year. The structure of the faculties was: the all-arms faculty, the ground artillery faculty, the anti-aircraft artillery faculty, the rear (logistics) faculty, the engineering faculty, the liaison faculty and the chemistry faculty. For the main common subjects it would be this division: the subject of Marxism-Leninism 15% to 17%, tactics and operational art 50% to 60% and the rest for special subjects.

These efforts would influence other changes in the program structure of military schools. Thus, after the 70s, military education switched to the three-year system and was called a higher military school, the trainees were called students, and the cycles were called departments. Now, students in the military schools were accepted only after having received a high school diploma. As a result, changes were reflected in the organizational structure of the schools, creating faculties where the departments were subordinate structures. Thus, in the United Higher School of Officers faculties were established on the basis of infantry, artillery, tanks and other specialties. Each had a number of departments in accordance with the subjects each covered.

3. The Military Scientific Association

In the late 1950s, the Military Scientific Association and the related bodies, its council and military scientific circles were established. All of these aimed at raising a higher level of technical-military knowledge from school officers, so that the society would also become an important factor and a necessary support for increasing the quality of combat training.[20] through a more organized work for the deep and systematic study of new issues that arose as a result of the introduction of new weapons and combat techniques.

The Military Scientific Association consisted of officers who showed a desire to actively work in this direction or, due to the nature of the work, had to participate in cycles where each specialty formed a circle of military scientific work. The tactical cycle circle was established, which included the instructors who conducted tactical training at the school, as well as other officers who wanted to be included, especially engineers, chemists, the fire training circle, the artillery circle, etc. All these circles formed the Military Scientific Association. A chairman and a secretary were appointed for each circle. The highest body of the Military Scientific Association of the school was the general meeting of the association. The council was elected for a term of two years with open votes. The council elected the chairman, vice chairman, secretary and the members, the number of which was determined by the meeting. The scientific military society had the task: to help officers in the study of military theory and technique, of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War, in the elaboration and generalization of the forms and methods of combat development according to today's conditions; to help find and develop new methods and introduce them to the training and education of school and military personnel; to develop creative and rationalizing work concerning the teaching resources, combat technique, weaponry, etc.

The Council of the Military Scientific Association dealt with the organization, planning and direct management of the work of the Association. It had the task to: work out the theme and work plan of the Association; to organize the departments and direct their work; to prepare and conduct the general meetings of the Association; to carry out the admission process of new members and help in the elaboration of proposals on various issues.

The activity of the Military Scientific Association also had the support of the School Command, which had its own influence. The command drafted the methodical and scientific military work plan, which aimed at raising the scientific level of combat training in the school and increasing the teaching

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[20] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 1, 1959 - Instructions on the organization of military scientific work at school. Military methodical and scientific work plan for the academic year 1959.

quality. Some of the measures taken to fulfill this plan were methodical training meetings, (artillery, fire, tactics, etc.) methodical conferences, joint methodical classes, part of which were the tactics, artillery, tanks and engineering departments, the exchange of experience between instructors from different departments and the commanders, demo classes, open classes, elaboration of military scientific topics, compilation of lectures and methodologies up to the drafting of reports and various articles. As can be seen from these measures, the engagement of all departments with the relevant instructors was comprehensive, where everyone brought the best experience, formatting a fairer conception of all the problems (issues) that were dealt with in the teaching-learning process.

Also, over the years, the military scientific research was focused on increasing the fund of military literature, compiling texts, brochures and teaching manuals for trainees and officers, finding the best forms and methods for training trainees, organizing studies, consultations etc., and in the furthering of the combat actions of the squad, platoon, company in defense[21]in mountainous terrain with a tunnel system.

Referring to the plan of military scientific research and individual tasks for 1964, a number of textbooks, lectures, methods, articles, etc. were published, which filled the vacuum of educational literature due to the change of programs.

Scientific research was becoming tradition, taking precedence over theoretical problems and the elaboration of scientific thought. The organization and development of scientific activities were directly related to the teaching-learning process and the tasks of the Armed Forces in the field of defense and security of the country. Thus, in September 1967, a scientific session was prepared and held on the topic: "The fight against the enemy's airborne assault". In addition to the main material, several statements were prepared in support of and analysis of this topic from other school departments. In the following years, experiments were carried out to determine the penetrating power of infantry weapons, and demonstration firings were organized and conducted with the new weapons that our army was equipped with.

In this context, the aim of the command of the United Officers School was to become a scientific center for the dissemination of teaching experience and a military-scientific center to process various topics, dispensaries, textbooks[22], to serve the school and the army.

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[21] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 1, year 1964 - Order no. 131 of the commandant of the school, dated March 3, 1964, on the military scientific work of the school for the year 1964. The plan of the military scientific work and individual tasks for the school year 1964.

[22] AQFA, Fund 474, File no. 6, Year 1984 - History of the United Officers' College, page 91.

4. Cooperation with military schools of friendly countries

In the framework of strengthening relations with sister schools of friendly countries, joint activities were often organized, which had a positive effect on the teaching-learning process, including both teachers and students. Thus in 1959 an agreement was made between the United Officers School and the Military School named after the hero of the Soviet Union "Captain O. Jarosh" of Czechoslovakia.

The purpose of this agreement was "... to strengthen even more the military friendship between the Czechoslovak and Albanian armies, to exchange experience between the two schools and to increase the results of the combat training of trainees...".[23] To achieve this, several types of competitions were organized between the two schools. The competitions started at the start of the 1959-1960 academic year and ended in June 1960. The special thing was that the al cadets of the infantry and tank specialties took part in the competition. The object of the competition was extensive, as it included a number of sections such as fall-in line training, physical training, fire training, sportsmanship and mass cultural activity. The incentive of this competition was that the winning platoon would spend a month at the sister school. This would serve to strengthen further ties and exchange experience.

It is worth noting that in this agreement all the conditions of the competitions and the evaluation methods (points) for each section were specified. In the fall in line training, they would be assessed according to the program, starting from the platoon alignment in a line formation, a wedge formation, the use of weapons and up to parades.[24] In the physical training, they would be assessed for different exercises such as pull ups on parallels, leapfrog and rope jump.[25] In shooting training, the assessment was based on shooting according to the prescribed exercises.[26] In shooting competitions between tank platoons, the platoons would be selected by lot and the assessment involved several stages, starting from putting the tank on standby, marching 20 km off the existing roads, to the respective shooting.[27] The assessment in the mass cultural work was done at the battalion level and not at the platoon level as in the other categories. In this field, the activities of the battalion ensembles would be assessed: in variety shows and in theaters, in ballet, in playing instruments,

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[23] AQFA, General Staff Fund, File no. 122, Year 1959 - Agreement on the announcement of socialist competitions between the Military School named after the hero of the BS "Captain O. Jarosh" of Czechoslovakia and the United Officers' School "E. Hoxha", page 2.

[24] Ibid., page 4.

[25] Ibid., page 5.

[26] Ibid., page 6.

[27] Ibid., page 9.

in the choir[28]etc. and as solos. In addition to these, the school staff would also participate in competition: in paintings, in obtaining the "Bookworm" award, in the number of performances inside and outside the school, etc. Content and quality would play a role in the assessment.

So, as it can be seen, these were not individual evaluations, which required a commitment and mobilization from each platoon, company, battalion and from each commander and teaching instructor, from each cycle and school command, in order to give the best values of the school and the army they represented. Necessarily, this would have absolutely positive values in increasing the effectiveness of the lesson, but also in raising the level of cultural and mass activities, as a necessary part of military cultural life.

Conclusions

The 50s - 70s of the last century constitute an important stage in the history of Albanian military education. This can be labeled as the "transition" phase, which would lead to the consolidation of the military school until obtaining the "status" of the higher education institution.

It marked a new step in the development of officers with a real military education, in the time span of two and three years, and, therefore, the military school obtains the status of semi-higher education.

This phase was characterized by the constant variability of the educational and organizational structure, the continuous creation of new departments and the extension of programs.

The mid-60s brought an innovation: the admission of high school graduates. This gave an impetus to the qualitative growth of the trainees, the reconceptualization of programs to respond to the relevant audience and the raising of the professional level of the faculty.

During this period, special attention was paid to building shooting ranges, labs as well as their occasional refresh and enrichment, the military-scientific research, the cooperation of the teaching corps with the commanding corps for the benefit of the learning process, the preparation of teaching materials, where all departments were engaged, as well as the continuous growth of their professional level.

Constant attention was paid to the cooperation between departments in order to unify methods, actions, terminology, ideas, vision, etc., through demo classes, methodical conferences, joint meetings or other educational activities.

The Albanian military school became a central and an ambitious institution

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[28] Ibid., page 16.

for quality physical preparation for cultural and mass sports activities.

With the opening of new military schools (Military Academy 1958, Naval Military School 1961, Military Aviation School 1962) the study cycle for all types of forces, weapons and services was completed. The opening of these schools was a necessity of the time and a need of the army, which clearly showed its growth and strengthening as well as completion with the up to date technology. These schools would serve to complete the education for all types of weapons and services with capable commanders and skilled specialists, responding to the policies of the Albanian state and the needs of the army.

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