

TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

MILITARY REVIEW

**Security and Defence Review
Training and Doctrine Command**

First Edition, January 2013

Tirana, January 2013

Editorial Board of Military Review Publication

Approved by the Order of the Minister of Defense No. 1721, dated 10/10/2012

Editorial Board Chairman

B.G. Bardhyl Hoxha

Members

Col. Ahmet Leka

Col. Dr. Agim Q. Sula

M.G. ® Prof. Dr. Ruzhdi Gjatoja

M.G. ® Prof. Dr. Kostaq Karoli

Col.® Prof. Dr. Pëllumb Danaj

Col. ® Thimi Hudhra

Editor in chief

Ajet Nuellari

Editor

Silvana Markgjonaj

English Translation

Jaup Zenuni

Endrit Kokona

Eva Reveli

Piro Tanku

Renalda Manushi

Ornela Shametaj

Art design

Teuta Mullisi

ISSH 2227-8133 (Print), ISSN 2227-8141 (Online)

Copyright © 2012 All rights reserved. The Centre for Doctrine (CD) of the Albanian Training and Doctrine Command.

The views and opinions expressed in this Military Review are of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policies or positions of the Ministry of Defence, General Staff and Training and Doctrine Command.

The authors of Military Review articles will not be subject to punishment for free expression of individual views and positions even if they are not in line with the official positions of the defence institution.

The authors are also responsible for any slander actions, distortions of facts, offense and plagiarism aspects to the creativity and thoughts of other authors.

This edition of Military Review is found on the website <http://www.tradoc.mil.al/> In case you can not get the information you need on the Internet, please apply for a copy at the electronic address: e-mail: revistaushtarake@aaf.mil.al or qd@aaf.mil.al

Training and Doctrine Command

Centre for Doctrine Publications Branch

Printed: January 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Introduction</i> _____	5
<i>Defence Directive 2013</i> _____ Mr. Arben Imami, Minister of Defence	7
<i>Challenges of the Armed Forces in 100 Years of the Albanian State</i> _____ Major General Xhemal Gjunksi, Chief of General Staff of the AF	16
<i>Albanian space protection, up to the Declaration of Independence</i> _____ Col. Dr. Agim Q. Sula, Commander of AFA	25
<i>Development of the Albanian military thought in 1912-2012</i> _____ Colonel Ahmet Leka, Head of Doctrine Centre, TRADOC	34
<i>The organization of the Albanian Regular Army in the years 1927-1939</i> _____ Prof. Dr. Proletar Hasani	44
<i>Albanian League of Prizren and its Armed Forces</i> _____ Dr. Bernard Zotaj, Director of Book and Information at TRADOC	53
<i>On the concept of the security and defence during the Cold War</i> _____ Major General ®. Prof. Dr. Kostaq Karoli, LtC. Msc. Edmond Doda, Deputy Director of AF Central Archive	60
<i>Prepare Today for what we will face Tomorrow An Albanian Perspective of Future Security Environment</i> _____ Col ® Thimi Hudhra, Deputy Director of National Centre for Security and Defence	69
<i>Military actions and levels of operations</i> _____ Brigadier General Bardhyl Hoxha, Commander of TRADOC	79

The difference between terrorism and state violence _____ 85
LtC. Enver Dugolli, Senior Course on Security and Defence Studies,
Albanian Armed Forces Academy

***Intelligence Services-Public Diplomacy Collaboration, Value added
contribution to National Security*** _____ 93
LtC. MSc. Vullnet Doka, Agency of Defense Intelligence

***Why do states intervene only in some humanitarian crises?
Case study: Libya and Syria*** _____ 102
LtC. Hasan Hoxha,
Senior Course on Security and Defence Studies,
Albanian Armed Forces Academy

Short Guidance for ‘Military Review’ Research Papers _____ 112

INTRODUCTION

Defence Directive 2013, addressed by Albanian Minister of Defence, Mr. Arben Imami, is the main paper in the front pages of the current Military Review. There are presented the priorities and the key tasks for the Armed Forces, during this year. Its motto is: 2013 will be a decisive year in achieving full NATO integration process and improvement on the planning process in all the Armed forces structures.

This year, the main priorities to the Armed Forces structures will be:

- Realizing the objectives of NATO Integration Plan;
- Recommendations detailed planning to Strategic Defence Review;
- Drafting of medium and long term plan of the Armed Forces development and objectives and skills implementation plan.

Permanent challenge will be: objectives achievement and standards maintaining of the North Atlantic Alliance member countries. In this context, a special attention is devoted to the process of standardization, compilation and publication of the Military Doctrine (DP-01), as well as to the further development of the system of “lessons learned”.

In the current edition, an important place is occupied by the articles of many authors on the 100th anniversary of the Independence of Albania, as a key historical act and important moment to the path of development and consolidation of the State and Armed Forces; a road full of challenges and significant sacrifices in the history of our country.

There is also reflected the military thought, the organization and the conceptual goals to the establishment and the development of the army, as well as the treatment and development of the doctrinal and strategic theories of the Armed Forces. They have been and remain important tasks to the overall and productive transformation of the military instrument, in the new Millennium, for the country security and defence issues and for the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

Through research and analyses of these phenomena, the authors have reached conclusions and outcomes to achieve and improve the goals, objectives and tasks, according to the actual requests and NATO standards.

Defence Directive 2013

Mr. Arben Imami,
Minister of Defence

The year 2012 marked a number of qualitative achievements for the Armed Forces in their entire activity and engagement. Important steps were made regarding the perfection of the planning process and AF integration into NATO. The basic document of Defence Strategic Review, which sets out medium and long term development path of AF was designed; in cooperation with NATO Command for Transformation, the 5th Conference of Integration into NATO was conducted, the main purpose of which was to certify the major achievements of AF; modernization process made headway with the introduction in the Air Force and Naval Force inventory, respectively, the two helicopters and two new vessels; an important element was the introduction of new uniforms with the best standards and quality of NATO armies, which transformed the aesthetic appearance of the AF; based on NATO assessment standards our engagement in NATO operations in Afghanistan had a new level by increasing more than two times the share of our contribution if compared to that of four years ago; we successfully followed the process of ammunition demolition and removal of excess materials thus creating the appropriate conditions for the conclusion of these processes in 2013; a series of important documents regarding a better management of personnel were designed and we prepared the perspective of implementing gender and equal chances policies, environmental policies, etc. Many of these achievements and projects should be consolidated and have further progress during 2013.

This directive is the foundation where the plans, working programs and activities of all structures of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces will rely on to fulfil the constitutional mission and obligations as a NATO member during 2013.

I. Priorities for the year 2013

The motto of this directive is: **Year 2013 - a decisive year to carry out the process of full integration into NATO and the improvement of the planning process in AF structures.**

In this context, the main priorities for 2013 are:

1. Achievement of the Objectives of NATO Integration Plan;
2. A detailed planning of the recommendations of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the drafting of the medium term and long term Development Plan of the

Armed Forces and Capability Targets (CT) implementation plan.

Achievement of the Objectives of NATO Integration Plan: The period after membership and especially the year 2012 has served to create enough experience about the full integration into NATO. Based on this experience, the year 2013 should be a decisive year for the full implementation of the Objectives of NATO Integration Plan. Special attention should be paid to the concrete implementation of the measures anticipated in the Integration Plan with NATO Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) and the Joint Force Command in Naples (JFC-N). The 6th Integration Conference should successfully crown the 4 years process of integration of the Armed Forces into NATO.

Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and the drafting of medium term and long term Plan of the Development of the Armed Forces and a detailed planning of the Achievement of Capability Goals:

SDR clearly defines what the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania will be and what is the track of their further development. MoD/GS and all leading structures of AF should focus their attention on breaking down the objectives and planning how to implement SDR. At the same time, in accordance with these objectives, they should design a medium term and long term Development Plan of the Armed Forces. Harmonization of medium term budgetary programs with the conclusions of the Strategic Defence Review, CT Implementation Plans, medium term and long term Development Plans and Force Operational Status Plan remain a major challenge of 2013 for all directors, the strategic and operational level planners of AF structures.

The plan for the implementation of SDR recommendations about the structure and personnel is to be designed within May 2013. Implementation will take place on 1st October 2013.

The new package of objectives, the “Blue Book”, defines the main obligations of the Republic of Albania as a NATO member. This package includes the major obligations for AAF as Battalion Group, Special Forces Task Group (SFTG), Role 2 Medical Team, etc., which will require the establishment of special working groups that analyze, study and break down into concrete and realistic plans the implementation of these objectives, in compliance with NATO requirements and standards.

II. Implementation of the objectives of the year 2013

Objectives that guide the implementation of this year’s priorities should be broken down into all areas of the main activities of the Armed Forces and the way they are going to be achieved should be clearly planned. This Directive is a guideline in planning and evaluation of activities of 2013 and a concrete product that emerges from should be “AF Main Activities Plan for 2013”, which should be a product of interaction and targets set by every subsequent AF structure.

Strategic Defence Review: The General Staff of the Armed Forces should coordinate the work and engage the best military experts for a detailed breakdown of the needs for the concrete development of operational capacities and deadlines for their implementation.

Military Strategy (MS) will be based on SDR Document conclusions and NATO's Strategic Concept. MS draft will be completed by March 2013.

Medium term and long term Development Plan of the Armed Forces will be designed taking SDR into account, the obligations deriving from "Capacity Package" (CT), and a more realistic assessment of financial resources. Its preparation process is guided by the highest level of the General Staff. Medium term Plan document and that of the long term Development Plan of the Armed Forces must be prepared within 6 months of the year 2013 and cover the period until 2018 for the medium term Plan and until 2023 for the long term Plan.

The Package of Capacity Targets (CT) will be conceived as an integral part of the medium term and long term Plan of Development of the Armed Forces, as well as other supporting plans. GS should break down each of the capacity objectives into programming documents with detailed measures to be taken for their implementation along with cost and deadlines by the end of August 2013.

The Package of Leading Policies of AAF activity, will include the policy for the creation of operational capacity, focusing on personnel, education training, defence planning, AF support services policies etc. Their topics must be submitted for approval to the Minister immediately after the completion of the Strategic Defence Review along with preliminary drafts for each of them.

Improvement and modernization of the planning process for all structures of FA

During 2013, the directorates in MoD/GS and all the structures of the Armed Forces will be focused on modernization and improvement of the planning process, acquisition and wide use of modern computing methods in planning and designing of detailed, controllable and enforceable plans. Harmonization and breaking down of all strategic documents requirements into action plans of operational and tactical levels by setting targets and timelines will become a common method for planners of all structures of the Armed Forces. AF's educational institutions will include more topics and projects related to understanding and breaking down of the modern planning process in their programs.

Standardization: The year 2012 was a year of consolidation and significant extension of the standardization process, making possible the ratification of 62 STANAG-s. 2013 should mark a further expansion of the process and work to focus not only on ratification, but especially in the implementation plans and practical use of STANAG-s in AF structures. General Staff to report in May on the implementation of STANAG-s adopted. Selection of STANAG/AP-s to rely on priorities, CT package and AF development plans.

Finalization of Legal Reform in AF: Within 2013 we should finalize the legal reform with a focus on five main laws that regulate the activity of the AAF, such as: "On the ranks and military career in the AAF", "On military discipline in AAF", "On medals for AAF personnel", "On the status of the military men in AAF" and the law "On the powers and authorities of strategic leadership and command of the AAF."

Personnel Reform: During 2013 we should improve and complete policies, procedures, plans and programs for the integrated management of personnel lifecycle

components according to the requirements and deadlines fixed in Human Resources Management Strategy 2011-2015.

Following the documents compiled during the year 2012 we should design three new documents which describe the policies for selecting and sending the personnel on overseas operations, for education, training and qualification of the personnel inside the country, for the physical and medical assessment of the personnel and a guide for the control of annual evaluation process for military personnel.

Job descriptions of all military personnel serving in the Armed Forces should be reviewed with the aim of introducing and widely applying standard procedures and the inclusion of NATO standards.

Computerization of accurate data is the basis for the provision of equal opportunities for advancement in rank and career and for training and education of the Armed Forces personnel. The database of the Armed Forces personnel will be improved and enriched with information during 2013. The automation system of the testing process of candidates for professional soldiers will be finalized, the files of the active and reserve personnel will be screened in order to increase computer access and efficiency of their use, and the supplementation of data of the citizens who have performed the compulsory military service over the years will be finalized.

Procedures for calculation of pensions for all retired and reserve military personnel will be finalized at the end of the first half of 2013 and all active and reserve military personnel will be provided with the military man identity card.

The program for psychological support and rehabilitation of military participants in international missions, as well as the differentiated psycho social support to their families will be implemented during 2013.

A comprehensive study of marketing based on the needs and requirements of a professional military force will be conducted within the first 6 months in order to promote and improve the motivation of young people to become part of the armed forces.

A study and long term plan for social support of military men with a focus on qualification of their spouses for labour market in collaboration with NGOs and the Ministry of Labour with the main goal of strengthening the sustainability of the family will be conducted within the first 6 months.

A study will be conducted and a concrete plan for the creation of support units for the children of military personnel (kindergarten and crèches) in TRADOC will be designed within the first six months.

The implementation of the project for the construction of military residence in Kuçova will start within this year. GS and the Directorates of Personnel Management will follow the implementation of gender equality and equal chances policies which must be always considered as a priority.

Defence Resources Management

Human Resources: The main objective is the completion of Defence structures with a real professional staff, able to accomplish the mission, in accordance with the

conclusions of the SDR. We should work for an integrated structuring of MoD staff with the objective of downsizing or reduction of certain structures that have completed their mission like Procurement Directorate and IT Directorate and empowering and filling the Directorate of Defence Policies with the certain capacities as a step towards full reform of the integrated staff in medium term.

Enhancing the quality of education of the officers, NCOs and professional soldiers are issues must be taken into account during 2013.

This year will be focused on the qualitative development of NCO corps, making them and the officer corps conscious of the challenges ahead, of the duties and responsibilities that NCOs have in carrying out the mission and the increasing of professionalism of the Armed Forces. All force commands, supporting commands and units of the Armed Forces will be involved in this process. Starting from 2013 we will make it a tradition to select the 10 best NCOs from force commands, supporting commands and other units of the Armed Forces and based on this, we will select the best NCO of the Year.

Material Resources: Establishment and consolidation of the Codification System and E-Logistics will serve for the unification of procedures and codes of materials management, according to the NATO system. This system should become fully operational during 2013.

Programming of defence resources: 2014-2019 Defence Programs aim at medium term development programming of AF, modernizing and transforming them into a force with operational capacities capable to accomplish their constitutional missions and will fulfil the obligations as a NATO member. Synchronization and further harmonization of the programming phase within the structures of the MoD/GS with the National Integrated System by anticipating the need of financial support for the objectives of the SDR, CT, medium term and long term Development Plans of the Armed Forces will be carried out during the period of January July 2013. Defence Resources programming will take into account the statements of the Armed Forces to participate in projects under the Alliance's concept of "Smart Defence".

Budget implementation: Year 2013 is the year of the implementation of strict financial discipline based on the priorities of the Armed Forces and strengthening of control over budget execution with a focus on efficiency in the use of funds. "Alpha" accounting software will be implemented and the finalization of the process of accounting computerization in all structures of AF to be achieved within the first 6 months. Complete review of the staff responsible for finance, on the basis of tests conducted during 2012 will be finished within the first three months.

Engagement in NATO, EU and UN led operations

AF engagement in the NATO-led ISAF operation will proceed in accordance with the approved engagement levels for the period 2013-2014 as well as with Alliance's policy scenarios for Transition in Afghanistan, and seeks to increase the quality of representation with training personnel and participation with staff officers in Regional Commands under which our country has deployed troops. GS will take all the necessary measures to plan, prepare and support in a qualitative way the MAT

contingents of mentoring teams, “Eagle” Special Forces and our representatives in the NTM-A, PAT and staffs of Regional Commands in Afghanistan. Alongside with the measures for the continuation of our personnel participation in KFOR and EUFOR operations, GS will start its preparatory work for future engagements of the Armed Forces in UN-led operations.

Security and Intelligence: In the field of security, a special attention will be given to the security of information classified as NATO and “State Secret”, the establishment of new elements of Cyber Defence and the increase of physical safety standards, through putting the systems and integrated electronic security equipments in AF structures in full efficiency. In the field of intelligence the focus of attention will be on informing decision making authorities for current problems and prospects of military operations at home and abroad. A concrete objective is intelligence capacity development at tactical level in line with the needs and capacities of the Armed Forces.

Military Education: The major task for all levels of the education system in the AF is its further consolidation and connection with the happenings of AF and contemporary standards aiming at the education of personnel with the necessary skills to fulfil the mission of the Armed Forces. A working group, which will conduct a full-fact-finding research of concerns related to the education system in AF, teaching, personnel quality, standards and content of curricula should be set up by the end of April. In conclusion, the group will present concrete proposals for a radical improvement of the educational system in AF.

A concrete plan for the opening of the School of Cadets will be designed within the first six-months and appropriate measures will be taken to open it at the beginning of the academic year 2013-14.

Compilation and publication of the Military Doctrine of the Armed Forces (DP-01) and the further development of the system of “lessons learned” are specific tasks for 2013.

Training: During 2013, in the exercise we will be implemented an objective system of measuring results and progress in the training of forces, units and subunits. This system must be simple, understandable, applicable and in compliance with NATO standards. Empowering the role of the NCO as a leader will constitute one of the main goals of training activity. In regard to subunits declared in NATO as “Pool of Forces” the process of evaluation and certification according to NATO standards should continue. Special attention will be paid to the programming, training and certification of forces stated in NATO grouping forces.

A joint exercise with the Ministry of Interior, the State Police and other security structures for EOD will be planned and conducted within April.

Research and Development: Completion of National Centre for Security and Defence with qualified personnel will continue and within the first three months its research plans will be designed. During 2013 its research work will focus on supporting MoD with advanced expertise for fundamental issues of full integration into NATO, reforms in security and defence of the country that derive from SSK, the MS, the Strategic Defence Review and implementation of the package of Capacity Targets.

The electronic library of research documents will be set up in MoD and put into operation in April. Computerization plan of AF archives will be finalized within this year.

Logistical support: The focus of the work of logistics structures of the Armed Forces will be the functioning and integrated logistics planning based on life cycle logistics support and advanced standards of NATO, as well as on the extensive use of information technology in logistics.

Rigorous enforcement of laws and regulations for procurement of funds allocated for the purchase of goods, services and investments for 2013; continuing with the project of completion of the Armed Forces with new uniforms; construction and improvement of existing infrastructure; completion of the master plans for the main garrisons in accordance with the distribution plan; finalization of plans for transport support of AF structures; implementation of norms and standards in the field of environmental protection constitute the main directions of activity of logistical support.

The master plan for Kuçova airbase will be completed in the first 6 months and the procedures for its implementation will be followed.

Medical Support: The main duties include planning for the full implementation of CT-related medical operational capabilities, computerization of individual health data, training of medical personnel, strengthening of periodic health checks to all Armed Forces personnel, vaccination and early planning for the support of the structures with medications.

Support and coping with civil emergencies: Training in “task force” formations in accordance with the experience of operations conducted in the field, use of computer simulation training, keeping military assets in alert, planning to support their operation, as well as coordination with other relevant national civil emergency structures require a special attention.

Dismantle of excessive ammunition: Year 2013 is the final year for the disposal of the entire quantity of ammunition in fulfilling the objective of the Government of RoA. Dismantle of all other calibre ammunition except 7.62 mm cartridges, which will require a special plan, to be achieved within the first half of the year 2013. Demolitions by industrial dismantle of the entire remaining amount of ammunition by increasing the capacity of industrial dismantle workshops and making them more effective to be scheduled during this year. Dismantle process will be completed by June 2013. Special attention to be paid to the security measures, environmental protection and the avoidance of accidents or exceptional events. Ten storage groups should be reduced by the end of 2013, six of which within the first 6 months. Only 4 storage groups should remain for the end of the year in order to meet the needs of the Armed Forces.

Evading surplus materials: While 2012 was a year of evading the majority of redundant materials, devices and systems, July 2013 will mark the completion of this process. The process of destruction of small weapons which are disposed of should start within May, and the process will be concluded within 2013.

Surplus properties that are out of the Settlement Plan and deployment of AF will be transferred from MoD management responsibility in cooperation with relevant

institutions of priority for; restitution and compensation of owners; their capital transfer under the central and local public institutions responsibility should be conducted; they must be transferred to METE for sale through relevant legal procedures. The type of file with the documents every property should have, must be compiled within the first 3 months. All files of surplus properties under the administration of MoD will be completed during 2013.

Environmental Protection: The now started work for the implementation of tasks defined in the Document of Environmental Policies of MoD, laws and regulations, NATO and EU standards in all activities of MoD structures, inside and out of the country will continue during 2013. The integrated management of urban waste, the systemization and treatment of sewage in Jala, Pashaliman, Durrës, Ground Force and Support Regiment, in accordance with the projects prepared by ISPD, will be carried out during the first half of 2013. Logistic Brigade (LBr) to rehabilitate the dismantle ranges environment within 2013; the entire amount of oil and tires, fallen out of use will be accumulated in LBr and be further treated in accordance with the applicable guidelines within February 2013. Military factories will take measures to obtain the environmental license, reduction of gases emitted in the atmosphere and conservation of ashes within April.

Modernization of the Armed Forces: The focus of work will be proceeding with those projects which are under way. Expectations of budgetary support will be considered in planning new projects of modernization. Design of projects must continue to be oriented towards fully integrated solutions and extended in several budget years in order to create balanced relations in the modernization of units and services.

In The Ground Forces, investments must intend to finalize the launched projects for modernization of the Special Forces battalion, the logistical support project, deployment and efficient use of other investments made in years. Mid term modernization plan for Ground Force with light weaponry, Special Forces Battalion and motorized battalion as priority will be designed within May 2013.

In the Navy: Intended outcome will be the finalization of the project for the construction of navy patrolling vessels and the design of a plan for maintaining Pashaliman shipyard fully efficient in the future.

In the Air Force: Making *Cougar* helicopters operational, the increase of technical readiness standards for helicopters in general and the operational capability of flying crews for the use of helicopters will be achieved. Meeting the full operational requirements of NATINADS will be finalized within this year. Procedures for ACCS system must continue.

Commands will design support programs for the investment made and the implementation of a new maintenance concept by transforming this investment into an operational indicator. New investments will be guided by analysis and management of their life-cycle and be in harmony with development trends of NATO forces.

Automation: The focus of work will be completed the implementation of the concept on the integrated automation of all structures of the Armed Forces, distribution and

extensive use of the constructed modules. Attention will be concentrated on the design of plans for identification, training and qualification of the staff that uses the constructed modules and plans for vitalizing computer infrastructure necessary for the operation of systems. Logistics areas during 2013 continue to be a priority in the process of resources automation by acquiring current logistical computer programs used nowadays by NATO as well.

Military cooperation with NATO countries and the region: The extension of the map of cooperation based on the principle of “cost sharing” and for the benefit of the growth and consolidation of our capacities and AF development; cooperation in order to achieve the Capacity Targets (CT), participation in NATO, EU or UN led operations, and facing civil emergencies, constitute the main goals in the field of military cooperation with NATO countries and the region. Map of bilateral cooperation in specific areas which was extended during 2012 will keep extending.

The detailed plan for filling the positions allocated for the Armed Forces in NATO commands will be designed during 2013. Particular attention must be paid to the development of defense diplomacy and cooperation within SEEDM and A-5, as very viable initiatives.

Cooperation with Kosovo Security Force, in addition to the field of education and civil emergencies, will be extended in the areas like troops and staffs training, simulation training, logistical support and health services, procurement, etc. Working groups from MoD and GS will work to make cooperation concrete and design detailed action plans in the first quarter of 2013.

Accountability, Monitoring and Reporting: Directorates in MoD, GS, Force Commands, Brigade Commands and Autonomous Unit Commands will issue guidelines and design concrete plans for their activities and subordinate structures for the implementation of this Directive. The relation among priorities, objectives, planning and results of work of each structure will constitute the basis of its finalization.

General Staff and Directorates in MoD will report quarterly on the progress of the applicability of this Directive. Reporting deadlines are the third weeks of April, July, October 2013 and January 2014.

The General Directorate for Defence Policies is responsible to monitor the entire work for the implementation of this Directive and the preparation of summarizing reports on the progress of its execution to Defence Minister. Requirements of this Directive will be applicable immediately. This directive will be published online as an unclassified document in MoD internet address: www.mod.gov.al

Members of the Armed Forces,

Your work to transform the priorities and objectives of Defence Directive for 2013 in plans and concrete outcomes of work of every structure constitutes the basis for its successful finalization.

Even in the future our permanent challenge will continue to be the achievement and maintenance of the standards of a country member of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Challenges of the Armed Forces in 100 years of the Albanian State

Major General Xhemal Gjunksi,
Chief of General Staff of the AF

Short commentary. *The 100th Anniversary of the Independence of Albania is not only a decisive historical act, but also a very important moment of reflection for the road to its development and consolidation. As one of the main pillars of this state, the Albanian Armed Forces have had their dynamics of birth, consolidation and development. This is a 100 years progress with its culminations and decisive challenges.*

Historical conditions in which the Armed Forces were created, organized and conducted their activity over 100 years coincide with the greatest challenges of the existence, development and progress of the Albanian nation and state in the bosom of civilized nations. Commitment to these challenges has rightly given the AF right an honoured place in the glorious history of the nation and state. I feel proud to say that regardless of the traits of political developments, in the course of these 100 years of the Albanian state, the Armed Forces have been committed to do the best for the nation and homeland, to the most sublime sacrifices.

100 years is a long chronology which cannot be included in the contours of this paper and this honoured conference. However, the establishment of the Armed Forces will be remembered forever as the starting point of this glorious history that will be enriched in the years to come. Our Armed Forces are currently listed on the side of world's most powerful Alliance by conducting missions in the interest of the country's defence and peace and security in the world.

Our contingents are nowadays found in geographical boundaries which were unthinkable at the beginning of the Armed Forces engagements. The standards of their activity are qualitative and comparable to those of our partners. Thus, they are increasing their reputation and honouring the name of the Albanian state.

A brief historical overview

Alongside and in support of the first Albanian independent state, during these 100 years, we find a very diverse history of the Albanian Armed Forces lined by numerous challenges. Certainly, these have also been historical challenges for the Albanian state itself.

Armed forces in the years 1912-1939

The initial challenge was probably the birth and consolidation of the first Albanian state due to the necessity of territorial defence organization, the country's independence, but also the preservation of key state institutions and governance, achieved through a lot of sacrifice and pain. At the time of the declaration of Independence of Albania and the creation of the first modern Albanian state, Vlorë Provisional Government, that emerged from the meeting of the National Assembly on 4th December, 1912, started to format and organize Defence institutions and the Armed Forces. These armed forces would be responsible for the safety and security of the country and for the fragile and chaotic order in the space of this newborn state. Furthermore, this was an undertaking that had to be fulfilled in very bad and extraordinary conditions. The newborn and independent Albanian state had to be established and represented while being developed.

The First Balkan War quickly turned into an alliance, where the countries of the region aimed at forcing the Turkish army leave the Balkan spaces "...More than that, at the same time their goal was to capture, hold and possess Albanian territories to expand further..."¹ Under these conditions, the government of Vlorë and the first defence institutions such as the Ministry of War and Major Staff, within the time limits allowing them, began the challenge to give life to their project to organize military forces, perhaps differently from the case of a country in normal conditions.

Many historians and analysts agree that the management, co-operation and command of the Albanian Armed Forces, in the area where Vlorë Government extended its activity and its power was recognized, was the first step and perhaps the most possible one, which would create the opportunity for growth and strengthening of the state and the Armed Forces themselves. Edward Erickson in the book "Defeat in Detail" states that "...This step was followed by the organization and management of the reserve forces which were under the Albanian non-commissioned officers and soldiers, by then part of the Turkish military forces organization in Albania..."² The third and probably the most difficult step which also appeared in the form of a great challenge, was the commitment to the establishment and organization of Active Forces, which initially almost did not exist and consisted only of a few dozen officers and non-commissioned officers, who had offered their professional and patriotic service to the modest Military Forces (AF) of Vlorë Government.

This very difficult and delicate process, but equally vital for the future of the state, the country and the Albanian government of the time, had to be fulfilled alongside with the organization of the Ministry of Defence (War) and Major Staff Offices.³ And further on, as reflected in the monograph entitled "First Balkan War and Albania," ...this process was taking place, while it had to be properly managed and combined with actions to protect the territory from neighbouring chauvinist attacks, and safeguard and maintain law and order in the country.⁴

¹ Historia e Shqipërisë. Krijimi i Shtetit Shqiptar, p. 112.

² Eduard J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913*, p. 293.

³ Lufta e Parë Ballkanike dhe Shqipëria, Tiranë 2007, p. 173.

⁴ Dr. Romeo Gurakuqi, *Historia e Shkodrës në 1913, vendosja e kontrollit ndërkombëtar në Shkodër, maj 1913-dhjetor 1913* (according to the documents of Public Record Office).

The efforts made by the government of the time in the field of international diplomacy were an additional element to this very delicate process. Top military leaders were involved in the process of ensuring understanding agreements with neighbouring countries and solving the problems related to organization, equipment and armament of the armed forces. It's worth mentioning here the report that the Austrian consul sent to Vienna, where he states "... Such negotiations and agreements were concluded with Austria-Hungary and Italy for arms, ammunition, clothing (uniforms) and the military regulations necessary for the establishment, organization and combat training of the Armed Forces...." ⁵

Following the consolidation, the Armed Forces faced with the challenges of a long-term vision conception line as it happened after the Congress of Lushnja. Stated more clearly, this process belongs to the period of the consolidation of the Albanian state, throughout the twenties of the last century. First of all, this challenge required redesigning of the strategy and a new vision for the defense of the country. This, however, did not break away from a new situation requiring the establishment and organization of the Armed Forces. As described in the History of Albanian People, ...Certainly, along with new geopolitical and geostrategic but also economic and military circumstances of the tiny Albania, with around 800 thousand inhabitants..., were parallel to and with the great desire for freedom, independence and progress..." ⁶

In these circumstances, according to the concept of the Government that emerged from Lushnja Congress, without any doubt, a major and pressing place took the decision to protect the country, which in addition to the organization of police forces (Gendarmerie) was synchronized with a common action in order to identify and unify the Albanian armed forces not only the existing ones, but also those inherited from previous years scattered throughout the country. These forces together with their officers and NCOs would become a good basis for the future Albanian military organization.

At the beginning to command these military forces the General Command of Armed Powers⁷ under the auspices of the Council of State was established. This Command acted in accordance with the Organic Statute of the country.⁸ Given that this was a fictitious command, it became necessary to re-establish the Ministry of War, which, together with its component elements would initiate the creation of the Albanian Army. Ministry of War, which came after long discussions in the National Council, was a new challenge for the Albanian state and government in first half of twenties.

Exactly at this period of time, the Albanian Armed Forces and exactly the Albanian Army, through many efforts and challenges laid the foundations of a purely military organization, and designed the front lines of a contemporaneous military profile. The laws for the organization and conduct of military service in the plains, and later in the mountainous areas of the country were drafted and adopted during these years.

⁵ Report of the Austrian Consul in Vlora, March 1913.

⁶ Historia e Popullit Shqiptar, Vol. 3, p.40"

⁷ Shqipëria më 1937, Tirana. "Kristo Frashëri" Printing House , 1938, p. 91.

⁸ Ibid, p. 146.

In the meantime the regulations that organized the life, military activity and the electoral report of the military men during elections, penal code and the laws that depoliticized the army were published.

From the organizational point of view, thanks to prominent Ministers of War who were well known for their reformist spirit as Brigadier General Ali Riza Kolonja and Colonel Said Selabaudin Said Shkoza, gained the nature and trend of a regular army not only in form but also in content.⁹ In addition to organizational improvements, supply and training, alongside with the tasks for the protection of the country as in Koplik and Dibër in 1920, the army except had to face and assist in maintaining order in the country. It is precisely in these years that events such as those Mirdita 1921, movements of 1922, 1923 and especially in 1924, constituted a real challenge for the country and the role of the military.

Years 1925-1928 and 1929-1939 posed new challenges ahead, one of which was the legal regulation of the organization and leadership-command of Armed Powers and not allowing the military men being involved in politics. This measure led to the removal of the Ministry of War and restoration of General Command of the Albanian Armed Powers. The arrangement of their leadership by the Commander-in-Chief who was previously the President and then the King was achieved in accordance with the state stages of those years. In addition, along with the military organization particular importance was given to empowering the Military School and the qualification of the Albanian officers in the military schools and academies of Italy, Austria, France and Greece.¹⁰

During these years the military organization took a new trend and direction toward a regular army, which toppled down the previous system, costly for a small country like Albania and with limited financial and economic reserves. It was exactly in these years that firstly the Law on "Arranging the National Army" was passed in 1929 which for the first time divided into three types of forces, the Army, Navy and Air Force, ground forces being dominant. This law was followed by those of 1934 and 1937, which enabled the further regulation of the Armed Forces, the creation and coordination of certain types of units and services, such as armored vehicles, military hospital and health services, royal guard of the border etc. The military logistics and armament were renovated and the equipments and training of military men were improved. Due to this, the Armed Forces budget was increased significantly, reaching its peak in the years 1932-1933, when it exceeded 50% of the state budget. On the eve of fascist aggression, Albanian army amounted to about 10 000 soldiers in total, which was a considerable number for a country with a small population like Albania.¹¹

Armed forces in the period 1945-1990

End of World War II and the liberation of the country from foreign invasion brought various new challenges for the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole. The post war military underwent the conversion process into classical regular army in

⁹ Historia e Shtabit të Përgjithshëm www.mod.gov.al

¹⁰ Arsimimi i ushtarakëve shqiptarë.

¹¹ Historia e Shqipërisë, Tirana, 2002, p. 187.

peacetime. The number of military forces was reduced significantly. They began to be reformed, military ranks were introduced and now the mission of the Army was the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

But, after 1966, with the abolition of ranks, the role of the single Party in the Army and all the FA was reintroduced, greatly increasing the ideological dosage in the formations of active army. This phenomenon constituted a great challenge for them, because the role and political line State Party should be introduced in every aspect of life and the military activity of the Armed Forces. The breach with Warsaw Treaty and further with other allies, made Albania self-isolated and like in all other spheres of life the safety and security of the country based on the principle of self-reliance.

Self-isolation and fear of foreign aggression prompted the state of that period to increase the number of military forces, technique, military weapons and the level of fortification at an unprecedented way¹². Consequently, this increase brought a very high cost for defence and the Armed Forces and further exacerbating the budget for Albania's fragile economy. All these aspects increased the challenges for the military men, the Armed Forces and the country, which should provide by all means the implementation of policies for protection of the country under extremely high pressure and stress.

Armed Forces after 90-ies

The decline of one-party system and democratic transformations of the nineties of the twentieth century in Albania naturally influenced the military and other components of the Armed Forces and opened to the new Albanian democratic state a new era, full of challenges, moreover for the Armed Forces. These challenges were part and parcel of the new contemporary concept for the Armed Forces, which required reformation of their vision and mission and, of course, of their organization, the size of numbers, symbols, military education, technique and weapons and above all their laws and regulations.

The implementation of this strategy and new vision consequently put into the agenda the departing of the Army from the parties and removal of the communist symbols; significantly cutting the number of manpower, military units and weaponry technique and concentration of forces in garrisons in the country, as well as a review of the doctrine and military strategy for the organization, operation and use of AF in Albania. During these years of dramatic changes, a special course of action and particular importance was given to the orientation for the membership of AF to the Euro-Atlantic structures in order that step-by-step they could be part of the system of European collective defence.¹³

In this context, Albania's membership in this organization has been one of its historical achievements and a product of the ongoing efforts to integrate into this organization, which began with PfP membership, in 1994. Full participation in an alliance so significant, historically successful and sustainable, members of which are from the most developed countries in the continent and beyond, in addition to benefits, brought a number of challenges for Albania.¹⁴

¹² Historia e Shqipërisë, Shqipëria në vitet 1945-1990, p. 265.

¹³ http://www.mod.gov.al/Historiku_i_marrëdhënieve_NATO-Shqipëri.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Commitment of AF during the period of being a NATO partner and later as a member has been multi-dimensional. Among the main requirements and needs have been the development of the Defence Strategic Review Processes and the development of key strategic documents such as the National Security Strategy, Military Strategy and Long-Term Development Plan of the Armed Forces. However, the evolution and development in the context of geopolitics and economic situation require the development of these processes and updating the strategic documents of the Armed Forces. For this purpose, the Armed Forces are in the process of the Defence Strategic Review, which are an important enterprise and the result of cooperation with Western strategic allies. Its main goal is to complete not only the full integration in Euro-Atlantic structures but also to meet the national priorities.

Management of the personnel gained a new dimension, where human resources are regarded as the most valuable asset of the Armed Forces. Such a thing is stated in the new Strategy for personnel Management in the Armed Forces.¹⁵ In this context, automation of personnel data has been an achievement, which directly serves the promotion of the most qualified people and appointing the right person in the right place. Armed forces are consolidated as an organism where every military man's career is based on a promotion system which works according to a special organic law and other legal acts which create opportunities for a fair assessment and equal chances to all military personnel.

For the first time since their creation the Armed Forces were engaged in peace support combat operations led by major organizations for security at global level as the UN, NATO, EU, etc.

This engagement continues to be successfully fulfilled and with high professionalism. All our allies have constantly highly appreciated this commitment and professionalism. From a country that needed support for its security, Albania is directly contributing to security of the others, in the regions of the hottest conflicts in the world. Albanian military people in such missions have been able not only to gain appreciation as "our ambassadors of peace in the world", but also to maintain this appreciation over time creating and enriching a great tradition. Among the operations where the Albanian military personnel serve are ISAF operation in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo and ALTHEA-s in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to quantitative contributions AF gives a qualitative contribution by special forces and in training Afghan Armed Forces and Afghan Police by OMLT and POMLT missions, medical teams, etc., which comprises a new dimension of Albania's participation in international operations.

AF standardization process also represents a challenge and is an indicator of success for the development of transformation and achievement of interoperability with NATO, which requires ratification of the STANAG and publication of Alliance's documents, among them the fundamental doctrines. Parallel to these processes modernization of the Armed Forces is required. Within this framework, Navy has just produced the second ship and is working on the third one. AAF has already taken the first helicopter EUROCOPTER-COUGAR, which will be followed by other helicopters.¹⁶ An

¹⁵ Doktrina e Arsimit dhe Stërvitjes. Tirana, 2009, p. 13.

¹⁶ Strategjia e modernizimit të FA.

important part of the mission of the Armed Forces is its continuous involvement in support of the civilian population, especially in emergencies caused mainly by natural disasters. They have always been close to people and local government authorities to help the civilian population in coping with the consequences of floods, fires and facing harsh conditions of winter. The conduct of operations to cope with the most severe emergencies in recent years is also a meaningful evidence of further deepening of the excellent cooperation of our Armed Forces with the local and central government organs and the community at large.¹⁷

A milestone achievement for AF constitutes the completion of the disposal of the definite quantity of ammunition by explosions in open ranges, a process which was completed in June of this year. I want to highlight that now, the process of dismantling of the remaining amount will be carried out in facilities of ammunition demolition and the AF commitment to meet the objective of completing the process of elimination of redundant and obsolete ammunition inherited from the previous regime, by the end of 2013, is total and at maximum.

Armed forces face new challenges

The 100th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence is an extraordinary event that carries great emotions and requires full commitment of all institutions in the country including the FA. Among the main challenges of the Armed Forces for the successful accomplishment of all the tasks contained in the mission alongside with the defence of the country and the successful accomplishment of missions abroad will also be its engagement in civil emergencies. In the meantime, full integration of the Armed Forces in NATO is also one of the main challenges in mid term and long term activity. This process will continue to be materialized through reforms and modernization.

The Armed Forces already follow the commitment to address new security challenges that continue to evolve. While conventional aggressions to alliance are almost impossible, actually many of the challenges NATO is facing are non-conventional and poles apart from the goal of the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty, in 1949.¹⁸ Our country as part of NATO for years has been involved in a systematic and continuous transformation to be secure and design the policies, capacities and structures that are required to deal with current and future challenges, certainly including the collective defence of its members. As the Alliance forces, the Armed Forces are engaged in operations and missions in several continents and like the Alliance Armed Forces our Armed Forces intend to maintain the modern, to be deployable and reliable, i.e. interoperable.

In this regard, defence planning requires a more systematic approach and has a medium term and long term perspective, which includes: the identification of requirements; development and distribution of capacities; review of civil and military structures and personnel issues; procurement of equipments and; development of new technologies. In Chicago Summit the package of critical capacities was introduced.

¹⁷ Address at "Biza-12" Exercise, September 2012.

¹⁸ NATO New Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2012, p. 4.

This package was developed to help the Alliance have the capacities for current operations, to face the ongoing challenges and have independent key capabilities. This package is based on the existing plans and programs as well as on real resources required. So it guarantees and mandates the Alliance to provide them prior to other capacities.

Today, NATO's new missions and its engagements in operations have shown a shift in their conduct from a single site in coalitions composed of multinational formations cooperating together. This reality requires that achieving interoperability is no longer a thing, that would be good to achieve, but a fundamental element of NATO operations, which is otherwise known as the multiplication of force. This fact proves that increased interoperability improves the effectiveness of NATO operations and saves lives and resources.

Instead of conclusion

Viewing things from the retrospect of this 100th anniversary of independence we estimate that the road made by the Armed Forces is not a straight line, but with ups downs and in some situations with incoherence. The activity and willingness of AF to carry out its mission in the service of the nation at any time is the only thing that has remained constant. Without repudiating the impact of political developments, it is important to highlight that the AF have always managed to find the right way for the interests of the nation and country.

It is very difficult and at the same time impossible to thoroughly deal with such a long and dynamic history of our Armed Forces in such a short paper, however, the aim of this treatise was not at all to analyze or assess all this history. The main purpose was going through some of the key moments, to "urge" debate and analysis, to evaluate the history as it has been developed and see its future prospects, without considering it separated from the prospective of independence and development of the entire nation.

100 years is a long chronology that cannot be included neither within the limits of this paper, nor those of this honoured conference. Other activities will be encouraged and are going to take place on this issue and about this topic.

While Independence Day, and in this view the establishment of the Armed Forces will always be commemorated as a starting point of a glorious history which will be enriched in the years to come, it is our individual and collective responsibility towards the nation and history to do as one of the famous presidents of the USA, J. F. Kennedy stated "... ask not what your country can do for you - ask what you can do for your country ..."

Bibliography:

- Historia e Shqipërisë. Krijimi i Shtetit Shqiptar.
Eduard J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913.
- Lufta e Parë Ballkanike dhe Shqipëria, Tirana 2007.
- Dr. Romeo Gurakuqi, Historia e Shkodrës në 1913, vendosja e kontrollit ndërkombëtar në Shkodër, maj 1913-dhjetor 1913.

- Historia e Popullit Shqiptar, vol. 3.
- Shqipëria më 1937, Tiranë. “Kristo Frashëri” Printing House, 1938.
- Historia e Shtabit të Përgjithshëm www.mod.gov.al
- Arsimimi i ushtarakëve shqiptarë.
- Historia e Shqipërisë, Shqipëria në vitet 1945-1990.
- <http://www.mod.gov.al/> Historiku i marrëdhënieve NATO-Shqipëri.
- Doktrina e Arsimimit dhe Stërvitjes. Tirana, 2009.
- Strategjia e modernizimit të FA.
- Address at “Biza-12” Exercise, September 2012.
- NATO New Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2012.

Albanian space protection, up to the declaration of Independence

Col.Dr.Agim Q. Sula,
Commander of AFA

Short commentary. *Albanian national issue, since its very beginning, faced not only the age- long Ottoman occupier but even the other new chauvinist bordering states particularly Hellenic, Serbian and Bulgarian as well. Immediately or parallel with the creation of their own countries, in terms of the so-called “Eastern Crisis”, with a pronounced nationalist content, since 1844 they worked out notorious platforms or programs labelled “Megali bitter” (Greece), “Narçetania” (Serbia), as well as the Treaty of Saint Stephan (for Bulgaria, the result of the Russian-Turkish war in 1876)¹. Their main point stood in the inclusion, in the composition of the Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian states of neighbouring territories. They had absolutely bold ambitions for Albanian territories, still conquered by the Ottoman Empire. Their full annexation was foreseen by a joint meeting line and Shkumbin River division². Unfortunately, our National Movement, very vital in defence of their territories, in certain moments, was faced even with the indifference of the Great Powers of the time being and why not with their opposition up to anti Albanian making decisions.*

The extent of ethnic Albanian lands in XIX mid. century

In the middle of the XIX century, when annexationist plans of chauvinist neighbour were compiled, according to many foreign observers who closely knew its human geography of the Balkan Peninsula, ethnic Albanian-populated lands had a wide range. Thus, according to a French erudite Ami Boué (1840), British observers E. Spencer (1847), Austrian J. Hahn (1853), etc., geographical areas with indigenous Albanian population were spread:

- In the North up to Nis, Leskovac and Vranje.
- In the East up to Kumanov, Periep and Monastery
- In the South up to Konic, Ioannina and Preveza, extreme provinces respectively³.

¹ Arben Puto, “Çështja shqiptare në aktet ndërkombëtare të periudhës së imperializmit”, Vol. II, Tirana 1987, p. 58.

² Arben Puto, Ibid p. 67.

³ Academy of Sciences of RoA, “Platformë për zgjidhjen e çështjes kombëtare shqiptare”, edition of 1998, Tirana, p. 6.

These researchers and observers accepted that in these regions there were even residents of neighbouring Balkan nationalities (Greek, Rumanian, Macedonians, Serbs, Montenegrin, Turkish). But all these constituted only minor persistence minority (in the form of small islands) within the context of the majority expansion of Albanian population.

Ottoman administrative division of the Albanian territories

In this period, territories inhabited by Albanian indigenous were separated by the Ottoman government in four districts: Kosovo, Shkoder, Monastery and Janine. According to some researchers Albanian population was extended in an area of 90,000 km². Although at that time it was not known any administrative division with the name Albania, (Albanian territories were named with the above districts' names), the Ottoman government, having a clear notion of Albania as a unity of the territories inhabited by Albanian population, its representation in St. Stephen talks laid out a concrete task to "...oppose Serb and Montenegrin attempts to put up ... on Albania"⁴. But before the Congress of Berlin, which marked the first large partition of the Albanian territories, and which torn them about 25,000 km² area, it was said that in 1878, the Albanian-populated area was extended to about 105,000 km².

Any change in the balance of forces in Europe necessarily appeared even in the Balkans, because all the Great Powers, especially the Russian Empire, Great Britain, later Austro-Hungary and Italy openly displayed their interests and emulation trying to use small and weak Balkan states and to align them alongside the Great Powers⁵.

Continuous deepening of East crisis, the Serb-Turkish war, Montenegro-Ottoman battles near the Albanian territories, Russians blackmail towards the Ottomans, British support towards High Gate etc., were followed with great interest by the Albanian public opinion and insurgent bands that were acting all over the Albanian territories.

The Treaty of Saint Stephan was considered throughout Turkey as a death sentence issued against the Empire. British intervention and Lord Bignonsfield gave hope for a possible intervention and prohibition of implementation and rough fragmentation of Ottoman Empire⁶.

The brutality of Russian imperial policy was shown especially in treating Albanian issue. Albanians were not treated as a separate nationality at all. Its name was not mentioned in the Treaty of St. Stephen. For Russia, Albania did not exist as a subject of political and national rights. Russia did not recognize Albania even as a geographical expression, not because there was no information about the Albanians, but this was made on purpose to allow Slavic states to enlarge territory in these areas after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover its territories were drifted among the four states. Most of them remained under the Ottoman Empire rule while multitude suburb districts were given to Russian Slav allies. Bulgaria would get, except other things, the districts of Korca, Pogradec, Struga, Debar, Kicevo, Gostivar, Tetovo,

⁴ Arben Puto, Ibid, p. 20.

⁵ Crampton, R.J. "Bulgaria" Published 2007, Oxford University Press, p. 206.

⁶ Thoma Murzaku, Traktati i Shën Stefanit dhe rrjedhat e zbatimit të tij për shqiptarët, "National Conference of Studies about the Albanian League of Prizren, 1878-1881", I, Tirana 1979, p. 102.

Kumanovo and Kacanik. Serbia would annex the northern areas of Kosova up to Mitrovica. Montenegro would include within its border the Albanian regions of Ulcinj, Kraja, Anamali, Hoti, Gruda, Tuzi, Kelemendi, Gucia, Plav and Rugova, thus including lands that had not been militarily conquered during the war⁷. The new border would pass through Hoti lake, Shkodra lake and Buna river. Parcelling out the Albanian territories changed maternal sharing administrative units within the Ottoman Empire.

Now, the Albanian lands would belong not to four, but three districts as the Monastery district would pass completely under Bulgarian administration. Among the three districts that would remain under the Ottoman yoke, one of them, Ioannina district would be subject to a special administrative reform. As stated in article 15, in its lands, a regulation would be implemented as in Thessaly, the same regulation with that which was decided on the island of Crete in 1866. Regulation would be set up by the High Gate, which would be forced to have Russian consent, before putting it into execution. In this way, Albanians scattered over three districts would be administered by different regulations, and this would further hamper their political, economic, social and cultural relations.

Albanians understood the Treaty of Saint Stephan content in April 1878, when it was officially proclaimed. They were informed about the partition of their lands and territories that would pass to Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro.

Treaty indicated that the Russian Empire continued to treat Albania as Turkish land, to be divided among its allies in the Balkans. As Abdyl Frashëri wrote, on April 12, 1878, the Emperor would not stop only with this parcelling out of the Albanian territories. According to him, the Treaty of Saint Stephan marked the first step towards the complete destruction of Albania. Such an assessment of the situation given by Albanians was bluntly expressed even by Abdyl's brother, Sami Frashëri: "As it was noted the Russia's tendency to extend Bulgaria up to the Adriatic coast", he wrote a few months later: "As it is clear from the map of the Treaty of Saint-Stephen, Russia after having changed the middle of Albania to Bulgarians, the remaining parts in its north, it means that Pristina, Prizren and Shkodra Sanjaks, would be given to Serbia and Montenegro, and the remaining part in the south, it means Preveza, Ioannina and Gjirokastra Sanjaks would be given temporarily to Greece, disappearing Albania, even wiping it off the map."⁸

Wild terror that exploded during the war from the Serbian, Montenegrin, Bulgarian and Russian armies towards Albanians living in the areas occupied by them continued even after the signing of the Peace in St. Stephen. This terror, which in other parts of the Balkans was mainly a burden on local Muslim population, in Albania it was a burden, as noted by Austro-Hungarian consul in Tivar, Nettovich, equal to all Albanians, regardless of being Muslim, Catholic or Orthodox⁹. This difficult situation for Albanians, forced a significant number of them to migrate from their homes, to

⁷ Ismail Qemal Vlora, Kujtime, Printing House "Grand Prind", Tirana 2007, p. 146. Original title "The Memories of Ismail Kemal Bey", Edited by: Sommerville Story, with a preface by: William Morton Fulerton, Constable and Company LTD, London 1920.

⁸ Kristo Frashëri, Albanian League of Prizren, Tirana 1997, p. 60.

⁹ Ibid.

abandon their properties and seek freedom. A great number of Muhajirun were violently moved from those Albanian territories which were occupied by Serbia, especially at Nish Sandzak. For Albanians who remained in the occupied territories, political persecution was associated by economic pressure as well. Military occupation authorities did not allow peasants even to work their agricultural lands. Since March, the Albanians in these areas were threatened by famine. According to Nettovich's saying, they were in a "deplorable condition."¹⁰ The intervention of the Great Powers did not soften chauvinistic passions that Russia sparked among bourgeois circles of the peninsula, but further aggravated them. Review of the treaty set in motion all the governments in the Balkans, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, undertook extensive diplomatic and propaganda actions to secure in Berlin the realization of their chauvinist aspirations. They, Abdyl Frashëri wrote those days, have "conquered Europe's diplomacy."¹¹

In addition to the complex international situation, there were even internal organizational and political difficulties. Albania had neither national government nor organized army to defend the homeland. It did not have even enough weapons. The so called weapons, that the highlanders were carrying on their shoulders, were outdated. Modern rifles, which the neighbour states armies were equipped, were very few in Albania. Due to the Ottoman police persecution, Albanians had no national political organization publicly known at home and abroad. There was only "Central Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Albanian Nationality", formed in Istanbul last December. But the Committee of Istanbul, except acting in illegal circumstances, had no organizational network spread in Albania. The only way that the members of the Committee used to communicate with their countrymen, was personal contact. But in the rapid development conditions of political events, these contacts were insufficient.

Sensing close danger, especially after Russian successes, the Albanian ideologues thought to organize the Albanians for their liberation from the Ottoman Empire. This progressive idea went into effect in May of 1877 when it was founded in Yanina an Albanian Committee at the head of which was Abdyl Frashëri. After consolidation, the Committee of Yanina established contacts with Albanian officers serving in the Ottoman army, who proved willing to join the fight for liberation.

Representatives of Ioannina Committee thought that Albanians should make an alliance with Greece in war against the Ottoman Empire before the Russian army descended on the Balkan Peninsula. However, before reaching an agreement Athens should be asked to support the idea of Albanian independence and its territorial integrity. Despite the Greek claims, the Greek government appointed Epaminonda Mavromatin Consul of Greece in Shkodra.

Whereas Albanians were represented by Abdyl Frashëri associated with Mehmet Vrioni¹². Abdyl submitted to Greek delegation his platform for the talks, justifying

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ NA, Fund of London (Foreign Office-London), Fa. 195/1303, File No. 2.

¹² Frashër Demaj, Qëndrimi i konsujve anglezë në Prizren dhe Shkodër ndaj Lidhjes Shqiptare të Prizrenit, "National Conference of Studies about the Albanian League of Prizren, 1878-1881", Adressed Paper in Pristina 10-11 June 2008, p. 1.

fundamentally Albanians demands for territorial integrity and the independent state formation. He strongly demanded that Albanians had to rise into rebellion against the High Gate, and Greece had to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. The Albanian delegation agreed that Greece would invade Thessaly and Macedonia on the condition that the Athens government had to recognize officially the establishment of the Albanian Independent Principality of ethnic borders of Albania, including Kosovo in the north up to Vranje and Chameria in the south up to Preveza.

However, the Greek side rejected the idea for the Albanian Independent Principality or its expansion of Epirus region in the South. Mavromati insisted that the southern of Albania would fight under the Greek flag and this part would seek union with Greece¹³. These talks were interrupted without giving any result due to the diametrically opposing positions of the parties.

However, this effort for collaboration was important for the fact that things began to move and then Albanians were engaged not only in terms of resistance and organizing armed uprisings, but also in diplomatic plan to seek international cooperation and support.

Albanians had started to be organized in the north of Albania. They had formed a committee led by Pjeter Gurakuqi, Luigj Gurakuqi's father who was known as proitalian according to Lippih, the Austrian consul in Shkodra.

Under the new circumstances of the complexity of the international situation when Russia and its allies were advancing, Greece judged it necessary to continue talks with Albanians. Abdyi Frashëri had demanded from the Greek side to withdraw Mavromatin from the delegation because according to him he was a serious barrier to the achievement of any eventual agreement. Athens, instead of Mavromatit, sent Stefanos Skuludhin who was deputy of the Greek parliament. Skuludhi arrived in Istanbul on December 15, 1877. The meeting between the delegations, at the request of Abdul Frasherli was delayed for several days because he and other representatives were busy with the organization of a national activity. In fact Albanian patriots had traveled from different districts of Albania to participate in the formation of a national organization that would be established in Istanbul. This organization, which was known as "The Central Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Albanian Nationality" was formed on December 18th, 1877.

The Committee briefly was known as the Central Committee or the Committee of Istanbul and Abdyl Frashëri was elected at the head of it. In the composition of participants were Pashko Vasa, Jani Vreto, Ymer Prizren, Sami Frashëri, Zija Prishtina, Ilijaz Dibra, Mehmet Ali Vrioni, Ahmet Koronica, Mihal Harito, Seid Toptani, Mustafa Vlora Tahiri Mane etc. Now, Abdyl was not anymore the representative of the Committee of Yanina, but his legitimacy was of the national character as he held the position of the chairman of the "Committee of Istanbul". In the secret meetings between the Albanian and Greek delegations held in Istanbul, Skuludhi was not withdrawn from his predecessor's attitudes, Mavromati. He even insisted to make an agreement very soon and within it to include two basic conditions. The first, Albanian areas in the south of Seman river to be part of the Greek kingdom, and second, the

¹³ Kristo Frashëri, *Ibid*, p. 46.

northern half of Albania to form an Albanian state under the crown of King George of Greece.¹⁴

However, these requirements chauvinistic in character were unacceptable to Albanians. Even though Albanian delegation led by Abdyl Frashëri presented his project of cooperation with Greece always seeking from the latter to recognize the Albanian state on ethnic borders. The project of the Albanian delegation was rejected by the Greek delegation though there was no tendency to Greece or other neighbors. Therefore, even these efforts to enter into any Greek-Albanian agreement with the bilateral interests failed. Even the Greek government order given to Skuludhi to withdraw from talks with Albanians on December 25th, 1877 was a clear signal that Greece was preparing to invade the Albanian lands in the South.

The Great Powers determination, especially that of Great Britain and France, the Serb-Montenegrin armies marching towards the Albanian lands in the north and the Greek government preparation to annex southern Albanian areas created a very unfavourable and complex situation for Albania¹⁵. Therefore, any outbreak of Albanian uprising against the Ottoman Empire in these circumstances would facilitate the penetration of Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek armies into the Albanian lands, whereas Albanians had no military capacity to fight against invaders and neighbouring chauvinists who claimed the annexation of the Albanian lands. For this reason, “the Committee of Istanbul”, which was preparing an uprising against the High Gate changed its political action strategy. They designed a new political program for the Albanian National Movement, but never renounced from the liberation of land and the creation of the Albanian state. Their primary goal was to safeguard the Albanian lands from the dismemberment and demand for unification of Albanian vilayets in one under the Sultan supervision.

The Albanian National Movement did not stop even after the League of Prizren termination. It took a new form of development with special focus on the education development and national culture. The results of this movement were seen with the opening of Korça Teaching School up to Congress of Monastery.

The centre of efforts for establishment of a new league as that of Prizren became again in the cities of Kosovo vilayet and Dibra sanjak, which regardless of the circumstances had never stopped their efforts¹⁶.

The League of Peja in 1899, was appreciated as a unique national organization that would unite in its bosom all Albanians, from North to South, Muslims and Christians. Under the command of this League leaders and the implementation of decisions revenge, quarrels and hostilities were stopped and were predicted severe penalties for those who would derive a vengeance, and other actions that violated public order¹⁷.

¹⁴ Kristo Frashëri, Ibid, p. 50.

¹⁵ Kristo Frashëri, Ibid, p. 53.

¹⁶ Dr. Frashër Demaj, Britania e Madhe dhe çështja shqiptare (1875-1913), Pristina 2011, p. 146.

¹⁷ The decisions of Peja Assembly are edited in the article “National Guide” at Sofia in 1900. The same is edited in the collection “Political and social thought of National Renaissance vol. I, Tirana 1971, p. 184.

The League determined, as the main important task, the Albania's territorial integrity protection against any attempt that Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece would undertake to the fragmentation of the Albanian territories. Serbia and other Balkan countries were concerned about the formation of the League of Peja. The Great Powers, especially Russia and Austro-Hungary did not show kindness towards this Albanian League¹⁸. The Albanian League claims created conflict with the pan Slavic Russian policy and Austro-Hungary was interested to benefit from any weakening of the Ottoman Empire in order to occupy this territory. The UK did not show any sign of support or any positive treatment compared with other Powers either. In fact, the Great Britain still followed the supporting old policy of the Ottoman Empire and did not take into consideration the national movements of the peoples occupied by Turkey.

Despite this, the League was determined that in case of war to scatter the Albanian forces, which would protect the homeland; those of Pristina sanjak, New Bazaar and Dibra would guard the northern borders against Serbia; Peja, Plav and Shkodra forces would protect the border with Montenegro, and those of Ioannina vilayet (Southern Albania) would oppose Greece. Peja Assembly resolution was a clear-cut distinction between the Ottoman Empire, "the Ottoman state" and Albania, "Albanian homeland".

Samis Frashëri's work "Albania what it was, what it is and what will be?" had a major impact on the Albanian League of Peja and Albanian National Movement activities; it was one of the main propagandist documents of this movement.

The Albanian League of Peja activity was supported even by the Albanian patriotic press as "Albania" (Brussels-London, 1897-1909), "Kombiar Calendar" (Sofia, 1897-1912), "La Nazione Albanese" ("Albanian Nation", Katanzaro-Pallagorio, 1897-1912), etc..

In March 1903, thousands of armed Albanians were gathered at Prizren and Mitrovica outskirts and occupied the whole area between Peja and Gjakova. About 5,000 insurgents were gathered in Drenica, where under their leaders guidance of Ahmet Delia, Uke Kamberi etc., held their assembly in Morina area, where they requested from the Turkish government to abandon the reforms that threatened the completeness of Albania and expelled Russian consul from Mitrovica.

The events in Mitrovica districts were of severe character, where 2000-3000 insurgents were focused in March 1903, who, as in Drenica Assembly, protested against "reforms that damaged the homeland interests".

The Albanian national movement being lonely and without any political support from Balkan independent states and Great Powers did not have much opportunity for choice in its political actions. The Balkan States by all means tried to prevent activities and Albanians' struggle for national liberation. The situation was strained and became even more difficult when it was compounded by aggressive attitude of the Ottoman Empire which hampered any Albanian national initiative. In these circumstances, the Albanian patriots faced a dilemma which approached two possibilities: First, to

¹⁸ Historia e popullit shqiptar... II, p. 277.

line up alongside Christian peoples of the Balkans, who denied the Albanian people existence and pretended to smash the territory of Albania and the second, to line up alongside the Sultan trying to benefit some of their demands¹⁹.

The Albanian uprisings of 1910-1911, though did not give the expected results, however, attracted the international diplomacy attention. Great Britain though did not officially support Albanian insurgent movements, diplomacy of this country constituted one of the strongest in the context of the Great Powers had no official attitude even against the Albanians interests. It came from the general circumstances and insufficient recognition of the Albanian cause in diplomatic circles, the absence of a single political centre, where you could coordinate political, diplomatic activities and anti Ottoman uprisings organization, so the lack of preparation at proper internal factor. The absence of these aspects had a direct impact on the impossibility of turning the "Albanian cause" into the strategic interest of the Great Powers.

The year 1912 began with the old unsolved problems in the Albanian territories. Relations between Albanians and the Ottoman government did not show improvements, but they were even more complicated by entering a one-way direction with no real opportunity to repair. Kosovo Vilayet as the most important geostrategic area, due to the created circumstances, was in the spotlight not only of the Balkan states, but even of the Great Powers.

In these circumstances, the Albanian National Movement, clearly seeing the weakening of the Ottoman Empire and the danger that threatened the Albanian territories from neighbouring chauvinist circles, was preparing to organize a general uprising, as the only way to force the Ottoman government to acknowledge Albanians their rights.

Among the patriotic circles there was ripe opinion for the preparation of an uprising that would begin in the spring of 1912. Austro-Hungarian consul in Thessaloniki on January 5th, 1912 informed his chief in Vienna, Erantalin, for these preparations. He stated that "the strengthening of national sentiment and unity has made significant progress particularly in Kosovo and we are working diligently to an understanding from all parts of Albania, aiming a huge uprising".

Ismail Qemal always cared about the coordination of insurgent activities with those of political and diplomatic ones. In Vienna he met the British ambassador, where he had informed him that the Albanians would hold a national assembly and would proclaim the independence of their country, because there was no way out. Ismail Qemal insisted on the Albanians determination to protect their lands, "all those regions where Albanian language was spoken."

Bibliography:

- Academy of Sciences of RoA, "Platformë për zgjidhjen e çështjes kombëtare shqiptare", edition of 1998, Tirana.

¹⁹ Georges Castellan, *Histori e Ballkanit (centuries XIV-XX)*, Tirana 1991, p. 381.

- Arben Puto, “Çështja shqiptare në aktet ndërkombëtare të periudhës së imperializmit”, Vol. I, Tirana 1985.
- Arben Puto, “Çështja shqiptare në aktet ndërkombëtare të periudhës së imperializmit”, Vol. II, Tirana 1987.
- Arben Puto, Pavarësia Shqiptare dhe diplomacia e Fuqive të Mëdha 1912-1914, Tirana 1987.
- Kristo Frashëri, Lidhja Shqiptare e Prizrenit, Tirana 1997.
- Ismail Qemal Vlora, Kujtime, Printing House “Grand Prind”, Tirana 2007. Original title “The Memories of Ismail Kemal Bey”, Edited by: Sommerville Story, with a preface by: Wiliam Morton Fulerton, Constable and Company LTD, London 1920.
- Thoma Murzaku, Traktati i Shën Stefanit dhe rrjedhat e zbatimit të tij për shqiptarët, “National Conference of Studies about the Albanian League of Prizren, 1878-1881”, I, Tirana 1979,.
- Frashër Demaj, Qëndrimi i konsujve anglezë në Prizren dhe Shkodër ndaj Lidhjes Shqiptare të Prizrenit, “National Conference of Studies about the Albanian League of Prizren, 1878-1881”, Adressed Paper in Pristina 10-11 June 2008.
- Dr. Frashër Demaj, Britania e Madhe dhe çështja shqiptare (1875-1913), Pristina 2011.
- Hasan Prishtina, Përmbledhje dokumentash 1908-1934, Tirana 1983.
- Zekria Cana, Kryengritja Shqiptare e vitit 1912 në dokumentet serbe, Pristina 2008.
- Archive of Institute of History-Tirana, (AIHT)Vienne Fund.
- Historia e popullit shqiptar, II, Rilindja Kombëtare vitet ’30 të shek. XIX, Tirana 2002.
- Crampton, R.J. “Bullgaria” Published 2007, Oxford University Press.
- “Messenger de Vienne”, No. 17, Vienne, 26 April 1878.
- NA, Fund of London (Foreign Office-London), Fa. 195/1303, File No. 2.
- Haus und Hof Staats Archiv, Politisches Archiv, Wien (HHST. AFA WIEN).
- Georges Castellan, Histori e Ballkanit (centuries XIV-XX), Tirana 1991.

Development of the Albanian military thought in 1912-2012

Colonel Ahmet Leka,
Head of Doctrine Centre, TRADOC

Short commentary. *In the first years of independence, in the framework of the organization, modernization and development of the AF, the research inheritance and that of the development of the military thinking has been relatively poor. In 1920-1932, for the were important the treaties and different publications for the military doctrinal thinking published in more than 30 magazines of the first military publication titled: “Revista Ushtarake-Military Review” and, “Buletini dhe e Përkohshmja Ushtarake-The Bulletin and the Military Daily”. During the Second World War, 1939-1945, the antifascist movement rightly valued the role of the doctrinal and theoretical military thinking by laying it down in a theoretical basis being even limited that helped the placement of the army in acceptable methodical and instructive measures, and also to ensure its growth and empowerment as a regular army.*

The development of the military theoretical thinking and the Albanian military strategy has been a conditional process based on several different circumstances that Albania has gone through from the early 1945-1948, with the Yugoslavians, the 1948-1960, 1968 with the Soviet Union and, 1970-1978 with the Chinesees.

The Albanian doctrinal thinking has known new development in 1970, when next to the General Staff Academy was opened the Military Research Institute to continue further on in 1974 until 1978. After the break up with the Chinesees, communist sayings “everything based on our own strength”, abounded everywhere and this also reflected strategic concept and doctrinal thinking until 1990. The progressive opening of Albania in 1991 towards global trends and developments, its integration in the economical, political and cultural structures both regional and global, brought about with it unavoidably a complex of challenges and chances with differing possibilities of influence for the security of the country. Under this context, the concept for the “enemies” changed and therefore the defence of the country. Albanian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the 4th of April 2009 brought about one of the most fundamental strategically changes, that dictate a new thinking of the entire security and defense of the country reflected in the Military Strategic Concept and the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Albania.

Declaration of Independence and the beginning of military operations

The declaration of Albania's Independence on 28 November 1912 in Vlora, brought to the end the 500 hundred years Ottoman occupation marking a basic turn in the destiny of Albania. Albania was declared sovereign, independent not only from Ottoman occupation but from every other neighbour occupation, crowning in this way its dreams and aspirations the National Renaissance could achieve its most important aim by crowning the heroic wars of a lot of generations to return the lost freedom and to joy the national rights to open the development and integration path to the nation.

The independence of Albania was not just the act of raising the flag by some patriots in Vlora. They certainly have the most respected place in history but it was the National Assembly of Vlora that ratified by law with an act undersigned by all representatives of the nation who had prepared and sacrificed decades of war, suffering and attempt from the random population too in every part of Albania. In the foundation of Independence had contributed the whole Albania.

Today the armed forces celebrate their 100 anniversary of foundation. Indeed the fourth of December 1912 marked the first meeting of the Temporary Government Cabinet of the first Albanian State whose President and foreign Minister was Ismail Qemali and the first minister of war was Mehmet Pashe Deralla.¹ The first Ministry of Defence was known as ministry of war and its prior duty was the organization and defence of Vlora where the newly formed government was settled.

The organization of the new order of the Albanian army consisted in some battalions, some knight group and some artillery battery that were dislocated in several cities like: Durrës, Tirana, Vlora, Permet, Korce, Tropoja, etc After the Recognition of Independence and the Ambassador's Conference in London and after Prince Wied was settled in Albania who was at the same time Commander Chief of the army. the battalion consisted on 100-300 soldiers. The first confrontation with regular unit groups of the Albanian army was seen in 19 November 1913 where the attack from the chauvinist Greek army was successfully handled by the Albanian volunteer patriots under the command of Ismail Qemali's son, Et'hem Beu in Llogara who did not allow the area around Vlora to get occupied by them. Despite that Prince Wied was never helped by the *allias* in reinforcing the army so the political and military situation became very difficult for our country.

As the First World War began, Albania became a battle field between the Atlantic forces (England-Italy-Russia-USA) and the central forces (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria). Meanwhile the unorganized Albanian military forces had no clear political and military objectives.

The end of this war found Albania occupied by Italians, Greek and Serbians which in the Peace Conference on 18.01.1919 in Paris demanded the division of Albanian land. During the first years of independency the legal research and development of military thinking for military issues of different levels was relatively poor. According

¹ General Mehmet Pashë Dërralla (1843-1933), Minister of War in 1912-1914 in Vlora Government.

to published and no published documents, Albanian or foreign ones of that time press and the valuable memory of the independency generation, except the written facts, valuable and acceptable opinions, judgements, aspirations come to us from the active participants in that period about these historic events. The problems of Albanian Independence and the path that led to it were an important part of the foreign historiography too, especially that of the Balkans. Besides the objective treatment of the history there were a lot of tendencies and superficially treatments with unbiased and *a priori* estimations. Even when the war transmits aggression, suffering and big losses to humans they always find the necessity to study it and to find acceptable deductions about it.

The famous English historian and military Cyril Falls, a world war analyst, insisting on the indispensable role of the studying theoretic military thinking and history says: *“What I want to say is that all people together or individually, small or big have always been deeply influenced by war. Our art, literature and architecture have been created from the traces of war. our languages have thousands of words and phrases generating from war. Our destiny, social life, customs, industry and trade have had the influence and have expressed forced characteristics from the results of the war.”*²

During the World War from 1912-1920 the newly formed Albanian state was fragile without any specific interest in the field of the application of the military theoretic thinking.

Crystallization of the Albanian military thinking

The Congress of Lushnje on 28 January 1920 formed the new government run by Sulejman Delvina where important objectives and duties were defined in order to protect the Albanian Sovereignty. In this contest the Ministry of War was reformed and together with it the organization of Albanian military began. the first step taken was the division of military from the policy and the creation of the first Albanian division by three regiments, three battalions, which was the biggest military unit in Albania until that time. Beside the structural reorganization a special attention was paid to the development of the military strategy by educating abroad most of the highest rank officers. Based on the execution of some of models from the abroad education, our military strategists after the foundation of the first state started to make connections between the war dialectic and the strategy and the results have been concrete with the compilation of a rich military literature which is the foundation of the creation and development of the Albanian military thinking and the contemporary military practice.

In 1922 there is another structural and conceptual reorganization of the Albanian Army passing from the division to the regiment with an active battalion and two reserves. Also the Ministry of War would have under control three border battalions which were created in 1922. In this same year the 24 month military service was made mandatory. During this period the army had approximately 5500 active soldiers and 6000 reserve ones.

² Cyril Falls “The art of war from Napoleon to the present Day”, London, 1961.

The war of Vlora was marked in the Albanian history as one of the most glorious wars regarding the organization and execution of the theoretic military thinking and concrete results in protection of its territory forcing the Italians to abandon Vlora and Sazan leaving a lot of dead, injured and captured bodies as well as a huge amount of weaponry and artillery. During the war, the Albanian Army was fighting against the Serbian army too to protect the city of Shkodra. After several months the Albanian Army fought against the North Epirots who wanted autonomy and union to Greece. During the rule of the King Zog there was a total reform of the army taking her out of the politics and the removal of the Ministry of War as well as the disarmament of the population. During this period, was made a detailed program where a remarkable help was given by foreign consulars, the Austrian Colonel Mirdash³ and the British Colonel Sterling⁴ who foresaw the removal of the Ministry of War which, at that time, had 5500 troops and formation instead of it a militia of 3000 troops commanded by the National Defence Command where the Commander Chief was the President or the King.

This militia was to be divided in nine infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, one battalion of the Republic Guard and one troop whose duty would be to protect the land and water border integrity. This was a reorganization of a strong army with new units and weaponry. In December 1925, the first Navy Forces of Albania were formed, in 1926 the first three infantry battalions “Vjosa”, “Erzeni” and “Devolli” of the Albanian Army were formed. After 1928-1929 the other battalions: “Shkumbini”, “Semani”, “Buna”, “Devolli 2”, “Sulmuesi A”, “Zogu”, and “Mesi i vitit” were formed. In December the 28-th 1928 the Royal Military School which was the first military school in Albania was founded in Tirana that marks the beginning of a remarkable work not only in preparing professional staff but also in the development of the military concept in Albania. Later on other services and weaponry were also established: in September 1927 was established the Topographic service whose purpose to study the Albanian territory, in June the 24th 1928 the tank weaponry was formed consisting in “Fiat 3000” tanks and Lancia auto blinds all of them bought in Italy. In the same day, the Royal Guard was also created and in February the 25th 1929 the Border Command was formed which consisted of 3 battalions, in September the 1st 1929 the Transportation Service was created consisting of some small trucks serving the army transportation and one year later the Transportation Technical Park was also established.

During 1926-1930 Albanian Army had approximately 8526 active soldiers. During this time the first Naval Command basing in Durres was also created and in June the 24th 1928 the first recruits of this force were enrolled. During this year three new motovedeta were added to the naval forces having the names of three important cities in Albania: Tirana, Shkodra, Vlora.

It is to be emphasized that during 1920-1939 important steps in building and enforcing the state structure were taken which enabled more organized studies and publishings regarding them.

In 1930 King Zog, due to high military expenses, decided to reorganize and reform the new army in structural and conceptual aspect. He decided to shorten the infantry

³ <http://www.arberiaonline.com>

⁴ Frank W. Sterling, British Colonel, one of the founders of the Albanian Gendarmerie.

from 9 to 6 battalions and the artillery from 5 to 2 batteries. These battalions would be the unification of some battalions which would form army groups. He predicted to enrol the knights in the army too. The obligatory military service was cut down to 12 months and in 1932 it would go down to 6 months. With this provisions the king would create a smaller but more powerful and effective army.

During this time a certain number of instruction texts and regulations for the staff and military schools were composed which effected in the regulation of the interior life of the army and also in the warrior preparations of the units and staff qualifications. During this period the different ideas about military thinking and doctrines published in more than 30 series of the army magazines were of great value. In these magazines: “Revista Ushtarake” and “Buletini” and “E Përkohshmja Ushtarake”, different issues such as military preparations, management and other essays like famous military theorists were treated. Important data about military issues come from the two publications by Teki Selenica⁵ in 1928 “Shqipëria me 1937”. Even though during this period we do not see fulfilled specific studies about the Albanian military art. The only serious publication of this time is the translated book of the Italian lieutenant colonel Raul Vivaldi⁶ in 1931.

During the Second World War the antifascist movement appreciated the theoretic and doctrinal military thinking. Even though in difficult positions, the General Staff through its organs could come up with some regulations, instructions, manuals, etc. which have affected in the elaboration of the military thinking presenting a theoretical base even though limited to help putting the army in acceptable instructional and methodical terms to ensure the growth and empowering of it, as a regular army.

The Albanian Army, after the Second World War consisted mainly in infantry inherited by National Liberation Army. The contingent was that of the war period, lacking military culture, professional and leading skills, especially the required technical-military level, a necessity for a modern army. Building, adopting and modernizing process of AFAR from a partisan to a modern army was exactly the development of theoretical thinking of the military strategy. It was an overall process of development and perfection, qualitative and quantitative change that was achieved through continues efforts, despite the difficulties and barriers of that time.

During these years, the main challenge was building and organizing an army and developing a military strategy based on a backward and ruined economy from the war, when this army was under organization and restructuring, but also participating in the rebuilding of the country, fighting against armed bands and reforming itself without impinging the military. Also, it was indispensable to fulfil some necessary criteria in amended criteria in order to transform this post war army in a modern one. If there was a potential confrontation, our army would fight with a modern army based on modern fighting concepts, tactics and strategies. In these circumstances, our armed forces, despite their reorganization and better equipment, had to create new doctrinal concepts, facing their enemies with modern and successful military

⁵ Teki Selenica, a well-known intellectual 1882-1962.

⁶ Raul Vivaldi, author of the book “*The historic military summary*”, 1931 and “*Storia della guerra europea*”, Roma, 1941.

strategies. In these years, many issues of doctrinal character were treated in the newspapers and magazines. Leaving apart the drafting of the regulation, instruction and texts for the military schools which had their importance, there were created different bodies for developing theoretical military thinking.

In the early 50 years, in the Ministry of Defence was created the “*the branch of Military History*” which was responsible for doing research on the antifascist National Liberation war history. During 70’ there was created the Institute of Military Studies, but it didn’t have success because of the pressure of its ideological factors. Many officials from this Institute were persecuted and convicted using stalking horse the preparation of antithesis for the Defence Council.

In the end of 70’, in the Academy of General Headquarter, the current AFA was created the sector of sciences by prepared experts, which soon became an authentic scientific research sector. Even though it was dissolved in 1984, it was a good experience for the staff of the Military Academy, creating both a researching and scientific profile.

During these years, a great push to the research scientific level was the right that the Military Academy had to organize and award the ranks and scientific titles for the military officials. The dissertations of different theoretical and scientific topics made possible the preparation of dozen monographs focusing on the theoretical thinking of military strategy. According to the political concept of that time, the organization and the preparation of AF, and the development of the theoretical thinking should be in compliance with the Strategic Plan of Defence, Strategic Directions, the real conditions and circumstances of the country development.

At the same time, the political leadership of the country, looking at the increasing number of the military forces in the neighbour countries, started to arm not only the AF but also “the military population”, based on the Lenin saying: “*In the world there are oppressed and oppressors we should ask not the disarming but general arming of the people. Only this will guarantee the freedom. Only this will overcome reaction.*”⁷

Albania’s membership in NATO and the development of the new military doctrine

Our military thinking and the conceptual goal for building, organizing and developing the strategic theories of AF, especially after the NATO membership, remains “the complete and most productive transformation of the military instrument in the new millennium.” There is a question: What does this mean? What are the reasons for changing? What is the role of the military instrument? What is the impact of the Alliance in organizing and building the new Armed Forces and in the development of doctrinal thinking in this transformation? What are the commitments that must be fulfilled for this transformation? These questions are crucial, especially for the new members of the Alliance where we are members, with modest financial budget and human resources.

The answers to these questions are considered essential. If all the efforts will bring this transformation, they will guarantee the technical, organizational, doctrinal,

⁷ V.I.Lenin, Writing “Mbi luftën, ushtrinë e mbrojtjen”, V.1, Tirana 1986, p.254.

practical, infrastructural and experimental equipment. All these factors taken together form the military terminology: “*capacities of the strategic defence*”. The transformation must be more than a simple technological development (DOTMELPFI). Nowadays operations require different methods of fight, which cannot be neglected. The concept of defending “*hand to hand*” in the doctrinal meaning is an outdated concept. The concept for the sovereignty and security in terms of European Integration and other processes requires another answer from the Armed Forces.

After the Cold War, the nature of the Armed Forces and their use for political reasons changed radically. The membership of Albania in the North Atlantic Alliance is one of those radical strategic changes that lead to a re-conception of the security system and the defence of the country. This system is considered part of the NATO security and defence system, for the legitimate benefits and also for the obligations serving this Alliance. In this framework, AF of RoA (Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania) are responsible for approximating all the strategic and doctrinal documents with the current documents of the Alliance.

The strategy of the Cold War was based in the victory by nuclear weapon combination, which preserved the *status quo* of peace and that of forbiddance of the nuclear conflicts, sufficiently based by fearful nuclear threatening as well as different cradles of war, which at various intervals seemed to either begin or stop. The perspective of the conventional war between industrialized and developed states has become now senseless. Nowadays the nuclear forbiddance isn't essential anymore in the considerations of the Alliance which had won the Cold War. On the contrary, in its place the stability, which should be politically, economically as well as socially defined, is a much more vital aim than the forbiddance. Precisely, the military construction, the organization and the development of their doctrine concepts as well as the defining of the long-term strategies of the development and the transformation of AF, should be done in conformity with the time's requests.

These are exactly the reasons that nowadays are required contemporaneous ways in order to simultaneously fulfil new&old tasks, which must be found, experimented and tested, so that the defined aims to be achieved, heading in what we do better, more effectively and with lower costs and risks. This would be the key to define the factor, which would make the transformation go ahead, which in itself requires wisdom and smart actions.

Nowadays, the dynamism as well as the request for flexibility and the quickness in replying to any situations, are too different from those existing in the Cold War period. The lack of transformation in organization, equipments and concepts, so as the no fulfilment of necessary changes from various specialists should not be considered an adversity anymore, but a tragedy. The Albanian Membership in the North Atlantic Alliance makes up one of those fundamental strategic changes that lay down a new concept of the whole security systems well as the defence of the State. This system is now considered an integral part of the security system as well as the general defence of NATO, concerning not only legitimate profits from this membership, but also obligations to the involvement in the service of Alliance. In

this framework, AF of RoA has a major duty that all the documents of strategic character as well as the doctrine publications must be adapted to the actual documents of the Alliance. The reexamining and the improvement of the doctrine documents are conditioned even by the vital changes happening in the area of regional and global security. In order to adapt these changes, AF of RoA have fulfilled major transformations. They have now been transformed into a new and small professional force, lean on new concepts and principles, and above all in a force widely engaged in missions not only indoors but also outdoors the state.

The development of the theoretical and doctrine thought aims to create the conditions for a mutual understanding of the principles and concepts for the preparation and accomplishment of the military missions, for the nature of the current and future operational environment as well as for the usage of AF of RoA in this area. Its purpose is to provide a general picture to the political authorities and to the military professionals of RoA, for the planning and the preparation of AF of RoA in order to perform military operations during the time of peace, crises and war. The military doctrine of AF of RoA, in appliance with the tasks for the security and defence that are set forth in the Strategy of the National Security and in the Military Strategy, constitutes the basic conceptual document of the national politics for the usage of AF in military operations of the full scope, in order to face threats and risks towards RoA and North Atlantic Alliance or its member states. As such it leans on the most advanced doctrine thought of the Alliance, reflects the best experience of NATO's operations as well as the dynamic and the complexity of the current and future operations.

That's why the embezzlement of principles, concepts and procedures that are set forth in this doctrine, is a necessity and a duty of each commander and headquarter of AF of RoA.

The concepts of the Joint Operational Developments (JOD) will enable the identification of the coming military problems and will put forward choices of new ways to the accomplishment of operations. The examining of the coming operations, through the development of these new concepts will describe the way a commander, using art and military science, will use the necessary abilities in order to fulfil challenges for the future.⁸

Nowadays AF of RoA have sufficient levels of doctrine concepts and military capacities to accomplish on time the mission of military force. The progressive opening of Albania towards global developments, its integration in economic, political & cultural structures, brings undoubtly in itself a complex of challenges, chances & risks, with various opportunities of implication for the security and the defence of the state. Differently from the Cold War period, when the obvious and relatively foreseen and computed risks, constituted the main problem for the security and the defence of state, nowadays the main problem is constituted by those kind of risks which can't be easily identified, can't be lightly foreseen and can't even easily be faced. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, after the full membership in

⁸ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, August 2005.

NATO, are conceptualized, constructed and even used as a force of the Alliance. The membership in NATO has created the political and strategic premises for the creation of a modern, effective and modest AF in dimensions and costs.

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania may be used to support and enhance the purposes of the politics of the RoA, but its usage will continue to seek a clear estimation of the long-term consequences. The power shouldn't be used in such a way so that it creates a hostile background towards the interests of RoA after the conflict. That's why the joint force must exercise the military power making the necessary distinctions, in accordance with the established principles by the political leadership, with laws and international duties, as well as with the RoA interests, aiming at the minimizing of the victims and the collateral damage, as a start to be improved in international relationships, as positively in the future.

The relatively small quantity of the Joint Force means that it wouldn't be able to apply the resistance and the major power of fire during the militant period. The precision will continue to replace the mass and the accurate computation of the operations will continue to be over the disengaged operations, acting in such a way so that it will provide the loss of the coherence of the enemy's tries. Meanwhile the accuracy in the appliance of military force must be a normative value in the international operations and a value as well that the military forces of the RoA must share with other coparticipants.

As forces of a member country of NATO, AF of RoA should be in full compliance with those contemporary, ensuring the required level of the standardization and interaction. RoA with its AF want to guarantee the security and the defence of the state, as well as to expand and strengthen its role contributing into a safer regional and international background. Being a member of NATO but also member of the other international organisms such as having the status of the nominee state for the membership in EU, as well as the successful bilateral and the numerous agreements with various states of the region provides the support of RoA interests and the accomplishments of the objectives set forth in ISS (International Security Strategy). In these new conditions, the theoretical doctrine thought must guide towards the concept already known, that the security and the defence of the Albania isn't considered anymore as an international isolated duty but as a whole national and international engagement. For the defence of Albania, nowadays there are considered even the capacities of NATO, which are activated as the fulfilment of the duties of all member states, in the framework of the Washington Treaty. Our engagement should be so as the establishment, the preparation and the development of the military doctrine thought, should be reflected in the Military Strategy of RoA and the Plans of their Transformations must be developed with seriousness, professionalism and maturity. The process of transformation not only does require recognition but also the acceptance and practice of priorities that accompany it.

The General Staff, the commanders and the headquarters of all the Forces, have as a continuous duty to insist and to work with the mentality of the following transformation in constructing, organizing and developing the theoretical and doctrine thought for the effective usage of the successive force. For that, while better exploiting the positive experience of these decades, in the organization and the conceptual development of

AF, in our job, we have now what to improve and to achieve perfectness, we have a lot to do, based on the new and required philosophy and methodology as well as in the new created environment. This is our responsibility for the future, for the safety and secure continuity of the days to come.

We did this necessary historic feedback in analytical form, today in the eve of the 100th anniversary of the symbolic establishment of the Albanian Military, in order to see what has happened, but also to notice how the theoretical military and doctrine thought has advanced in the usage of Armed Forces of RoA over a decade.

Bibliography:

- Charles Oman, The place of war in history, London, 1947.
- Cyril Falls, "The art of war from Napoleon to the present day", London, 1961.
- Gaston Sanxhak, "Ushtria Popullore Shqiptare", First version.
- The document "Rishikimi Strategjik i Mbrojtjes i RSH" (draft) 2.
- Strategjia Ushtarake e RSH, 2007.
- AJP-1- Joint Doctrine of NATO, 2011.
- Strategjia Ushtarake e RSH (draft), 2012.

The organization of the Albanian Regular Army in the years 1927-1939

Prof. Dr. Proletar Hasani

Short commentary. *The Albanian Army and its main institutions have their origin in the Independence and the First Albanian State. They have the age of the first government and its ministwers. Said in a figurative way they were born together and come to us exactly from the 4th of December of the Historical year 1912, when in Vlore, Independence was proclaimed and the Provisional government was promoted, as the first government of an independent and modern Albanian State.*

In the initial vision and strategy of the Provisional government, newly formed in Vlorë, were taking place a great and incumbent worry of hers' which was "...the raising and organization of an armed force no matter how small, to protect itself from the attacks of the neighbours".

At the time in Vlorë the government thought even about the most suitable system of model of the military organization for the area where the Provisional government extended its power however unbelievable this may sound, considering the circumstances of that time. In accordance to that opinion the organizers were convinced that the most suitable model for the conditions of the Albania of the day was exactly the Austro-Hungarian military one. This was a strong testimony that the Vlora Government had a vision for the creation and the organization of a military force, for the protection of the independence of the small Albanian State.

But the birth was extremely difficult for many reasons. First of all because of the very complicated circumstances, not just for the environment and the Albanian space. At the geopolitical and strategic view, the Albanian territory had been changed into a highly valuable objective of the Balkan Wars, undertaken from the coalition of the Balkan states against Turkey and its military forces and troops, in the entire Balkans, where Albania was naturally included. One of their main objectives, combined with the first was the separation of the Albanian territories and their occupation. These were the reasons of fighting in the northern and southern regions of Albania, while in some Albanian areas a large presence of Turkish military forces was still obvious having not withdrawn completely from there, adding to the chaos and anarchy and further violating the law and order in the country. If you add to these circumstances

the extremely difficult economic, financial and military conditions, as well as the impossibility due to the fragility of the State and first provisional government and newly created, to manage rightly and in time this, it is understood that the situation was very difficult and delicate.

Despite these challenges, the above intentions and choices were not to remain simply ideas. On the contrary, the Vlora government undertook concrete steps to give life to the project and the vision with its strategy even though it might have been vague and not fully complete.

Under these circumstances, at the time of establishing the first institutions of the newly independent Albanian state, still not recognized by the early XXth century Great Powers occurred the establishment of other *main Defense institutions*. Exactly in this time period originates the Albanian Army and the state Albanian military organization, while in December 2012, they celebrate their one 100 years anniversary.

This signal that was given since the creation of the modest cabinet of the provisional Vlore government on the 4th of December 1912 when, at the makeup of its first cabinet as one of the main ministries, was included also the War Department, or otherwise called National Defence, with at the head of it, an officer with a great military career, with a lot of leadership, combat and organization experience, Brigadier General Mehmet Derralla (Tetova)¹. Also some months later the provisional government of Vlore with all of the problems and many difficulties it was facing on the 14th of May 1913 made possible the creation of the important apparatus for the organization, training, and commanding of the military forces, *Major Staff (Shtabit Madhor)*, led by a very energetic and professional military Major Ali Shefqeti (Shkupi). Just one month later, this staff formulated and sent for approval the regulation "On the organization of the Albanian Militia", that would see the light in Vlore, the 3rd of June 1913². Through it was now legalized the rising of a military militia, until it would be made possible the raising of an organization of the regular Albanian Military.

These institutions had their structures, regulations, symbols and seals, the same as the regular militaries of the time, having professional and career officers. They had been educated qualified in the best known Turkish military academies, such as the NCO's, all of which of Albanian origin, which had accepted the call and the military program of the Vlora government and had offered their patriotic and professional services to the first independent and modern Albanian government and state.

The government made endeavors to implement its strategy of country's national defense and sovereignty, through the newly established defence institutions, reestablished later. It firstly managed one of the available human assets which were the Volunteer Popular Forces. They had been raised and armed by themselves, in support of the Government and State by now independent. While the organization of the reserve forces had started, and alongside them, some measures were planned to reorganize Active Forces prepared in format of type companies so called "models"³.

¹"Historia e Popullit Shqiptar", Vol. III, Tiranë, "TOENA", 2007, p 18.

² "Historia e Ushtrisë Shqiptare", First Part, Tirana-2000, SHBU, p. 56.

³ Ibid.

In conformity with the Directive of Senior Staff Chief of Albanian Army, June 1913, which drew the attention to accelerate the process of its creation, this company was considered in all aspects an example and model for the entire Albanian National Army⁴. Several orders were issued by this Staff on the organization, training and equipping the military, dating back to this year, to enhance the process of organization, aiming at the completion process. And furthermore the government of Vlora had gone even further in connection with formation and presence of this new army. It had even thought about the new uniforms and weaponry which had been by now ordered in Italy and Austria, heavy weapons like Machine Guns, several cannons and the ammunitions for them. The purchasing of the weapons and ammunition from the Austro-Hungarian government was confirmed by its consul in Vlore, on the 16th of June 1913. By the 16th of September 1913 he notifies his own government that the Government of Vlora had asked for machine gun bullets, mountain cannons and hundreds of mules in Austria⁵. Also in another notification of the time he was notifying that, *"the provisional Government of Vlora made today the final requirement in the ammunition factory in Shtjar, by providing at the same time also the money for the supplying as soon as possible with three machine guns and 30.000 cartridges. At the same time it intends to send an agent at the munitions Factory in Bitenbergl to purchase even more rounds"*.

While the government of Vlora had requested at the capital of Austro-Hungary, in Vienna material aid also from several other acts, necessary for the organization of an Armed Force. Similar materials were books for the organization and training, internal service, or guidance in connection with the weapons of infantry, Mountain Troops, Artillery, Support, Engineering and Health⁶.

All of these events, altogether, indicate that the government of Vlora had a vision and a strategy, although outlined only in general, dedicated to the important and vital issue of the defence and safety of the new created state, a newly independent and still fragile sovereignty which is not totally recognized internationally.

The Provisional Government could not take further progress on its "Project", since in January 1914, due to the decision taken by the Great Powers of the time of July 29th, 1913, for the declaration of Albania Sovereign principality led by a foreign Prince, the Government resigned. *Prince Wilhelm von Wied* came to power based on the decision of the Great Powers and created a new government, which included also the Ministry of War, led by its minister, Brigadier General Esat P. Toptani. This government was followed just a few months later by a reformed government, August 1914, which had as its part the Ministry of War.

The government considered as important the gendarmerie and the creation of the military militia. The gendarmerie which conducted mainly defensive tasks alongside the usual traditional ones, for the protection and safeguarding of Law and Order, was aided by the Dutch military advisors of the General de Weer and Colonel Thomson, forces that were reinforced with a Defensive Artillery battery. Only in Korce was

⁴ ACA, Fund Kryesia e Qeverisë së Përkohshme të Vlorës, File III-5/1, doc. No. 11234.

⁵ "Ismail Qemali", Tirana, Printing House. "Naim Frashëri", 1982, p. 322.

⁶ Idem, p.322.

raised a military unit, but with limited defensive capabilities and that only in regional measures.

After this, in the years 1914-1918, the country became part of the First World War and one of the participating powers, the same as Austro-Hungarian Empire, France and Italy, in a theatre of this war. Thus, it can neither be thought of an army of national dimension and nature and certainly nor of a regular army.

It can be concluded that with the completion of the first phase of the Albanian state military organization, starting with the independence and Vlora' Provisional Government, despite several attempts aiming at creating the organized scheme of a regular army, it turned out to be inadequate. This happened due to the comprehensive extremely difficult circumstances and the limited time for the Provisional Government of Vlora to exercise its authority.

Therefore it can be said that based on the above mentioned circumstances, the government of Vlore, its Premier and military leaders, had a vision and strategy for the defence of the independence and sovereignty of the new fragile Albanian state. This vision was shaped by outlining, establishing and developing the main institutions of defence and military force, which would defend the country, guide and lead the defence activities. Also it can be estimated that despite the lack of the impossibility of establishing a regular classical army of the time, the Vlora' government considered and valued the gendarmerie as an armed force for the defence of the country, playing the traditional role as well as maintaining the law and order. This role should be carried out until the creation of a regular army, something which explains the interest of the Government of Vlora for the best equipping and arming of this force which was the most completed force of that time.

Whatever it is, in the years of this government, with all the limitations, undoubtedly the basis were laid down for the defensive institutions, as well as the beginning of the Albanian Armed Forces were laid down, independently that those structures were very far away from today's image. They made further progress and were improved significantly in subsequent periods of the history of our people.

We may consider a real military organization and the Albanian regular Army only in the subsequent years after the historic Lushnja' Congress, January 1920, during the government chaired by Sylejman Delvina, established in Tirana.

Exactly in the time of its creation, in the year 1920, the government of Lushnja inherited from the previous years, gendarmerie forces organized from the Durres government. Also in country there were acting also some type units of gendarmerie or local militias, created on the basis of the Albanian military personnel with the initiative and support of the foreign commands, parts of the Albanian theatre of war during the First World War. Similar were the: "Albanian Militia Legion", created during 1916-1917 from the Italian Invading Command, that was placed in the area of Gjirokastër-Delvinë-Përmet, the gendarmerie of Korca, with the support of the French troops, as well as the gendarmerie of Shkodra, with the support of the Austro-Hungarian empire and maybe some others. At the same time in separate areas of Albania operated and continued to do the same, some separate military units that

made their presence known even more so after 1920⁷.

With all of this presence the new Albanian government did not inherit purely military, regular and organized forces at country wide, while in the north and north east, as well as in the south of the country the continuous threat of chauvinist neighbours persisted.

Under these circumstances, the first discussions for the return of the War Ministry and National Albanian Army started in the country's National Assembly, about the second half of the 1920's. In those discussions the idea was brought about and many discussions took place "...on the formation of an army", idea that was to become concrete again on the 27th of October of the same year. In the meeting of the 26th of October, the senator, patriot and well known poet Hil Mosi had brought about the proposal in which, amongst others, laid down the need for the creation of the Albanian Armed Forces. The basic argument was that: "...the army is that power that secures the vitality of the state"⁸. Therefore he was requesting the laying down of the foundations for the War Ministry⁹. In that same meeting, the prime minister of the time, accepted that proposal by evaluating it such: "...to protect the boundaries of the state, the power of the gendarmerie is not enough, on one other side, when an rebellion shows itself, the power of the Army is needed"¹⁰. Talks and discussions regarding the creation or not of the Albanian Army and the Ministry of War, were long and passionate and, finally, the judgement in favor of its creation prevailed.

The main and essential concern that emerged from the discussions already was the creation of a regular army, considered as "*national power*" needed "...to protect the national honor"¹¹. In conclusion: "*The government should be based on a national force such as the army*"¹². These issues and arguments led the National Council to adopt a decision on the creation of "...Ministry of War and appointment of Mr. Ali Kolonja as the minister."¹³ It was proposed as well Along the Government an "*independent*" army that was "*impartial*" and "*free of influences*", which meant free from influence of politics and parties, "*having the goal of not diverting from military discipline*". Another powerful request was "...good economic treatment of this army from the state" since, "...it should be considered that an officer, in order to protect the official honour had to be properly clothed and have a guaranteed economic situation, while the opposite would be a dishonour for the army".¹⁴

Ministry of War was reestablished and rebuilding the National Army was approved. Having a clearly defined national mission and a modern professional military leader, as it was the case of the Minister of War, *Brigadier general Ali Riza Kolonja*, this Army was already in place and modelled according to the schemes of the time and in

⁷ Ibid, p. 112.

⁸ Ibid, p. 113.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ ACA, Fund-Parlamendi Shqiptar, File 42, year 1920.(Talks in National Council).

¹¹ Ibid, p. 153.

¹² Ibid, p. 114.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

line with the scope of a small country and people, such as Albania of those years. The Army was organized on the basis of a division consisting in three regiments. The forces' deployment was made according to the main directions and potential invaders of Albania. It intended to organize a small, well organized and effective force. Nearly a year later, 1921, when in the lead of the Army came another War minister; Colonel of Major Staff *Selaudin Said Shkoza*, a well known reformer, Albanian Army achieved some indications of a regular style army. It already operated on the basis of adopted laws and regulations and the Statute of the State of that time.¹⁵

In the aspect of numbers, regarding the population of that time, more than 800 thousand inhabitants, the Army and Gendarmerie reached in total a significant figure. According to the reports of the Minister of War, S. Shkoza and Major Staff, to the Prime Minister of Albania in response to a request by the League of Nations, in December 1921, we read: "... 1. *The army has its power to protect and support the Gendarmerie to maintain peace. This power does not exceed the amount of 7000 people. Its organization is like this: a division that consists of three regiments of three battalions, 6 batteries and 6 companies of machine guns.* 2. *The Army Budget was 6.500.000 golden frangs.*"¹⁶ This is the best example necessary to be studied by focusing on the way it was organized, trained and used with a high level efficiency, in a country having a wrinkled and small population like Albania of the early twentieth century.

Army and other Gendarmerie forces followed the course of the efforts and fluctuations of Albanian State, still weak and fragile, to consolidate and maintain the country's independence and integrity towards the ambitions of neighbouring states in the subsequent years, up to the year 1924. Efforts to apply some elements of the regular army were evident at this time. Legislation was outlined in the legal framework, as well as in dozens of regulations for military services. *Regulation of Permissions, 1921, Regulation of Resign and military pensions, 1923, Military Penal Code, Regulation on depoliticizing the Army* were some regulations.¹⁷

In January 1925, immediately after the dramatic events of June and December 1924, Albania was declared a republic and, among the first measures taken, was the replacement of the Ministry of War, after nearly 12 years of existence. *General Command and Army Powers* replaced the previous structure aiming at "*complete separation from politics*" the Albanian armed structures as it was commonly mention at that time.¹⁸ Distribution of the Army, following this act, necessitated the reorganization. The most important lesson coming from this act, that conveys the years until today, is the maintenance of the Armed Forces away from the impacts of the policy and its politic affiliation.

In reality, the first concrete efforts to this end were made by Colonel Selaudin Shkoza in 1921, one of the most reformists among Ministers of War. He designed and published several regulations, as well as the regulation "Depoliticization of the Army".¹⁹ The impact of the military's role in politics, which was allowed until 1924,

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 126.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 102-112.

¹⁸ Prime Minister Ahmet Zog Proclamation addressed to Albanian people, Tirana, year 1925.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 112.

was sanctioned by the *Law on Elections*, which followed the promotion of *Fundamental Statute* of the First Albanian Republic.

In essence, both sides of politics, had used the Army in the middle of the 20's century to regain power from one another, but the important thing is what came afterwards. The Army and other armed structures had to be removed from the party's political games, otherwise the country would suffer very painful traumas of high cost. The most bitter and simultaneously precious lesson was that military or armed powers should be used according to the law to carry out their mission, for the safety and protection of the country.

These reasons had strictly dictated the request and indispensable necessity for the reformation and reorganization of the Army and other armed forces of Albania. Among the first drastic actions was the distribution of the Ministry of War, even of the *National Army*, which was replaced by the *General Command and Army Powers*.²⁰ This measure was taken since it was judged that many of their members had supported the Movement of June 16, 1924. The army was extremely purged. While at the end of 1924 had 5700 people, it numbered only about 1.200 members.²¹

Since the beginning of reorganization and reformation, the idea that they had to be made according to the law and regulations of the time, was highlighted and meant that they had to keep in mind some standard criteria, adopted by the armies of many European countries. On January 21, 1925 was proclaimed the Republic, which is known in our history as the First Republic of Albania, of presidential type. At the end of this month was elected the *President of the Republic*.²² It was also defined clearly that in the military aspect, the President of the Republic was simultaneously the Commander in Chief of the Army Powers. He appointed and dismisses all Armed Powers officers.²³ While in *Article III* of this Statute, it was defined that "... *military service, is mandatory for all Albanian citizens.*"²⁴

Another clause of the Statute did not allow the servicemen to become MPs, by changing the existing tradition. According to the *Law on Elections*, March 14, 1925, officers were entitled to be MP Candidates, but had no certainty to return back to their former duty at the time of declaring their candidacy.²⁵

Transition from the organization of the Albanian Army to the *militia military system*, applied after 1922, after the selection between the two projects, "Myrdaci" and "Tatzati" and, especially after 1925, led to the promotion and implementation of another organization system starting from 1927. This was the *regular army system*, which was beneficial for the numerical growth as well as the improvement and modernization of structures of this army. Since 1926,²⁶ a time when in Albania, in line with the agreements signed between Italy and Albania, about 40 *Italian military missionaries* came to our country, having the first military attaché, Colonel Alberto

²⁰ Ibid, p. 248.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid, p. 168.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid, p 251.

Pariani, attached to the Albanian Army. This year can be considered as the basis of its transformation into the regular Army, in conformity to European models of the time.

The transformation consisted of several important conceptual and formal points of view. Most notable were the changes made in the Army when on *November 6th 1929*, it was enacted "*Law on regulating National Army*", which would be followed by three others, namely in 1931, 1934 and 1937. Changes naturally brought about, for the first time, the fall of the Militia system of military organization and official establishment of the organization system of the *regular Army*. The Army was organized for the first time on the basis of three forces, the Land Forces, Navy and Air Force, while the land forces certainly were the most important forces.

In the ten-year period 1928-1939, Army Powers of Albanian Kingdom and particularly the Army were enriched and improved by other elements, giving to it increasingly the image of a regular army, similar to the armies of other countries. Consequently, six years after the attachment of Italian military missionaries to Albanian Army Powers, became visible the impacts of their work to transform them according to the model of the modern regular armies of the time. The army consisted of Active and Reserve Forces; the latter were obliged to be trained until the age of 45. The main force of Army consisted of Land Powers as their were called at that time, which were divided into two divisions and included Infantry Forces, arranged in 6 mixed groups (regiments) the Artillery and Engineer branch. Another group consisted of 4 Corps; *Intendenca, Recruitment, Health and Veterinary*, and the group of military schools and several different elements. In the last category were included the General Military Hospital, Pharmacy, etc²⁷.

According to the new Law "*On National Army Regulation*", enacted on June 30, 1931, Army as part of the Army Powers was subordinate to National Defence Command, led by a senior officer having the rank General. In order to realize these ideas, especially in this year and in the following years, 1931-1932, the Army budget had a large increase by reaching an unprecedented figure up to that time, *11.499 million gold francs*. Together with that of the Gendarmerie, it reached 3.991 million gold francs and amounted to 50 per cent of the total state budget! This figure accounted for the highest quote in the history of Army Powers, 1912-1939 years. In this year, which coincides with the above budget, the Army personnel consisted of *700 officers, 800 NCOs, 7800 soldiers and 1350 animals*.²⁸

Even schools and local military education, since 1926, formally intertwined with the education abroad in the schools (colleges) and the Italian academies and allied neighbours but, although they were less in number, even the cooperation with Austria and Greece, gained new dimensions. In Albania, since January 1929 it was set up and operated the *Royal Military School and School Officers, School of Completion and Perfection* etc. They contributed to the education and training of the Albanian

²⁶ "Shqipëria më 1937", Vol. II, Tirana, Printing House "Kristo Luarasi", 1938, p. 104.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 130.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 131.

military, to increase the level of organization, training and acquisition of new and contemporary techniques and weapons, by the Albanian Army. Thus, we can say that, until the first days of April 1939, the Albanian Army had the form and content of a regular army, but was unable to prove itself that it was such an army.

In conclusion, we can say that, since the very beginning of their creation, the National Army was considered as indispensable need to defend the Independence of the country, the new, free and sovereign nation from the threat of a new invasion. Likewise, this army was considered and regarded as a factor that was part of national pride. Provisional Government of Vlora, for the first time in the history of the Albanian military, not only created and organized major defence institutions, but also marked the beginning of the Albanian state military organization and its Army. It made efforts, to the extent possible, within the time and space the circumstances allowed, not only simple to create and improve the image of the organization, but also to shape its vision. This occurred although this was far from what we can think today and contemporary image of armies of nowadays.

In 1920, at the time of Government that was formed after the historic Congress of Lushnja it began the genuine state military organizing and the proper and regular organization of the Albanian Army. This organization and the Albanian Army entered in the Albanian military organization. This organization would serve as an experience for the Albanian Army, despite the fact that its performance was interrupted by the fascist occupation of the country and from World War II that included Albania.

Within the broad one hundredth anniversary of the establishment and existence of modern independent state and the Albanian Armed Forces were among the first branches, irreplaceable and the most important ones. They have been seen and appreciated as the armed wing to protect and save the people, country and the independent state, their precious sovereignty. However, the evolution of military organization, the Army and further on of the Albanian AF, which started in Vlora, on December 4th, 1912, together with the First independent and modern State continued with its distinct features through the successive periods of history, to come until the present, in this important One hundred Anniversary and specifically, that we commemorate rightfully, with pride and deserved respect.

Bibliography:

- Historia e Popullit Shqiptar, Vol. III, Tirana, "TOENA", 2007.
- Historia e Ushtrisë Shqiptare", First Part, Tirana-2000, SHBU.
- ACA, Fund Kryesia e Qeverisë së Përkohshme të Vlorës, File III-5/1, doc. No. 11234.
- "Ismail Qemali", Tirana, Printing House. "Naim Frashëri", 1982.
- ACA, Fund-Parlamendi Shqiptar, File 42, year 1920.
- Prime Minister Ahmet Zog Proclamation addressed to Albanian people, Tirana, year 1925.
- "Shqipënia më 1937", Vol. II, Tirana, Printing House "Kristo Luarasi", 1938.

Albanian League of Prizren and its Armed Forces

Dr. Bernard Zotaj,
Director of Book and Information at TRADOC

Short commentary. *This paper deals with issues resolved by the Albanian League of Prizren (1878- 1881) concerning the organization and activity of the Armed Forces. In the process of the territory's protection activity, the Albanian League did not disregard the Albanian tradition of being always on alert, and giving rapid and sudden counterattacks and counterblows. The author handles the organization and composition of these forces acting throughout all the League's activity from the military point of view.*

The author deals extensively with the League's National Guard Forces, and their rear bodies with vertical stretch. He also stated that a 5 member Commission collected people's aid, donations and contributions from the rich for the army's needs and conducted the collection and distribution of the war trophy. The rear body was also stretched down to the base and consisted of district commissions, commissions of the defence committee of the League's branch, as well as special medical units, transport and storage.

He also emphasizes that the Albanian League of Prizren and its military activity accomplished its mission in history, fulfilling the political and strategic goal it was founded for. From the military point of view, it reached a climax experience for the time being, not only for the Armed Forces construction but also for the most necessary types of weapons and services, possible for that time, according to the appropriate military hierarchy from the centre to the base, with a mindset and especially a valuable practical combat in both tactical and strategic level.

The one hundred anniversary of the Declaration of Independence is the most marked event of the Albanian people and their nation. This major achievement was not and could not be an immediate act. Gradually, it was mentally and patriotically cultivated, especially on the basis of the Enlightenment ideas of the National Renaissance.

Albanian League of Prizren as a prologue of the new Albanian State

In the framework of the National Renaissance, the most crucial point of strengthening

national sentiment, became the League of Prizren (1878-1881). It carried out the organisation, political and military activity to protect Albanian lands, by increasing the sense of national duty of the four vilayets, part of the Ottoman Empire. Its activity was aiming at achieving Autonomy in proportion to the performance of internal and external events, and finally declaring Independence.

It was born during threatening and aggressive situations against Albanian lands since its very beginning; in its form and content, it was shaped as a pan-Albanian political, executive, and military organisation with a platform and a national political program, with an organizational structure extended in all Albanian territories. It was obvious that the Great Powers and their clients, our chauvinist neighbours did not want to recognise the Albanian nation, in the context of the expected solution of the Albanian issue.

Albanian patriots were encouraged by the blast of Eastern Crisis in 1870, especially by the pro-Slavic annexation provisions at the expense of the Albanian territories. The Treaty of Saint Stephan (March 1878) set everyone in motion. It was considered throughout Turkey as a death sentence issued against Empire¹. Patriots, were set in motion to raise the internal and external opinion in defence of the Albanian interests by following the work progress, devouring goals, not only those of the neighbouring chauvinist states, but also the ones of the Great Powers themselves.

They began the preparation and accomplishment of an armed uprising without waiting for the official approval of these treaties at the Berlin Congress, although the latter truncated Russia and its vassals' benefits by the Treaty of Saint Stephan. The Central Committee or the Committee of Istanbul was established in Istanbul, led by Abdyl Frashëri. Pashko Vasha, Jani Vreto, Ymer Prizreni, Sami Frashëri, Zija Prishtina, Idriz Dibra, Mehmet Ali Vrioni, Ahmet Koronica, Mihal Arito, Seit Toptani, Mustafa Vora Mane Tahiri, etc.² were among the other participants.

The activity of this uprising would be not only against predatory goals of chauvinist neighbouring states, but also against anti-Ottoman aiming at the first unification of Albanian territories and the declaration of autonomy. Furthermore, they would proceed towards the full independence from "Bosphorus patient", the Ottoman Empire. In this way, those measures aimed to raise the Albanian issue not only with Albanians themselves, but especially to display it to chancelleries, and negotiating table talks among Great Powers themselves, even with neighbouring countries not only as a simple diplomatic factor, but also as a particular issue to be solved out. They stressed that the Albanian issue should not be considered as a "spoils market" to satisfy the appetites of the chauvinist neighbours, but on the basis of the fundamental principle of the time "nation state".

In this context, on June 10, 1878, the National Assembly was gathered in Prizren with representatives from all regions of Albania. It announced the creation of the Albanian League of Prizren, which chose the higher bodies: the General Council with legislative functions and the Central Committee with executive functions. The

¹ Ismail Qemal Vlora, Kujtime, Printing House "Grand Prind", Tirana 2007, p. 146.

² Kristor Frashëri, Lidhja Shqiptare e Prizrenit, Tirana, 1977, p. 49.

National League Committee established three commissions; the commission led by chairman Sylejman Vokshi would manage the budget and provide the means for the purchase of arms and ammunition for the League's army and police³.

So, in terms of existing political and historical conditions, the League was determined for the autonomy of Albania in the framework of the Ottoman Empire, as a transition stage towards full independence.⁴ On June 17 the status of the ALP ("Kararnamë") was completed on July 2nd with corrections, clarifications and "Directions" ("Talimat"). Aspects of organizational, political and military measures were defined in them, in order to achieve the protection of the territorial integrity of the Albanian territories. In order to achieve its own objectives, an important act was the decision to create League's Armed Forces, which were otherwise called "National Guard"

Through these documents and similar acts, the League rejected the Treaties decisions of the Foreign Great Powers, extended its own organizational links, almost in all Albanian regions, creating a wide patriotic front without regional and religious differences. When the League found out that its efforts did not become fruitful even close to Great Powers, then it started from the radicalization of its own autonomous attitudes (July 1878) and later up to Independence from Ottoman Empire.

In these circumstances, the Albanian League of Prizren in addition to diplomatic acts at European Chancelleries, strongly acted by means of Armed Forces, for example: Gjakova's action, the battle to defend Plava and Gucia during winter (1879-1880), the battle to protect Hoti and Gruda (April 1880), Ulqini (in autumn of 1880).⁵

At the end of 1880, the League decided to call the Central Committee "Useful Government". So, the ALP took a glance and a lot of efforts towards an independent Albanian state.

Approaches to military thought and practice on the Albanian League of Prizren

In this framework and in accordance with its political strategy, in view of the strategic goal set on June 18, 1878, with the decision of the League's Central Council: "We will not allow in any way the entry of foreign troops in our country". So, it would ensure the integrity and territorial integrity of all Albanian lands from Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek aggression further ensuring its autonomy from the High Gate itself. The League, in addition to its military strategic formulation, displayed its activity for the creation of the National Guard, along with its armed wing. In this function, it stated that the main task to be solved by the League's military strategy was the organization and the completion of the volunteer military, the weaponry, the development of defence plans and allocation of the necessary forces required to protect any direction from the possible aggression wherever it came, solving the problem of leadership, rear organization, etc. Fundamentals of AF organization and

³ Dr. Frashër Demaj, *Britania e Madhe dhe çështja shqiptare 1875-1913*, Pristina 2001, p. 71.

⁴ Aleks Buda, "Shqipëria në vitet e Krizës Lindore 1877-1881", *Studime Historike* no. 3, Tirana 1967, p. 103.

⁵ Thoma Murzaku, *Traktati i Shën Stefanit dhe rrjedhat e zbatimit të tij për shqiptarët*, "National Conference of Studies about the Albanian League of Prizren, 1878-1881", Tirana 1979, p. 202.

their structures were laid in the Military Order of the Central Committee of the League.⁶

In the organization of its military force and country's defence, the League aimed at mobilizing and making efficient all Albanian human resources, moral and material ones, by relying on popular organizational fronts mainly voluntary. The main mobilization criteria was "a fighter from a family", in the border provinces directly threatened by enemy armies aggression; this principle went beyond to "three men for a family" or even more. Volunteers registration was performed from 15 to 17 years old. Based on this, the national guard manpower reached up to 260.000 people. Mobilization could be partial to protect mostly the border areas, and general depending on the risks encountered in one or in all directions at once.

Taking into account all the forces it was able to mobilize, the League calculated that in its military program as part of the "National Guard", organized and set up 480 battalions in total; each battalion had to have 500 volunteers (each had four infantry companies and one cavalry with 50-60 horses) organized in regiments composed up to 2000 fighters (4 battalions), brigades (two regiments, up to 4000 military volunteers) included in five corps (not having the same composition with brigades). In special cases the divisions and unit manpower could be more limited: battalion up to 300 persons, regiment up to 1200 persons and brigade up to 2500 persons. Infantry would be the main force of the "National Guard". But, in special cases, divisions and units were also equipped with artillery, navigation equipment, military intercommunication, intelligence services, itinerant units and defensive units for castles and towers.

To protect Albania's territorial integrity, the League compiled strategic plans as well. In its military ordinance, on June 18, 1878, it predicted "...labour division to protect the Albanian lands from North to South, military support to each other" and defence accomplishment, having definite strategic directions. The most important directions were those against Montenegro, Serbia and later on against Greece.⁷ In proportion to risks presented by different directions, in the North of Albania it was predicted to concentrate forces and main equipments, namely four corps (380 battalions) and in the South one corps or 1/5 of all the forces (about 100 battalions).

The League was not able to keep multiple forces ready. That's why it decided a readiness escalating system of the National Guard to cope with the expected aggression. Depending on the tasks to resolve, in proportion with the location and actions of the expected enemy, the system of readiness and organisation was foreseen to be composed in three rounds:

First rotating force-a small number of volunteers that came out of the border regional population, mainly storage, surveillance and notification. *Second rotating forces*-from regions inside the Albanian territories from 1000-2000 volunteers for each defence sector. When the aggression's danger approached, these forces doubled or tripled the defence to face the initial defence of the enemy. *Third rotating forces*-generally played the *role of strategic reserves*. Such forces were expected to be

⁶ Dr. Frashër Demaj, *Britania e Madhe dhe çështja shqiptare 1875-1913*, Pristina 2001, p. 68.

⁷ Great Britain 1878-1913 in History of United Kingdom, www.british-history.ac.uk

completed in the Middle of Albania (Mat, Krujë, Tiranë, Durrës, Elbasan), which were accounted to be 30.000 fighters and would strengthen Shkodra units during the protection against Montenegro along with them, they would pass to counter assault to liberate the territories that could be conquered.

The Central Committee of the League paid attention even to the election and assignment of the commanding staff. "The commander, major, and other army officers, selected on regular basis, would be appointed with the consent of the people's district, according to the census in each country, as it was stated in the relevant ordinance". In general, the high and low staff were selected from people who had skills, experience, courage and authority. During the League's military operations, there were formed military headquarters "operation centers", "division officers councils", and so on. They dealt with issues of organization and fighting conduct, with troop material safety, by ensuring rules and discipline among League's forces. Military hierarchy from company to brigade according to ranks and functions was defined in the ordinance.

Objects of military strategy were also problems of the distribution of National Guard forces. Because of the rugged mountainous terrain that surrounded Albanian borders, in order to maintain the required density, the defence was not supported by forces during the entire width of the front. For this reason the sectors that would be covered or defended by the Leagues forces, were mainly predicted in passable terrain, valleys and especially roads which linked territories of neighbouring states with areas of corps defence. Thus, these front sectors would be about 50-60 km towards Montenegro⁸, the same with Serbia, and even smaller towards Greece. Military actions of the League's forces would start with position defence acts, accompanied by intensive activities with counterattacks, counterstrokes, counterassaults. In the last one it was predicted to participate up to 40.000 forces by giving concentric blows, and in some directions three corps altogether. Attention was also given to the organization of interaction among units especially in their assault acts, manoeuvring of great forces (corps) from one direction to another, especially in the North of Albania, according to risks coming from one aggression to another (Montenegro, Serbia).

The study of the pursued tactics followed by the League's forces in fightings and battles they fought against Serbian, Montenegro, Greek and Turkish forces presented great interest. Of all these, the most important ones were those of Plava and Gucia, Hoti and Gruda, Ulqini and Zhvivo, Shtimja and Carrelevo. In general the military acts were characterized by impetus, initiative and the assaulting spirit, determination and high moral, mass heroism, etc. Different fightings and battles at first had active, positional, and protective character; the battle order was generally organized in two echelons and even with reserves; in defence assaults, terrain was completely used by setting up a "foothold" system and defensive areas with forces from hundreds up to 2.000 persons. In Plava and Gucia there were set up 5-6 defensive areas, in Hoti and Gruda 7-9 ones, while in Ulqin 3-4 of the above mentioned.

⁸ Skënder Rizaj, *Çështja shqiptare në marrëveshjet e Fuqive të Mëdha të Evropës (1878-1881)*, Gjurmime albanologjike, VII-1977, Pristina 1978, p. 193.

What was taken into consideration during the protection activity was the fact that counterattacks and counterblows were given quickly, immediately, upwards-downwards, and in the direction of the enemy's wing. Thus, all the forces took part in Plava and Gucia battles of December 4, 1879, and even in January 1880; forces reached over 8000 persons during counterattacks, in January. In one of the counterattacks at Slivova and Shtimja, about 3000 persons took part, or 50% of the defence forces.

Forces of the League's National Guard had their own rear body with vertical stretch. A five member Commission topped in the centre collected people's aid, as well as donations and contributions of the rich for army's needs, and conducted the collection and distribution of the war trophy. The rear body was also stretched down to the base and was composed of district commissions, commissions of the defence committee of the League's branch, as well as special medical units, transport and storage.

League of Prizren and its military activity carried out its mission in history in the function of its political and strategic purpose it was created for. From the military point of view it marks a culminating experience for that time not only for the creation of the Armed Forces but also for the types of weapons, and services most necessary and even possible for the time, with the appropriate military hierarchy from the centre to the base, but also with a common sense and valuable military thought, both at strategic and tactical level. Part of this experience is found in some documents or orders of the League and the rest is drawn from the study and analysis of multiple military actions, committed in various fightings and battles especially in those of Plava and Gucia, Hoti and Gruda, Ulqini and Zhvivova, Shtimja and Carreleva.

League of Prizren, functioned only for three years. In the first quarter of 1881, when it was quite clearly revealed that the High Gate itself supported the Great Powers, League's forces took the initiative and liberated important cities in turn, such as Skopje (January 4), Mitrovica (January 15) and Prishtina (January 18), by expelling all Ottoman officials and establishing ALP power. The High Gate undertook armed actions invading Shkupi with betrayal (25 March 1881), and after bloody battles in Slivove and Shtimle entered Prizren, and restored its powers, finally ending ALP.

The Albanian National Movement, identified at that time with the Albanian League of Prizren, presented in a summary and programmatic form the fundamental positions of its foreign policy. It contained the request for the protection of territorial integrity, expressed a desire to uphold the European affiliation of their own country and granting the autonomy or independent state of Albania, which could be identified with the request for acknowledging Albania as a subject of International Law⁹.

Yet, with its military and patriotic activity, the League, for the first time, made it possible to display increasingly the diplomacy of the Albanian issue near the external factor. With its political platform, and military mass actions it led to constantly rising and moulding the idea of nationality. All these made it possible to gain awareness of a particular historical destiny, already even by the Ottoman Empire itself. In other

⁹ Ksenofon Kristafi, "Lidhja Shqiptare e Prizrenit dhe Fuqitë e Mëdha" në Lidhja Shqiptare e Prizrenit dhe vendi i saj në histori, Pristina 2008, p. 204.

words, the League displayed and moulded the prospect of the Albanian people itself to become an independent state with its own example, and being illuminated by Enlightenment ideas of the Renaissance. This state was created by the ardent patriot Ismail Qemali with the establishment of the National Flag, on November 28, 1912, in Vlora. The precursor value of the ALP for the formation of the new Albanian state was worth and still retains major national values.

Bibliography:

- History of United Kingdom: Primary Documents, www.british-history.ac.uk
- Great Britain 1878-1913 in History of United Kingdom, www.british-history.ac.uk
- Ismail Qemal Vlora, Kujtime, Printing House "Grand Prind", Tirana 2007.
- Aleks Buda, "Shqipëria në vitet e Krizës Lindore 1877-1881", Studime Historike no. 3, Tirana 1967.
- Arben Puto, Çështja shqiptare në aktet ndërkombëtare të periudhës së imperializmit, Tirana, 1984.
- Kristo Frashëri, Lidhja Shqiptare e Prizrenit, Tirana, 1977.
- Dr. Frashër Demaj, Britania e Madhe dhe çështja shqiptare 1875-1913, Pristina 2001.
- Thoma Murzaku, Traktati i Shën Stefanit dhe rrjedhat e zbatimit të tij për shqiptarët, "National Conference of Studies about the Albanian League of Prizren, 1878-1881", I, Tirana, 1979.
- Skënder Rizaj, Çështja shqiptare në marrëveshjet e Fuqive të Mëdha të Europës (1878-1881), Gjurmime albanologjike, VII-1977, Pristina 1978.
- Ksenofon Kristafi, "Lidhja Shqiptare e Prizrenit dhe Fuqitë e Mëdha", në Lidhja Shqiptare e Prizrenit dhe vendi i saj në histori, Pristina 2008.

On the concept of security and defence during the Cold War

Major General ®. Prof. Dr. Kostaq Karoli,
LtC. Msc. Edmond Doda,
Deputy Director of AF Central Archive

Short commentary. *During the period from 1945 to 1990, the term “security” has been inseparable from the term “protection”. Security, as the country’s ability to cope with and break aggression against it, has been closely related with the development and emancipation of the country and strengthening its defensive ability, as well.*

The liberation of the country from Nazi-fascist invaders was a great military and political achievement. Albania was the only country in Europe, liberated without the direct assistance of the allied forces. Albanian partisans gave a valuable contribution in the liberation of Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia’s lands.

Albania’s geostrategic importance, the siege from the countries having territorial claims, determined to a considerable extent, the problems related to our country’s security and defence. That happened because Albania was listed in the eastern bloc for a period of time. This was also related to the fact that Albania had been threatened in the past by certain directions, so it was believed to be threatened again in the future.

Talking about issues of our country’s security and defence in the period 1945-1990, three stages or phases have been observed, which besides some things in common, have also qualitative and quantitative differences. Such characteristics are reflected in alliances, military organization, variety, in operational-strategic and tactical concepts etc..., that came as a result of the changes in the internal and external political environment, as well as threats and economic development of the country.

Today we observe rapid changes at the regional and global level, in relations among states, economical, geopolitical, technological development, etc. Today we are witnessing a process in which the society has been transformed from industrialized to information one. This can be reflected in security and defence issues as well. However, to better understand and clarify the present situation, it is necessary to have a retrospective look in the past, in order to understand and treat the security and defence issues, as well as stages that country passed in the period from 1945 to 1990.

During the first stage, from 1945 to 1950, in the basic content of the security and defence issues, measures taken to rebuild the war-torn country belong to that stage; furthermore efforts to be recognized in the international arena as well as the alignment of the winning states of the Second World War, which would lead to the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S. in a message sent on the occasion of the 32 anniversary of the Declaration of Independence stated that: "Albanians, have given their full assistance to ensure the defeat of the common enemy, through their heroic resistance, against the Nazi invaders. Albanians have fought hard battles, over a period of more than five years."¹

During the early post-war years, National Security was an issue of vital importance. Corfu incident that led to the cessation of diplomatic relations with England and biased sentence by Hague court, along with the negative impact on political and economic terms, on the other hand demonstrated the meaningful response to anyone who would threaten our country's defence and security.

Opposing the provocations on August 2nd, 1949, was not only a response to the statement of the General Papagas that: "It is now the time to liberate Northern Epirus", but also a significant indicator that the security and defence of our country were currently one of the main issues.

During this period, interest was shown in strengthening security and defence; a variety of forms of political work were used through propaganda, agitation and press through rallies at the district level, job centres, regimental and battalion, political conferences, etc.. in the internal plan. For the first time military flyers were used as a new form of agitation, where internal and external news were written, about work in factories, collection of agricultural products, slogans such as: "Not a single inch of land in enemy's hands", "rifles and shovels are soldier's best friends in war", "I swear on the blood of the martyrs that the ugly monarcho-fascists's boots will never violate our country" etc.²

However, with the deep economic backwardness, low educational level of population, with about 95% illiterate, an underdeveloped health service with a limited network; a poor traffic and a very great army newly released from war, equipped with weapons mainly trophies, etc., the country's defence and security could not be ensured. It was quite obvious that an army so big could not be held for a long time, not being a burden in the economy, but also without hampering its modernization. In those circumstances, the main work was focused on the National Army's³ rapid transformation into a contemporary army in peacetime. Efforts were made to find the most appropriated and affected roads and forms of organizational building, raising and increasing the types of weapons and services, standardization of armaments, in order to increase the level of training, improve the quality of personnel, etc.

The issue of security, necessarily required army's strengthening and equipping in order to achieve the main objective reflected in the country's Constitution "People's

¹ Gazeta "Mundimi", no 36, date 30 November 1944.

² F. 14, F. 33, year 1949.

³ From 10th of July 1945 to 10th of July 1950, National Army of Liberation is called National Army.

Army is the armed power of People's Republic of Albania, It guards the state's boundaries and serves to protect peace and security".⁴

In this period, the number of military manpower was ensured through the demobilization of old fighters, women, pioneers, those without family assistance or different specialists necessary to rebuild the country influenced not only quantitative but also qualitative indicators.

Consequently, in the first reorganization (July 1945) Army's effectives were reduced to 35%, corparmats were also reduced. In the second organization in March-April 1946, the number of National Army reached 50%, which led to its organization with five divisions of three regiments each. (3 divisions were armed by the Soviet Union, and 2 divisions stationed in Yugoslavia were armed by the Yugoslavs). Due to the economic situation of that time, the country's leadership advised that it might not be possible to have a high moral army if they were not well-worn, when it would not have comfortable barracks, and even not eat well.⁵

During the completion progress of AF structures with manpaower, the National Assembly, with Decree no.246, dated 13.12.1946, defined the compulsory active military service for the age of 20-35 years and the reserve's service for the age of 36-55 years old.

The main criterion of the second stage (1950-1960), in terms of security and defence, is the strengthening of the country's economic and political stability, UN membership and establishing positive diplomatic relations with almost all countries of Europe as well.

Thus, on May 14, 1955 in Warsaw, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance among Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia was ratified.

The treaty predicted that in case of an armed attack against any of the signatory states, the other participants of this treaty will give immediate military assistance to the attacked state by all necessary means, including the use of armed force.⁶ While the creation of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces in these countries will contribute to the strengthening of their defence. Meanwhile, the Warsaw Pact membership emphasized the common defence concepts and doctrines, modernization of the Armed Forces, the starting point in the creation of the reserve components, and some types of weapons and services etc, which further strengthened our country's security and defence.

Despite this, internal threats emerged in evidence, as they derived from different opposing groups related to external pressures. The fact that western countries prepared plans and made efforts to change Tirana's regime, was quite obvious.

They prepared groups of fugitive Albanians as well as "4000 Company", who were thrown occasionally inside the country, where most were caught or eliminated. "I

⁴ Kushtetuta e Republikës Popullore të Shqipërisë, Article 94, Tirana, 1946.

⁵ ACA F.14OU, F. 2, year 1945, p. 18.

⁶ CAA, F. 100/3, F. 18, year 1955.

trained the saboteurs to overthrow Enver Hoxha” wrote in one of his books David Smajli.⁷ At that time, a major impact had the events in Poland and Hungary. All these dictated an expansion of forces in the Interior Ministry.

Despite the economic growth, which at the end of 1954 increased to 179% the total industrial production, bread grains cereals were 153%, whereas 44% of the total investment was approximately spent for the industrial development, while in agriculture 66% more funds than anticipated, consequently the strengthening and modernization of AF structures could not be supposed. Moreover, the educational level of the population and recruits was low. In 1956, 97% of recruits were primary educated or illiterate.⁸

In the current situation defence issues were focused on the improvement of AF structures, and units interoperability, while ammunition and equipments were supplied by former Soviet Union. Reductions made in 1955-1956 provided a qualitative improvement and a better concentration of the personnel. At present, the Brigade's personnel constituted 60.8% of the troops in peacetime, officers 15%, NCO 22.3% and, 1.9% civilian personnel.⁹ In war time personnel was 1.6 times higher than that in peacetime¹⁰. The total amount of AF during war, in that period, was 3.1 times greater than in peacetime. Reserve forces were 6% of all the Armed Forces or 7.9% of the combat forces. In peacetime mechanized forces (motorized infantry and tanks) constituted 6.5% of active troops¹¹.

The third Congress of the ALP declared the collectivization of 85% of agricultural economies by the end of five years, where the army would have a special role, officers should make propaganda about the benefits that collectivization would bring. Another task was the mechanization of agriculture, where peasants' sons had to become technique's masters in the production front during their military service, in addition to becoming masters of the military techniques.

Progress made in the weaponry technique, events of the Suez Canal, etc., not only provided structural improvements, but also oriented in defence preparation in terms of using mass destruction weapons; war against air troops; strengthening the anti tank protection; war against helicopters etc. Thus, for example in Infantry Brigade, if the personnel of ground artillery increased 1.2 times, antitank artillery and anti air artillery grew up to 3 times. Increasing numbers of warships made the creation of Naval Combat Fleet Command necessary.

The Completion of studies in the former Soviet Union by a large number of professionals in the army and also from other sectors, influenced positively in the strengthening of country's defence.

In process of strengthening country's security and defence problems at that time, it was necessary to emphasize that, attention was paid to the preparation of voluntary

⁷ Gazeta “Mapo”, 3 tetor 2012.

⁸ CAA F.100/4, F.24, year 1956.

⁹ CAA, F.100/4, F.84, year 1953.

¹⁰ ACA, F.14, F.13, year 1956.

¹¹ CAA, F.100/4, F.16. year 1958.

people, especially before performing military service. So, only via the association in aid of the Army and Defence (AAAD) in 1956 60,000 people were prepared in 17 specialties.¹²

Despite these achievements the responsive ability to war time forces was slow. Meanwhile, reserve forces did not know the unit or the squad where they would line up, or act; the area where they would be equipped with weapons and clothing. Also, the units' commanders did not know the entire plan etc. This meant that the first echelons wards with active forces were calculated to get ready after 2-4 hours, the second echelons consisting of reserve forces, which composed those formations, would be ready after 3-5 days.¹³

The beginning of the breakup among Warsaw Pact countries and especially with the USSR influenced the increasing of the internal and external risks and threats. Likewise, they slowed down the Armed Forces modernization programs, by preventing the delivery of military technique for their completion.¹⁴

Thus, in the period 1957-1959 it was given 1 submarine; 6 torpedoes; 2 anti submarine guns, 1 search and rescue ship; 1 floating machine shop; 1 floating dock; 6 helicopters Mi-4; 10 aircraft Il-28; two coastal batteries (100 mm and 130 mm); 32 mortars 120 mm; 59 guns calibre 122 and 152 mm; 40 special machines etc.

The third stage, 1960-1990: During different trainings in front of our "reds", we set up the blues for Yugoslav, Greek or Italian; the same thing had been done by the armed forces of these countries being put in front of our military forces. In fact it was not only during exercises, but also in reality. So, in December 1960, the Italian command set up the so-called "Albanian plan" that predicted forces and commands that were supposed to take part in case of a possible attack by Albania¹⁵. The breakup from the Warsaw Pact (de facto 1963) and the interruption of diplomatic relations with USSR, according to that time were also related to internal and external risks and threats.

According to estimation of the time, the two blocks were eager to invade our country as soon as possible and after removing the "Albanian barrier", it could be used as an important strategic base to get out of Balkans and Mediterranean. Aggression could start after a threatening and surprise period.

The same could also be done by our neighbours, starting their aggression with available forces in the vicinity of our borders or with larger forces penetrating from the depth, pretending to do exercises. The "causes" for the beginning of the aggression could be different, for e.g. NATO block, as well as Italy, might exploit the "risk" of the Russians exit to the Adriatic coast. Moreover, Warsaw Pact under the pretext of "aid" to Albania to cope with the danger threatened by NATO. Greece might also use the so-called Northern Epirus issue, etc.¹⁶

¹² CAA, F.100/4, F.24, year 1957.

¹³ CAA, F 100/4, F.66, year 1953.

¹⁴ CAA, F 100/4, F.41, year 1964.

¹⁵ CAA, F. 100/5, F.32, year 1960.

¹⁶ CAA, F. 100/5, F.21, year 1974.

Balkans geopolitical situation was rather complex, as the two countries (Greece, Turkey) were NATO members, the other two members of the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria and Romania), while Albania and Yugoslavia were uncommitted in military alliances. Under these conditions, it was estimated that by staying out of the blocks despite the negative consequences they had, keeping neutrality of disengagement, it was intended to avoid risks as much as possible and maintain autonomy. Therefore, the main purpose of foreign policy has been on the whole, the solution of security and defence problems in the most independent way, efforts to improve relations with its neighbours and other Western countries, and ensuring conditions to maintain the country's sovereignty. As a consequence, Albania's international position was strengthened in general, and the relations with other countries were expanded.

The consolidation of relations and mutual cooperation with PR of China, the growth rates of the economy, reforms in education, health, complete electrification of the country, the creation of new branches of industry, strengthened people's cohesion and created favourable conditions for the strengthening and modernization of the Armed Forces to further enhance the security issues of the country's defence.

If until 1960, our country's defence was associated with Warsaw Treaty obligations and as such it was dealt in this context; at this moment, new conditions required processing a new thinking on defence. As a consequence, and on the basis of the accumulated experience on Army trainings as well, in 1967 "Theses on the National Military Art of PR of Albania" came out; it could be characterized as "the common doctrine of the Armed Forces," which was revised twice.

In accordance with this, our country's defence was planned to be fulfilled in terms of isolation, consequently the concept of "relying mainly on our own forces"; "the final victory could be achieved by a small army against a large one, by means of the popular struggle led by a revolutionary party", etc.¹⁷ As a result of the implementation of this concept, a large-scale passing of reserve structures was implemented side by side with the organization and expansion of Volunteer Forces, Student and School Youth structures, strengthening of the security line, strategic proliferation of units and subunits closer to military duties, recreation of the corpus structure, etc. In the programs of high schools and universities, military preparation was included each academic year.

Such way of organization brought therefore by the end of 1970 compared to 1960, the number of Armed Forces increased 3.8-4.3 times, and up to 8.5-9.5 times higher than during peacetime, which in turn increased 1.5 times more in comparison with the second phase. Similarly, the operating units increased 6 times; infantry tactical units over 5 times; tank units more than 7 times; land artillery units about 8 times; AAA units about 4 times; aviation and aircraft about 3 times; engineering units about 10 times; machine gunner units about 2.6 times, FVVP about 2.4 times etc.¹⁸

The strategic defence concept was built on the basis of its position and activity with all types of weapons, combined with various engineering obstacles, with counterblows

¹⁷ CAA, F. 100/1, F.86, year 1968.

¹⁸ CAA, F.100/4, F.29, year 1970.

and counterattacks. To break the opponent's sudden aggression and to ensure the opening of structures with wartime organics, a special role would be played by the security zone, which would open for war not only the first but also the second echelon of the opponent's Infantry Division, as well as the emergency units of Ground Artillery, AAA, etc.

The increase of the defence sustainability was carried out not only in its depth, but also through the massive fortification of regions, positions and defence generations, by building fire positions for artillery and infantry, about 200,000 ones, tunnelled Fleet bases, Aviation, post commands, warehouses, military industry, underground telephone intercommunication, shelters for population, etc.

Strategic counterassault (assault) was conceived as a result of taking the initiative in an operational scale and achieving equilibrium of forces in the strategic-operational level in the given directions, accomplished by defensive operations. It was predicted to be given in specific directions, from the second generation or between the second or third one, but not back, approximately 30-40 km in depth.

For the successful implementation of the operations against air assaults, defence and counterassaults (assaults), in the concept of country's defence, special attention was paid to the increase of General Command reserves; the creation and growth of food, fuel, spare parts, ammunition reserves, etc., in addition to state resources. So, in infantry units the General Command reserves accounted for about 18%, in tank units over 50%, in artillery units over 67%, in engineering units about 70% of them etc.¹⁹ Rationing of various resources (food, ammunition, fuel, etc.) in the first echelon units lasted only for 15 days of war, in ID for 25 days, whereas in the foreseen areas of siege fighting it was provided for 3-6 months. Since peacetime, the HQ, units and subunits, had prepared a detailed planning with many options to be used by AF and FVVP, for all types of operations.

Local and central government bodies had determined the personnel in war time. Basic principle for the country's civil-state preparation since peacetime to face a potential war situation is that in time of war, all human and material resources of the country must be mobilized to successfully cope with the state of war, under the war slogan "Everything for the front", "Anything for victory."²⁰ Units' establishment, the composition of the organizational structure, and its completion, etc., was performed according to the importance of directions, the principle of facing the most difficult situation and the preparation for a long struggle.

In terms of the country's isolation, the creation of design lines, maintenance and production of armament, ammunition and military technique emerged as a necessity. Implementation of the directive "...the production of infantry weapons and its ammunition inside the country"²¹, and many other tasks, led to the creation of study-design institutes and about 12 military plants. In the country's military industry worked over 14600 people, its annual production, in the country's currency, was equal to the

¹⁹ CAA, F.100/4, F. 29, year 1980.

²⁰ CAA, F. 14, F. 6, year 1968.

²¹ CAA, F.100/1, F. 48, year 1962.

production of the country's mechanical industry. Alongside there were also workshops for each infantry Division (corpus).

A situation in isolation conditions, under an uncertain and complex security environment, limited opportunities of intelligence service, brought into evidence the improvement of surveillance system, land, sea and airspace detection. For this purpose, considering our country's security and defense as one of the most important directions, the problem of detecting and warning of aggression, about 18 radio technical posts operated, about 8 post radiolocation, about 8 post radio detection, radio locator system, land survey posts, etc.

This entire defense structure necessarily required the preparation of high-level officers and an increase of the troop training level. New schools were established as that of MNF, Aviation, three reserve officers' training schools, schools corps (divisions) etc.

Applications for the High Officer School and Military Academy, (today the Academy of the Armed Forces) were increased. Troop training programs were improved, paying attention to fire training, firing with various types of weapons, tactical training in units (subunits), fire shooting, antitank attacks, air raids and air targets, protection against AMD, trainings at night, fighting diversionists intelligence groups, etc.

However, it should be noted that taking into consideration the issues of security and defence in terms of the isolation of the country, they were a heavy burden on its economy. The economic decline, especially after China's separation, the extreme herding "class struggle", etc., could not beat the morale and readiness of all security and defence structures, people in general and consequently could not increase the internal and external risks and threats.

The Removal of ranks, collisions provided in the various sectors of the country, the dismissal of nearly 100% of MOD's main staff, HQ and corps commanders in the years 1974 and 1982, could not seriously hurt the issue of country's security and protection. Even the restructuring of the Division in 1982-1983, alongside with the positive effect of the best closing of operative and operational-strategic and the speed up with the reserves' completion, led to a decrease in the volume of GA fire, AAA, and to an increase of staff and forces number, etc.. So, out of 9 Corps headquarters and operational grouping became 22 headquarters, so they increased to 2.4 times, from 675 effective forces at its headquarters to 1320 that is 2 times more. They equalized the personnel who worked at the chain bk (Gr A) and down (about 52%), with the personnel working in headquarters, Regiment, Brigade, Division (about 48%).

The extension of units and subunits in about 2346 opening points and warehouses, the commitment for a long time of forces during fortification work service, reduced the training level and diffused the forces in small groups. These and many other problems reduced the level of country's security and protection.

To conclude, we can say that the security and defence of the country did not have the current meaning nowadays not only in the concept but also in practice; however, the Armed Forces as the main element of this security regardless of economic, military circumstances, and its politicization, managed to complete the mission to protect the integrity of territorial and sovereignty of the country. It was also confirmed by God

Manfred Werner in the Parliament in 1993, where he declared that “Albanians are known for their firmness and elasticity. These characteristics have maintained the independence of your country during the confrontation...”²²

Bibliography:

- Newspaper “Mundimi”, no 36, date 30 November 1944.
- F. 14,F. 33, year 1949.
- Kushtetuta e Republikës Popullore të Shqipërisë, Article 94, Tirana, 1946.
- ACA (Albanian Central Archive) F.14OU, F.2, year 1945.
- CAA (Central Army Archive), F. 100/3, F.18, year 1955.
- Newspaper “Mapo”, 3 October 2012.
- CAA F.100/4, F.24, year 1956.
- CAA, F.100/4, F.84, year 1953.
- CAA, F.100/4, F.15, year 1954.
- CAA, F.100/4, F.40. year 1961.
- AQSH, F.14, F.13, year 1956.
- CAA, F.100/4, F.16. year 1958.
- CAA, F.100/4, F.24. year 1957.
- CAA, F 100/4, F.66, year 1953.
- CAA, F 100/4, F.41, year 1964.
- CAA, F. 100/5, F.32, year 1960.
- CAA, F. 100/5, F.21, year 1974.
- CAA, F. 100/1, F.86, year 1968.
- CAA, F.100/4, F.29, year 1970.
- CAA, F.100/4, F.29, year 1980.
- CAA, F. 14, F.6, year 1968.
- CAA, F.100/1, F.48, year 1962.
- Manfred Verner-From the address in The Parliament of Albania, March1993.

²² Manfred Verner – From the address in The Parliament of Albania, March1993.

Prepare Today for what we will face Tomorrow - An Albanian Perspective of Future Security Environment

Col (R) Thimi Hudhra,
Deputy Director of National Centre for Security and Defence

Short commentary. *Does Albania have more or fewer risks and threats than 20 years ago? Which of them are decreasing and which are expected to increase? Which of them are internal, which are external, and which are trans-national? Which of them can come from state actors and which from non-state groups? What risks come as a result of globalization, what as a result of membership in international security structures, what as a consequence of regional ethnic issues, and what as a result of re-emergence of traditional risks? Further, what are the risks defined as new security challenges that our country can not avoid? And, last but not least, what are the risks coming as a result of the forces of nature, or caused by human or industrial disasters?*

No doubt, the security environment is not a question of only threats, risks and challenges. The national and regional security environment will be incomplete, without including the positive opportunities and chances it offers. Only based on this analytical approach, the security environment can be evaluated as a coin with two sides, in order to have a realistic assessment.

Security environment is the barometer for the development of security institutions. The expectations of the security environment are the foundation of the National Security Strategy, the Military Strategy, and the Joint Doctrine of AAF. This article serves precisely the efforts currently being made for the formulation of these documents.

Introduction

The introduction part of this article is of a philosophical nature. Is there any precise prediction on the global security environment for the coming decade? Can trends or cycles of history serve as a basis to predict the developments of the history? Can we predict all possible scenarios or their combinations? If yes, how can we influence, and if not, what can we do?

Confucius says that “those who do not know the past can not predict the future” and *Churchill* says that “he who does not learn from the mistakes of history is destined to repeat them again.” Of course, the teaching of history is necessary, but it is impossible that through history and any analysis that embraces human thought, we can accurately predict the future, as claimed in the 100 prophecies of *Nostradamus*.

The latest study of “*Multiple Future Projects*”, which engaged over 400 scientists and analysts of various fields concluded that “*it is true that we can not accurately predict what might happen in a specific time many years ahead, but we can understand the trend of development of events, and we can give an impact to the best interests we promote*”.¹

According to the scientific analysis, it is already recognized that human kind is almost impossible to exactly predict the events of history, but great leaders can give an impact to the course of history. Decision-making, especially at crucial historical moments, are of great importance in the history of mankind and nations. Otherwise, they will fall victims of the philosophical expression of “*Alice in Wonderland*”, regarding the terms of the famous rhetorical question “*if I do not know where to go, any road will lead you there*”².

A dynamic strategic environment of the 21st century

The evolution of the strategic security environment is a crucial factor for shaping the approaches of security and defense institutions. In times of a growing globalization, with a new political geometry, many demographic and environmental changes, together with a rapid development of technology, it is expected that the next decade will frame a further dynamic security environment.

Unlike conventional threats of last century, the 21st century began with the new risks and threats to civilization, democracy and human rights. The 9/11, 2001, was a ‘*Pearl Harbor*’ of the modern era; it shocked the minds of the civilians and military of all NATO countries, serving as a catalyst for the beginning of a post-industrial revolution in military affairs. In this context, the U.S. Secretary for Defense Policy Douglas J. Feith states that “*...we are not faced with relatively predictable threats of the Cold War, on the contrary, we have entered a phase of uncertainty and surprise...; What we can anticipate today is that we will face unpredicted challenges tomorrow, with a wide spectrum of opponents-some of them known and many others unknown* ...”³.

Global security environment in the last two decades has undergone profound changes. Irregularity and asymmetry are replacing regularity and symmetry. Future security trends are associated with a world of irregular developments. Factors and new priorities are replacing old priority factors. The yesterday’s capabilities appear to be less useful in today’s operations, while the today’s capabilities will most likely be less useful in tomorrow’s operations.

As an ally country, despite the significant reduction of the weight, scale, and intensity of risks and threats to the country, we experience an increase in numerical terms. Albania, like other member countries, is now sharing all risks and threats affecting the Alliance as a whole and each of its 27 other countries in terms of their specific circumstances. So the map of risks and threats to the security of Albania, along with internal non-military risks and threats, reflects what security of the Alliance carries out as a whole, expressed in its Core Tasks of the Strategic Security Concept.

¹ Multiple Future Project, 2009 Edition, p. 35.

² Alice in the Wonderland, English edition, 1989, p. 23.

³ Douglas J. Feith, “*Beyond the Cold War-What Next?*” Speech at Institute for Defence Analyses, US, August 1994.

Also, while shaping the security environment one should bear in mind that risks, threats or opportunities may have a difference in different regions of the Alliance, especially when comparing inland countries with countries in the periphery. Some risks and threats for a specific country or region may be of primary importance and for some others they may not. In this context, in my opinion the Joint Doctrine of AAF should reflect a realistic and creative approach in the identification of the spectrum of the risks and threats to the Republic of Albania (RoA), which require both the use of military power and engagement of other components of national power, in the three security situations: peace, crisis and war.

Opportunities/Chances of the security environment

Unlike the traditional way of the “*half empty*” glass, which provides a pessimistic assessment of the regional security environment starting with risks and threats, I think that we may have a different approach of the “*half full*” glass, by initially addressing the chances and opportunities of this new security environment under an optimistic view.

Our country and the Balkan region have now a security map much more favorable than 10-20 years ago. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia created new states. The map of direct territorial neighboring countries to the RoA has undergone positive quantitative and qualitative changes. Likewise, our country’s security is significantly favored by the presence of the Albanian population in direct neighboring states. This opportunity that should be used by all countries in the region to build bridges of cooperation between our countries and peoples.

Expectations are for a further improvement of the present security climate. Newly born states, despite the challenges of development, are making progress based on the fundamental principles of the rule of law, multi-party democracy, free market economy and respect for human rights and minorities. Spirit of old confrontation between states is being more and more replaced by the spirit of the new cooperation and competition. The presence of NATO, EU and other organizations in the region will continue to be a positive factor for the establishment of a lasting peace and stability in the region.

Our region now consists of allied, aspirant or partner countries with NATO or the EU. Security and defence reforms of the countries in the region are not following intentions or promoting goals for conventional confrontation with each other. The main objective of the regional countries’ security sector reform is their defence and security in the context of collective defence and security. This is reflected through the development of small professional forces with mainly defensive capabilities, under the control of related national civil authorities.

Types of regional cooperation have been and are expected to have a broader extension in the political, economic, and security area. As never before, we have established common regional units, participated in joint international operations, provided mutual assistance in civil emergencies, and other various formats of cooperation, etc. This cooperation is expected to extend in other areas in the context of a regional ‘*Smart Defence*’ initiative under development.

In this emerging security environment of 21st century, Albania is completely open and active in the process of regional and global cooperation. It supports the concept

of ‘*common/shared security*’ as the best option for today and for the future. Albania is a member of the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is making efforts to become a member of the European Union (EU). It is an active member of many regional initiatives, such as: Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECp); Regional Cooperation Council (RCC); Central European Initiative (CEI); Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI); Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC); Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII); Regional Arm Control and Verification (RACVIAC); Partnership of Adriatic Charter (A-5); Southeast Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM), as well as participation in Southeast Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), etc.

Under a realistic view, our regional security environment has never been more favourable than now. This current situation should be carefully managed, both chances and opportunities and the new challenges, risks and threats.

Categories of challenges, risks and threats

Besides the above mentioned chances and opportunities, the Balkan security environment is expected to be a dynamic environment in terms of risks, threats and security challenges. On one hand, we see many threats, risks and challenges in decline, and on the other hand, there are many others arising.

Rightfully, this is mentioned in the first paragraph of the new Strategic Concept 2010, which states “... *the next phase of NATO’s evolution in order for it to remain effective in a changing world, to new threats, new capabilities, and new partners*”⁴. Such a thing should be also expressed in our strategic documents, as well as in the RoA’s Joint Doctrine.

According to the Joint Doctrine AJP-1 (D) of the Alliance already ratified by our country, which is the main doctrine for AAF multinational operations, in terms of the nature of their protagonist positions “... *the opponents of the Alliance are grouped in nation states, groups within states, as well as non-actor - states*”⁵. I believe this general statement should be a central points of our Joint Doctrine, being specifically articulated to our particular case.

Based on this approach, I think that potential risks and threats to the RoA, as an ally country, now and in the future, taking into account the full range of national, regional and global security, may be classified into **4 main categories**: 1) conventional risks and threats; 2) non-conventional and asymmetric risks and threats; 3) risks and threats from natural, industrial and human factors; 4) and risks and threats identified as ‘emerging security challenges’.

1) Conventional Risks and Threats

These risks and threats, otherwise referred to as classic or traditional threats, are risks and threats arising from countries/alliances to other countries/alliances. They include aggressions and attacks performed by a country or a group of countries

⁴ Allied Strategic Concept, approved by heads of states in Lisbon, 20th November, 2010.

⁵ AJP-1 (D) Allied Joint Doctrine, Albanian Edition, p. 31.

against our country or the Alliance aiming at the violation of territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of our country or other allied countries.

At global level, conventional risks and threats have significantly decreased, and the chances are that they have a further reduction. Alliance's conventional military superiority will most likely discourage any conventional military aggression at strategic level to the Alliance, its members, or areas of strategic interest. Although the low probability of occurrence of conventional type threats in and around the Euro-Atlantic area in the near and medium term, this ... 'does not exclude the possibility that these types of threats to be developed in the longer term'.⁶

At regional level, from the conventional perspective, our country has today a security map much more favourable than 10-20 years ago. Albania has no intentions to forcibly annexing the territories of neighbouring states, as well as we see that neighbouring states have not such purposes in their defence policies. I also observe that the security and defence reforms of our regional countries do not support objectives for a conventional confrontation with each other.

Although conventional risks and threats to our country are less likely to occur in the medium term, this does not mean that they should be underestimated. The Joint Doctrine should be sensitive and reflect timely responses to potential changes in security and military strategies of the countries that could pose threats to our country.

In this context, even if such threats evolve with unprecedented speed, Albania and its Armed Forces are prepared to respond in the context of Article 5 of the collective defence of the Alliance, combined with Allied plans in order to meet their constitutional mission. Preparation, equipment and training of the AAF in peacetime, to deal with external aggression, are crucial for the future of the country.

Apart from direct state to state confrontation, the current and the perspective security environment reveals that the clash of ethnic groups, of cultural, ideological, religious or other configurations groups that cross national borders, could be a permanent threat to regional and international security. "... *Ethnic rivalries, political and religious disputes over vital resources, unsuccessful or failed reforms, human rights abuse, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and regional instability.*"⁷

Albania will participate with relevant civil and military capabilities in regional and global crisis response operations, taking place before, during or after various conflicts in regions considered of strategic importance for our country's security, the Alliance, or other international security organizations.

2) Non-conventional and asymmetric risks and threats

Such threats and risks are mainly designed when confrontation is between nation states, on one hand, and non-governmental adversaries, on the other hand. These risks and threats can be favoured, among other things, by the growing globalization, demographic changes, cultural frictions, prevalence of advanced technology, democratic developments and increased transparency to civil society, crises of various

⁶ Ibid, p 27.

⁷ Ibid, p 27.

natures, failed states, rise of extremist groups, insurgency movements of various characters, combined hybrid threats, corruption, illegal trafficking or organized crime.

During the last 20 years, in addition to the reduction of the set of traditional risks and threats to the Alliance, we have also a significant expansion of non-traditional spectrum of asymmetric and hybrid risks, which are expected to recognize new developments during the 21st century. *“Opponents of the Alliance today are smaller, more numerous, more sophisticated and more difficult to be identified or anticipated. They have the advantage to change quickly and select the striking asymmetric “weapon”, to the key weaknesses of allies”*⁸.

The achievement of the objectives with asymmetric approaches, by our opponents and those of the Alliance, will most likely become a widespread experience in the next decade. These non-state adversaries will grow nationally, regionally and internationally. To achieve their objectives, they will have different natural, cultural, and ideological goals, and will use more sophisticated forms, most destabilizing means and media effects to shape the public opinion.

The existence of certain groups in a neighbouring country that propagate the annexation of parts of our country's territory, secessionist movements, etc., in certain cases, could lead to covert or open operations to violation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country, with or without the use of violence. Their danger would be even greater if certain individuals and groups are supported by failed states, which for different reasons seek to transfer their opponents, problems and crises abroad.

Protection of constitutional order is one of the main areas of the constitutional mission of the armed forces⁹. Violation of the constitutional order may come in different forms. It can stem from unrests in the country originated by non-functional aspects of rule of law, collapse of constitutional institutions by force or intimidation to achieve certain objectives or political favours, etc., organized by specific groups of extremists of various national and international natures. In this context, the participation of certain units of the AAF in operations for the protection of the constitutional order, in coordination with other security institutions, is of particular importance.

Terrorism will remain a challenge to states and international security organizations in the 21st century. Asymmetric opponents have become more numerous, smaller in size and more unpredictable in tactics and strategies. They use the strategy and tactics of irregular formations, sometimes surprising even the most sophisticated military forces. Moreover, they always have the advantage to choose the right weapon and time to hit *“...the weakest link in the security chain of a country. The situation is asymmetric because the protector should protect and cover all possible strike points, while the attacker need only identify the weakest point to focus its efforts and cause significant damages”*¹⁰.

⁸ R. Gjataja, Thimi Hudhra, Military Review article, March 2011.

⁹ According to International Law, by constitutional rule, we understand *“a number of state institutions expressed in constitution and founding basis of their functions, through which basic decision-making process of the state in precise setting of time”*.

¹⁰ Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy. University of Reading, England, p. 14.

Used by opponents, asymmetric threats should be evaluated and faced with new methods, different from those of conventional war with clear rules based on the law of war. Asymmetry is mainly expressed in three elements: the nature of the identification and localization of adversary; the nature of his ideals and objectives; and the non-conventional methods to achieve a qualitative and quantitative advantage.

Albania is a small allied country, and it may not be the preferred target of international terrorism, compared with other major allied countries, where media effects of public opinion are more sensitive. This does not mean that the AAF will be indifferent to the preparation against terrorism; they will engage in the Alliance's response to international terrorism, while at the national level, they will have a supportive role to the internal security structures.

AAF can be also engaged in a number of scenarios and situations of national planning, operation conducted on their own or by other law enforcement institutions. These scenarios may include, among others, the neutralization of terrorist attacks against facilities of special importance (*ports, airports, hydroelectric power plants, power grids, tunnels, stadiums, meeting facilities, etc.*). Also, management of 'Renegade' situations or hijacking of aircraft, ships, trains, etc, control of territorial waters from illegal activities, control of airspace and air policing in coordination with NATINADS system (NATO Integrated Air Defence System), etc.

Also, different type of crises can accelerate activities of extremist groups with the support of national, regional and global organizations. AAF will be neutral to resolve crises of political, economic, financial and social nature, and become a constitutional actor to support a political solution. The armed forces will never intervene to solve a political, economic or social crisis will military means.

Non-conventional risks can come from demographic changes between the developing world and the developed world. Risks resulting from the need of survival of human communities for a better life and jobs will be increased. Poverty, hunger and disease in the developing world can considerably affect the continued growth of tension in the global security environment. Issues of hunger and reduction of water resources will continue to be a serious problem for different parts of the developing world. These phenomena may have effects on our country and our Armed Forces, in terms of participation in economic development programs or crisis management missions.

Non-state actors are part of society and should be treated as such. It is important that security institutions identify these actors with radical goals and use violence in achieving them. We should take into consideration that the individuals or groups from different backgrounds may seek to neutralize targets of the state and its institutions. Cases of individuals types or groups that can be described as '*lonely wolves*' or '*wild flocks*' may be an additional risk to the future security environment.

3) Risks and Threats from Natural, Industrial and Human Factors

These risks and threats of a civil emergency nature are likely to increase in the future security environment with environmental changes, climate changes and technological developments. These are the unintentional risks arising from natural causes or negligence of human and industrial cases. In order to face these challenges, the military

component will support the central; and local civilian authorities, when the size of the consequences exceed the capabilities of civil authorities.

Risks of natural, industrial and human origins are generally identifiable. They are a vital part of the historical and geographical areas of the country according to the characteristics of natural, industrial or other specific issues, identified in historic years, decades, and often centuries. Training to contribute to the operations according to contingency plans is essential. Natural risks should also bear in mind the effects of global warming and their climate changes.

Particular risks and threats of natural, industrial and human nature include: earthquakes, floods, and avalanches of snow blocks, massive fires, major landslides, etc, as well as major industrial accidents or caused by man: exploding ammunition depots; air, maritime and land accidents in high density populated areas, elimination of major land, sea and air environmental pollution of country, as well as infective diseases of different types, etc.

In order to face these risks and threats, the Armed Forces support the state institutions having a lead role. AAF will cooperate during the peace time with these institutions, to update plans for specific situations, as well as conduct of joint exercises.

4) Emerging Security Challenges

Among potential risks to the security and defence of Alliance countries, including our own country, are the risk called Emerging Security Challenges. Among them, we can mention: the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); development of ballistic missile capabilities outside of the Alliance; increase of terrorist activities with sophisticated weapons and equipments; cyber attacks, hybrid threats, challenges to energy security, scarce resources; maritime piracy, etc.

Many of these challenges are as the result of our country's participation in collective security and defence, and as such, they will be handled in this context. Compared with major allies, these risks might have limited impact on the country and AAF, but they do not exclude the possibilities that, in certain circumstances, have an increase in their intensity.

a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Proliferation of WMD (*nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological*) and the means of their release outside the Alliance constitute a major threat to global security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, especially when efforts of possession and proliferation are made by rogue states or terrorist organizations and criminals. *Also, 'lethal weapons that cause slow death, as well as other weapons are lethal electromagnetic pulse weapons and radiological weapons of chemicals with carcinogenic effects may result with a greater access in the future'¹¹.*

b. Ballistic missile attacks. Till now, more than 30 countries outside the Alliance are able to produce or buy assault land systems, high quality naval air defence, guided ballistic missiles and other advanced weaponry. Some of these countries are adversaries the alliance. In this context, as part of the Alliance, Albania will support the initiatives

¹¹ Ibid, p 30.

of missile defence in the territories and allied populations, which may require the allocation of costs for anti-missile systems or participation with staff personnel.

c. Sophisticated terrorism. Terrorism is expected to be further sophisticated from state actors, non-state actors, and in some cases, in close coordination with state actors. Strike of large civil and military aircraft; shoulder-fired missile attacks; attacks against shipping ports by surface equipment or underwater equipments; hitting airports, aircraft and helicopters with rifle grenades systems; using improvised explosive devices (IED); suicide attack in populated environments, smashing infrastructure of national and international importance, etc., are some of the current and future sophisticated terrorist methods.

d. Cyber attacks. Increase of reliance and dependence on Alliance in communication and information systems has created a vulnerability to cyber attacks, which can damage the NATO's superiority in conventional armaments. Cyber attacks are asymmetric attacks leading to irreversible damage to systems, networks and national information infrastructure, economy, banking, business, air traffic, maritime and land surveillance systems, etc.¹². Expectations are that the threats of cyber attacks against our country and AAF may be increasing in the coming years.

e. Hybrid threats. There are threats that include the combination of a large number of methods of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and strength, terrorist acts and violent nature of intimidation, criminal and anarchic actions performed by state actors and a number of non-state actors. Future conflicts will be characterized by a mixture of many forms of war along the broad spectrum of conflict. *"Hybrid threats can not be initiated only by the use of the military instrument; they will require a comprehensive approach, supported by information operations"*¹³. AAF units are expected to be affected in their operations, especially those of multinational nature, to be under the effects of hybrid threats.

f. Negative effects of globalization. Besides the positive effects, increasing globalization and new political geometry has favoured the development of existing or emerging risks, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime and illegal trafficking, especially the spread of high security hazardous materials, as well as various piracies. These risks that include all non-state actors to carry out illegal activities become particularly dangerous when backed openly or secretly by state actors or failed states.

g. Energy security. Energy security and scarce natural resources are becoming one of the future challenges of global, regional and national security. Our country will be more and more a part of regional and international networks of energy, where the role of the AAF is expected to be on the rise. There is a fundamental difference

¹² According to *US Cyber Command*, only in 2010 over 6 million cyber acts have been recorded in a day against Pentagon and Defence Ministries of allied countries. According to *Symantic Web 2010*, the most targeted sector was the public administration where 1 in every 35.8 emails are blocked by malware viruses; more than 40% of middle business companies have had serious problems and 75% of them believe that crashes of database may make business fail. According to McFee, October 2010, virus '*Stuxnet*' was ID as the first virus that can destroy the whole infrastructure of power plants and industrial companies. According to Alliances data, during 2010 it had to face a huge number of malware attacks daily.

¹³ AJP-1 (D) Allied Joint Doctrine, p 2-6.

between NATO Energy Security Concept of the Cold War, based solely on the supply of fuel, and the today's concept of Allied energy security. NATO's role in energy security and scarce resources is still evolving and the position of our country will be in accordance with the position of the Alliance.

h. Maritime piracy. Maritime piracy has been a crime since the ancient history. Today and in the future, civil ships of allied countries or other countries are and will be the subject of modern piracy. Today's piracy has increased in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, but it can be further extended in other regions. These attacks can undermine humanitarian efforts and road safety of global trade communication. NATO is committed and will continue to engage in these operations. Our country and the AAF will have modest engagement in operations against maritime piracy. In addition to maritime piracy, an important place is expected to overtake our country's commitment to respect the conventions and laws against sea slavery (UNCLOS).

Conclusions:

Risks and threats to the security environment of the Republic of Albania as an Allied country will significantly influence the development of AAF capabilities and the scope of their operations in the short and midterm.

Despite the risks and threats coming from nation states, linked with Article 5, which remain at the centre of the Alliance's Strategic Concept, the future security environment is expected to be dominated by risks and threats coming from groups within states, non-state actors, natural, industrial and human factors, as well as those coming from emerging security challenges.

I think that, despite the fact that we are an allied country, not all allied countries are affected equally by the whole broad spectrum of threats and risks of the future security environment. Some may be more affected by specific risks, some less, and vice versa. Despite the common things of collective security, each country has its own specifics. This article provided a national approach of the risks and threats, as well as the chances and opportunities to the Republic of Albania as an allied country, in our specific region and geopolitical situation, history and unique culture.

This study of the security environment can serve as an alternative approach of the new National Security Strategy, Military Strategy and Joint Doctrine of Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania.

Bibliography:

- Alliance Strategic Concept, Lisbon, November 2010.
- Multiple Future Project, 2009 Edition.
- AJP-1 (D) Allied Joint Doctrine, Edition 2010.
- Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy. University of Reading, England.
- Douglas J. Feith, "*Beyond the Cold War- What Next?*" Speech at Institute for Defence Analyses,
- R. Gjatoja, Thimi Hudhra, Military Review, March 2011.
- Strategjia e Sigurisë Kombëtare të Republikës së Shqipërisë, January 2005.
- Strategjia Ushtarake e Republikës së Shqipërisë, December 2007.

Military actions and levels of operations

Brigadier General Bardhyl Hoxha,
Commander of Training and Doctrine Command

Short commentary. *The following article treats, on conceptual and doctrinal terms, the types of military operations, classification, division and their planning at three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Generally, the level of operation is therefore determined by the level of utilized resources (power). But in modern war conditions there do not exist any clearly defined boundary between these levels.*

This article explains how to perform the escalation of war and levels of military operations. On the whole, it is mainly performed initiating by the content and the importance of objectives set to achieve, the amount of participant forces, the extent of military operations environment and their continuance. It does hereto present the reciprocal correlation between the aim to be achieved and resources to be used. So the level of operation is thus determined by the importance of the attained target.

The following article deals with military power and its component elements, addressing in detail conceptual moral and physical elements. Furthermore, the article reflects the limitations on the use of military power, focusing on the political, military and physical limitations. In this sense, the need for the Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC) and Rules of Engagement (RoE) in the use of force, is hereby very well explained.

Operations, types and distinction between them

Regardless if the Armed Forces or their constituent elements conduct independent military operations or engage as members or partners of an alliance or coalition, establishing strategic and political objectives is the responsibility of the political leadership of the country. Without going into detail of how to use resources, in the strategic and political level, there are heretofore defined the sources and means to be used and there are also shown the limitations on their use.

In the military strategic level of the Alliance, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania are deployed and used on the basis of a political engagement framework, as part of a collective strategy for meeting the strategic objectives of the Alliance.


Military operations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania are addressed, planned and performed at three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. In terms of modern war there does not exist any clearly defined boundary between these levels.

The escalation of war levels and military operations in general is therefore performed principally starting from the content and importance of objectives that they achieve, the amount of participating forces, the extent of military operations environment and their duration.

In a national perspective, the strategic level is concerned with the use of all national resources, as well as all other instruments of national power, in order to achieve policy objectives. This level is related to the decision-making authority at the political level. While under NATO's framework, the strategic level deals with the obligation of Albania for approaching capacities and national resources for the common use in the achievement of strategic objectives as stipulated by the North Atlantic Council.

At the strategic level it is therefore performed the definition of directives and synchronization of using all the available resources for the security and defence of the country. At this level, there are being set the targets of military operations through the development and coordinated use of political, economic, diplomatic, psychological means and national security structures, to ensure the interests of the country.

Political leadership, at the strategic level, determines the amount and nature of the country's resources which are allocated to the achievement of national policy objectives.



Levels of operations

In contrast to the strategic level, in the operational level there is therefore performed the link between the strategic and the tactical level through planning, organization, integration and implementation of campaigns, operations and battles, to achieve operational-strategic aims. There are therefore planned, developed and supported campaigns and major military operations, to accomplish strategic objectives, within theatres or areas of operations¹.

The operational art, such as theory and practice of preparation, organization and conduct of military operations, transforms strategic objectives into projects and

¹ AJP – 03(B), Chapter I, Section III.

operational plans, which connect and integrate tactical fighting and battles to achieve strategic goals. In a more concrete sense, operational art determines when, where and for what purpose will the armed forces engage in operations. At an operational level and in the context of a specific region of joint operations, the Armed Forces are disseminated and used to achieve strategic objectives.

Operational level commander designs a concrete plan (OPPLAN), thus setting operational level objectives, he determines the order of the fulfilment of these objectives, relevant resources, in line with the achievement of operational missions, logistical requirements and chief priorities, operational reserves, coordination with other available instruments of power as well as plans the acceptable level of risk towards the force and its mission.

The Concept of Operations Development will enable the identification of future military problems and will propose solutions of new ways in operations performance. Visualization of future operations, through the development of new concepts, will describe how a commander, by using military art and science, can use the necessary skills to meet the challenges of the future².

The achievement of combative duties and military objectives through military forces, in order to achieve operational and strategic level success, takes place at the tactical level.

Levels of military operations do not always directly relate to a certain level of command, with the amount of forces and participating means or type of force that carries out a military operation, but also with the objectives and contributions which are thus accomplished. The difference between strategic, operational and tactical level of joint operations will rarely be clear. This is because even when a force is of a small tactical level, its use can generate a huge political impact in terms of the country which gives it as a contribution and the aim to be achieved.

In this context, as appropriate, tactical activity may therefore have effects on the operational and strategic level. And vice versa, the achievement of strategic objectives will not always ask spread of large and heavily equipped forces. Also, not all of the military capabilities which do therefore expand in a joint operation region will necessarily be under the command and control of the operational force commander for the task (*task force*). Some capabilities, such as Special Forces (SF), some intelligence capabilities, military police, etc., may hereto be under the direct control of the strategic military level. The successful development of operations depends on military power.


What is military power?

Military power of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania determines their ability to fight. It is an instrument to defeat the enemy. Military power consists of three interconnected components: conceptual component, moral component and physical component.

None of the three components is considered more important than others; for example, in determining the combat power it is therefore of less importance how much advanced

² Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, August 2005.

the platforms, weapons or equipment of military units are, if the people who run them are unmotivated, untrained or lacking proper leadership. On the other hand, all the three components are not independent from each other. Each of them integrates with others.



Components of Military Power

Moral component. It is the willingness of members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania to deal with greater efforts in conducting operations. Moral component of military power has to do with the creation of deep convictions to the forces to fight and achieve victory. It is not measurable and it aims at achieving a high level of morality, based on the belief that the goals of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania are morally and ethically just, being prepared as a result of fighting spirit and high determination to achieve the goal. The progress of moral component level is therefore achieved through motivation, values, leadership and careful management of people.

Conceptual component. It does therefore include the lessons learnt and theoretical knowledge of how the Albanian Armed Forces can operate effectively today and in the future. These include: the principles of war, military doctrine, the development of military theory and practice. The conceptual component³ is mainly concerned with the observation and perception of the operating environment where the activity of an individual, commander, or of a structure will be conducted. The principles and doctrines, combined with the initiative and creativity of commanders will ensure the intellectual strength of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania which govern their power in carrying out the operations.

Physical component. It does hereto consist of the group of elements that perform the combat. It includes all the forces and resources to carry out the operations and it is thus a quantitative and qualitative indicator of violence and effectiveness of each unit. Physical component consists of five elements: human resources, equipments, collective performance, availability and support.

Restrictions on the use of military power

Restrictions on the use of military power are binding in the exercise of certain

³ Some countries denominate it as the *psychological component*.

mandates. Legal restrictions constitute a moral code and common law, through which there are being defined rules and restrictions in cases of conflict, dating back from medieval times to the present day modern wars. Some of these limitations are self-imposing, in accordance with the ethical, moral or political considerations, while others are based on the legal requirements arising from the Law of Armed Conflict, which are unique during the use of Armed Forces in operational environments. Restrictions on the exercise of military power are thereby related to political, military, physical aspects, etc. In more detail we give the following explanation of these definitions, which constitute the legal framework of the use of operations:

- a. *Political restrictions* are usually placed before the start of operations and may include such matters relating to the type of policy objectives to be achieved and specific guidelines for strategic level operations;
- b. *Military restrictions* are those restrictions that are placed within the framework of the National Armed Forces or dictated by the need for interoperability in multinational operations. The lessons learned during the course of operations, particularly in extended periods of time, lead to the evaluation and review of military restrictions;
- c. *Physical limitations* result from the impact of the physical environment in which develops the armed conflict that could bring severe limitations in the conduct of military operations, caused by the physical characteristics of the terrain: rivers, roads blocking, climate, etc. and that can be overcome through the mastery use of doctrine, tactics, techniques and operational procedures.

These restrictions are constantly updated in relation to modern weapons systems and platforms, military structures, concepts and developments of doctrines. Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC) (STANAG 2449 NATO), the Guidelines of the European Union Council “For the recognition of the Law of Armed Conflict”, the Geneva Conventions “For the human and individuals rights”, the Additional Protocols of Hague and the International Red Cross materials, which are distributed in all units and departments of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, do therefore form a “unique legal package” of international law that the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania should apply in the conduct of operations within the country and abroad, in peacetime or in armed conflict.

Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC) is often cited as the “Law of War” or “International Humanitarian Law”. It sets out the circumstances in which countries may hereto have a legal basis for the use of armed force and the manner in which they can carry out the development of combat operations between them. It protects the fundamental human rights of individuals who fall into the hands of an enemy, that is to say, prisoners of war, the wounded, the sick and civilians. It determines the countries’ legal restrictions on the use of force that results in collateral damage among civilian populations and defines the rights and obligations of combatants.

Rules of Engagement and use of force

In addition to the Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC), a great importance acquire even the “Rules of Engagement” which are directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which the Armed Forces will

undertake and thus perform military actions. They constitute the entirety of the instructions to the commanders on the nature of the use of force, in accordance with international law and political circumstances. Rules of Engagement ensure the controlled use of force and constrain the discretion of the commanders in the performance of tasks in non-combat and peace support operations.

Commanders make the necessary proposals to the rules of engagement during the planning of operations. Once established, they fully apply during the mission fulfilment.

The government of the Republic of Albania, military commanders, and all other members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania are subject to national and international law, which requires that any use of force is to be controlled, limited, proportionate, reasonable and necessary to achieve the objectives.

In peacetime operations there apply peacetime laws, regardless of whether the operation is classified as “domestic” or “international”. In these cases, the commanders at all levels apply these principles: reasonable belief, negotiations and warnings, the consumption of other options, the exercise of minimum force, proportionality, duration and termination of the use of force, escalation, use of deadly force only for self-defence (side damage, revenge and reprisals are strictly prohibited), positive control and accountability (direct liability).

Unlike peacetime operations, the principles governing the use of force during the period of armed conflict have much bigger space. The use of force during armed conflict is not unlimited. In armed conflicts there apply principles derived from the International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict or the Law of War). Under this law, there are five key principles that should be considered by the commander of the operation: military necessity, distinction, proportionality, humanity and restraint.

Senior political and military authorities, based on national and international laws, send to the operation commander the directive on the use of force in various ways, including the Rules of Engagement as well for self-defence and the authority to use force.

In conclusion, as a co-author of the final draft of Military Doctrine of Armed Forces (DP-01), I do therefore recommend that this study can serve as the main base in the articulation of the operation concept as treated in the Joint Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania and, particularly, in the Manual of Joint Operations of the Armed Forces which may be compiled in the future.

Bibliography:

- AJP-1- Doktrina e Përbashkët e NATO-s, 2011.
- Department of Defence of USA “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0, 2009.
- Doktrina Ushtarake e FARSH (DP-01) (draft), 2012.
- NATO Strategic Concept, approved in Lisbon, 2010.
- Strategjia Ushtarake e RSH, 2007.

The distinction between terrorism and state violence

LtC. Enver Dugolli
Senior Course on Security and Defense Studies,
Albanian Armed Forces Academy

Short commentary. *The phenomenon of terrorism and that of state violence are two forms of violence which have set up debates throughout times. Violence committed by terrorists or states has been present in the past as well as today. These phenomenon differ only in perception and ways of interpretation, especially when theoretic aspects of defining terrorism are concerned. Scientists of various profiles are continuously showing great interest in the phenomenon of violent state establishments, and they have also published opinions and numerous scientific definitions regarding these particular issues.*

Both phenomena are related to security as a separate discipline including political and social aspects involved, therefore handling of these social aspects is as complex as human complexity and the surrounding environment. There is plenty of controversy about these subjects, and a consensus has not yet been realized, nonetheless. These two phenomena face major contradictions, which at certain interpretation phases become insurmountable as well. The subjectivity of the parties dealing with these two phenomena is so great, that it sometimes creates confusion between the sets of differences that may exist between these two kinds of violence.

Justification of terrorist violence and state violence acts, by actors or representatives of each camp, is the separator element that occurs in scientific efforts to interpret and define the phenomena. The phenomena become even more complex when political and religious implications are added into the interpretation, because these are factors with great influence on social development. The Political factor is a major obstacle in identifying differences between terrorism violence and state violence. The political power is a great means of justifying, interpreting or commenting on the motive of violence usage, whether the violence is terrorist or committed by the state.

Terrorism

In its actual sense, the word terrorism was used for the first time in Russia, around the second half of XIXth century.¹ Since then, the violent political actions directed

¹ Dr. Kole Krasniqi, *Terrorizmi Ndërkombëtar*, Printing House "UEGEN", p.28.

against the state, have been defined as terrorist acts. Legal and political meaning of terrorist actions are causing violence and fear to achieve different goals, whether it be political or of another nature. Originally terrorist violence has been directed against the state apparatus or designated representatives of local authoritarian and different states for the implementation of specific interests. These forms and acts of terrorism are considered to be organized and structured, although these activities have recently evolved², by placing as their target not only the state apparatus, but also ordinary citizens, such as crowds of people in public places like stadiums, markets, aircraft, bus or train stations, etc.

Terrorism, as a phenomenon easier to describe than defined, has provoked many thinkers to formulate unique definition content to the word terrorism, but despite various efforts, a single unique definition has not been agreed upon yet. In his efforts to find a unique definition to the word “terrorism”, an American scholar wrote that he had read 109 definitions of the meaning and content of terrorism, all different from the other³. Same or identical definitions regarding the concept of terrorism, cannot be found in any annals of national or international interpretations. As examples, we can mention the numerous definitions compiled about this phenomenon from various American governments and the United Nations Organization. Political perspective of diplomats and scientists in connection to terrorism is also noticed from the resolutions offered in the United Nations Organization. In this context, it is worth mentioning the various parties interpretations made on this issue at the UN. For example, European diplomats and American scientists consider terrorism a “coordinated action of political violence against the state”, while for diplomats and scientists of several African countries, terrorism was “systematic violence against the peoples.”

As mentioned previously, there is no unique definition, neither in the United States of America, nor other countries, or the UN. An American attitude claims that “Terrorism is an act of a person or group of persons with the aim of impairment, and authority undermining of a state or its government (power)”⁴. Another American attitude defines terrorism as: “Terrorism is the application of various forms of physical violence with the aim of causing mass fear that would affect the creation of a certain political course”⁵. On the other hand, a totally different definition comes from a group of African countries: “Terrorism is a violation of human rights, freedoms and personal liberties by different governments or military authorities.”⁶

Meanwhile, based on the composition (Constellation) of UN, (at the moment of speaking), the Communists defend two positions and opinions about this topic. They (the Communists), interpret terrorism as “a form of armed war”, when the “war” in question is crowned with success, whereas, if the “war” fails, it is interpreted as “coup attempt against the state”.

² Extreme and Islamic terrorism.

³ Alex P Schmid, Political Terrorism, A Research guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Base and Literature, Amsterdam 1983, p. 70.

⁴ US Draft Convention for the International Terrorism.

⁵ Ibid, p.33.

⁶ Independent Group of African States, Helmut Jansen, Criminalistic. No 1/84.p.17.

Such differences, not only in terminology, but also in content, are also a result of different interests of states and nations at different times. The differences appeared more severe when the world was divided into blocks, while African countries were in the stage of anti-colonial war and all the emphasis on the interpretation of terrorism was addressed to Western colonial forces. On the other hand, America and Western countries living in their stable states and a growing prosperity, interpret terrorist actions in light of seizures in the state, at a time when the state was the guarantor of security and civic prosperity.

Communist or socialist States, through revolutionary forms, were interested in ignoring the will of the people with other forms of making the right choice, thus stimulating successful terrorist actions at the price of extending the Eastern block.

Despite the difficulties of reaching a possible consensual definition of terrorism and terrorist acts, as we will refer to the International Conference on Terrorism, held in Jerusalem, in 1979, wherein many Western scientist, diplomats and politicians who participated offered a relatively common definition, which determines terrorism as: “attack, threat or deliberate murder of innocent people in order to cause public fear, which would affect the realization of certain political goals”⁷.

The State and State Violence

The term “State” refers to the state in the sense of a historical phenomenon and philosophical idea, as well as a continuous and organized form of leadership, or an actual contemporary phenomenon. The state is a social phenomenon that plays an important role in the development of human social and historical relations. The State represents the largest organization in modern societies that coordinates relations and relationships between people. The state is the mediator and regulator of all social developments including human life from birth to death. All this activity is performed by government and state administration that is composed of various elements and forms. The state is the only social institution, which provides peace and order among people through various mechanisms (including violence). These actions of the state, according to known sociologist Max Weber, are described and interpreted as “legitimate rights to use physical force.” According to this theory it can be said that the state is the only institution that has the monopoly of using violence.

Numerous theories in relation to the term “State”, mention the social contract, an advanced theory in terms of idealism. Thomas Hobbes, is a representative of this theory, as elaborated in his work entitled *Leviathan*. According to Hobbes, the natural state, in which all men are equal, precedes the origin of the state. Hobbes claims that men create the state, and bear it part or all their natural rights, in order to escape from the rule of passion, war, fear, poverty, loneliness, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty and instead live in the empire of peace, security, wealth, knowledge, goodwill, etc.

One of the oldest theories, the Patriarchal theory, aims to interpret the origin of the state via social factors. According to this theory, the state is only a form of family development, and the state government is an outgrowth of family governance in the

⁷ Hans Josef Hoechen, *Terror in Europa*, No. 1/1987.p. 32. Beniamin Netanyahu, *Terrorism. How the West can Win*, New York 1986, p. 6.

wider community. This theory's main representative is Henry Sumner Maine, who came to this conclusion after doing research into ancient societies, believes that the state was born from the family, in particular from the patriarchal system, the development of the privileges of the leading man in a family. According to this theory the state is only one developed family, led by a ruler or sovereign.

According to historical materialism and the Marxist theory, during the trasspass from the first human non-class community on the first class formation, certain economic conditions of this newly created class were the conditions that divided the society into classes, when the state originally appeared The Marxist theory claims that the main socio-economic condition leading to the birth of the state is private property and the accumulation of wealth, things that have shaped the exploitative class and the exploited class in the society. Lenin, a representative of this theory, asserted that "the state is a force apparatus of the ruling class, and it serves to keep the lower class under oppression." In addition, Engels, who based his research on the emergence of European states like the Athenian, Roman, German, etc., concluded that the state is a result of the division of non class society to opposing classes. According to this theory, the state is a transitory phenomenon that will disappear with adjustment or by social relations into a communist society.

Another theory, the "Force theory" explains the concept of the state as a political supremacy legitimate for the use of power. This theory does not mention internal factors in explaining developments of the state; it emphasizes external factors such as the dominant origin of the state. Representatives of this theory are: Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, Dühring, etc., who claim that "the state was created by conquering different territories and subjugation of the people who have lost the war."

The distinction between terrorism and state violence

Based on the theories and practices of social development, we learn that violence is a condition created by man, groups of people or a state with a goal. The elaborated history of these two phenomena indicates that terrorist violence and the state violence have evolved and are no longer presented as when they were originally incepted. The different points of view regarding terrorism and state violence have existed since the early days and still do exist today. The different legal mechanisms define perfectly the distinction between terrorism and state violence. The biggest problem in this context, lies in interpretation forms.

Some countries and groups of people who apply terrorist actions and activities, are convinced that such acts are justified by a cause, or a higher purpose. Various acts of terrorism applied by different individuals and organizations like Al Qaeda, Islamic fundamentalism and the like, reflect a direct attack on the highest human values. However, the acts of these individuals and organizations are in absolute contradiction with the principles of Islam. Generating the idea of a holy war in the name of Islam is just a camouflage for their hidden goals. Islam, as well as other religions promote peace and love as the main principles, and never violence or terror! On the other hand, when the state (especially the U.S.) take action to combat terrorist groups and declare war without compromise, these last ones (terrorist organizations) declare America and its allies as terrorist states which apply state violence against them.

These are ways of interpreting the terrorist and state violence phenomenon, according to respective interests and goals. Fortunately, most of the democratic countries are positioned correctly regarding these issues, thus judgments and interpretations of such fundamentalist views are intended to cover and justify their acts of desperation.

Terrorists do not attack the strongest element of the opponent, such as the army or other military targets. Instead they focus on civilian targets by causing death, panic and fear amongst the innocent population. Thus, the objective determines to a large extent the legitimacy of the use of force. In this regard, how can the actions of September 11, 2002 when Al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center be called legitimate? The victims were all innocent civilians who were attacked only because they were American, not because they were combat soldiers in the battlefield.

Hamas (a Palestinian organization) calls itself revolutionary organization, but its actions demonstrate the contrary. Using suicidal people to bombard a bus full of Israeli innocent civilians, can only be an act of terrorism. Revolutionary fighters usually fight to take control of the area, territory and population, or fight for their rights against the military forces who do injustice, whereas terrorists fight for revenge, renown, fame and a response to such actions.

On the other hand, there are also times when certain governments do not comply with state laws and obligations, especially laws regarding respect for basic human rights and freedoms and exhibit affinity for terror acts against citizens and certain social groups in their countries. Such cases occur especially when the state is governed by certain dictators leading a totalitarian government or by diseased ambitions of certain national-chauvinist politics. The time of Yugoslavia's dissolution, is a period noted and observed in the Balkans and world history as the worst mourning phase for the people of the Balkans. The states of Serbia and Montenegro, (Montenegro was firstly introduced to this scheme, against the will or desire of Montenegrin citizens), both tried to create favors for these two states, and unjustly waged war against Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and most recently Kosovo.

The war against the republics of former Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, was regarded as "care" for the Serb minority, although behind this war hid the Serbian hegemonic ambition to conquer these republics. Major bloodshed took part in this war, including various massacres and genocide mainly in Bosnia, by the Serbian military, which later attracted awareness of the international community that subsequently reacted with bombings (in the case of Kosovo, 1999) to maintain the credibility of the international community on what happened in Bosnia. Kosovo as an autonomous unit of the former Yugoslav federation was not accepted by Serbia which forcibly removed to turn violent autonomy as an integral part of the Serbian state. Albanians who were always indigenous and absolute majority in Kosovo, never agreed to this position. Consequently, Serbia suspended all Kosovo institutions and excluded all Albanians from all state institutions from health system and education.

Violence against Albanians by Serbian state was permanent. Albanian citizens were systematically terrorized, only because they were Albanian. Serbian exclusion state policy led by Milosevic used entire Serb state apparatus to achieve the objective of evacuating Albanians away from Kosovo. Advice and warnings by the international

community which obliged Serbia to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms were totally ignored. Serbia was determined terrorize the Albanian majority in Kosovo by using state violence. The Serbian government also tried to label the Kosovo Liberation Army, as a terrorist organization, when in fact it was a revolutionary organisation fighting for basic freedoms and human rights. Kosovo Liberation Army's actions were directed only against Serbian army and police, and never against Serbian civil population, thus, Serbian efforts in labeling the Kosovo Liberation Army as a terrorist organization failed. Serbian state terror and genocide against the Albanian majority population was beginning to become obvious to the entire world. Thousands of Albanians were killed, including women, children and the elderly, and approximately One million people were driven away from their homes.

Serbian terror and genocide was followed by NATO bombings in 1999 as a measure to stop the ethnic cleansing that Serbia was applying in Kosovo.

This example, and many other examples in the history of the world, show that state violence where the state's dominant objective includes extermination of a certain community can be extremely dangerous, therefore safety and security mechanisms established by the democratic world are crucial for the integrity protection of countries and their populations.

The Serbian government has not only used violence against Albanians, and other republics of former Yugoslavia, it has also sophisticated violence in different forms. Structural violence is far more deadly, due to the fact that it is supported by state institutions, which apply repressive policies.

Regarding the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, to protect and rescue the civilian population, former U.S. Secretary, Albright, in an interview for a Czech newspaper titled "Tyden", 13 years after the event, said: "What we did for Kosovo, to stop ethnic cleansing in any way, was just right, and we are proud to have achieved our goal. I personally believe in peace, but I am not but am not a pacifist. Sometimes violence is necessary to stop violence", said Albright in her speech.

Madeleine Albright also stated, "if the government of a country is not able to protect its citizens, then it is the duty of the international community to do such a thing".⁸

Serbian state terror applied to Albanians, had large proportions, thus the U.S. President, at the time, Bill Clinton, comparing the events in Kosovo with the Holocaust, stated also that "NATO ended the deliberate and systematic effort to ethnic cleansing and genocide"⁹.

The judgments of the above mentioned prominent political and public figures, show perfectly how far certain leaders and states can go, such as Serbia at the mentioned time, in order to accomplish their goals. Such dangerous expressions of violence and terror of a state is bestly responded by the reaction of NATO, the most prestigious organization globally.

⁸ www.rtklive.org

⁹ www.evropaelir.org

Conclusion

Based on many facts and arguments set forth, we can say that the differences between terrorism and state violence are naturally qualified and interpreted. If we decode terrorism among many definitions, it appears that this phenomenon consists of violence by a person or group of persons against state institutions or individuals. Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or force a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in support of political or social objectives.

Conversely, state violence is a legitimized and mandated kind of violence, and it also had its limits and can never be unlimited, otherwise it may be considered state terror and be condemnable by international laws. Differences between terrorism and state violence can be distinguished only in legitimacy. It means that state itself uses among other things, also the instrument of violence, but this type of violence must not turn the state into a monster, otherwise it would even pass terrorist proportions and would have greater damage, as Hobbes would say. The state must be a guarantor of the individual and collective rights of citizens, and as a reflection of people's will.

This was made possible by the formation of the civil society, which strengthened the tendency of creating states that belong to all the people living within the society. Strengthening the feeling of equality between people, and at the same time, establishing the liberal-democratic state, which Fukuyama called the culmination human history evolution, in terms of social adjustment¹⁰. In these kinds of states, state violence can not be connected in any way to terrorist violence, because this kind of state violence is destined only at maintaining stability and human progress, as well as fighting and exposing terrorist tendencies of certain groups and/or individuals.

The State continues to survive in today's world, despite the Marxism theory which claimed that the state is a transitory phenomenon that will disappear with adjustment or by social relations into a communist society. The application of this theory has failed, and today, new states are continuously being created, heading towards liberal democratic governing state structures. On the other hand, countries which continue to exhibit rampant state violence against own citizens, have been convicted and sentenced in continuity, not only by its own citizens, but also by the democratic world. The actions of the democratic world, which strive to maintain the highest human and national values, are the evidence and reasoning of fundamental standards of this democratic world, and are necessary even when they are violent against a world of terror and terrorism, state, groups or individuals!

Bibliography:

- Lecture electronic materials.
- Dr. Kole Krasniqi, International Terrorism, "UEGEN".
- Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 1992.
- Barry Buzan, *Peopes, States and Fear*, Wheatsheaf Books LTD, 1983.

¹⁰Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* 1992

- Documents, Independent Group of African States, Helmut Jansen, Criminalistics. No 1/84.
- Max Weber, Politics as Profession, "Fan Noli", 2007 ISBN.
- <http://www.academia.edu>
- www.rtklive.org
- www.evropaelir.org
- www.wikipwdia.org
- <http://www.librariaartini.com>
- <http://www.scribd.com>

Intelligence Services-Public Diplomacy Collaboration, Value added contribution to National Security

LtC. MSc. Vullnet Doka,
Agency of Defense Intelligence (AIM¹)

Short commentary. *The XXIst century is accompanied by extraordinary developments in the geopolitical, ideological, economic, scientific, cultural field. A variety of threats have fallen, but many others have arisen and may therefore arise, by giving the national security new dimensions. Ensuring the safety and fulfilment of national interests is accomplished through the establishment, acquisition and effective use of the national power elements. Change in the nature of threats has thereby dictated a new paradigm in how to use the elements of national power, where nowadays time requires focusing and investing in what is called “soft power”. “Soft Power” is the ability to influence in a tangent or in direct way, through culture, values and ideology, the behaviour of others, in order to get the desirable results². In those conditions when “soft power” is competing quite successfully the “hard power”, the cooperation between Public Diplomacy and Intelligence Services, as elements of “soft power”, plays a prominent role in ensuring national security and accomplishing national interests.*

The relationship between public diplomacy and intelligence services is hereto difficult to analyze because intelligence services are by nature exclusive institutions, where secret is the key to success. However, cooperation and sharing of intelligence with public diplomacy is quite a necessity, since it affects the public opinion orientation, based on facts and concrete data. This requires the intelligence services to come out of conservative tradition of using information, regardless of the challenges in this respect. Sharing information with public diplomacy, without endangering the resources and the accomplishment of the mission on the one hand will guarantee success for public diplomacy, on the other hand, through public diplomacy, intelligence services can therefore penetrate and thus create a better recognition of the opponent. In this article there are going to be analyzed the relationships between public diplomacy and intelligence services, the way of their interaction, in view of national security, in the new security environment.

¹ AIM - Agjencia e Inteligjencës së Mbrojtjes (Agency of Defense Intelligence).

² Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power*, New York: Public Affairs Press, 2004, p 35.

Introduction

The new security environment, characterized by a series of complex threats, has therefore detected a new paradigm in how to use the elements of national power, thus, focusing and investing in what is called “*soft power*”. “*Soft Power*” is the ability to influence in a tangent or indirect way through culture, values and ideology, the behaviour of others, in order to get the desirable results³. In the conditions when “*soft power*” is competing successfully towards “*hard power*”, the cooperation between Public Diplomacy and Intelligence Services plays an important role in ensuring the security and accomplishment of national interests.

During the second half of the XX century, traditional diplomacy and the so-called nuclear diplomacy played a crucial role in avoiding and preventing a collision between the two blocks, while the intelligence services served as a powerful supply tool with information for the purposes, capacities, plans and ambitions of the two superpowers. The end of Cold War, the developments in information technology, and the development of asymmetric threats with unidentified threatening actors, raised the need for an aggressive public diplomacy, in order to win the “*war of ideas*”. Public diplomacy, as one of the most significant elements of state power in the information age, thereby plays a key role in influencing the public, mostly the foreign one, in the interest and for the defence of national interests. In order for the public diplomacy to successfully fulfil its mission, it is imperative that information coming from intelligence to be placed under its disposal.

In accordance to James K. Glassman, Public Diplomacy is: *understanding, engagement, informing and influence* of foreign public in order to achieve national interests⁴. In these four elements, the most important is *impact*, which cannot be accomplished without informing. As a result, public diplomacy needs information, and information for the foreign audience which it will address to. This is quite essential to ensure success. One way of obtaining information is intelligence services, which are responsible for the collection, evaluation and intelligence production for the consumers, for the purpose of national security. The relationships between public diplomacy and intelligence services are difficult to analyze because, by their nature, intelligent services are exclusive institutions, where secret is the key to success. Collaboration and sharing of intelligence service information with public diplomacy is a necessity, since it affects the orientation of public opinion, based on facts and concrete data. This requires the emergence of intelligent services from the conservative tradition of utilizing information, thus, outrunning the barriers, but to guarantee at any time the preservation of resources and mission accomplishment.

Intelligence Services-Evolution from Traditional Diplomacy partners to Public Diplomacy ones

Intelligence as a profession is one of the world’s oldest, being identified with espionage. In the contemporary context, Intelligence is therefore defined as:

³ Ibid, p 35.

⁴James K. Glassman “Strategic Public Diplomacy”, p.21.

- Knowledge-product obtained by the process of collecting, processing, analyzing and disseminating intelligence products for issues of particular interest;
- Organization-specific structures, which have the right to use specific means and methods stipulated by law to collect information;
- Activity-intelligence services activity in order to accomplish the mission.

Based on this definition, intelligence includes structures, operations and the product that they produce, but above all it is the process of collecting, processing, evaluating and informing. Intelligence services have existed for centuries as professional institutions and separated from diplomacy. Diplomats did therefore have their undercover agents as part of their normal work for collecting information and political action, but with the exception of open and closed operations of diplomacy, the collection of information has been relatively un-institutionalized. There was a great need for intelligence, however, kings, ministers, generals had their secret informants and they did hereto assess their own reports, as part of state duties.

Evolution of intelligent services

The concept of specialized intelligence and real intelligence services emerged by the mid-XIX century, primarily for military needs. The new technology and industrial revolution made it possible the arousal of new forms of war, for which the army had the need for advance planning and, as a consequence, information about the enemy. This also led to the emergence and creation of intelligence services.

World War I was followed by two significant technological developments such as: the use of radios, which in turn of intelligence was associated with interceptions (signalling intelligence) as well as aerial photography. World War II was an even more intelligent war, because intelligence succeeded and affected the outcome of the war, by breaking Nazi codes. During the Cold War, intelligence services had an unimaginable development in developing cumulative assets up to satellite espials.

The end of Cold War, the development of information technology and the emergence of asymmetric threats made it necessary the alteration of intelligence services towards a new paradigm. The terrorist act of September 11th, 2001 testified that the intelligence services, along with other elements of national power, were not oriented to the new geopolitical and ideological reality. In the report prepared by the committee of 9/11, *“the criticisms in terms of intelligence services, to disclose on time the preparations, prevention of terrorist attacks accomplishment were precisely directed towards the lack of co-operation, exchange and sharing of information, and even towards the lack of analytical skills to evaluate and predict the use of civil aviation, for terrorist attacks. Among the recommendations performed by the committee was even the increase of information exchange under the principle of “Responsibility to Share”.*⁵

After September 11th, 2001, the intelligence community is aware that the total transformation in methods, structures and philosophy of intelligence utilization is a must, in order to cope successfully with the risks and increasingly complex threats.

⁵ Final Report & Recommendation of 9/11 Commission, US Congress Bookstore, 2004, p. 156.

Intelligence services in the age of information have evolved in two directions which are combined to one another. *Firstly*, the collection of information through special means seeking the one information that is not available. This includes secret methods of intelligence gathering through human sources (agents), and electronic, photographic, satellite means, etc. *Secondly*, it is the analysis or evaluation of reports from various secret sources by comparing them with non-secret sources as press, radio-television broadcasting programs, diplomats' reports and all the other information at the disposal of governments. The combination of these two components is made in what is therefore called multi-source analysis, which provides the final product of intelligence for the policymakers. The challenge of intelligence services nowadays is the collaboration and information sharing with public diplomacy. The final product of intelligence is a very good "nutriment" for public diplomacy or strategic public diplomacy.

Public Diplomacy and Security **The Concept and Threats to Security**

Security is a set of measures which are undertaken for the comprehensive maintenance of territorial integrity, independence and constitutional order from threats and risks, by identified and unidentified actors. Threats can come from a variety of approaches and state and non-state actors, in the form of principles, offensive or aggressive actions and undesirable social trends such as terrorism and cultural hegemony⁶. To ensure security it is thereby required to obtain comprehensive and versatile measures, which are capable of inhibiting, preventing, discouraging and avoiding all acts or omissions that may affect the security and undermine national interests. In the general concept of security, the best means for ensuring security is investment in the general culture, which serves as a preventive measure against acts of violence, but at the same time promotes peace and stability.

The security environment is changing rapidly and in a complex way. Thomas Friedman, in his book *"The World is Flat,"* argues that the positive and negative effects of security move so quickly from one place to another, in a way that the existence of national borders is quite incomprehensible. Global, regional, national and human security in the future will be tested by the emergence and development of new threats, some of which will thereby require complex operations and efficient organization, at a time when rapid response is vital, prowess is critical and resources will be limited. Security threats are becoming more complex and difficult to be identified and fought against. Efforts to prevent security threats are necessarily and inseparably related to information. In the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania, the first part, Item 12 stipulates that: *"the fast and accurate information provisions are inseparably related to the right decision and prompt actions in order to neutralize the consequences to the detriment of national security"*⁷. Ensuring security requires the prevention of information use to manipulate public consciousness, protection of classified information "state secret", but at the same

⁶ Gega Simon, ppt Lecture "Diplomacia Publike dhe Siguria", Academy of Armed Forces, Tirana, 2012.

⁷ Strategjia e Sigurisë Kombëtare e RSH, Centre for Press and Military Editions and Traductions, p 18.

time ensuring the exchange of information with international organizations, in function of peace and global security.

The new forms of terrorism, violent extremism, cyber attacks, threats for energy security, threats from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, piracy, the risks posed by failed or failing states, as well as safety risks by climate change, natural disasters, etc, require the re-formulation of the mission, procedures and plans for a timely and effective response. The new strategic concept of NATO makes it possible its evolution, ensuring its effective engagement in a constantly changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners. Albania, as a member of NATO, feels safer and protected, but at the same time, our national security is threatened by the same threatening actors and factors that pose a menace to collective security. The fight against terrorism is not a clash of civilizations, however, it brings a clash within the civilization, a battle for the future and this is a battle of ideas⁸.

Public diplomacy - important element of national power to ensure security

Public diplomacy is one of the most important elements of national power and thus contributes actively and effectively in providing security and fulfilling national interests. The mission of public diplomacy is to approach the audience by addressing its values, to promote democratic values, to initiate cooperation and expand communication channels, therefore enabling the expansion of contributing actors to security, by avoiding conflict and preventing war. Public diplomacy, by using all the available tools, has to fight the threat before it evolves and emerges as such. Public diplomacy should be mobilized to combat the violent extremism, by being engaged in the “war of ideas”, which can be accomplished in two ways. *Firstly*, by fighting, discrediting and undermining the ideology that lies behind violent extremism and, at the same time, by explaining the proposed new alternative and, *secondly*, by diverting the youth from pursuing those paths that lead to violent extremism. All terrorist groups do therefore have in common the use and exploitation of vulnerable young people, who are isolated and easily indoctrinated and who can thereby be transformed into striking troops. Public diplomacy needs to approach and address to these strata in order to encourage and interdict them to fall as victims of ideologies that lead to violent extremism. Public diplomacy should use the means of ideological-words engagement, actions and images, in order to create an unfriendly environment for violent extremism. The successful accomplishment of the public diplomacy mission, for the security, at all its levels, makes it necessary the cooperation and coordination with intelligence services and the efficient use of intelligence.

Public Diplomacy-Intelligence Services Relations

Public Diplomacy and Intelligence Services are related and do therefore need each other. In order to make the analysis of the relationship between these two components of national power, we will refer to the incident that occurred between the Israeli authorities and the Turkish ship “*Mavi Marmara*”, which sailed to send aids to Gaza Strip.

⁸George W. Bush “War on Terror”, White House Library, Washington DC, 2006, p 94.

Operation “Sea Breeze” - failure of Israeli intelligence and public diplomacy

“On April 28th, 2010, a number of organizations led by the Turkish organization, İnsani Yardım Vakfı, IHH pronounced that they would sail to send aids to the Gaza Strip, by breaking thus the sailing embargo, imposed by the Israeli authorities, on January 2009. The flotilla aimed to reach Gaza by ten ships with humanitarian aids, which would depart from the south of Cyprus, on May 24th, 2010. Israeli government stated that they will not be allowed to break the embargo and they demanded the military authorities to exercise control over the ship. IHH provided 40 activists, three ships, including even the ship “Mavi Marmara” and stated that the ship had on board children and elderly people who would serve as human shields, if Israeli authorities would try to stop the sailing. On May 31st, 2010, following a large number of warnings, Israeli commandos intervened to stop the ships. They were instructed to apply the Rules of Engagement (RoE) and to make minimum use of force only if this would be necessary. Israeli commandos, who accompanied the ship “Mavi Marmara” were attacked by the people on board, what forced them to use force against the passengers⁹.”

The conflict between Israeli authorities and IHH organization, which claimed to send humanitarian aids to Gaza, was widely covered by international media by influencing the international public opinion and official authorities. Turkey, countries of the Arab world, to a certain extent, the U.S. and EU proved to be too critical towards Israeli authorities in relation to the intervention in the ship “Mavi Marmara”. After 12 hours, the Israeli authorities displayed a video, showing that Israeli soldiers were hit by a planned and coordinated attack on board of the ship “Mavi Marmara”. If this video would have been showed earlier, it would have drastically changed the international perception of what had happened on board. The whole framework would have therefore also been a lot more different if it was made known, through the media, who were on board, and the truth of connections between organizations and people sailing on the ship, beyond their alleged humanitarian mission. Israeli intelligence services had sufficient information, which proved that the ship “Mavi Marmara” did therefore have persons on board who were related to the organization “Hamas”, and that the “humanitarian” journey actually aimed at delivering training materials for the preparation of handicraft bombs by “Hamas”.

Operation “Sea Breeze” testified for the malfunction of public diplomacy and cooperative relations of public diplomacy to intelligence services. The Israeli government should have allowed the sharing of intelligence information with public diplomacy, aiming to communicate to the international public what was actually happening on board of the ship “Mavi Marmara”. By the lack of cooperation between public diplomacy and intelligence services, Israel suffered strategic consequences such as: jeopardizing of relations with important neighbours like Turkey, tense relations with Europe, the Arab world, even the U.S. The case showed that it is imperative that, in specific issues, information of intelligence services should be shared and thus become the issue of the day, and this is possible only by public

⁹ Operation Sea Breeze Summary and Background, May 31st -June 5th Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division/Israel Defence Forces.

diplomacy. The analysis of this incident, in the context of public diplomacy' relations with intelligence services, shows that what did not work can be found neither in intelligence services nor in public diplomacy. The essence of the problem lies in the orientation and strategic handling of mutual relations: Public Diplomacy-Secret Services. This requires a change in the intelligence community and security when it comes to information sharing, overrunning secrecy barriers, in view of a greater cause. Public diplomacy does therefore have the ability, the opportunity and the needed capacities to transform an important issue into a cause, but for this it is thus required "ammunition" that only intelligence can and should provide.

Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy as a consumer of intelligence

Intelligence serves as an input for the foreign policy in the strategic levels, including national and international security. Intelligence helps diplomacy more in the tactical level and public diplomacy at the strategic level. Sir Reginald Hirbert in his book "Intelligence and Diplomacy" has pointed out that: *"It is thus very difficult to counter what is achieved by not-secret information. It has great value because it is often immediate, practical and focuses on general conclusions. Secret or top secret intelligence is usually valid for a short time and shows generally what is expected to happen in the short and medium terms. Its value is mainly tactical while strategically, public diplomacy has an even greater value"*¹⁰.

Diplomacy and public diplomacy are consumers of intelligence in different ways and paths. Specifically, they obtain assessments and advice from intelligence on specific and different issues for the development of a defensive diplomacy and assurance of security and national interests. Diplomacy as a consumer of intelligence can use the cumulative intelligence, threat assessment as an attack tool to discourage the opponent, to influence public opinion, by giving accurate information and by being oriented in international relations. Diplomacy consumes intelligence even in terms of its protection from penetration, infiltration and influence by the opponent and their public diplomacy which aims to provide the proper message and just action in the appropriate manner to protect the security and national interests.

Public diplomacy in function of intelligence services

Diplomacy serves to the intelligence community by creating facilities for intelligence gathering, as well as by giving that information which the intelligence community finds it difficult to collect by its own assets. Intelligence community can also benefit from the opponent's public diplomacy. Intelligence services have already been adapted to the new paradigm and have shifted from traditional services depending entirely on limited secret sources, to services with a variety of sources and where more than 80% of the information is to be found in open sources. Today's threats towards security are of special nature. Moreover it's a battle of "ideas", where the key to success is to combat the threat before it emerges. This task is perfectly accomplished by public diplomacy. Also, by means of the opponent public diplomacy there are unfolded the objectives, goals, capabilities and objectives of the adversary. Intelligence services can take required input for the following objectives and goals and also they can organize their work on behalf of national security.

¹⁰ Sir Reginald Hirbert, Intelligence and Diplomacy, p 113.

Public diplomacy and intelligence services in the war on terror

“On the way over, winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas¹¹.”

George W. Bush

War on terror is one of the areas where intelligence services and public diplomacy interact with each other and their coordinated use contributes to the achievement of success. War on terror is difficult and complex and above all, it is a war of ideas, the victory over which requires coordination and interaction of actors and factors of different levels that affect the achievement of victory.

Terrorists have rapidly adapted to the use of mass media, especially the Internet and, in some cases, even of the television channels and thus give them a high priority and integrate them in their propaganda activity. Media campaigns are an essential part of terrorists' campaigns, especially in the mobilization phase. Furthermore, for pure operational purposes, the Internet is used for teaching purposes, recruitment and propaganda. Public diplomacy and intelligence services play quite a crucial role in the war on terror, in order to win the battle of ideas. For this public diplomacy should:

- *Change* the way of approach on the war on terror. This is not a war against the Muslim religion, but against radical extremists' persons, who have nothing in common with the Muslim religion, but who use it as an excuse to achieve their own goals.
- *Engage* all ideological means, words, actions and images to discredit the terrorists, and to stop the recruitment and radicalization of the population, mainly in underdeveloped and backward areas that may prey upon extremist propaganda.
- *Provide* education, financial support for vulnerable strata.
- *Expand* communication lines, using mass media and mass communication to discredit extremist ideology, which is far from promoting the values, coexistence and peaceful existence.

Conclusions

Public diplomacy and intelligence share the same goal and stand altogether in view of national security and interests. Their objective is the public. Public diplomacy aims at its influence, while intelligence aims at the recognition, evaluation and informing the decision-takers about the objectives, goals, capabilities and interests of the opponent, towards his country.

Public diplomacy and intelligence community interact with and serve to one-another. The successful implementation of their joint common mission requires that these two elements of national power adapt to the new developments, by parting from traditional practices as well as by the obstacles dealing mainly with information sharing.

¹¹ <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/>

Diplomacy is a consumer of intelligence by using the intelligence product for strategy and tactics, while intelligence community uses diplomacy as a mitigating element in the organization of work, but also in fulfilling its mission.

Bibliography:

- Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
- Eytan Gilboa, *Public Diplomacy, the missing component in Israel's Foreign Policy*, *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4, October 2006.
- Hiram Henderson, *US Public Diplomacy: Waiting for the war of Ideas*.
- Jan Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, London: Palgrave, 2005.
- Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power*, New York: Public Affairs Press, 2004.
- M. Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge University Press and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).
- Michael Herman, *Diplomacy and intelligence*, Kings College, London (1998).
- N. Snow dhe Phylip M. Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, First published 2009, by Routledge.
- Nicholas J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*, Published by FIGUEROA PRESS a division of the USC Bookstore, 2009.
- R. Hibbert, *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol.5, No.1 (Jan. 1990).
- S. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965 edition)
- Samuel P. Huntington in *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, Simon & Schuster, 2004.
- *Strategjia e Sigurisë Kombëtare e RSH*, Centre for Press and Military Editions and Traductions, Tiranë 2005.

Why do states intervene only in some humanitarian crises?

Case study: Libya and Syria

LtC. Hasan Hoxha,
Senior Course on Security and Defence Studies,
Albanian Armed Forces Academy

Short commentary. *In this paper I have reviewed the topic of international military interventions with a close emphasis on the case of intervention in Libya, and discussing also for the latest situation in Syria, where a civil war is still going on, with the opposition forces calling for an international military intervention under the principle of preventing further civil casualties.*

The first part of this article is a short explanation of the concept of humanitarian intervention, which basically can be considered the right of the international community to undertake military intervention in those countries where government forces reject or are not able to protect the basic human rights, such as the economic and political rights of its citizens.

The Responsibility to Protect, under which principles the military intervention in Libya was conducted, is another issue which is treated on this article. Under the doctrine of the Responsibility, states have the responsibility to intervene and protect the citizens of another state, when that other state has failed to fulfil its obligation to protect its citizens. Through the example of Russia's intervention in Georgia, I have tried to give an argument how false interpretation of the responsibility to protect principles can cause confusion on what is that the responsibility to protect consists. It is clear that the responsibility to protect does not address the question of a country taking direct action to protect its nationals located outside its own borders.

The next part of the article deals with the situation in Libya and it is a short story of the civil war in the country, the violations of the human rights by the Gaddafi's regime and the reason which convinced the international community to intervene and prevent further massive civilian casualties of the conflict.

Humanitarian Intervention

Intervention in another state, without its consent, is usually taken to include the

justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state.¹

Although there is no formal legal definition of the term humanitarian intervention, in short terms it means that foreign powers have the right to undertake military intervention in other countries in order to protect people from the crimes against humanity.² The legal case for intervention in humanitarian crises rests on the claim that the “UN charter (1945) commits states to protecting fundamental human rights, and second, there is a right of Humanitarian Intervention in customary international law”. This means that every state is obliged to provide and protect basic human rights, such as the economic and political rights of its citizens, and must not violate them. If the government does not follow these principles, there a right of Humanitarian Intervention against this state.

There have been differences in what is considered a humanitarian intervention. The variations consist in whether humanitarian interventions are limited to instances where there is an absence of consent from the host state; whether humanitarian intervention is limited to punishment actions; and whether humanitarian intervention is limited to cases where there has been explicit UN Security Council authorization for action.

Essential characteristics of the humanitarian intervention:³

1. Humanitarian intervention involves the threat and the use of military forces as a central feature;
2. It is an intervention in the sense that it entails interfering in the internal affairs of a state by sending military forces into the territory or airspace of a sovereign state that has not committed an act of aggression against another state;
3. The intervention is in response to situations that do not necessarily pose direct threats to states’ strategic interests, but instead, is motivated by humanitarian objectives.

As a concept, the humanitarian intervention was first mentioned in 1625 by the Dutch legal philosopher Hugo Grotius in his book “On the Law of War and Peace” where he states that intervention to help people resisting tyranny is a just war.⁴

First references on humanitarian intervention appeared in the world legal literature after 1840. There were two interventions made by England, France, and Russia in Greece on 1827, in order to stop Turkish suppression of populations associated with insurgents and the other one, made by France in Syria in 1860 to protect Maronite Christians. During 1827 to 1908 there were, at least, five different interventions undertaken against the Ottoman Empire by European countries.

¹ Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre for ICISS, December 2001) Foreword at VII.

² Mario Bettati and Bernard Kouchner, eds, *Le devoir d’ing rence* (Paris: Deno l, 1987).

³ Alton Frye. “Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine”. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000.

⁴ Homans, Ch. (2011, Nov). *Responsibility to Protect: A Short History*. Foreign Policy, 1-4.

The term humanitarian intervention as such began being used after the end of the Cold War and the dissolve of the Soviet Union when armed conflicts between states started to occur. These intra states conflicts, not only were extremely violent, but they targeted mainly civilian populations.⁵ Because of its statutory impartiality, the United Nations were seen as the most appropriate entity to lead such humanitarian interventions and protect people.

The first cases of putting into action of the concept of “humanitarian intervention” involve Somalia and Bosnia where the armed conflicts started in 1992. Unfortunately in these cases, the United Nations and the international community failed to stop the violence and effectively protect civilians in these countries because of political divisions among its members. The image of the UN was damaged as the intervention in Somalia failed and massacres were committed in Srebrenica and in Rwanda. After that many concluded that the organization was lacking in political will, authority and military capability, which is the basic requirement for engaging in a humanitarian intervention. This provided more ground for increasing permissiveness toward individual interventions by powerful states, or regional organizations, which were perceived as more effective. Examples of such interventions include NATO actions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, Australian intervention in East Timor, and British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. These interventions quickly put an end to the hostilities and set grounds for post conflict reconstruction.⁶ There has been an increasing conviction that the international community has the obligation to protect civilians against atrocities and massacres in all circumstances, not only in traditional wars.⁷

The responsibility to protect

Since 2005 the United Nations have adopted a doctrine named Responsibility to Protect. This is projected to be as a first step of an international legislation which aims to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. It is the responsibility of every state to protect the population, but in cases when a regime “fails” to properly hold this responsibility, then it is the international community’s responsibility to come to the rescue, if necessary even by using force.

In the 2005 World Summit, the United Nations member states agreed to include the following paragraphs to the Outcome Document of the summit. The paragraph 138 states that “each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage

⁵ James Kurt, “Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities”, *Orbis* 50, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 87101.

⁶ Gierycz, D. (2010). From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P). *Criminal Justice Ethics*, 29(2), 110-128.

⁷ Dorota Gierycz, “The Responsibility to Protect: A Legal and Rights-based Perspective,” NUPI Report, Responsibility to Protect no. 5-2008 (Oslo: NUPI, 2008), available at: <http://english.nupi.no/Publikasjonar/Boeker-Rapportar/2008/The-Responsibility-to-Protect.-A-Legal-and-Rights-based-Perspective>.

and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability”.⁸

The following paragraph explains the measures which should be undertaken by the international community in order to impose the responsibility to protect.

“The international community, through the United Nations, has also the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and International Law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States building capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out”.⁹

The basics of the Responsibility to Protect:¹⁰

1. A state has a responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities;
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist the state to fulfil its primary responsibility;
3. If the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention is considered the last resort.

Due to controversies that international military interventions have historically caused concerning the legitimacy and legality of such an act, the United Nations is seen as the most legitimate body to authorize military interventions in order to prevent civilian casualties in the conflict areas. “The prevention of mass atrocities demands a system-wide UN effort. Goals related to the responsibility to protect should also inform our development and peace building work, not just our efforts in the areas of human rights, humanitarian affairs, peacekeeping and political affairs.”¹¹

It is clear that there is not a global point of view for the responsibility to protect and, because of that, the debate about military interventions for human protection “will

⁸ 2005 World Summit Outcome. United Nations General Assembly, Sixtieth session, items 48 and 121 of the provisional agenda. A/60/L.1, p. 40. Retrieved 2012-01-07.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon at the Stanley Foundation Conference on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Tarrytown, New York, 15 January 2010.

not go away so long as human nature remains as fallible as it is and internal conflict and state failures stay as prevalent as they are.”¹²

The Russian government has argued that its military operations in Georgia were justified by the principle of “responsibility to protect”. The primary ground stated for intervention by Russian leaders was “to protect Russian citizens”. But this is not a responsibility to protect case. The responsibility to protect is about the responsibility of a sovereign state to protect the people within its own borders, and the responsibility of other states to intervene with appropriate action if that state is unable or unwilling to do that. It does not address the question of an individual country taking direct action to protect its nationals located outside its own borders. When such action has been taken in the past, the justification has been almost invariably advanced in terms of “self-defence” (since 1945, under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter). The second major reason for resisting the Russian characterization is that Russia has not made a compelling case that the threat posed by Georgia to the South Ossetian population was of a nature and scale to legitimate the use of military force. Five criteria are relevant here, and it is not clear that any of them were satisfied.¹³

This example shows how important it is for the international community to agree on the same definition.

A short background of the civil war in Libya

Muammar Gaddafi had become the *de facto* ruler of Libya after he successfully led a military *coup d'état* in 1969. Since then, he has singlehandedly led the country. During this period, and especially in the last decade, the country was criticized for the lack of freedom. Freedom House, the prestigious non-governmental organization which is specialized in advocating in democracy, political freedom and human rights, has rated Libya among countries which were considered “Not Free”. For decades Libya seemed to be the country from which political or social unrest was not expected as Gaddafi’s totalitarian regime looked strong. At least this was the idea from the outside world. In January 2011 non violent protests broke out in several cities in Libya, inspired by similar events in Tunisia and Egypt. In the beginning the protests had more of a social and economic background, but soon after, they have been transformed into a question for more freedom and human rights in Libya.

The National Transitional Council was formed in February with the aim to coordinate the efforts to overthrow of Gaddafi’s government and, in a short time, took control over several cities, mostly in the eastern part of the country. A month later Gaddafi forces regain control over the territories which previously have been lost to opposition forces before the French Air Force entered Libyan airspace under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, to prevent any attacks on civilian targets.

¹² Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81.no. 7, November/December 2002, p. 110.

¹³ Gareth Evans, ‘Russia and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’’, *Los Angeles Times*, 31 August 2008, available at www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-evans31-2008aug31,0,5576279.story (last accessed 8 October 2012).

Officially, the Libyan leader Gaddafi had in control an army of 76,000 soldiers and 40,000 paramilitary troops when the situation first escalated into an armed conflict. He also had 260 attack aircrafts, 650 tanks, 2,300 artillery pieces and more than 100 helicopters.

An air based military intervention was launched by the first French forces coalition in order to damage the Gaddafi government's military capabilities and enforce the UN Security Council resolution. By the end of March, NATO took the command of the coalition operations.

It is estimated that more than 30 000 people have lost their lives and other 50 000 were wounded during a 6 months civil war.

Intervention in Libya, a success story

The Libyan civil war was considered to be over on late October 2011 and the UN Security Council voted to end the mandate of NATO for combat missions in the Libyan air space on 31st October. The intervention in Libya is considered as one of the most successful operations in NATO's history with 18 countries, from which 14 were NATO members and four partners under a unified command.

The international community responded quickly. In late February, the UN Security Council placed sanctions, weapons embargo and has frozen Libya's assets. Later, the Arab League suspended Libya from its sessions and then called on the international community to impose a no fly zone. On March 17th, the Security Council granted that request, mandating "all necessary measures" to protect civilians.

NATO's Operation Unified Protector which lasted for 222 days without any doubt should be recognized as a great accomplishment for the international community that reacted on time in order to save the lives of thousands of civilians, which were in constant threat from the loyal forces of Gaddafi.

The first measurable result of the international intervention is that it helped the Libyan people to free themselves from an extremely authoritarian and violent regime. This fact is a very important step towards building a democratic system in a country where the majority of the population has been born during one of the world's longest ruling dictatorships.

It is true that Libya's new government institutions, which are still in transition, are facing considerable challenges on the security sector which is affecting foreign investments, much needed for the oil industry of the country.¹⁴ Things are not perfect one year after the intervention but at least now the country has a parliament and had free democratic elections after a period of over four decades of a one man rule. All sceptic claims that an international intervention would lead to a possible partition of the country turned out to be false, as there seems to be no real support for such an idea.

From the NATO point of view, the Libyan story was a successful one also because it

¹⁴ Al Shalchi, H., & Gumuchian, M. (2012, Oct 22). Instability grips Libya a year after Gaddafi's fall| Reuters. Retrieved November 15, 2012, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/22/us-libya-anniversary-idUSBRE89LOCS20121022>

helped the Libyan opposition to overthrow Gaddafi without a single casualty. Also, the costs for undertaking this operation were much more affordable as it is estimated that around three billion dollars were spent by the international coalition. The United States spent around 1.1 billion dollars and the United Kingdom something near to 1.5 billion dollars, which is much less than what have been spent on previous international military interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁵

The operation was conducted under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution and had also a big support from the other Arab countries in the region. Another successful aspect of the intervention is that it helped in building of an international norm which does not allow the regimes go unpunished for massacring their own people.

Libya's success did inspire democracy protestors in other Arab nations across the region, including Syria, where the opposition forces are continuing to fight to remove Syrian President Bashar al Assad, who is on his twelfth year as the absolute ruler of the country, after replacing his late father Hafez al-Assad who ruled Syria for 29 years.

Why take so long in Syria?

More than a year after the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, massive protests have been evolved into a real rebellion also in Syria. The legitimate aspiration of Syrian people for democracy and human rights encountered a violent response of the government controlled by the President Bashar al-Assad.

The countries of the Arab League, United States and European Union have condemned the use of force by the Assad's government against the protesters.

The Arab League sent an observer mission in December 2011, as part of its proposal for peaceful resolution of the crisis. A further attempt to resolve the crisis was made through the appointment of Kofi Annan as a special envoy, but both attempts failed. Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed as the United Nations and Arab League envoy to Syria and he has called for a quick solving of the conflict in Syria, otherwise the country could turn into a new Somalia, which means country has been without effective central government.

The situation in Syria seems to be very similar to this in Libya, but the main distinction remains the lack of a greater involvement of the international community to solve this problem. Reports from the Human Rights groups estimate that over 39 000 people have been killed since the uprising began on last March. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights lists 27 410 civilians, 9 800 soldiers and 1 359 military deserters among the victims of the armed conflict. In these figures, there are not included the missed persons, many of whom are presumed dead and deaths among the pro-regime militias.¹⁶ This should have been enough of a reason for the member countries of the United Nations Security Council to support an eventual international intervention

¹⁵ Dadlдер, I. H., & Stavridis, J. G. (2012). NATO'S Victory in Libya. *Foreign Affairs*, 91(2), 2-7.

¹⁶ France 24. (15, November 2012). *More than 39 000 killed in Syria conflict: NGO*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20121115-more-39000-killed-syria-conflict-ngo>

through a Resolution under the principles of the responsibility to protect, as it did in the case of Libya.

China and Russia have continuously rejected any attempt to reach an agreement for a UN resolution which would condemn Assad's actions and the unjustifiable use of state violence, although statements of that kind were made the Arab League, United States and European Union.

In fact Syria is an important ally for Moscow's government, as Russia has a supply and maintenance naval base in the Mediterranean port of Tartous which is the only Russia's naval facility outside the former Soviet Union.

Iran is another factor that rejects a possible intervention of the international community and has supported the claims of Russia on this topic. The country with the largest Shia Muslim population has acknowledged that they are directly involved on the conflict in Syria. This means that Assad, who himself is a Shia muslim ruling a country where 74 percent of the people are Sunni Muslims, has received support from the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Lately an agreement was reached between different opposition groups in Syria to create the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. The coalition is committed to build a transitional government and has stated that there will be no negotiations with the Assad regime. By this, it is made clear that the plans for reaching a political solution for the conflict in Syria between the regime and the opposition forces are destined to fail.

Recommendations

International military interventions have always caused debate regarding legality and the legitimacy of those operations. The Security Council of the United Nations is seen as the entity which should be entitled to authorize military operations through a resolution in order to prevent civilian atrocities during an armed conflict.

However, the Security Council of the United Nations not always has achieved a consensus for that, and a clear example of that is the fact that until now there is no decision of such nature to intervene in Syria. Regardless of the similarities between the situation in Syria and this of Libya one year ago, the international community is yet to find a solution for the conflict which has lasted for more than 22 months.

The intervention in Libya is considered a success story for the NATO, and in my opinion this estimation is true. Although Libya is still facing several post conflict challenges, the fact that thousands of lives were saved as a result of the intervention is enough to conclude that the mission is accomplished.

In my opinion, the reason for non intervention in Syria comes as a consequence of the Russian and Chinese foreign policy which have proven that do not use the same standards to approve, or better say not to oppose a Security Council Resolution for a "no fly zone" also in Syria, just as they did on 17th March 2011 when they authorized the initiation of operation *Unified Protector*.

If in Libya it took only one month for the international community to act in order to save the lives of thousands of civilians, the people of Syria is suffering the

consequences of the civil war since 15th March 2011 when the first protests emerged onto the streets across Syria.

The principle of the “Responsibility to protect” should be equally treated and enforced in all cases when a country uses violence against their own citizens.

The non-intervention approach by the international community, and especially from Russia and China who have the *veto* power as permanent members of the Security Council, is a typical example of applying different standards for two very similar situations (if not identical) as far as the humanitarian aspect is concerned.

From the humanitarian point of view the situation is alarming. As long as the number of victims is bigger than the number of the casualties for the parties involved in the conflict, an international military intervention is not only completely justified, but it’s an immediate need.

In my opinion, the United States and its partners should find the way in order to stop the genocide against the Syrian people from Bashar Al-Assad’s regime.

A military intervention is inevitable because if the violence will be tolerated there is a risk that a Syria’s northern neighbour, Turkey may be involved in the conflict as well. Tensions between former allies have been high since June when the Syrian forces shot down a Turkish fighter *Jet*. Then, in October, a mortar bomb from Syria exploded in the Turkish border town of Akçakale, killing five people and wounding several others. Sporadic gunfire have been exchanged across the border ever since.

The democratic world should intervene, first of all to save the civilians and also to avoid an eventual extent of conflict in the region.

Bibliography:

- Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre for ICISS, December 2001) Foreword at VII.
- Mario Bettati and Bernard Kouchner, eds, *Le devoir d’ing rence* (Paris: Deno l, 1987).
- Homans, Ch. (2011, Nov). *Responsibility to Protect: A Short History*. *Foreign Policy*, 1-4. available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/responsibility_to_protect_a_short_history, Retrieved 2012-11-18.
- Dorota Gierycz, “From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” *Criminal Justice Ethics*, Volume 29, Number 2, August 2010, 110.
- Dorota Gierycz, “The Responsibility to Protect: A Legal and Rights-based Perspective,” NUPI Report, *Responsibility to Protect* no. 5-2008 (Oslo: NUPI, 2008), available at: <http://english.nupi.no/Publikasjoner/Boeker-Rapportar/2008/The-Responsibility-to-Protect.-A-Legal-and-Rights-based-Perspective>
- 2005 World Summit Outcome. United Nations General Assembly, Sixtieth session, items 48 and 121 of the provisional agenda. A/60/L.1, 40 pages, available at: <http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf>, Retrieved 2012-11-15.
- Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 7, November/December 2002, available at: <http://>

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58437/gareth-evans-and-mohamed-sahnoun/the-responsibility-to-protect

- Gareth Evans, "Russia and the Responsibility to Protect", Los Angeles Times, 31 August 2008, available at: www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-evans31-2008aug31,0,5576279.story, Retrieved 2012-11-08.
- Al Shalchi, H. & Gumuchian, M. (2012, Oct 22). Instability grips Libya a year after Gaddafi's fall. Reuters. Retrieved November 15, 2012, available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/22/us-libya-anniversary-idUSBRE89L0CS20121022>, Retrieved 2012-11-11.
- Dadlader, I. H. & Stavridis, J. G. (2012). NATO's Victory in Libya. *Foreign Affairs*, 91(2), 2-7.
- France 24. (2012, Nov 15). NGO. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20121115-more-39000-killed-syria-conflict-ngo>

SHORT GUIDANCE

FOR ‘MILITARY REVIEW’ RESEARCH PAPERS

Dear contributors to the Military Review!

“Military Review” is a research review focused on security and defense aspects. It is the magazine of the AAF military elite and prominent civilian analysts, through their research papers. The papers are not based only on information, but primarily, they provide recommendations and solutions to the most important security and defense issues, at the strategic and operational level. That means that priority number one of the Military Magazine is the applied value of the research papers.

With this purpose, we invite talented students of high military studies of Albanian Defense Academy, instructors, lecturers, researchers, analysts, commanders, chiefs and trainers of all institutions and units of the Albanian Armed Forces, and beyond, independent analysts, civilian or military security and defense, to engage and organize their community, creating highly valuable and respected research works.

In order to facilitate the efforts of the researchers, the Editorial Board of the Military Review provides the following guidance and technical data on the structure of the articles for the author (authors) of the Military Review, which should be respected by all contributors.

Structure of the Article

Title. Title of the article

The author, co-author: Name of the article’s author or co-author

Short commentary: The short commentary is a summary of the article. It precedes the full article. It is a brief of about half a page or some 400-600 words of the main findings of the article (such as, fundamental issues in the article, intentions of the author’s view, conclusions or recommendations, etc.).

Length: The main part of the article (including introduction and conclusions) written in Albanian/English should be 6-8 computer pages with a maximum of 15.000-25.000 characters, including “footnotes” and additional information.

Format: Page must be A4: Type of script: “Times New Roman” size of font 11. Indent (new paragraph) is determined by a blank line. Presentation of the text is to be

simple and to a minimum of styles and formatting options. Paragraphs should not be numbered; text should be a structure of 3 levels maximum. Highlighted bold text or colored letters should be avoided. Writing steep and quotes should be used only for quotations and literature sources used.

Graphs, tables and other images should be in-group formatted by avoiding their disintegration. They should be clear and closer to the text explaining them. All images should be reflected in the way that readability is not affected by reducing the size and black and white printers. If an image is taken from another source, it is essential that the respective source is quoted.

Articles should be sent in printing format and electronically to the editorial board of Military Review. For those items that do not meet the above requirements and language format, the editorial staff decides to return to the authors for improvement, or to exclude them from the submission process.

Documentation: All contributors of the Military Review should respect all rights reserved policy and provide references and “footnote” throughout the article and finally to identify all the literature used for the article. “Footnotes” should respect the national and international rules correctly to include: Surname, name (referring to copyright), title of reference material, the name of the entity editor, publication place, publication year, number of pages where it relates ISBN number, website where the item is published. (E.g. SMITH, James Carl, Nowak, George. *Security in the 21st Century: History unknown. 2nd edition*. New York, London: Oxford University Press, 2006. 235 p. ISBN 0071448209, <http://www.iir.cz / display.asp? LNG=uk & ida=>).

Biography: Along with the article, the author should also send an electronic photo, and a short CV of about 100 words including: name, surname, military and research degree, job position, education, research efforts, phone number and email address.

Style: Writing must present a simple structure, using titles and subtitles. It is important that author use at the end of the article conclusions and recommendations on the key issues.

The article should not contain classified material and must apply the rules of classified information. Also, the article should not contain political positions or views on the issues concerned. It must respect the research orientation of this review.

For further information, please contact:

Publications Branch, Centre for Doctrine (CD), TRADOC

Mail: Komanda e Doktrinës dhe Stërvitjes, QD, Dega e Botimeve
Kutia Postare 24 23, Rruga e Dibrës, Tiranë, Shqipëri

Nr. Tel: 00355(4)23 63 465 ext. 516/ 2022, 516 /1051

Nr. Fax: 00355(4)23 69 179

Email: revistaushtarake@aaf.mil.al or qd@aaf.mil.al

Editorial Board of the Military Review